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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to provide a thorough examination 
of the reign of the Byzantine Emperor Nicephorus 1 (802-811) 
and to evaluate its historical significance. To this end 
the author turns his attention first to the situation which 
Nicephorus inherited at the time of his accession to the 
throne. He then examines the major aspects of this 
Emperor's reign: his domestic, religious and foreign 
policies. The main emphasis is upon his domestic policies, 
because it is the argument of this thesis that Nicephorus 
was one of the few Byzantine emperors who attempted a 
concerted reform of the administration. To support this 
it is necessary to assess the causes, the value and the 
results of the Emperor's measures. Nicephorus' attitude 
towards, and relations with other major powers of the time 
are not neglected. They form an important chapter, 
because under Nicephorus I the Byzantine Empire found 
itself hemmed in by the Franks of Charlemagne, the Caliphate 
and the Bulgars. Nicephorus' reactions showed him to be 
a competent statesman, though the end results were far from 
satisfactory. The Emperor's views on religious affairs 
inevitably attracts the author's attention too. Their 
importance lies in his confrontation with the leader of the 
monastic party Theodore of Stoudios. Nicephorus pursued 
a policy of moderation, which was misunderstood at the time. 
It provided a long term solution to the Empire's religious 
difficulties, but in the short term, probably intensified 
division. The events and measures which characterized 
Nicephorus I's reign, are not examined in any chronological 
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THE STATE OF THE QUESTION 
THE STATE OF THE QUESTION 
The reign of Nicephorus 1 (802-811) ended in disaster 
and humiliation. He was killed in battle against the 
Bulgars. Not since the death of Valens in 378 had a 
Byzantine emperor fallen in battle. Yet Nicephorus 
deserves the attention of modern historians. This is 
not only because his fiscal and economic policies were 
one of the foundations upon which the Byzantine recovery 
from the middle of the ninth century was built, but also 
because he confronted two of the most urgent problems 
ever facing a Byzantine emperor: how to come to terms 
with the newly-created western Empire and how to deal with 
the challenge of the monastic party under the formidable 
leadership of Theodore of Stoudios. They provided a test 
of the very character of the Byzantine Empire. 
Surprisingly, there is no concerted treatment of 
Nicephorus' reign, even if some aspects have attracted the 
attention of modern historians. In his A History of the 
Eastern Roman Empire from the Fall of Irene to the 
Accession of Basil 1 (802-67) J. B. Bury devotes only forty 
pages to the reign of Nicephorus I. Valuable as they are, 
this paucity of treatment stands in marked contrast to 
P. Speck's more than generous approach in his recent book 
on the reign of Constantine VI (780-797). 
1 In it he 
devotes no less than 419 pages of text and 411 pages of 
notes to a reign, which is by any standards much less 
important than that ol: Nicephorus I. Speck's approach is 
1. P. Speck, Kaiser Konstantin VI, (München 1978). 
2 
chronological. His book is an elaborate commentary on 
the relevant pages of the Chronographia of Theophanes. 
Perhaps Constantine VIIS reign is peculiarly susceptible 
to this approach, since so much of what we can know about 
his reign has to do with his pathetic struggle for power. 
Nicephorus' reign demands a different approach, because 
its interest lies in problems faced and policies elaborated. 
We have therefore adopted a more analytical approach. Our 
survey of the historical literature bearing on the 'State 
of the Question' will therefore be divided up according to 
various topics, 
To begin with, Nicephorus' economic and fiscal policies 
have been the field on which a series of works are mainly 
focused. Already at the end of last century (1895) the 
French scholar R. Monnier discussed the measures taken by 
Nicephorus in detail, but only from the point of view of 
the `F_Ti%Vjoý%A' 01 Monnier examined Nicephorus' so-called 
Ivexations' more or less separately, or in small groups, 
according to their importance for the purpose of the article. 
More than forty years later (1938) G. I. Bratianu dedicated 
considerable space in his book 
2 
to an exhaustive 
examination of these measures, with the Ivexations' again 
tackled one by one. Not long afterwards appeared an 
1. R. Monnier 'Etudes de droit byzantin (B: 11 IFEr\\ý6ok%\1 
depuis Nicephore Genicus jusqu'a Basile le Macedonien: 1) 
Les Vexations de Nicephore Genicus)l in Nouvelle revue 
historique de droit franýais et etranger, 19 (1895), 
pp. 59-103. 
2. G. I. Bratianu, Etudes Byzantines d1histoire 6conomique 
et sociale, (Paris 1938), especially the sections under 
the titles 'Empire et "de-mocratie" a Byzance', pp-93-126 
and ILa politiq e fiscale de Nicep ore ler, ou ubu roi 
a Byzancel, pp-183-216. 
3 
article by Professor A. Chrystophilopoulou, 
1 
who, in her 
turn, also made some comments on Nicephorus' fiscal and 
economic reforms. Finally, a new book by W. Treadgold 
2 
provides us with rough figures on both the revenues and 
the expenditures of the Byzantine Empire during Nicephorus 
I's reign. 
Among other aspects of the Emperor Nicephorus' domestic 
policies, the concerted effort he made to assimilate the 
Slavs of continental Greece must be emphasized. 
Nicephorus' efforts to achieve this have been the object 
of a series of articles by P. Charanis. 
3 The importance 
of such a policy from the point of view of the 
christianization of the area and especially of the 
Peloponnese, forms the subject of two articles, one by 
M. Dunn and another by J. Herrin. 
4 
Among the books which shed some light on problems 
connected with the internal administration and organization 
the works of Bury, 
5 Karayannopoulos., 6 
1. A. Christiphilopoulou, '%. %% 011 KOVOý41&4VN Koc"% A%&t4CP610V0j41Kn"' ljoýirlK--, 
-ToO A 
6TIOWfOlrOf"S N%%&vN(04r*V A. EIs Vvi' eviv K- "A *'k OL v-rov 
(Athens 1960), pp-413-31. 
2. W. Treadgold, Byzantine State Finances in the Eighth and 
Ninth Centuries, New York 1982. 
3. P. Charanis, 'Nicephorus I, the Savior of Greece from the 
Slavs (810 A. D. )', Byzantina-Metabyzantina, 1 (1946), 
pp. 75-92; id., 'On the Question of the Slavonic 
Settlement in Greece during the Middle Ages', Byzantinoslavic 
10 (1949), pp. 254-58; id., 'Observations on the History 
of Greece during the Early Middle Ages', Balkan Studies, 
vol. 11, no. 1, Thessalonica 1970, pp-1-34. 
4. M. Dunn. 'Evangelisation or Repentance? The re- 
christianization of the Peloponnese in the Ninth and Tenth 
Centuries', Studies in Church History, 14, (1977), pp. 
71-87; J. Herrin, 'Aspects of -the Process of re- 
Hellenisation inthe Early Middle Ages', Annual of the 
British School at Athens, 68 (London 1973), pp-113-26. 
S. J-B. Bury, MT-Imperial Administrative Systemin the Ninth 
Century.,, New York, 1911. 
6. J. Karayannopoulos, 'Contribution au probleme de th6mes 
Byzantins'. in L'Hellenisme-CQntemýorain, 10 (IýS6) 
pp. 45S-502, 'id., 'Die Entstehung der Byzantinischen 
Themenoydnurig', Byzantinisches Ajchi-V , 10, MUnchen 19S9. 
4 
Lemerle, 1 Guilland, 2 D61ger, 3 Kaegi 4 and Haldon 
5 
need to 
be mentioned, but they have nothing specifically on the 
reign of Nicephorus I. 
Relations between church and state during the early 
ninth century have also attracted the attention of a 
number of scholars. This is partly because the reign of 
Nicephorus coincides with an obvious strengthening of the 
so-called monastic party at Constantinople, but also 
because during the same time eastern church went through 
some quite unusual experiences. Among the books which 
contributed to a better knowledge of the religious 
tendencies and policies during the period under consideration, 
the works of A. Gardner, 
6 P. Henry 7 and, of course, 
P. Alexander 8 must be singled out for special mention. 
Yet again the aim of these works is not to reveal the 
Emperor Nicephorus' religious tendencies and policies, but 
1. P. Lemerle, 'Esquisse pour un histoire agraire de 
Byzance', Part I, RH, 219 (19S8), pp-32-74,254-284. 
Part II, RH 220 (1958), pp. 42-94. 
2. R. Guilland, Recherches sur les institutions Byzantines, 
2 vols., Berlin 1967. 
3. F. D81ger, Beitrdge zur. Geschichte der Byzantinischen 
Finanzverwaltung besonders des 10 and 11 Jahrhunderts, 
Hildesheim 1960; id., lZur Ableitung des Byzantinischen 
Verwaltungsterminus his Paraspora, Ettal 1961, 
pp-231-40- 
4. W. E. Kaegi, Jr., Byzantine Military Unrest, 471-843, 
Amsterdam 1981. 
S. J-F. Haldon, Recruitment and Conscription in the 
Byzantine Army . 550-950, Wien 1979; id., Byzantine Praetorians, Bonn 1984. 
6. A. Gardner, Theodore of Studium, London 1905. 
7. P. Henry III, Theodore of Stoudios, the Churchman, Ph. D. 
Yale University (1967); id., 'The Moechian Controversy 
and the Constantinopolitan Synod of January A. D. 809', 
in Journal of Theological Studies,, N. S. vol. XX, pt. 2, 
Octo er 1969, pp-495-522. E -er 
8. P. Alexander, The Patriarch Nicephorus of Constantinople, 
Oxford 1958. 
5 
to illuminate the ecclesiastical and political role 
played either by Theodore, the abbot of Stoudios, or by 
the Emperor's namesake, the Patriarch Nicephorus. 
Scholars who have dealt with the relations between 
Byzantium and the newly created Frankish Empire in the 
West have mainly directed their research on Charlemagne 
and his various achievements. This is, of course, 
understandable, since he was a dominant figure on the 
political scene at the end of the eighth and the beginning 
of the ninth century. Among the abundant literature on 
Charlemagne, the works which seem to have covered new 
ground in regard to the rivalry between the two Empires, 
are those of F. D61ger, 
1 P. Classen 2 and W. Ohnsorge. 
3 
Disturbances in Asia Minor and conflicts between the 
Byzantine Empire and the Caliphate have been sketched by 
several scholars, none of whom, nevertheless, refers 
exclusively to the reign of the Emperor Nicephorus I. 
Though the majority of them are Arabists and not 
Byzantinists, their works have certainly contributed to 
the history of Byzantium too, in its relations with the 
Muslim world. For a better knowledge on this subject works 
4 dating from the last century such as the book by W. Muir 
must be examined together with the results of recent research 
1. F. Dölger, 'Europas Gestaltung im Spiegel der frankisch- 
byzantinischen Auseinandersetzung des 9. Jahrhunderts', 
in his collected studies under the title: Byzance und 
europäische Staatenwelt, Ettal 195 3. 
2. P. Classen, Carl der Große, das Pa pstt-um und Byzanz., 
DÜsseldorf 1968. 
3. W. Ohnsorge, Das Zweikalserproblem im früheren Mittelalter, 
Hildesheim 1947; id., AU-endland und Byzanz, Darmstadt 
1958; id. Konstantinopel und der Okzident, Darmstadt , 1966;, -id., Ost-Rom und der Westen, Darmstadt 1983. 
4. W. Muir, The Caliphate; its Riý_e, Decline and Fall, 
Oxford 1892, Reprint, New Yoi: -k197S. 
6 
made mainly by J. J. Saunders, 
1 M. A. Shaban 2 and H. Kennedy. 
3 
In regard to the geographic data, we possess the outstanding 
book of W. Ramsay'4 still of great value, though outdated, 
and the article by J. G. C. Anderson, 
S 
referring basically 
to the road system of Asia Minor. Problems connected 
with the eastern frontier line of the Byzantine Empire 
during our period have been tackled by E. Honigmann, 6 
while the work of J. F. Haldon and H. Kennedy 
7 
is of slightly 
different character. Finally, the Arab invasions in 
Byzantine territory have been discussed by H. Ahrweiler 8 
and by M. Canard. 
9 
Students who wish to study the Bulgarian history without 
knowing the Bulgarian language, inevitably limit themselves 
and their access to a rather small number of works written 
in western European languages. Among them the most 
valuable for our purpose are the books by S. Runciman 
10 
and R. Browning. 
11 For the geographical background, the 
1. J. J. Saunders, A History of Mediaeval Islam, London 1972. 
2. M. A. Shaban, Islamic History 2, A. D. 750-1065, 
Cambridge 1976. 
3. H. Kennedy, The Early Abbasid Caliphate, Totowa, 
N. Jersey 1981. 
4. W. M. Ramsay, The Historical Geography of Asia Minor, 
Royal Geographical Society's Supplementary Papers, IV 
(London 1890). 
S. J. G. C. Anderson, 'The Road System of Eastern Asia Minor 
with the Evidence of Byzantine Campaigns' (with map) 
in J. H. S., XVII (1897), pp-22-44. 
6. E. Honigmann, Die Ostgrenzen des Byzantinischen Reiches 
von 363 bis 1071, as third volume in A. Va'sTir-liev'S 
Byzance et les Arabes (Brussels 1935). 
7. J. F. Haldon anJ H. Kennedy, 'The Arab-Byzantine Frontier 
in the Eighth and Ninth Century: Military Organization 
and Society in the Border-lands', in Zbornik Radova, 19 
(1979), pp. 79-116. 
8. H. Ahrweiler, 'LlAsie Mineure et les invasions Arabes' 
in R. H., 227 (1962), pp. 1-32. 
9. M. Canard, Byzance et les musulmans du proche Orient 
(Variorum Reprints) London 1973. 
10. S. Runciman, A History of the First Bulgarian Empire, 
London 1930. 
11. R. Browning., Byzantium and Bulgaria, London 1975. 0 
7 
works of J. Cvijic, 
1 S. Michailov 2 and N. Banescu3 are 
also indispensable. 
The books or articles which have been listed so far 
cover several aspects of the reign of the Emperor 
Nicephorus I separately. They do draw our attention to 
some of the problems connected with our period in one way 
or another. The general histories of the Byzantine 
Empire, such as the works of A. A. Vasiliev 
4 
and the better 
one of G. Ostrogorsky, 5 also have their value. However, 
because they cover a vast chronological era, namely from 
the rise till the fall of the Byzantine Empire, they 
could not afford the luxury of devoting much attention 
and enough space to rather short reigns, such as the one of 
the Emperor Nicephorus I (A. D. 802-811). It must be 
said, however, that Ostrogorsky goes out of his way to 
stress the importance of the reign, because of the reforms 
Nicephorus initiated while R. Jenkins 
6 
prefers to 
emphasize his role as the 'Saviour of Greece'. R. Jenkins' 
account is fluent but somehow superficial. One gets the 
impression that the various sources have not been exploited 
either extensively or profoundly. What J. B. Bury 
7 has 
written on the Byzantine history of the years 802-867 has 
not so far been surpassed by any other work covering the 
1. J. Cvijic, La p6ninsule balkanique: g6ographie humaine, 
Paris 1918. 
2. S. Michailov, Pliska, die Hauptstadt des ersten 
bulgarisc 
* 
hen Reiches, Berlin 1960. 
3. N. Banescu, 'Les frontieres de l1ancien etat Bulgare', 
in M6morial Louis Petit, Bucarest 1948, pp-4-14. 
4. A. A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire, Second 
English Edition, Oxford, 1952. 
S. G. Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, trans. 
by Joan Hussey, second edn. Oxford, 1968. 
6. R. Jenkins, Byzantium, The Imperial Centuries A. D.. 
610-1071, London 1966. 
7. J. B. Bury, E. R. E. 
8 
same period. Though more than seventy years old, Bury's 
book still remains the best guide for students dealing 
with this period. Bury's major contribution to the 
reign of Nicephorus I was to see through the bias of 
the sources and to present Nicephorus as a competent, 
if not outstanding, ruler. His intention was, of course, 
to write a history of the period 802-867, not a monograph 
devoted to the reign of Nicephorus. Thus he does not 
treat the reign on its own but as part of a general 
history. As a result his treatment is somewhat 
fragmented, and its impact slightly blunted. 
It is quite clear from this brief survey of modern 
historical writing devoted to the reign of the Emperor 
Nicephorus that it still awaits a proper treatment from 
the historian. The comparative lack of attention paid 
to this Emperor is all the more surprising because, as 
we shall see in the opening chapter, the sources for his 
reign are relatively abundant. It will be the task of 
this thesis to bring out its special character. By way of 
an introduction there will be a survey of the. condition 
of the Byzantine Empire in 802. This will concentrate on 
the particular problems facing Nicephorus I, at the moment 
he came to power as the result of a coup d16tat. How he 
4 dealt with these problems will be the subject of a serLes 
of chapters on his domestic, religious, and foreign 
policies. It cannot be claimed that he was uniformly 
successful. H is death in battle in 811 at the hands of 
the Bulgarian Khan Krum was the signal for more than a 
decade of political turmoil, which nearly brought the 
Byzantine Empire to its knees. That the Empire survived 
was very much the result of the far-reaching internal 
reorganization that he was able to effect. But it went 
further than this: he provided the foundations for the 
9 
sustained advance of the Byzantine Empire from the 
middle of the ninth century. In so many ways, his 
reign seems to provide the key to the success of the 
Empire under the house of Macedon. He was faced with 
a series of problems, that threatened to overwhelm the 
government of the Empress Irene: the challenge from 
the West, in the shape of Charlemagne's coronation on 
Christmas Day 800; the revival of Bulgarian power; 
the renewed aggression of the Caliphate; and the 
emergence of a monastic party around Theodore of Stoudios 
as a decisive factor in the internal politics of the 
Empire; not to mention the impE. -ial government's loss 
of control over so many aspects of everyday life. 
Nicephorus pioneered lines of approaches and even 
solutions to all these problems. In doing so, he was 






The sources which cover the reign of Nicephorus I can 
be divided into the following main categories: 
A: Narrative sources (Greek-Latin-Arabic-Syriac. ). 
B: Saints' Lives 
C: Letters of Theodore of Stoudios, and 
D: Other sources. 
A: NARRATIVE SOURCES 
1- Greek 
a. Theophanes the Confessor 
Without any doubt Theophanes should be seen as the crucial 
source for the period on which we focus. We learn about 
this iconodule author mainly from his Vitae. Four of 
them are appended to De Boor's edition of Theophanes' 
Chronographia (vol. 2). 1 An anonymous fifth one was copied 
from a codex of the monastery of Koutloumousion on Mount 
Athos and edited by M. I. Gedeon in 1896.2 However, it 
1. The first one was written by an anonymous author and 
the second by Nicephorus, the skevophylax of Vlachernae. 
Of the remaining two, also anonymous and much shorter 
than the previous ones, one has beeii copied from the 
Paris of Theophanes and the other is transcripta 
ex menologio codicis bibliothecae messinensis. Z3. 
2. The text was published in an appendix to the 26th vol. 
of the periodical of the Greek Philological Association 
of Constantinople ýC)'Ev Kwvýýi% WAoýokijc'()s T%'# 'ýxoxos)- 
The editor dates the ms. from which he copied the Vita, 
to the twelfth century. 
12 
would seem that all these Vitae are based on a sixth 
and the only complete Life of Theophanes, written by 
the Patriarch Methodius, 1 
Dating probably from the period 820-29 
2 
the Life is 
of vital importance, not only because its author is a 
near contemporary source, who played a prominent role in 
Byzantium during the first half of ninth century, but also, 
and mainly, for its impartiality. 
3 
Some information on Theophanes can also be derived 
from the so-called Panegyric of Theophanes, which, if it 
has been written by Theodore of Stoudios, as C. Mango 
VV4 
and I Sevcenko seem to assume, would be the earliest 
source on the Confessor, 
5 
and from a letter by Michael 
Psellos, (dating from the year 1078) which describes the 
voyage of Theophanes along the coast of the sea of Marmara 
and his landing somewhere near Agros. 
6 
0 <x %* os 1. It was edited by D. Spyridonos in 'EýcKXv%fi-10WIK s Cý 
12 (Constantinople 1913), pp. 95-96 and 113-65. 
Unfortunately, another edition by V-V. Latysev, 'Methodii 
Patr. Const. Vita S. Theophanis Confessoris... ' 
Zapiski Russijskoj Akad. Nauk. po istor-filol. 
otdeljeniju, 8e seriCý, l3,4 (1918) was not available 
to me. On this Vita see, E. Kurtz, 'Zum Leben des h. 
Theophanes von Methodius', B. N. G. J. 5, (1926-27), 
pp. 390-96. 
2. On the date see: J. Gouillard, 'Une oeuvre inedite du 
Patriarche Methode: La vie d'Euthyme de Sardes', B. Z. 
53, (1960), pp. 36-46; cf. p-4S; see also I. ýeveenko, 
'Hagiography of the Iconoclastic Period', in Iconoclasm, 
(Birmingham 1977), p-118. 
3. On this cf. belo . 1j. 
24. 
4. C. Mango and I. 
L 
enko, 'Some Churches and Monasteries 
on the Southern Shore of Marmara', D. O. P. 27 (1973), 
p. 260. 
5. On this see, C. Van de Vorst, 'Un Panegyrique de. 
S. Th6ophane le Chronographe par S. Theodore Studitel, 
A. B., 31 (1912), pp. 11-23 . 6. E. Kurtz and F. Drexl, Michaelis Pselli Scripta Minora 
III, (Milan 1941), pp. 167-68. 
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Theophanes was born in 759-60.1 His family was one 
of the most noble and distinguished in Byzantium. 
2 His 
mother's name was Theodote. His father, whose name was 
Isaac . was a close friend and collaborator of the Emperor 
Constantine V. When Theophanes was three years old, his 
father died. 3 At that time the Emperor gave the child 
the second name 
4 
of Isaac, 
5 in memory of his father. 
Being the son of a high officer 
6 
and the heir to a 
large estate, Theophanes was destined to follow an army 
career. At the age of eighteen he became a member of the 
corps of stratores 
7 in the reign of Leo IV (775-80). 
1. The patriarch Methodius (op-cit. p-128) asserts that at 
the time the Emperor Leo IV died, i. e. in 780, Theophanes 
was twenty-one, and in the same Vita (p. 147) it is 
stated that Theophanes was fifty-three at the time of 
Leo V's accession to the throne (813). Therefore the 
much earlier dating of the Confessor's birth 'somewhere 
around the year 7521 provided by A. R. Santoro: 
Byzantium and the Arabs during the Isaurian period 
717-802, Ph. D7. __1f_978,, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, 
p-2, is unacceptable. 7 .0 2. Anonymous Vita, De. Boor I I, p. 4 -t%JAC-VWV Vveajv 1ACE1 -ruiv 
'ev cq%4<X61 n6-V%WnrWV ý"pvj. -, r1YCV0V0 6& 
3. Methodius (2p. cit. ), p. 115. 
4. Methodius (2. p. cit., p-115) asserts that, when the child 
was baptised, prýýbably much earlier than his father's 
death, he was given only one name, that of Theophanes. 
5. According to a custom in Greece today, when somebody's 
death leaves an unbaptised son or daughter, then the 
child is given the name of his father or his mother who 
had died recently. 
6. One can assume that from the Patriarch Methodius' 
(a-cit., p. 116) phrase: "T; a%krýOýA&oý 
7. Methodius, p. 119. On the corps of stratores see 
J. B. Bury, The Imperial ... (op. cit. ), pp. 117-18. One 
of their tasks was to assist the emperor in mounting his 
horse; in general they performed the duties of imperial 
grooms. See also R. Guilland, 'Etudes de titulature et 
de prosopographie byzantines, le protostrator' in R. E. B., 
7 (1949), pp. 156-79. 
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Later, after he had led a successful operation around 
Cyzicus, Theophanes received the dignity of spatharius. 
In the meantime he had been engaged at the age of ten and 
married at eighteen to MegalO, whose father Leo was a high 
dignitary of his namesake the Emperor Leo IV. However, 
Theophanes does not seem to have been a worldly man. He 
never consummated his marriage and after some time, retiring 
from public life, established two monasteries. The first 
one was built on the island of Kalonymos, 
2 
where the 
Confessor spent the first six years of his retirement. 
Nevertheless our Saint is best known as the abbot of the 
monastery called Megas Agros on Mount Sigriana, where he 
spent the rest of his life. 
3 
Theophanes was one of the participants of the second 
council of Nicaea, which restored the veneration of sacred 
images. d qpý 4 -- ---- - that lie was -7--------YW 
an iconodule. Thus at the time of the revival of 
1. Anonymous Eq &cp 4*cx-*Nro v (op -c it. p, 8: 
r*nOL3CLp%WV -IQ KMTOýAJkLy T%t4vop 
The highest rank of spatharii was obtained by the 
protospatharius, on whom see R. Guilland, 'Etudes sur 
1'histoire administrative de 1'Empire Byzantin. Les 
titres auliques des eunuclo. 4eS. Le Protospathaire' in 
Byz. 25-27 (1955-57), pp. 649-711. 
2. Methodius, p. 131; Vita Theophanis Parisina (21-cit. ), 
p-29; From the sources one may argue that this island 
was one of the Prince's Islands in the Propontis; see 
C. de Boor's edition of Theophanes, vol. II, p. 635 where 
it is stated: "insula Propon idis in qua Theophanis 
Chronographi uxor vitam deget" See also J. B. Bury, 
E. R. E. p. 74, note 1, who identifies Kalonymos as the 
ancient Besbikos, the modern Emir Ali Adasi. 
3. Methodius, p-132; Life by Nicephorus Skevophylax 
(loc. cit. ), p. 19; According to this Vita (p. 26) the 
monastery was located twelve ro", y%f-, ýcx from Hieria; 
cf. also Vita Parisina, (loc. -cit. ), p-29- For location 
of the monastery see W. Ramsay, The Historical Geography ... (2p. cit. ), p-162, where he says: 'The hilly country between 
Cyzicus and the north of the Rhy'dakos was called Sigrianal. 
Further below Ramsay translates the word rou%vAt7oL as 
miles. Such a location has also been identified by 
Bury, E. R. E., 74, n. 1; see also T. E. Evangel ides, '1A -, ekovi 
-T %7% T-, )g p -.;, s. Tvý; Akf, * Athens 
189S., and the article by C. -Mango - I. Se4enko, 
'Some Churches-', (loc-cit.. ), pp. 259-67. 
is 
Iconoclasm in 815,1 Theophanes bravely opposed the 
Emperor Leo V's policy against icons. This Emperor's 
attempt to win over Theophanes by peaceful means failed, 
and thus 
two years. Ar-cer -cna-c we rina nlM Danisnea ro rne 
island of Samothrace, 
3 
where he spent the last days of his 
life. 4 before he died on 12 March 818.5 
1. On the second Iconoclasm see the following: K. Schwarzlose, 
Der Bilderstreit. Ein Kampf der griechischen Kirche um 
ihre Freiheit (Gotha, 1890); J. Pargoire, 'Saint M6thode 
et la pers6cution', E. O., 6 (1903))pp-183-91; D. Serruys, 
'Les actes du concile iconoclaste de l1an 8151, 
Melanges d1archeologie et d1histoire, 23 (1903), ee pp. 345-51; L. Br6hier, La Querelle des images (VIII IX 
si6cles)(Paris 1904), pp. 30-38; J. Pargoire, LlEglise 
Byzantine de 527-847, (Paris 1905), pp. 265-272; 
J. B. Bury, E. R. E., (2p. cit. ), pp. 56-76 and 135-143; 
A. J. Visser, Nikephorus und der Bilderstreit. Eine 
Untersuchung Uber die Stellung des Konstantinopler 
Patriarchen Nikephoros innerhalb der iko oklastiSChen 
Wirren (Haag, 1952); P. Alexander, The Patriarch 
Nicephorus (2p. cit. ), pp-111-47; id., 'Church Counci. ls 
and Patristic Authority. The Iconoclastic Councils of 
Hiereia (754) and St. Sophia (815)', Harvard Studies in 
Classical Philosophy, 63, (Cambridge Mass., 1958), 
pp. 493-505; H. G. Beck, 'The Greek Church in the Epoch 
of Iconoclasm', Handbook of Church History, vol. III 
(New York, 1969); A. Bryer and I. Herrin, Iconoclasm 
(2p. cit. ), Birmingham 1977; H. G. Beck, Die Kircha in 
ihrer Geschichte, (G5ttingen 1980), pp-81_-: '_9_0- 
2. Methodius, p. 150; Nicephorus Skevophylax, p. 25; 
Anonymous edit. by Gedeon p. 85. 
3. Methodius, p. 151; Nicephorus Skevophylax, p. 25; 
Anonymous, de Boor p. 12; Anonymous, Gedeon p-85. 
4. Most of Theophanes' hagiographers do not commit themselves 
to the problem of how long the abbot of Megas Agros 
survived his banishment. Nicephorus Skevophyla , however, (loc. cit. p. 25) gives us a duration of only 
twenty-three days, after which Theophanes died. 
S. C. Van de Vorst 'En quelle annee mourut S. Theophane? ', 
A. B., 31 (1912), pp-148-56, dates the death of the 
Confessor to the year 817. See, however, J. Pargoire, 
'Saint Th6ophane le chronographe et ses rapports avec 
Saint Theodore Studite', V. V., 9 (1902), p-73 fn. 
as well as Constantine Porphyrogenitus De Administrando 
Imperio, (ed. Moravcsik), Commentary (London 1962-Y, 
p. 80, where it is clearly stated that Theophanes died 
in 818. 
the abbot of Megas Agros was put in prison for 
2A I-- -- I- ---- (- --I I- .I-. -II.. I 
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Scholars all around the world have always seen 
Theophanes as a prominent literary figure and as a very 
important historian. This is because of his 
Chronographia, which is a world chronicle covering the 
period from A. D. 284 to A. D. 813.1 This work is a 
continuation of the work of George Syncellus., 
2 
which 
starts from the creation of the world and ends in the 
year A. D. 284. Theophanes was a close friend of 
George Syncellus and the latter, before his death, had 
asked the abbot of Megas Agros 
3 
to complete the unfinished 
chronicle. 
4 
1. Two modern editions of Theophanes' Chronographia. exist: 
The first one in Corpus Script. Hist. Byzantinae (Bonn 
1839-41,2 vol. ) and the second and better one by 
C. de Boor, Theoýhanis Chronographia, with a Latin 
translation, (Leipzig 1883-85). The work was 
republished by Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, in 2 vol., 
Hildesheim 1963. The Greek text is contained in vol. l. 
Unless otherwise stated, my references to Theophanes are 
made from De Boor's edition. For literature on 
Theophanes, see the following: K. Krumbacher, IZur 
Chronik des Theophanes', Hermes, 23 (1888), pp-626-28; 
C. de Boor., 'Zur Chronographia des Theophanes', Hermes, 
25 (1890), pp-301-307; id., IZu Theophanes'. B. Z.., 1 
(1892)1, pp-591-93; K. Xrumbacher, Geschichte der 
Ryzantinischen Literatur, second edit., (MUnchen 1897), 
pp-342-47; J. B. Bury, 'Zu einer Stelle der Chronik des 
Theophanes', B. Z., 6 (1897), p. S08; id., 'An unnoticed 
Ms. of Theophanes', B-Z ., 14 (1905), pp. 612-13; N. Jorga, 'Medaillons d1histoire litteraire Byzantine', Byz., 2 
(1925), pp-248-50; V. Beýevliev, 'Zur Chronographia des 
Theophanes', B. Z., 27 (1927), p-35; G. Ostrogorsky, 
'Theophanes', in Paulys_Real E, ncyclopddie der Classischen 
Altertumswissenschaft 10, Reihe 2, (Stuttgart 1934) 
pp-2127-32. 
2. He had served as Syncellus under the Patriarch Tarasius 
(Theoph. de Boor 1, p-3"c g6XC4 W'S 7CWat6l'00: 4 
On the office of Syncellus see J. Bury, Imperial... 
(o -cit. ), pp-116-17. He was the intermediary between 
tFe emperor and the patriarch. 
3. We cannot be sure about the exact year of George's death, 
but we do know that he was still writing in 810 (on this 
cf. his chronicle, Bonn ed. vol. l., p. 389). 
4. Theophanes 1, p-4. 
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In a recent article C. Mango has put forward the 
strong possibility that Theophanes' Chronographia was not 
written by Theophanes, but by George %Syncellus. 
1 The 
scholar seems to argue that George kept writing till the 
year 813 and that Theophanes 'had little part in the 
compilation of the work that has made his name immortal'. 
2 
Furthermore Professor Mango suggests that Theophanes' 
task was nothing more than 'to fill in certain gaps or 
verify certain chronological calculations'. 
3 
Though Mango's article is based on good arguments, 
the problem of the identity of the author of the 
Chronographia is not going to be solved till some concrete 
evidence will point either to George or to Theophanes. 
But so far as we are concerned here the really important 
thing is who wrote the section on Nicephorus I, which, 
one might rightly observe, has a slightly different 
character from the rest of the Chronographia 
,. 
4 One might, 
of course, have some reservations about Theophanes being 
the author of the section on Nicephorus, because the slant 
L: 1 9' "' rar4r against the Emperor ill accords withVithodius' favourable 
treatment of this Emperor. But, then, his perspective is 
rather different. Both the Emperor and the Patriarch 
Nicephorus fell foul of the Studites, because they seemed 
to be less favourable to the monastic party than Irene had 
been. But can Theophanes be considered to have been a 
member of the Studites? 
5 Broadly defined, the answer must 
1. C. Mango, 'Who Wrote the Chronicle of Theophanes? ', 
S. R., 18 (1978), pp. 9-17. 
2. C. Mango, 'Who Wrote, ', (2p. cit. ), p-16. 
3. ibid. 
4. On this see below, pp. 24-25. 
S. On this see J. Pargoire: 'Saint Th6ophane le 
Chronographe et ses rapports avec Th6odore Studite. 1 
V. V., 9 (1902), pp-31-102. 
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be yes! For he was a member of the monastic party, of 
which Theodore and his monks were the core. More 
precisely,, it seems that the only issue which divided 
the abbot of Megas Agros from his disciple, the abbot 
of Stoudios, was the so-called Moechian controversy. 
1 
Now, it must be remembered that after the death of the 
Emperor Nicephorus in 811 that obstacle was removed with 
the deposition of the Skandalon, Joseph, abbot of Kathara. 
Therefore the problem of the authorship of Chronographia's 
section on Nicephorus would be better solved, if we first 
indicate the time during which this part of the 
Chronographia must have been written. It cannot be dated 
from a period after the outbreak of the second Iconoclasm, 
because, in the light-of it, Nicephorus' measures would 
seem less oppressive. Even the sections of the 
Chronographia devoted to the Emperors Michael I and Leo V 
must have been completed before the later part of the year 
814, because, as G. Ostrogorsky has already rightly 
23 
observed, Leo V is called (pious), and his 
elevation to the throne as 'most legitimate'. 
4 
On the other hand the section which concerns us cannot 
have been written before the year 811 either, because the 
death of Nicephorus, an event which the Chronographia 
records in detail, occurred on 26 July Of that very year. 
We can therefore conclude that the section devoted to 
Nicephorus is likely to have been written between 811 and 
813 and, if this was the case, it is more likely that it 
was the work of Theophanes than of George Syncellus. 
1. On this see below, pp. 64-65 and 177-81. 
2. G. Ostrogorsky, 'Theophanes', R. E., Reihe 2, vol. 10 
(Stuttgart 1934), col. 2129. 
3. Theophanes, 1, p-S02. 
4. ibid. 
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The Chronographia is written in the form of annals. 
Each year is headed by a chronological table, in which, 
next to the year of the creation of the world and that 
of the incarnation, one finds the current date of the 
Byzantine emperor in power, as well as those of the 
contemporary Arab and Persian rulers, The current dates 
of the Pope and the patriarchs in office at Constantinople, 
Jerusalem, Alexandria and Antioch are also given, 
Moreover., Theophanes provides the number of the indiction 
cycle. For the reign of Nicephorus I the number of each 
year provided by Theophanes' calculation does not coincide 
with the indict-ion number, a coincidence which also does 
not occur for an earlier period, i. e. from the year of 
creation 6102 (A. D. 609-10) to 6265 (A. D. 772-3) with the 
exception of the eleven years from 6207 to 6218 (A. D. 
714-15 to 725-26). 1 
Surprisingly enough, Theophanes does not employ the 
Byzantine era, which puts the incarnation 5508 years after 
the creation. Instead of this, he uses the Alexandrian 
era, according to which the incarnation occurred 5492 years 
after the creation. 
2 This is one of the grounds that 
3 C. Mango employed to support his 'serious doubts 
concerning the real author of the Chronographia. 
1. Thanks to G. Ostrogorsky's article: 'Die Chronologie 
des Theophanes im 7. und 8. Jahrhundert, B. N. G. J., 7 
(1930), pp-1-56, problems associated with chronology 
have been eliminated. 
2. On the question of chronology used by Theophanes, see 
furthermore: E. W. Brooks, 'The Chronology of Theophanes, 
605-7751, B. Z., 8 (1899), pp. 82-97; F. Martroye, 
'Chronologie de Theophane', Bulletin de la Societe 
nationale des Antiquaries de France' (19107-, pp. 292-9S; 
V. Grumel, IL'ann6e du monde J-ansla Chronographie de 
Theophanel, E. O., 33 (1934), pp. 396-408; F. D61ger, 
'Das KaiseriaLTr- der Byzantiner', Jahrbuch der Bayer. 
Akad. der Wissenschaft, 1949, Heft 1, pp. 21-38; 
V. Grumel, Trait6 d16tudes byzantines, I, La Chronologi 
Paris 19S8), pp. 95-96. 
3. C. Mango, 'Who 17rote... ' (loc. cit. ), p. 17- 
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George Syncellus had lived in Palestine, where, as 
V. Grumel has pointed out, 
1 the Alexandrian era was 
current, at least among ecclesiastical circles. But 
some further remarks must be made about the chronology 
and more especially about the way Theophanes counts the 
years in his Chronographia. 
As has already been mentioned above, in the Confessor's 
Chronographia each year is headed by a chronological 
table, indicating various dates. According to this 
chronological table, Theophanes dates Nicephorus' 
elevation to the year 6295, which in the Alexandrian era 
is the year 803 from the incarnation. The table assures 
us that this was the eighteenth year of Harun al-Rashid's 
rule, the seventh year of PopeLeo III's office and the 
nineteenth year since Tarasius became patriarch at 
Constantinople. The rest of the dates are not recorded. 
However, one must be very careful in accepting the accuracy 
of these lists. The reason for this seems to be the 
fact that, when one of the dates in the chronological table 
changes, the rest of them change together too. Let us 
take an example: The Patriarch Tarasius remained 22 years 
in office (784-806). His last year was the third of 
Nicephorus' reign, the twentieth of Hdran al-Rash'id's 
caliphate and the ninth of Leo III's papacy. On 18 February 
806 Tarasius died and the Emperor's namesake Nicephorus was 
elevated to the patriarchal throne of Constantinople. 
From that time, of course, the first year of Nicephorus' 
patriarchate begins, but it becomes obvious that the year 
806 counts as Tarasius' twenty second and at the same time 
as Nicephorus' first year in office. It is clear, 
nevertheless, that, in reality, it is one and not two solar 
years, as they are reckoned in Theophanes. Furthermore, 
1. V. Grumel, Trait6 ... (op-cit. ), p. 95, note 4. 
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what also strikes us here is that with the election of the 
new Patriarch, Theophanes adds one year to each of the 
other three columns of the chronological table. Thus, 
we get the impression that in the Chronographia some 
years begin at a certain date, let us say the 1 September 
or the 25 March, as V. Grumel seems to suggest, 
1 
and other 
years begin at any indefinite date in which a major change 
occurred. In other words, it would seem that in 
Theophanes some years become shorter, just because they 
happened to be marked by a major change, i. e. a change on 
the thrones of Constantinople, of Rakka, of Rome, etc. 
In brief, in the Chronographia one finds two 'categories' 
of years, the 'solar' ones, i. e. those which complete a full 
round of 365 days, and the 'occasional' ones, the length 
of which varies according. to the case. Although this 
classification does not apply only to our period, it is of 
some importance and it provides us with sufficient 
explanation of why, when the Annus Mundi and the indiction 
do not fall in line, it is safer for us to trust the 
indiction rather than the year from the creation of the 
world, provided by the Confessor. 
One last point: V. Grumells hint that in Theophanes 
the year begins on 25 March, 
2 does not seem to apply to 
the period of Nicephorus' reign. Theophanes dates the 
elevation of that very Emperor to 31 October of A. M. 6295, 
which is the year 802. According to the same author 
Bardanes' rebellion broke out on 19 July 803 
3 
and the death 
of Irene at Lesbos occurred the same year on 9 August. 
4 
1. V. Grumel, 'Llannee ... 1, (loc. cit. ), p. 408. 2. ibid.; id., Traite.... (22. Lit. ), p. 95, note 4. 
3. Theophanes 1, p-479- 
4. ibid., p. 480. 
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These three events dominate a period of slightly more 
than nine months which extends from October 802 to August 
803. Now it would be quite inconceivable that, although 
he considers 25 March as the first , of the year, Theophanes 
includes these three events in the same year, In brief, 
if Theophanes took the 25 March as the first day of the 
year, he would not have included all these three events, 
as he does, in the same year, that of 629S. It looks as 
if the Confessor employed the Alexandrian era only in so 
far as it concerned the year of the creation and not the 
first day of Ve year. The first day of the indiction 
could mark the first day of the year too in Theophanes, 
at least for tLe period under consideration. 
As for his sources., it seems very possible that our 
chronicler drew his information from a number of materials, 
which had been available to him through George Syncellus. 
The Hungarian Byzantinist G. Moravcsik 2 argues that the 
chronicle of Traianos Patrikios, extending till the end 
of the eighth century must have been used by Theophanes. 
In addition to this the Great Chronicler (Mc-3(xS X? ayopa40s 
a work which emerges at the end of the eighth century and 
exists in fragments, was probably consulted by Theophanes 
as well as by the Patriarch Nicephorus. 
It would be a commonjlace to say that for the period 
of Nicephorus' reign the Confessor relies on oral 
information. Being a contemporary of the Emperor Nicephorus, 
Theophanes is very likely to have had strong connections 
and acquaintances among prominent people at court and in 
ecclesiastical circles. 
4 Furthermore his military 
1. On this, cf. the English translation by H. Turtledove, 
The Chronicle of Theophanes, Philadelphia 1982, where 
each Annus Mundi. begins on 1 September and ends on 
31 August. 
2. G. Moravcsik, Byzantinoturcica, second edit., (Berlin 
1958), p-532- 
3. A. R. Santoro, Byzantium and... (21. cit. ), p. 8. 
4. A hint of this is apparent in the Emperor Leo V's attempt 
to win over Theophanes by peaceful persuasion at the very 
beginning of the second Iconoclasm (A. D. 815). 
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background and, more important, his acquaintances among 
high officers made the chronicler well informed on every- 
thing that happened among the tagmata as well as the 
thematic army. 
For no other emperor's reign does Theophanes dedicate 
so much space in the Chronographia as he does for the 
relatively short period (802-811), during which Nicephorus 
I was in power. The Confessor's narrative description 
of this reign covers eighteen pages in De Boor's edition. 
The passion and liveliness of the narration is also an 
astonishing fact. The chronicler provides a detailed 
description of all the policies followed by that Emperor. 
His intention is to show how entirely mistaken they were. 
No historian has so far provided a sufficient explanation 
for the bias with which Theophanes has treated Nicephorus. 
It is noteworthy that another reliable contemporary 
author., the Patriarch Methodius, not only did not try to 
denigrate Nicephorus, but, on the contrary, he left us a 
very favourable account, fulsome in its praise of the 
Emperor. This is of considerable interest, because 
Methodius was also the biographer - the main one - of 
Theophanes and might therefore have been expected to follow 
the latter's view on Nicephorus. Taking into account this 
contrast, one might argue that, if Theophanes had private 
motives for hating the Emperor, 
1 then Methodius would not 
have chosen the Confessor's hagiography to insert an 
eulogy of Nicephorus; 
2 
unless we admit that Methodius was 
not in a position to know of any such private motives. 
1. C. Mango, 'Who Wrote ... 1, (loc. cit. ), P. 15; F. H. Tinnefeld (Kategorien der Kaiserkritik in der 
byzantinischen Historiographie, München 1971, p. 78) 
also attributes Theophanes' bias mainly to 'pers6nlichen 
Erfahrungen des Chronisten mit dem Kaiser'. 
2. Methodius, ýop. cit. ), p. 26. 
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Such ignorance is, after all, not totally impossible, 
since he does not seem to have spent much of his life at 
Constantinople before the year 821.1 But, no matter how 
plausible appears the opinion of modern historians, i. e. 
that Theophanes' bias against Nicephorus was for personal 
reasons, there is no real evidence to support this. 
Instead, it would perhaps be sufficient to say that 
Methodius' perspective is different from that of Theophanes. 
The author of the Chronographia seems to have been capable 
only of a very schematic approach to history dominated by 
rather crude value judgements on the personality of the 
different emperors. Theophanes is the type of 
historian whom R. Jenkins calls 'essentially mediaeval'. 
2 
His haglographer, the later Patriarch Methodius, can be 
better classified as a broad minded author perhaps 
influenced by the more humanistic approach of a historian, 
such as Plutarch. 
Nevertheless, there is one point which might help us 
to explain the unjustified bias, which informs Theophanes' 
section on Nicephorus. It must be remembered that the 
chronicler accuses Nicephorus of having been a close friend 
of the Paulicians whose heretic rituals - as Theophanes 
says - the Emperor found delectable. 
3 But, what seemed 
to have irritated Theophanes more than anything else, was 
the fact that during Nicephorus' reign these heretics felt 
free to preach their own ideas openly, with the result that 
a number of orthodox Christians were converted to the 
heresy. 4 No matter how exaggerated these reports of 
1. On this see his Life, in P. G. 100, col. 1245; See also 
J. Pargoire's article 'Saint M6thode de Constantinople 
avant 8211, E. O. )6 (1903), pp. 126-31 and V. Laurent, 'M6thode de Zonstantinoplel, D. Th. C., 10 (1929), cl. 
1597. 
2. R. Jenkins, 'The Classical Background of the Scriptores 
post Theophanem', D. O. P., 8 (1954), p. 14- 
3. Theophanes 1, p-488- 
4. ibid. 
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Theophanes are, they do reveal the chronicler's strong 
opposition to the Emperor's tolerant policy towards the 
Paulicians. Moreover, an advocate of these heretics, 
annihilation, Theophanes probably wrote this section on 
the Paulicians, after Nicephorus' successor, the Emperor 
Michael I. had already inflicted capital punishment against 
a certain number of these heretics, almost immediately 
after his accession to the imperial throne in 811.1 it 
is definitely of some interest to know that at that time 
(late in 811) the Patriarch Nicephorus persuaded Michael 
to go ahead with the annihilation of the Paulicians and 
the Athinganoi. But, the Patriarch was not the only person 
by whom the Emperor Michael I was influenced. It would 
s, eem that the Studites had already won the upper hand on 
certain matters, and their advice to the Emperor to spare 
the lives of these heretics, proved stronger. 
2 This 
change in the mind of Michael which resulted in the survival 
of the heretics disappointed Theophanes who, nevertheless, 
celebrates the fact that 'the pious Emperor Michael 
decapitated many of them anyway'. 
3 
But there is more. From the way Theophanes records 
it, it becomes obvious that the chronicler favoured 
Bardanes' rebellion against Nicephorus in 803. Such a 
sympathy, of course, does not need much explanation. Since 
he hated this Emperor, it is quite understandable that our 
chronicler favoured any movement against Nicephorus. 
However, one needs also to remember that at the time he 
held the powerful post of the monostrategos. of the five 
eastern themes, Bardanes had already built a monastery at 




the island of Proti with the intention of retiring there 
and becoming a monk at a later age. 
1 His failure to seize 
power in 803 forced him to fulfil this long term intention 
much earlier than originally planned, But even as a 
monk Bardanes did not escape his opponents' attack. As 
we hear from our main source about the event, some time 
during the first half of 804 a band of Lycaonians deprived 
him of his eyesight in his own monastery on the isle of 
Proti. 2 Theophanes does not say, of course, that these 
people were heretics, but this is probably what he implies 
by asserting that they were of the same opinion c" 
the Emperor. 
3 In relation to that one needs to remember 
that both the Paulicians and the Athinganoi were settled 
in Phrygia and Lycaonia- 
4 In brief, these data lead us 
to the following consideration: given the clear hatred of 
Theophanes against the Paulicians, together with the 
Emperor Nicephorus' clear tolerance towards the same 
heretics, one would be tempted to suggest that the bias with 
which the Confessor treated this Emperor might have been 
caused by this contrast of opinion of the two men on this 
particular issue. Furthermore, as we have already 
5 
calculated above, this section must have been written 
between 811 and 813, at a time when Nicephorus' successor 
Michael I was in power and, more important, at a time when 
the Radicals were in the ascendancy. Therefore, would it 
be totally groundless to suggest that the criticisms of 
Nicephorus would be intended as a guide to the new regime? 
Methodius' favourable opinion is similarly to be explained 
by a realization of the Emperor Nicephorus' true worth, 
1. Theophanes 1,, p. 479. 
2. ibid., p. 480. 
3. ibid. 
4. ibid., p. 495. 
S. On p. 19. 
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now that the iconoclasts were back in power. 
To end the section on Theophanes, one must admit that, 
in spite of the bias with which its author treated the 
Emperor Nicephorus, the Chronographia's contribution to 
the history of the early ninth century is invaluable, 
because it is the only contemporary source describing 
his reign in detail. 
b. Nicephorus the Patriarch (758-828) 
Born in Constantinople of a distinguished and noble family, 
Nicephorus, like his contemporary Theophanes, was a 
prominent figure of our period. His father!, Theodore, 
who at first was imperial secretary under Constantine V, 
later lost his post and was sent into exile because of his 
iconodule ideas. Nicephorus seems to have received a 
mainly secular education, but he did not neglect to study 
the Bible and the writings of the church fathers. Like 
1. Our main source on Nicephorus is his Vita written by 
Ignatius the Deacon. It was edited by C. De Boor, 
Nicephori Archiepiscopi Constantinopolitani Opuscula 
Historica (Leipzig 1880), pp. 139-217. P. Alexander, 
'Secular Biography at Byzantium', Speculum, 15 (Cambridge, 
Mass. 1940) p. 204, argues that, because Of the lack o, 
miracles performed by the saint, Nicephorus' Life can 
be classified as a 'semi-secular hagiographyl. For 
bibliography on Nicephorus see among others: Gass 
'Nicephorus' in Herzog and Plitt, Realenzyklopddie fUr 
protestantische Theologie und Kirche 2na ed., X. 
(Leipzig 1882), pp. 537 sq.; A. rd, VNicephorus', 
in Wetzer and Welte, Kirchenlexikon, 2n ed. IX, 
pp. 249-59; Karl Krumbacher, Geschichte..., (op-cit. ), 
pp-71-73 and 349-52; E. von DobschUf_z'rNicephý5_rai_§1, in Hauck 
Realenzyklopddie fUr ... (a. cit. ), XIV, pp. 22-25; N. Jorga, IM6daillons d1histoire litt6raire byzantine, 8. 
Le patriarche Nic6phore', in Byz., 2 (192S), pp-252-53; 
R. Janin, 'Nic6phore de Constantinople', D. Th-C. XI, 
pt-I, (Paris 1931), pp. 4S2-5. -); G. Moravcsik 
'Byzantinoturcical, (2]2. cit. ), 1, pp. 456-59; A. J. Visser, 
Nikephoros ... (op-cit. ); P. Alexander, 'The Patriarch Nicephorus ... (op-cit. ); R. P. Blake, 'Note sur l1activite litt6raire de Nicephore ler Patriarche de 
Constantinople', ýyz-, 14 (1939), pp. 1-15. 
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his father, Nicephorus too, held the post of imperial 
secretary, from which he later resigned with the intention 
of becoming a monk-' Before becoming patriarch (806) 
Nicephorus served for a time as head of a poorhouse at 
Constantinople. 2 During the second outbreak of 
Iconoclasm he became an outspoken defender of the icons. 
But Nicephorus is not only a person deeply involved 
in our period. He is also a prominent literary figure, 
who wrote both, historical as well as theological works. 
Unfortunately his historical writings cover a period much 
earlier than the, reign of his namesake Nicephorus, 
3 
while 
the theological ones refer mostly to the second Iconoclasm. 
Nevertheless, there is one work, namely his Epistola 
ad Leonem III, which is of vital importance for our period. 
4 
The letter must have been sent to the Pope some time between 
October and December of 811. This letter, which does not 
appear to have been exploited properly so far, illuminates 
from inside the following problems: 
The relations between church and state in 
Byzantium and in the West. 
The rivalry between the eastern and western 
Empire. 
The involvement of the papacy in the political 
scene of the West during the very last years of 
the eighth and the first years of the ninth 
centuries. 
1. cf. his: Epistola ad Leonem, Migne: P. G. vol. 100,176 A: 
e- )If - %% WS tEF(X Sj 3llV0L(tAV%%f 'r. 00 jA0V4? 0U5 
6%OV ttbCLr, To t-4 EV 0 S. 
2. Vita Nicephori, (ed. De Boor, loc. cit. ), p. lS2. More 
aT3out his activities before and during his patriarchate 
can be found below., pp. 181-95. 
3. His chronicle, for example, ed. C. de Boor, Nicephori 
Archiespicopi ... (2p-cit. ), pp. 3-77, extends from the death 
of Mauricius (602) to the time when Leo IV was married to 
Irene (769). 
4. The letter can be found in J. D. Mansi: Sacrorum 
Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio (-Florence 17S7- 
98), Reprint, (Paris and Leipzig 1901-27), vol. XIV, pp. 
29-S6 and in ý,, Iigne's P. G. 100,, col, 169-200. On this 
letter see also V. Grumel,, Le patriarchat byzantin, Les 
reRestes des actes du patriarchat de Constantinople, 
vol. I, fasc. II, pp-25-26. 
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c. George the Monk 
It is difficult to say for sure whether George the Monk 
is an original or a derivative source of information for 
our period. Only a few things about him are known. He 
was a monk and called himself Hamartolos (= the sinful), 
He lived during the ninth century probably dying at the 
end of the reign of Michael 111 (842-867). 
1 His 
contribution to the Byzantine literature is a world 
chronicle under the title Chronikon Syntomon2 which begins 
with the creation of the world and ends with the first year 
of Michael III's reign in 842-43. 
It is true that George's interest concentrates mainly 
on ecclesiastical matters. However for the period of 
Nicephorus' reign the chronicle is certainly of considerable 
importance. Though he used the Chronographia 
, 
of 
Theophanes, his historical judgements display a large 
measure of independence. In contrast to the Confessor's 
bias against Nicephorus, George the Monk considers this 
Emperor as a 'very pious and friend of the Christians' 
3 
as 
well as 'a prudent and sensible' 
4 
ruler. Therefore 
St. Runciman's argument that George based his work on 
5 Theophanes, is only partly correct, for he brings to his 
treatment of the reign of Nicephorus I an independence of 
2 fj! 
ýAq 
It TA 19 vI CC V'T %*%; fI GT "(X S 1. J. Karayannopoulos t 
second edit., Thessaldinica 1971, p-203- 
2. The best edition of the chronicle is the one made by 
C. de Boor, Georgii Monachi Chronicon, (Lipsiae 1904). 
For literature on George see among others: F. Hirsch, 
Byzantinische Studien (Leipzig 1876), p-88; Fr- Lauchert, 
'Zur TextUberlieferung des Georgios Monachos', B. Z., 4 
(1895), pp-493-513; K. Krumbacher, Geschichte..., 
(22-cit. ), pp. 352-58; J. B. Bury,. E. R. E., pp-453-54; 
N. Jorga, 'Medaillons... ' (loc. cit. ), pp. 258-60; 
G. Moravcsik, Byzantinoturclc-a (op. cit. ), I, pp. 277-80. 
3. C. de Boor, Georgii..., (op. cit. ), vol. 2, p-772. 
4. C. de Boor, Georgil..., (op-cit. ), vol. 2, p-774- 0- - 5. St. Runciman, The First..., Yp-pendix 1, p-266- 
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outlook. This is in contrast to the first part of his 
chronicle, which covers the period up to the deposition 
of Irene (802) and which is not of much significance. 
For this section George relies heavily on Sozomenus, 
J. Malalas, Theodore Anagnostes, the Patriarch Nicephorus 
and Theophanes. 
1 However, it is the second part of his 
chronicle covering the period 802-842, for which George 
deserves attention. Not only is he for the period 813- 
842 the only contemporary narrative source, but for 
Nicephorus' reign, too, he is an independent witness. 
To take just one example: in contrast to Theophanes, 
George believes that the Emperor Nicephorus was sincere 
when he disclaimed responsibility for Bardanes Turcus' 
blinding by the Lycaonians in 803.2 This is all the more 
remarkable, because he was well aware of Theophanes' 
opinion on this matter. Both historians use the same 
phraseology to describe the Lycaonians- George was 
therefore deliberately disassociating himself from 
Theophanes' point of view. 
d. The Chronicle of the year 811 
The title of this little chronicle is: 01) 
T65 4ot 6%ý 4ýW 5 14 (X"% nZý a-ýO %"kn 61 -T ' ý< %51 cx "Y 
7R O'J % CC, CX le ýKow L 
and refers to the disastrous defeat of the Byzantine army 
by Krum in July 811. At times it was thought to have 
been a fragment of a longer chronicle under the title 
3 Scriptor Incertus de Leone Armenio. The best and most 
recent edition with a commentary is the one made by 
Ivan Dujýev- 4 The text seems to be of great importance 
el 14 1.1. Karayannopoulos, (22. cit. ), p. 203. 
2. C. de Boor, Georgii... (op-cit. ), vol. 2, p-772. 
3. H. Gregoire, 'Un nouVeau fragment du "scriptor 
incertus de Leone Armenio"', Byz., 11 (1936), pp. 417-27. 
4.1. Dujýev, 'La chronique byzantine de Van 811', in 
T. M., vol. I, (Paris 1965), pp. 20S-S4. 
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for our period. It matches and at the same time differs 
from Theophanes' narration. Its anonymous author is 
more objective than Theophanes, providing a balanced 
portrait of Nicephorus I. 
e. The Chronicle of Monemvasia 
The chronicle is an invaluable source of information for 
our period. Without it the problem of the invasion and 
the settlement of the Slavs in Greece and particularly 
in the Peloponnese would scarcely have been illuminated. 
Together with Theophanes, the Chronicle of Monemvasia is 
also our main source for the activities of the Emperor 
Nicephorus in repopulating the area and strengthening its 
Byzantine and christian character. 
Though short, the Chronicle of Monemvasia has 
attracted the interest of many scholars, mainly Greeks. 
This is quite understandable, since it refers to the 
question of the Slavonic settlement in Greece. It was 
much exploited by FAmerayer to support his argument that 
the inhabitants of modern Greece are mostly of Slavic 
origin and that the roots of the ancient Greeks have 
completely disappeared. 
1 
The Chronicle of Monemvasia has survived in three 
versions: the Iberikon, the Koutloumousion and the Turin 
version. 
2 The so-called Scholion of Arethas cannot be 
1. J. Ph. Fallmerayer, Geschichte der Halbinsel Morea, 
Stuttgart 1830, Reprint, Hildesheim: Olms, 1965, 
vol-1, pp. 171 sq. 
2. The first complete edition was made by S. P. Lampros, 
"I c'D, rt c- pI -r %; & i( -r %' (a & vi % -rqý m o-1 e \^ ga6 ( lxs Xe ov% i-C C7, V, 
in hisc., -r -c a'L KA c-, k *-T %4 %4acTcKJAthens 1909), pp. 
37-105. See also: P. CharaiTT's, 'The Chronicle of 
Monemvasia and the Question of the Slavonic Settlement in 
Greece', in D. O. P., 5 (1950), pp-141-166; E. Chrysanthopoulos, 
"I C- ?%% T05 )4pov\KoG "T%Tir. "o\tfcýx6oL&(as', ' in E. E. B. S., 21 (1951), 
pp-238-53; the best edition, however, seems to be the one 
made by P. Lemerle, 'La chronique improprement dite de 
Monemvasie: le contexte historique et legendairi, 
R. E. B., 21 (1963), pp-5-49. 
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considered as a fourth version. The text of the Scholion 
1 
on which S. Kougeas has commented, is smaller than the 
last three and it shows many similarities with the 
Iberikon version. For our period the most important 
texts are the Iberikon text and the Scholion of Arethas. 
The other two versions refer to later periods. 
2. Latin Sources 
We should consider ourselves lucky, because Nicephorus' 
reign in the East coincides With the era during which 
Charlemagne was in power in the West, and there are fairly 
abundant sources of information for the reign of that 
Frankish Emperor. 
Among these sources the most valuable ones are three 
series of chronicles called Annales Regni Francorum, 
2 
covering the period from 741 to 829,3 a revision of these 
Annales for the period 741-801 and the Annales Mosellani, 
or Moselle Annals for the period 703-797. The rest of 
the Annales, such as those of Fulda, Lorsch, Saint Amand, 
Altahenses, etc., seem to be of lesser importance for our 
period. 
The author or the authors of the Annales are unknown., 
but it must be assumed that they belonged to Charlemagne's 
circle or court. The Annales very often refer to the 
7 )(- ?oqIV, o; j- TAS MO V(- lAgCr6/ SI 1. S. Kougeas, "En*t TC)G VOCýOQkAfr%"'00 ( (X I i ti m0os c-f_. Ak v, vq IA v" tAwv, 9 (1912) , pp. 473-80. 2. They are published in M. G. H., Scriptorum, vol. I, 
Hannoverae 1826. The Tv-6--rks are described by 
W. Wattenbach, Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen im 
Mittelalter, New edit., W-e--17-mar 1953, Heft 2; see also 
4 the introduction Ln F. Kurtz's edition: Annales Regni Francorum, inde ab a. 741usque ad a. 829, qui dicuntur 
Annales Laurissenses Majores et Ein di, post editionem 
G. H. Pertzii, Hannoverae 1895, as well as R. Rau, 
Quellen zur Karolinischen Reichsgeschichte, Darmstadt 195S. 
3. Later a continuation extendin-g down to the year 1073, 
was added. 
33 
rivalry between East and West during the crucial years 
of the turn of the eighth and the beginning of the ninth 
centuries by giving us the names of ambassadors and 
contents of letters exchanged between the Frankish and 
the Byzantine emperor of the time. 
As for the dating of the events., it is noteworthy that 
there is usually agap of one year between the dates we 
get from eastern sources and those of the Annales Regni 
. 
Francorum. The latter ones, for example, date the death 
of Nicephorus I to the year 812 instead of the correct 811. 
The two Lives of Charlemagne, one by Einhard and the 
second by Notker the Stammerer, monk of Saint Gall, 
1 
though 
biased against the eastern Empire and consequently in favour 
of Charlemagne, also provide us with pieces of useful 
information on the period. The first of these two Vitae, 
modeled on the pattern used by Suetonius in his Lives of 
the Caesars and especially that of Augustus, provides us 
with valuable information on the period under consideration. 
Its significance has been pointed out by A. J. Grant who 
argues that 'in the chronicles of the same period by other 
hands we can feel confidence only in such parts as are 
2 
corroborated or supported by Eginhard'. This Vita, dating 
1. The Latin texts of both Lives can be found in M. G. H.,, 
Script. Rerum German. N. S. vols. 25 and 12 respectively. 
The e exist two English translations with introductions 
on the authors. The first is the one by A. J. Grant 
Early Lives of Charlemagne,, New York 1966, and the 
second is the Penguin Classics one: Einhard and Notker 
the Stammerer., Two Lives of Charlemagne (translation and 
introduction by Lewis Thorpe), Middlesex 1969. For 
literature, see among others: R. Folz, Le souvenir et 
la legende de Charlemagne dans 1'Empire germanique 
ii"eT177val (Paris 1950), pp-4-15; D. A. Bullough, 
'Europae Pater: Charlemagne and his Achievements in the 
Light of Recent Scholarship', in E. H. R. 85 (1970) 
pp. 67-69; F. L. Ganshof, The Carolingian-s and the 
Frankish Monarchy, (London 1971), pp. 1-16. 
2. A. J. Grant, Early Lives ... (op. cit. ), Introduction, 
P. vii. 
34 
from some time between the years 829-36 can be seen as 
'the memoirs of a former public servant who is now in 
retirement'. 
1 The second one is more or less a mixture 
of fiction and history, and as such is of lesser value 
than the one by Einhard. 
Much more valuable are the pieces of information that 
we get from the Liber Pontificalis, 
2 
and from the Epistolae 
Carolinae. 3 
3. Arabic Sources 
The relations between Byzantium and the Arabic world during 
the years under consideration cannot be sketched out 
properly without taking into account reports provided by 
Arabic sources, namely historians and geographers. These 
authors not only confirm information given by Greek sources, 
but they add their own contribution. The annual raids 
launched by the Arabs against the Byzantine territory are 
reported systematically and almost exclusively by Arab 
historians, while the Byzantine chroniclers hardly refer 
to them. Among these Arabic sources the most invaluable 
ones are: 
1. Einhard and Notker the Stammerer, Two Lives of Charlemagne, 
(op-cit. ), P-15. 
2. Ed. by L'abbe L. Duchesne, Liber Pontificalis Ecclesiae 
Romanae, 2 vols, (Paris 1886-92). Reprinted in 3 vols 
(Pari's 1955). For the events under pope Leo III see 
vol. 2, pp. 1-48. 
3. Ed. by Ph. Jaffe, Monumenta Carolina, Epistolae Carolinae, 
Berolini 1864-73. The letter number twenty-nine is of 
particular interest. It was sent by Charlemagne to the 
Emperor Nicephorus and reflects the views of the 
Frankish Emperor on the relations between East and West. 
More about the contents and the importance of this 
letter see below, p-243. 
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a Ya 'ýubi -I 
Ya IKu-bI! I is a ninth century historian and geographer, 
who 
ýrought 
his world history down to the year A. H. 2S9 
(A. D. 872). He was born in Egypt, where he lived for 
the greater part of his life. 
2 Of his work, which is 
divided into two parts, the most important for our period 
is the second one, since it is in this part that the 
author includes a summary of the Arabic raids against the 
eastern provinces of Byzantium. 
3 He died in A. H. 284 
(A. D. 897). 
b. Al-Tabarli (839-923) 
One of the most outstanding Arab historians, Abu Dialfar 
Muhammad b. Djarir, is commonly known. as al-Tabari., 
because he was born ;" Tabaristan. He was educated first 
at Baghdad. Later, travelling extensively, he visited 
Syria and Egypt. Finally he settled again at Baghdad 
teaching and writing. His main work Talr1kh al-Rusul wall 
Muluk (History of the prophets and kings) is usual known 
as the Annals. It is a world history from the creation 
1. His full name was: Al-Yalýubi Aýmad b. Abi-Ya'Kub b. 
Dia'far b. Wahb b. Wadih Al-Katib Al-'Abbasi, 
(Encyclopaedia of Islam), ed. M. Th. Houtsma, 
A. J. Wensinck, Le"Jden 1934, vol. IV, p. 1152. 
2. For literature see: C. Brockelmann, Geschichte der 
Arabischen Literatur, vol-I (Weimar 1898-1902), p-226; 
R. A. Nicholson, A literary History of the Arabs, 
(Cambridge 1930), p. 349; F. Rosenthal, A History of 
Muslim Historiography, Leiden 1952, pp. lfT4--16. 
3. On these raids see E. W. Brooks, 'Byzantines and Arabs 
in the Time of the Early Abbasid$', E. H. R., vol-lS 
(1900), pp. 728-47. It is in this article (p. 740) 
that Brooks presumes that Tabarl has derived his 
information partly from Al-*Wakidir. 
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to the year 915 (A. H. 302). 
1 According to its editor 
De Goeje, what makes Tabarills work of great importance 
is: 'completeness of detail, accuracy and the truly 
stupendous learning of its author that is revealed 
throughout and that makes the Annals a vast storehouse of 
information for the historian as well as for the student 
of Islam'. 
2 Less enthusiastic, however, is the remark 
made by D. S. Straley, who argues that 'we must treat 
al-Tabarl with the same circumspection as other sources' 
3 
and that 'there is no foundation for considering him an 
"objective" historian'. 4 
c. Al Mas'udi 
Abull-Hasan 'Ali b. Al-Husain is another important Arab 
00 historian, whose works cover our period. He is called 
MasludT 'after one of the Prophet's companions, 'Abdullah 
5 b. Maslud from whom he traced his descent'. He was a 
1. The best edition with a translation into French was made 
by De Goeje, Kitab Akbar al-Rusul wa4al Mulu-k, Annales, 
15 vols, (Leiden 1897-1901). For literature see: 
K. Brockelmann, Geschichte..., (op-cit. ), I, pp-142 sq.; 
R. A. Nicholson, A literary... (22-cit. ), pp. 350-52; 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, old edition, (9p. cit. ). vol. IV, 
pp. 578-79; Ilse Lichtenstadter, 'Arabic and Islamic 
Historiography', The Moslem World, 35 (1945), pp-130-31; 
Fr. Rosenthal,, A history.... (op-cit. ), pp-116-17; 
D. M. Dunlop, Arab Civilization to A. D. 1500, (London 
1971), pp. 88-92; D. S. Margoliouth, Lectures on Arabic 
Historians 
,2N. 
York 1930, pp-101-102. 
2. Selection from the Annals of Tabari (ed. by J. J. de Geoje, 
Leyden 1902, XI). 
3. D. S. Straley, Perspective and Method in Early Islamic 
Historiography-: A study of Tl-Tabar-71's Ta'rikh... 
Edin. Univers. Ph. D. Th. 1977, ý-171- 
4. ibid. 
S. R. A. Nicholson., A Literary..., (op. cit. ), p. 352- 
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native of Baghdad, born probably some time between 890 
and 895.1 Following Ibn Khaldun's opinion, Nicholson 
calls Mas'udi 'the Herodotus of the Arabs', because like 
the Greek historian, Masludi shows 'the same eager spirit 
of enquiry, the same open-mindness and disposition to 
record without prejudice all the marvellous things that he 
had heard or seen, the same ripe experience and large 
outlook on the present as on the past'. 
2 He spent almost 
all his life travelling. As a stimulus for his constant 
travels should be seen not his thirst for adventure but 
his 'desire for knowledge', 3 
Maslu-d7i showed particular interest in the Byzantine 
world. According to A. M. H. Shboul, he was the first Arab 
historian to have shown interest in the Byzantines 'not 
only as an enemy of Islam, but as people of their own right 
too,. 4 We find information on Byzantium in both of his 
5 
works, the Murudj al-Dhahab (the Meadows of Gold), as well 
as in the Kitab al-TanElh (the Book of the Warning). 
6 
In fact it is in this second work, though much shorter 
than the first, that Mas'Udi dedicates much more space on 
Byzantine affairs than he does in the Muru-ýj, which is his 
7 
main historical work. Masludi's account on Byzantine 
1. D. M. Dunlop, Arab Civilization..., (op-cit. ), p. 89. 
2. R. A. Nicholson,, A Literary ... (op. Lit. ), p. 353. 3. Encyclopaedia of Islam (ýR-cit-), vol. 3, p. 403. 
4. A. M. H. Shboul, Al-Masfidi and his World (London 1979), 
p. 227- 
5. It was edited and translated into French (Les prairies 
d'or) by G. Barbier de Meynard (Paris 1861-77). 
Pavet de Courteille was co-editor of the first four 
out of a total nine volumes. 
6. It has been translated into French (Le livre de 
l'avertissement et de la revision) by-B. Charra de Vaux, 
Paris 1897. 
7. For literature on Mas'udi cf. also: F. Rosenthal 
(2p. cit. ), pp-117-18; D. M. Dunlop, (22. cit. ), pp-99-114. 
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affairs is slightly different from the accounts provided 
by the other two already mentioned Arab historians. 
Mas'udl7 is not interested in listing the yearly raids 
launched by the Arabic forces against Byzantine territory. 
Military events seem not to have played an important role 
in Mas'udi's history. He appears to have seen the 
Byzantines as a neighbouring nation and not as a rival 
to the Caliphate. In his references to the Byzantine 
emperors, Masludi tries to assess their competence or 
their weakness in governing. His reports are in some 
ways similar to those provided by the Syriac sources, 
namely Michael the Syrian and Bar Hebraeus. They have all 
tried to sketch portraits of the Byzantine emperors of the 
day. Furthermore., Masludi was well versed in ancient 
Greek and Byzantine history and philosophy. Such a 
knowledge had been built up with the help of various 
sources, both written and oral. Here his frequent visits 
to the frontier area acquire a certain significance. There 
is evidence that in the year 946 Mas'udi met at Damascus 
with an important Byzantine ambassador, the mystikos 
John, proconsul and patrician, 
1 
who had a considerable 
reputation as a scholar. The details contained in 
Masludi's account of the Emperor Nicephorus I may have come 
from some such source, but his anxiety to present 
Nicephorus as a great ruler may have another explanation. 
2 It will be shown elsewhere that Mas'udi considered 
Nicephorus to have been of Arabic origin. 
1. al-Masludi, Le livre de llavdrtissement., (op-cit. 'j., 
p-261. 
2. Below p. 80. 
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4. Syriac Sources 
Being of some importance themselves, the Syriac sources 
can be considered as exceptionally significant for the 
early ninth century history of Byzantium. It has 
been argued that during the seventh century, and probab ly 
later, Byzantine historians relied on Syriac sources. 
1 
However, the two chroniclers whose reports refer directly 
to the reign of Nicephorus I, belong to a considerably 
later period. These are: 
a. Michael the Syrian 
He was born in 1126 at Antioch or its neighbourhood, 
2 
where later he served as the Jcxcobite patriarch from 1166 
until his death in 1199.3 Among his literary works, 
what interests us here is"his world history up to the end 
of the twelfth century (1196). 
4 In the dating of the 
events he used the SecOeor-i'aq era, i. e. he started counting 
from 311 B. C. We would not, of course, expect Michael 
to have been a completely independent source. He must 
have relied both on some Greek as well as or, some Arabic 
sources. Furthermore, he seems to have used a source, also 
S 
used by Theophanes. Nevertheless as far as Nicephorus' 
reign is concerned, Michael is in complete disagreement with 
1. S. P. Brock, 'Syriac Sources for Seventh-Century History', 
Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 2 (1976), pp-17-36. 
2. V. Langlois,. Chronique de Micfi-ael le Grant., (Venice 1868), 
p-2. 
3. For literature see: W. Wright, A Short History of 
Syriac Literature., (London 1894), pp. 250-53; 
A. Baumstark, Geschichte der syrischen Literatur, Bonn 
1922, pp. 298-300; R. Duval, La litterature syriaque, 
Paris 1907, pp-401-02 (second vol, in the Series: 
Anciennes littdratures chr6tiennes); J. B. Chabot 
LittJ-rature Syriaque, Boucard 1934; see also the 
introduction in Langlois' translation into French. 
4. It was edited and translated into French by J. B. Chabot, 
Chronique de Michael le Syrien (4 vol. ), Paris 1899-1910. 
S. E. W. Brooks, 'The Sources of Theophanes and the Syriac 
Chronicles', B. Z., 15 (1906), pp. 578-87. 
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the Confessor. Michael speaks very highly of this 
Emperor, suggesting with some exaggeration that nobody 
until then had been 'so courageous and sobrilliant in war 
as him'. 
1 Moreover, the Syrian chronicler traces 
Nicephorus' abilities in government and administration. 
2 
This is in contrast to the account of Nicephorus provided 
by Theophanes. It is of some importance, since Michael 
seems to have read or at least to have heard of the 
accusations made by the abbot of Megas Agros against this 
particular Emperor. 
3 Therefore, though a derivative source 
of a considerably later period, Michael the Syrian must be 
considered as indispensable for an asse, sment of Nicephorus' 
character and achievements. 
b. Bar - Hebraeus 
Another outstanding Syrian writer is the so-called Bar- 
Hebraeus, also known as Abull-Faraj Gregory. 
4 He was born 
in Melitene in 1225-26 of a Jewish father. His first name 
was John, but it seems that he adopted the name Gregory, 
when he later became bishop of Goubos, near Melitene in 
1246.5 Among his prolific works what is of interest to us, 
is the first part of his universal histor-Nr, which is nothing 
less than a political history of the world from the creation 
down to his times. 
6 He died in 1286.7 Though he used 
Michael the Syrian as his main source.., Bar - Hebraeus 
1. J. B. Chabot, Chronique... (22. cit. ), III, p. 16. 
2. ibid., p. 15: 'homme vigoureux et capable de gouverner'. 
3. ibid., p. 16: 'Un des ecrivains chalc6doniens accuse ce 
Nicephorus de beaucoup de choses'. 
4. W. Wright, A Short History... (2p. cit. ), p-265. 
S. J. B. Chabot ' Litt6rature Syriaque., 
(2p. cit. ). p-131. 
6. For a translation into English see E. A. W. Budge, 
The Chronography of Bar-Hebraeus, (London 1932). 
TH-ework was reprinted in Amsterdam (1976). For 
literature see also A. Baumstark, Geschichte ... (op-cit. ), 
pp. 312-20. 
7. R. Duval, La litt6rature..., (op. cit. ), p. 410. 
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alters Michael's narration on Nicephorus in many points. 
His reference, for example, to Nicephorus' elevation to 
the throne and to Irene's banishment includes some peculiar 
details - mostly not true - which are not recorded by 
Michael. Bar - Hebraeus says, for instance, that the 
Empress was sent into exile to Athens, where she became 
a nun. 
1 Therefore, it would seem that in addition to 
Michael, Bar - Hebraeus had access to a different chronicle 
tradition. At any rate, it is quite obvious that with 
regard to the period in question, our two Syriac sources 
complement one another rather well. Finally Bar - 
Hebraeus is one of the four sources 
2 from whom we hear 
about a possible Arabic background of the Emperor Nicephorus. 
B: SAINTS' LIVES 
The iconoclastic controversy, if nothing else, 'produced' 
a great number of saints. As our period covers a part 
of the short interval between its two phases, it touches 
both periods and consequently the number of saints' Lives 
connected with the reign of Nicephorus I, in one way or 
another, is rather high. No fewer than forty-two relate 
to the short reign of the Emperor under consideration. 
In practice, however, the real number of the Vitae is 
much higher, because sometimes two or three and even more 
Lives, or versions of the Life of one saint exist. 
3 
1. E. A. W. Budge, The Chronograpýy.. - jop. cit. ), p. 120. 2. The other three are Tabarl, Masludi and Michael the 
Syrian. 
3. We have, for example, at our disposal six Vitae of 
Theophanes the Confessor, three of St. Ioa-nn-i-R-ios, 
three of St. Peter, the Patrician and Domestic of 
the Schools, two of St. Theodore of Stoudios, etc. 
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These forty-two hagiographies concern a vast range of 
the populace., running from the top of the secular or 
ecclesiastical hierarchy to the anonymous soldiers killed 
by the Bulgars in the fatal battle of July 811. We 
possess the Vitae of one empress, 
1 four patriarchs, one 
ek prosopou who later became a monk, two patricians, 
three archbishops or metropolitans, seven bishops, one 
syncellus, ten abbots, eleven monks or nuns, one rich 
landowner, Philaretos the Merciful, and one Life which 
refers collectively to the martyrs of 811. 
Our hagiographies also cover a vast array of backgrounds. 
Some of the saints were descendants of distinguished and 
noble families, while others had already reached high 
posts in the civil service. A few of them had built 
considerable careers in the army, from which they later 
resigned to become monks. There are nevertheless some 
insignificant ones, who came from poor backgrounds and 
became known either because of their pious life or thanks 
to their actions against Iconoclasm. 
In a certain number of Vitae the authors kept their 
anonymity. The rest of them were written by clergymen 
and mostly by monks, usually connected in one way or 
another with the saint, belonging to the same monastery or 
group of monasteries, or even being kinsmen of the saints; 
for example: St. Philaretos' biographer was his grandson 
Nicetas. The majority of the authors lived in the course 
of the ninth century and one may argue that they themselves 
witnessed what they narrate. Among these, the most 
prominent ones seem to have been the Patriarch Methodius, 
1. The unedited Life of Irene, Nicephorus' predecessor 
on the throne of Constantinople. 
2. His granddaughter Maria of Amnia was married to the 
Emperor Constantine VI. 
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who wrote the complete Vita of St. Theophanes the 
Confessor, and Ignatius the Deacon, whose hagiographical 
activity produced the Vitae of the Patriarchs Tarasius and 
Nicephorus and perhaps that of Gregory the Decapolite too. 
Among the hagiographers who wrote after the ninth century, 
Nicetas-David the Paphlagonian (1st half of tenth century), 
who wrote the Life of Ignatius the Patriarch (d. 877) and 
Symeon Metaphrastes (2nd half of the tenth century), 
1 
author of one of the Vitae of St. Theoctiste of Lesbos and 
of one version of the Life of St. Ioannikios, must be 
mentioned. 
The majority of the hagiographers are, of course, 
iconodules. The Life of George, bishop of Amastris, might 
form an exception to the rule, an observation which has 
already been made by I. gevýenko., 
2 
who also thinks that the 
Life of St. Philaretos is non-iconodule and has iconoclast 
traits 03 
Saints' Vitae as texts are different from the 
chronicles. The intention of the hagiographers is in 
fact entirely different from that of the chroniclers. 
They aim at another target. They would like their readers 
to know how great the holiness of their saint or saints 
had been. Only occasionally do they refer to political 
events and mainly to those connected with the life of 
their saint. 
Hagiographers of the period follow a certain pattern 
in their narrations., but they do not copy each other. Some- 
times they extend their stories by using too many 
quotations from the Bible. In other cases they exaggeraje 
1. K. Krýmbacher, Geschichte ... (op. cit. ), p. 200. 2. Ihor Seveenko, 'Hagiograpj'-). y of the Iconoclast Period', in 
Iconoclasm, Birmingham, 1977, p. 121. The hagiographer of 
this Vita kept his anonymity, but I. 
gevýenko argues on 
good grounds that it is a work of Ignatius the Deacon 
(ibid. p. 123). . 3. iFil-d., p. 126; Life of St. Philaretos, text and French 
translation of the original version in M. H. Fourmy and 
M. Leroy, 'La vie de S. Philarýtel, Byz., 7 (1934), pp. 85-1"/70. 
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the performance of miracles by their 'heroes'. But 
again, in comparison to saints' Lives written during 
earlier times, the ninth century Vitae are not overloaded 
with miracles. 
1 The Vita of St. Peter of Atroa, 
2 in 
which the Saint is reported to have performed twenty 
miracles, forms probably an exception to that rule. This 
lack of many miracles in the Vitae of our period should 
not come as a surprise. It was by their opposition to 
the second Iconoclasm and not by the performance of miracles 
that their holiness was established, along with their claim 
to be called confessors. For this reason the reign of 
Nicephorus I is less well covered by saints' Lives than 
for example the reign of Leo V or that of Theophilus. 
One further point: It is well known that monastic 
opposition to Iconoclasm was centred mainly in and around 
Constantinople and, to a lesser extent, around the Mount 
Olympus in Bithynia. This is, of course, of importance, 
since we would have preferred our hagiographies to cover a 
much wider variety of geographical settings; the point 
being that because the Vitae 
, 
are centred mostly around 
Constantinople, social and economic life in the provinces 
is not well illustrated by them. But again social and 
economic conditions do not change decisively in a reign 
lasting only nine years, such as that of Nicephorus. The 
task of a student who deals with short periods like this, 
is mainly to reveal and interpret policies in the short 
term, and in this, saints' Lives provide valuable help, not 
only over religious matters, but also as a guide to the 
political and even economic concerns of the time. 
1. See D. Z. F. Abrahamse, Hagiographic Sources for Byz. 
Cities 500-900., Ph. D. f967, Michigan Univ., pp. 324-26; 
see also J. Pargoire, 'Saints Iconophiles', in E. O., 
4 (1900-901), pp. 347-56, and D. Z. F. Abrahamse, 'The 
Transformation of the Saint in the Early Medieval 
Byzantium', B. S., vol-2, pt. 2 (197S), pp-122-31. 
2. V. Laurent " La vie merveilleuse de Saint PierreJ'Atroa (d. 837)., Brussels, 1956; id., La vita retractata et les 
miracles posthumes de Saint Pierre d'Atroa, Brussels, 1958. 
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C: LETTERS OF THEODORE OF STOUDIOS 
Theodore was born at Constantinople in A. D. 759, from a 
family 'intimately connected with the administration of the 
imperial government and intensely susceptible to the 
religious influences around'. 
1 We learn about the life of 
this outstanding monk from various sources, the most 
important of which are his two Vitae, written by the monk 
Michael, probably a Studite, after Theodore's death. 
2 
His father, Photinus, held a post in the imperial treasury, 
while his mother, Theoctiste, had been a lady of good 
birth. 3 Theodore was the first among the four children 
of the family. From his hagiographer we hear that he 
received a good Greek education. 
4 Later, when he became a 
monk at the age of twenty-two, Theodore dedicated himself 
almost completely to the study of the Bible and of the works 
of church fathers, especially to those of St. Basil. 
5 
After the death of Photinus, Theoctiste, deserting her 
children, retreated into a monastery. At about the same 
1. A. Gardner, Theodore of Studium. His Life and Times 
(London 1905 3. 
2. Both Lives can be found-in Migne, P. G. 99, columns 113-328. 
A slightly different version of the first Vita was 
edited by B. Latyschev, 'Vita S. Theodori Studitael, 
V. V. y 21 (ser. 1,1914), pp. 2S8-304. 3. On Theoctiste's background and life, cf. C. Diehl, 
'Une bourgeoise de Byzance au VII sieclel, in Figures 
byzantines, 1 (Paris 1948), pp. 111-132; see also the 
funeral speech by her son, Theodore, in P. G. 99, cols 
883-909, 
4. B. Latyschev, 'Vita ... (loc. cit. ), p-260. S. B. Latyschev, 'Vita ... (a. cit. ), p. 264; for literature 
on Theodore, see among others: E. Marin- De Studio 
coenobio Constantinopolitano, (Paris 1897); A. Gardner, 
Theodore., (op-cit. ), London 1905; C. Van de Vorst, 
ILa translation dE S. Theodore Studite et de S. Joseph 
de Thessalonique', A. B., 32 (1913), pp. 27-62; H. Delehaye, 
'Stoudion-Stoudios', A. B. 52 (1934), pp. 64-5; 
J. Leroy, ILa vie quotidienne du moine studite', 
Ir6nikon., 17 (1954), ler trimestre, pp. 21-50; 
N. X. Eleopoulos S41ro0,7 &<&j Kat ro 
Maws TtZv 1rovA0% Athens ,' 19 67; J. Leroy, "ý5tuditisches 
M6nchtum, Graz, Wien, K61n 1969. 
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time her brother, Plato, founded the monastery of 
Sakkoudion, in the neighbourhood of Prousa. He held the 
position of abbot, a post in which his nephew, Theodore, 
later succeeded him. The new abbot's monastic life was 
to be very turbulent. He was sent into exile for the 
first time in the year 795, because he had been an 
outspoken opponent of the Emperor Constantine VI's second 
marriage. Two years later, when Irene became the sole 
ruler of the Empire, Theodore and those exiled with him 
were allowed to come back to their monastery. Immediately 
or shortly after their return, they abandoned Sakkoudion 
and took up residence in the capital itself, where they 
reactivated and reorganized the monastery of Stoudios. 
This transfer wy- fo prove to very decisive for 
Theodore himself and for the so-called Studite movement 
in general. Their influence, not only on purely religious, 
but also on political issues, dates mainly from this time. 
After the death of the Patriarch Tarasius in 806, 
Theodore was probably a candidate for the see of 
Constantinople which, nevertheless, was filled by the 
Emperor's namesake Nicephorus. In the following years 
Theodore played a very important role, strongly opposing 
the restoration of Joseph, who as abbot of Kathara had 
consecrated Constantine VI's second marriage, But since 
it was the Emperor Nicephorus himself who desired and 
initiated that rehabilitation., Theodore and his followers 
were sent into exile for the second time (809). 
The reign of Michael 1 (811-13) witnessed the peak of 
the Studite influence and political power. Theodore is 
reported to have been among the Emperor's close advisers 
even on problems related to foreign affairs. 
1 
1. Theophanes 1, p-498. 
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Theodore died in 826,, long before the second restoration 
of the icons (843), for the sake of which he suffered his 
third exile during the second outbreak of Iconoclasm 
under the Emperor Leo V. In the meantime he had come to 
terms with the leader of the Moderates, the Patriarch 
Nicephorus. 
Theodore of Stoudios is well known not only as the 
leader of the monastic party, the influence and power of 
which he strongly promoted, but also as a reformer of the 
monastic life in Byzantium, 
1 
and as a prominent literary 
figure, too. Of his prolific output which includes 
speeches and catechisms, it is his letters, which are of a 
particular interest for this thesis. 
In Migne, P. G. 99, col. 903-1670, we find a selection of 
278 letters sent by Theodore to various persons., male or 
female, laymen or clergymen. Migne has divided these 
letters into two books. However, as we learn from 
Theodore's Lives, 2 his letters originally formed five 
books. Migne simply reprinted what Jacques Sirmond had 
edited in 1696,3 i. e. the first two out of the five 
books into which the whole body of the letters was divided. 
It looks as if the designation of the books was derived from 
the manuscripts used by Sirmond. 
4 
The first book includes fifty-seven letters,, 
5 
which are 
supposed to have been written mainly during Theodore's 
1. On the reforms introduced to monastic life by Theodore, 
cf. J. Leroy, 'La reforme studitel, Il Monachesimo 
orientale, (actes du congr6s tenu a 11 Institut 
P-o-ntif-ical Oriental du 9 au 1Z avril 19S8), pp. 201-206. 
2. Migne P. G., vol-99, cols. lS3B, 264D. 
3. Theodori Studitae, Epistolae, ed. by J. Sirmond, 
Opera Varia, 5 (1696). 
4. Patrick O'ConnellS. ]. 'The Letters and Catecheses of 
Theodore Studites', O-Ch. P., 38 (Rome 1972), p. 2S6. 
S. Of the letters 4S. 46 and 47 we possess only the names 
of the persons to whom they were sent, without anything 
else. 
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first and second exile. The second book contains two 
hundred and twenty-one letters, mostly written during 
Theodore's thirdexile. Some of the letters of the second 
book are incomplete. It is worth noting that these two 
hundred and seventy-eight letters are followed - in 
Migne's edition - by a list of another two hundred and 
seventy-seven, of which we are given only the names of the 
addressees andthe incipits. Migne took these titles and 
incipits from the Paris manuscript, Coislianus 94,1 it 
was the full text and the Latin translation of these 277 
letters that Cozza Luzi printed in 1871.2 Cardinal Mai, 
who was involved in this edition, added another seven 
letters, so that the total number edited by C. Luzi 
reached two hundred and eighty-four. At the same time and 
in the same edition Mai also provided a complete text of 
twelve letters., which were incomplete in Migne's edition. 
Now, to the five hundred and fifty-nine letters, which 
were published either by Migne (275) 
3 
or by Cozza Luzi - 
Mai (284), another two letters are added. The first was 
published in 1950 by R. Devreesse, 
4 
and the second in 1968 
by J. Gill. 5 They both belong to a rather early period 
of Theodore's correspondence and are related to the Moechian 
Schism. Therefore a total of five hundred and sixty-one 
letters of Theodore of Stoudios have been edited so far. 
It should be indicated here that from this bulk of 
letters, it is only the first book in Migne's edition and 
the two recently edited letters,. that refer to our period. 
1. J. P. Migne, P. G., vol. 99, cols. 1669-80. 
2. Patrum Nova fflFb-liotheca, VIII, 1. (Romae. 1871. ) 
3. The already mentioned 45th, 46th and 47th letters of the 
first book are not included in this number. 
4. R. Devreesse, 'Une lettre de. S. Th6odore Studite 
relative au Synode Moechien (809)1, A. B. 168 (1950), 
pp. 44-S7. 
S. Joseph Gill, 'An Unpublished Letter of Theodore the 
Studitel, O. Ch-P. 34, (1968), pp. 62-69. 
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More precisely, even from the fifty-four letters of the 
first book only a certain number were composed between 
the years 802 and 811. The rest of them relate to the 
sole reign of Constantine VI (792-97) as well as that 
of Irene (797-802). They are still of importance, 
because they reveal the social framework on which Theodore 
relied in order to oppose the alliance of the two 
Nicephori (emperor and patriarch) over the restoration 
of Joseph of Kathara. 
Of the fifty-six letters, forty-one were addressed to 
clergymen (including monks and nuns), twelve to laymen 
and three to mixed communities. Among the letters sent 
to clergymen the most valuable ones for our purposes seem 
to be the four addressed to Theodore's uncle Plato, the 
two sent to Pope Leo III, another two to Theodore's 
brother Joseph, archbishop of Thessalonica, two again, 
of which the addressee was the Patriarch Nicephorus and 
the six sent to Naukratios, who at the time of Theodore's 
exiles was the acting abbot at Stoudios' monastery. 
1 On 
the other hand among the letters addressed to laymen we 
should mention one letter sent to the Empress Irene, one 
to the Emperor Nicephorus, one to Magister Theoctistus 
and a fourth one to Spatharius John, who had named an 
icon of St. Demetrius as the God-father of his son. 
Baronius dated twenty-seven letters from the first book. 
It looks as if the dated ones are the most important and 
that the dates which he provided are more or less accurate. 
Baronius' dating is based on the content or on the contents 
of the letters. Through the dating, -which is important, 
one can observe that Theodore was exceptionally active at 
the peak of the Moechian controversy. The letters which 
1. He was also elected as abbot of the monastery of 
Stoudios after Theodore's death. 
so 
Theodore wrote during his second exile (809-811) exceed 
in number and in variety of addressees those which form 
Theodore's correspondence during his first exile (7/95-97). 
In order to understand this, one needs only to remember 
that Theodore suffered his first deposition at a time he 
was still at the remote monastery of Sakkoudion, from 
where his contact with Constantinople and its surroundings 
had been, no doubt, limited. 
As for the issues discussed in these fifty-six letters, 
the dominant one is, of course, the Emperor Constantine VI's 
adultery and its implications or consequences (restoration 
of Joseph, Moechian Schism., etc. ). No matter how effective 
this correspondence of Theodore proved to have been, what 
cannot be denied is that he had already established a wide 
contact with a variety of persons, some of whom had 
prominent posts, both in the ecclesiastical and secular 
hierarchy. On these acquaintances he could also rely later 
during the second outbreak of Iconoclasm. Unfortunately 
we do not possess any reply to Theodore's letters. There 
must have been some. Elements of replies can be traced in 
cases that the abbot of Stoudios addressed more than one 
letter to the same person. In some of these cases 
Theodore complains either because he did not get any reply 
to the letter which he had already sent to the same person, 
or because the reply had not been satisfactory. In other 
cases the abbot of Stoudios expresses his gratitude for 
the understanding and the moral help which he had already 
received from some of his correspondents, or he gives 
answers to special questions put to him by various persons. 
Generally speaking the letters of Theodore of Stoudios 
are very important for the history of the turn of the 
eighth and the very early ninth century. Being a 
contemporary source, they illuminate the period from 
si 
inside, i. e. from the views and the connections of a 
person deeply involved in the political and ecclesiastical 
scene of the era. Furthermore, as K. M. Ringrose has 
already rightly pointed out, 
' these letters were not 
written for publication. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
believe that they often reflect real conditions in a way 
that the chronicles and hagiographical sources do not. 
Moreover, Theodore of Stoudios was at the time the leader 
of the monastic party. As such he had his own convictions 
and his own policies over certain issues. His letters 
provide us with the necessary information, first, as to 
what exactly these convictions and policies were and, 
secondly, on the consistency with which they were followed. 
In other words some of his letters make us sceptical as 
to how Irigorist' the leader of the party of the Rigorists 
was. Finally, the letters enable us to trace Theodore's 
views on the relations between church and state as well 
as on the relations between eastern and western 
Christianity. But, above all, the letters reveal 
Theodore's attitude towards the ecclesiastical party of 
the 'Economists', i. e. towards those who favoured the use 
of dispensation from rules in exceptional circumstances. 
Although Theodore does not seem to have influenced the 
Emperor Nicephorus' policies very much, his letters are of 
primary importance both for the political and ecclesiastical 
history of the period under consideration. It would be 
perhaps sufficient to remember the vital role which the 
monastic party played in Byzantium during the years 
immediately after Nicephorus' death in 811. In other 
words, it might be argued that the persecution and exile, 
which the monastic party suffered under Nicephorus, 
stimulated its strength, prestige, and determination, so 
1. K. M. Ringrose, Saints, Holy Men and Byzantine Society, 
72 
F6- 
to 843,, Ph. D.,, Rutgers University, New Brunswick 
197 ", p. 59- 
S2 
that when Michael I came to office, the monks had already 
paved their way to power. 
D: OTHER SOURCES 
Arrayed under this rather odd title are other sources, 
which are otherwise difficult to categorize. These are: 
The three treatises by the Emperor Constantine 
Porphyrogenitus (De Cerimoniis., de Administrando Imperio 
and De Thematibus) and the records of the oecumenical 
councils - 
1. De Cerimoniis 
In the Emperor Constantine VII's literary activity the 
treatise on the ceremonies of the Byzantine court, etc. 
occupies a prominent position. There is only one 
manuscript at our disposal 
1 
and on this the work is 
ascribed to that Emperor. Given its general character, 
ý. ge the treatise De Cerimoniis is used very cautiously. The 
few references made to it are intended to shed some light 
on problems of the early ninth century, only in comparison 
1. In Leipzig University library. The manuscript has been 
dated to the XI or the XII century. The treatise was 
first edited in 1751-4 by Leich and Reiske, an edition 
which was reprinted later in C. S. H. B. (Bonn 1829-30). 
About a century later a new edition with a French 
translation by A. Vogt appeared in four volumes, of 
which two are commentaries (Paris 1935-40). For 
problems connected with the original composition and 
the periods to which each one of the incorporated 
documents belongs, see J. B. Bury, 'The Ceremonial Book 
of Constantine Porphyrogennetos', E. H. R., 22 (1907), 
pp. 209-227 and 417-39. For literature see: H. Wdschke, 
Studien zu den Ceremonien des K. Porphyrogenitos, 
Zerbst 1884, A. Rambaud, Llempire grec au diRTF-Fe 
siecle, Paris 1870, New York reprint, 1964, pp-128-136; 
K. Krumbacher, Geschichte..., (, 22-cit. ), pp. 254-57. 
C. Diehl, Etudes Byzantines (Paris -190S), pp. 293-306; 
see also Vogt's introduction in the Paris edition. 
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to what was happening in the mid-tenth century. For 
example, the section of the De Cerimoniis which refers 
to the process to be followed during the election of a 
new patriarch provides a useful comparison with the reports 
we have from other sources on the election of Nicephorus' 
namesake as patriarch in 806. Furthermore, a passage 
of this treatise, helps to corroborate the details provided 
by Theophanes on the Emperor Nicephorus' reform of the 
system of military recruitment. 
2, De Administrando Imperio 
This treatise was compiled between the years 948 and 952. 
It was originally without a title. The Latin title was 
given to it by its first editor John Meursius in 1611.2 
By addressing and dedicating the work to his son Romanus, 
Constantine Porphyrogenitus wanted him to become a wise 
sovereign. But the purpose for which the De Administrando. 
Imperio was written is better illustrated in the following 
passage attributed to the Emperor Constantine VII himself: 
'But what of events which have taken place 
at various times between the Romans and 
different nations? For it is worthwhile, 
my dearest son, that record of these things 
also should not escape you, in order that, 
should the same things come about on 
similar occasions, you may by foreknowledge 
find a ready remedy. '3 
1. J. B. Bury, 'The Treatise De Administrando Imperio'. B. Z. 
1S (1906) p. 539; for literature see: G. Manojlovic, 'La 
composition de I'De administrundo imperio"', Deuxitme Congrbs 
International des Etudes Byzantines, Belgrade 1927; 
G. Moravcsik, ',, 'ý( Xe%p C& t \* ým-o ms IR cx e 9X' d' osij To ýj 
De Administrando Imperiol, E. E. B. S., 7 (1930), pp-138-152, 
id., IL16dition critique du "De inistrando imperio"', 
Byz., 14 (1939), pp. 353-60. 
2. Among the five editions which followed, the best and recent 
one is the one by G. Moravcsik - R. J. H. Jenkins, 
Constantine Porphyroge itus De Administrando Imperio, with 
an En lish translation, Budapest 1949, (in two volumes, the- 
second one being the commentary). My references are made 
to this edition. 
3. Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De Administrando Imperio) 
(22. cit. ), p. 223. 
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The important thing for us is the abundant information 
provided by the treatise on the nations around Byzantium 
and also on its internal history and organization. The 
information which this treatise provides on the reconquest 
of the Peloponnese during Nicephorus' reign, is also 
invaluable. 
3. De Thematibus 
A third and equally valuable treatise by Constantine VII 
is the book: De Thematibus. 1 As the title itself 
indicates, the work deals with the structure and the 
organization of the themes, i. e. the provincial army units 
and local administrations. It is generally believed that 
the promotion of some European provinces into theme units 
took place at the very beginning of the ninth century and 
most probably during the reign of Nicephorus I. The 
De Thematibus is one of the sources which enable us, if not 
to solve, at least to discuss this particular problem. 
4. Records of Oecumenical Councils 
Nicephorus' reign follows hard on the last oecumenical Cý 
synod of the eastern church, i. e. the second Nicaean (787), 
which restored images. Some of the participants of that 
council were also prominent figures in the history of the 
early ninth century, It would be perhaps sufficient to 
say that some otherwise well known ecclesiastical figures, 
such as the bishops, Euthymius of Sardis, Michael of Synada, 
1. Edit. by A. Pertusi, De thematibus Citta del Vaticano 
1952. For literature see: A. Pertusi, 'La formation 
des Thbmes Byzantines', Berichte zum XI intern. 
Byzant. Kongress, MUnchen 1958,1, pp-1-40. 
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Manuel of Adrianople and Gregory of Amastris along with 
the abbots, Theophanes of Megas Agros and Sabbas of 
Symboli, were among the participants of the seventh 
oecumenical council. From this point of view the records 
of the councils are precious for our purpose-' 
E: GENERAL ASSESSMENT 
Of the majority of the sources for our period we know the 
authors, though some are anonymous. Most of the sources 
are contemporary or near contemporary. Some of them, 
though only a minority, are biased against the Emperor 
Nicephorus I. Others are more or less impartial. Some 
of them, mainly chroniclers, copy each other, while others 
rely on texts unknown to us. Some of the sources 
illuminate our period from inside, i. e. they reflect the 
views of persons who were themselves involved either as 
supporters or as opponents of certain policies of the 
Emperor Nicephorus I. 
How well is our period covered by the sources? They 
provide us with a relative. abundance of information, and in 
some fields, such as religious affairs, they do help us to 
unravel the Emperor Nicephorus' policies and convictions. 
This is understandable enough, since the vast majority of 
our sources have been written by monks or clergymen. In 
other areas, however, as for example administration, the 
evidence provided by the sources is less generous. This 
will have a bearing on the generally accepted view that 
Nicephorus was a reformer. In order to test this, we must 
embark on a detailed examination of the various policies 
adopted by Nicephorus in both domestic and foreign affairs. 
1. They were edited by Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum... 
(op. cit. ), Paris and Leipzig 1901-27, vols XII and XIII. 
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By the time Nicephorus I came to office at the 
beginning of the ninth century., certain lines of policy 
had been elaborated by his predecessors. It is also 
well known that during Irene's reign some problems facing 
the Empire were at a peak. With his elevation to the 
Byzantine throne, Nicephorus inherited both, policies and 
problems. How did he react? What did he keep and what 
did he jettison from the policies of his predecessors? 
How well did he maintain Byzantine power and prestige, 
balanced as it was, between Aachen, Pliska and Baghdad? 
Futhermore, the various religious and political groups, 
who existed at that time in Byzantium, pulled in different 
directions. How successfully did Nicephorus manage to 
control them and keep a balance between their aspirations 
and the interests of the Empire? These are'some of the 
main problems to which the sources direct our attention. 
Finally, a careful sifting of the sources will enable 
us to establish dates, a very necessary task, because 
in a short reign like that of Nicephorus, it is all too 
easy to confuse different events and different policies. 
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Chapter II 
BYZANTIUM IN 802 
At the seventh oecumenical council held in 787 at Nicaea 
the Empress Irene was able to engineer the restoration 
of images. She hoped in this way to make a contribution 
to the internal peace in the Empire. Iconoclasm was by 
no means completely beaten. Its adherents surrounded the 
young Emperor Constantine VI, whose rights to the throne 
Irene was not very prompt to recognize. Constantine 
himself does not appear to have bothered much about religious 
affairs. What probably concerned him most were the reins 
of power, which, at least from the year 790 onwards, he 
wanted entirely for himself. Constantine was tired of his 
mother's tutelage. She continued to act as the sole 
ruler of the Empire, even when her son had reached manhood. 
Furthermore, Constantine's dissatisfaction with the situation 
must have grown greater, because of the fact that the 
eunuch Stauracius had concentrated in his hands every 
power he could. 
1 Stauracius had been a sort of prime 
minister under Irene. It is worth noting that for 
Constantine, it was not his mother Irene but the powerful 
Stauracius who seemed to be blocking his way to power. 
Theophanes lets us know that, at least, at this stage, 
Constantine was content to go on ruling together with his 
mother. 
2 He thought, nevertheless, of arresting Stauracius 
1. Theophanes, 1, p-464- 
2. ibid. 
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and sending him into exile to Sicily-' The plan, 
however, did not work and as a consequence Constantine's 
agents,, who ought to have carried out the deposition of 
Stauracius, 2 were now themselves punished either by exile 
or by dismissal from their posts. Even Constantine 
himself was flogged as a result of the conspiracy (790). 
3 
After all these events, it became clear which way the wind 
was blowing. Irene's success in putting down the 
conspiracy strengthened her in her intention of remaining 
sole ruler of the Empire. She demanded that the military 
forces recognize her as first ruler, while she left for 
her son the consolatory title of co-emperor. The tagmata 
at Constantinople obeyed without any objection, 
4 but the 
thematic army of the Armeniacs rebelled against the plans 
of the Empress. Unfortunately, the sources at our disposal 
do not say for sure what the motives of that rebellion had 
been. Did the soldiers of the Armeniac theme oppose 
Irene's plans out of mere interest for the rights of 
Constantine VI to the throne, or were they also opposing 
the Empress' iconodule policy? G. Ostrogorsky suggests 
that the motives of the soldiers were mainly religious. 
5 
It could have been. But so far as we know, no source 
reports that Constantine had shown, at least up to that 
1. Theophanes, 1, p-464- 
2. ibid., pp. 464-65. They were the Magister Peter, the 
F-atrician Theodore Camulianus, the Patrician Damianus 
and the Protospatharius John Picridius. 
3. Theophanes, 1, p-465. 
4. One must remember that these soldiers ' 
were brought into 
the capital from Thrace four yearsvce, 1%"41'in order to 
replace the iconoclastic army which disturbed the 
first session of the seventh oecumenical council, which 
took place at the church of Holy Apostles of 
Constantinople. In the course of the year 786, Irene, 
using an Arabic threat as a pretext, sent these soldiers 
to Asia Minor and replaced them with"'army from`ýuropean 
provinces with iconodule convictions. On this 
replacement see Theophanes 1, p. 462. 
S. G. Ostrogorsky, History... (9p. cit. ), pp-179-80. 
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time, any affiliation to Iconoclasm. On the contrary, 
it is reported that three years earlier (i. e. in 787), 
Constantine along with his mother signed the decisions of 
the seventh oecumenical council 
1 by which the icons were 
restored. It is true that from a letter of Theodore 
of Stoudios we hear that in the year 795, at a time that 
Constantine divorced his legitimate wife Maria ol Amnia 
for the sake of the K0V 4% K0 vAtxp6'(x Theodote, 
2 the 
young Emperor placed the Patriarch Tarasius in dilemma: 
according to the source, Constantine demanded that either 
the official church would perform the wedding ceremony 
and recognize his second marriage as valid, or he 
threatened to renew Iconoclasm: "Toýj icwAtfwý ýýAAo GýAov-Tof, 
1ýpNjV tAO1Xt'%; b1V %n' The letter dates from the 
year 809 and, since the information comes from an 
iconodule source, it might have been fabricated some time 
after the year 797 in order to lessen the enmity of the 
populace against Irene, following the blinding of her son 
on 15 August of that year. In any case, even if such a 
threat took place in the year 795,4 there is nothing to make 
us believe that by the year 790 Constantine had shown any 
affiliation to Iconoclasm. 
S Iconoclastic emperors had 
been strong rulers, while Constantine VI was too weak a 
character to attempt to renew the iconoclastic controversy. 
Therefore, it might be more reasonable to believe that in 
the year 790, the soldiers of the Armeniac. theme rebelled 
against the Empress Irene not only out of mere religious 
motives. It would seem that they were deeply concerned about 
1. Theophanes 1, p-463. 
2. More about Constantine's second marriage and the Moechian 
Schism which originated from that marriage, see below, 
pp. 64-6S and 177-80. 
3. J. P. Migne, P. G., 99, col. 1032 D. 
4. For further discussion on this hypothetical threat, see 
again below, p-179, note 2. 
S. P. Speck (Kaiser Konstantin VI, op. cit., p. 299) also 
believes that the young Emperor was "Kein Ikonoklast 
und auch nicht daS 7entrum einer ikonoklastischen 
Partei". 
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the rights of the young Emperor to the throne. At a 
time when Constantine's capabilities as a ruler had not 
yet been tested, the soldiers might have expected him to 
become a sound ruler as his grandfather Constantine V 
had been. Furthermore, it would not appear unthinkable 
to suggest that Constantine's marriage to a daughter of 
a landowner of the region must have been a factor behind 
the action of the soldiers of the Armeniac theme. But 
it is also likely that the soldiers, or at least the 
majority of them, did not like Irene simply because she 
was a woman. Finally, the arrogance of the eunuch 
Stauracius, might have been a sufficient reason in itself 
for the rebellion of the army of the Armeniac theme. In 
reference to that, one needs only to remember that already 
in the year 782 Tatzatius the strategos. of the Boukellarion 
theme deserted to the Arabs and this flight was caused 
by his dislike of Stauracius. 
1 At any rate., what seems 
to be of more significance, is that the opposition against 
Irene spread to the whole of the Asiatic army which, putting 
aside her claims, declared Constantine as sole ruler of 
Byzantium. At that stage (October 790), Irene seemed 
to have lost the throne for ever and she therefore left 
the imperial palace. It appears, however, that 
Constantine was not""Strong enough character to keep his 
mother away from power for long. Less than two years 
later,, supporters of the Empress managed to persuade the 
young Emperor to allow his mother to come back to the palace 
andSu& sequently to power,, too. The events which followed 
in the course of the next five years and especially what 
happened in August 797 showed that Constantine VI did not 
understand the character and the aspirations of his mother 
1. Theophanes 1, p-456. 
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at all and, by permitting her to return to palace, he 
made a mistake with fatal consequences for himself. Had 
Constantine been a strong ruler, he could, even with his 
mother next to him, have managed to control the situation 
and check Irene's activities. But the young Emperor did 
not have the abilities and the courage required by 
circumstances. Nevertheless, by putting aside the 
eunuchs favoured by Irene, 
' Constantine VI does seem to 
have strengthened his hold over the key posts of the 
government and of the army. Judging from the case of 
Michael Lachanodrakon, who is well known to have been one 
of the Emperor's very close collaborators.. 
2 
one might 
assume that Constantine relied on persons who had started 
their career during his grandfather's or his father's 
reigns. 
3 
In regard to the relations between Byzantium and its 
neighbours, the prestige of Constantinople was decisively 
damaged, by a campaign which Constantine undertook in the 
summer of the year 793 against the Bulgars. The total 
defeat of the Byzantine army near the border outpost of 
Marcellae, became even more sensational, because the 
Emperor himself deserted the battlefield and many of the 
prominent leaders of the imperial army were captured. 
4 
After such shameful behaviour, even his close supporters 
must have become disenchanted with the young Emperor. Thus 
the outbreak of a conspiracy in favour of his uncle 
Nicephorus, the eldest of the five surviving sons of 
Constantine V, did not come as a surprise to anyone. But 
the Emperor, as if expecting such a movement, reacted 
1. Theophanes 1, p. 466. 
2. ibid. 
3. P. Speck, Kaiser Konstantin VI (2p. cit. ), p. 237. 
4. Theophanes 1, pp. 467-68. 
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immediately and decisively: Nicephorus was blinded and 
the tongues of the rest four of the Emperor's uncles 
were slit. 
1 
It would seem that at that time, Irene had already 
overcome Constantine in their struggle for supreme power. 
There can be no other explanation for the fact that 
Alexius Mousele, the strategos of the Armeniac theme, 
who more than two years? te'ý ..... 5t had supported Constantine 
against his mother., was now deprived of his eyesight. 
According to Theophanes, the blinding of Alexius was 
suggested, if not demanded, by Irene and Stauracius. 
They argued that Alexius was about to be proclaimed an 
emperor and, therefore, if Constantine VI wanted to sit 
safely on the throne, he ought to deprive Alexius of his 
eyesight. 
2 The army of the Armeniac theme rebelled against 
the central government and Constantine found himself in 
the humiliating position of undertaking a campaign against 
his previous supporters. The cruelty with which he put 
down the rebellion proves that Constantine had become a 
mere pawn in the hands of his mother. She had managed to 
deprive her son of any support either from the army or 
from populace (793). 
However, what seems to have given the final blow to 
Constantine VI's popularity, was his second marriage. In 
January of 795, the Emperor divorced his wife Maria, whom 
he forced to become a nun. A few months later (August 
of the same year), a lady-in-waiting (Wo%j6jKovAcxpe,, cx) 
of the Empress Irene, called Theodote, became Constantine's 
fiancde and augusta and in September, Constantine celebrated 
his notorious second marriage. If the duration of the 
celebration (Theophanes says it lasted fifty days! ) 
3 
was 
1. Theophanes 1, p. 468. 
2. ibid. It reads"... E To i I 5TOV 
3. ibid. , p. 470. 
%V cb, 
.0o vrcx "', 
w% E-34 IM6%At-CX 
(X&Izv 
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probably a provocation to public feelings, the second 
marriage itself, while the first and lawful wife of the 
Emperor was still alive, was definitely considered to 
have been a real scandal. With such an abuse of authority, 
the Emperor alienated the 'Rigorists', i. e. those who 
demanded the application of the canon law to everybody and 
to every case. At a time wken this part of population was 
either headed, or simply influenced, by dynamic monks 
such as Plato of Sakkoudion or later his nephew Theodore 
of Stoudios, the damage which the second marriage of 
Constantine VI did to the unity of the Byzantine society 
in 795 was too big to be healed in the near future. Thus 
the unity between the different religious factions in 
Byzantine society, achieved by the seventh oecumenical 
council in 787, was partly destroyed eight years later by 
the second marriage of the young and inexperienced Emperor 
Constantine VI. More important, the irregularity in 
the 'adulterous' 1 marriage of Constantine, gave ground for 
another irregularity to +oLke. pd'*c(, a, for the Empress Irene 
was able to use Constantine's second marriage as a good 
pretext to blind her son two years later (August 797). 
During the period 797-802, Irene ruled alone with the 
help of her eunuchs. It was the first time in Byzantine 
history that a woman became the sole ruler of the Empire, 
not as a guardian for a young emperor, but as the only 
ruler. Irene realized that by assuming the supreme power 
in Byzantium, she had broken a long Roman tradition, which 
required that a man be the head of the state and at the same 
time the head of the army. That is why in the acts of 
1. The words ý&Olx%lxt VAO % x-O s etc., by which the monks 
characterized the Emperor's second marriage, do not seem, 
however, to have been used before the later's blinding 
and deposition in 797. 
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her government, she is called 
got 6% A rr*v' s instead 
of the more appropriate 4(: t&% 
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Irene had been in power for only two months, when a 
conspiracy, again in favour of the imprisoned sons of 
Constantine V, took place (October 797). The movement 
was revealed in time and put down by the eunuch Aetius 
who sent them into exile to Athens. 
2 About one and a 
half years later (March 799), the Slavs of mainland Greece 
under the leadership of Acamer, the archon of Belzetia, 
tried to free the sons of Constantine V and proclaim one 
of them as emperor. Irene reacted immediately and sent 
against Acamer the Patrician Constantine Sarantapechus 
and his son, the nephew of the Empress, the Spatharius 
Theophylactus. The two men managed to catch the 
ringleaders of the conspiracy and deprive them of their 
eyesight. 
3 
Furthermore., Theophanes lets us know that the rivalry 
between Irene's chief eunuchs, i. e. Aetius and Stauracius, 
came into open from that time. 
4 They both wanted to secure 
the throne for one of their relatives. Aetius was thinking 
of his brother Leo, whom he promoted to monostrategos, of 
the themes of Macedonia and Thrace some time between 797 
and 801. Stauracius' intentions are a bit of a mystery. 
The sources do not mention by name any of his relatives, 
whom he might have wished to elevate to the imperial throne. 
On the contrary, in the year 800, Stauracius is reported to 
have plotted to overthrow Irene, but it is not known in 
favour of whom. Theophanes narrates that Stauracius' 
1. J. and P. Zepos,, Jus Graecoromanum. (Athens 1931,1, p. 45: 
-IE4 OVcpVA0LT% To; InCKTip*6$ KcL' -roýj U-64, a wc)L* T, 2; 4x" 0V IN Vf- 
'#. AOL T -CPS E? f) I% "VA 
AliVrOS -&4X6-, k6v's: 'k See also J. B. Bury, Constitution of the Later 
Roman Empire (Cambridge 1910). p. 23 sq.; G. R'6ýs-ch, 
2, C) v0 t^ cx. IN Ot 6%A e-% Ix S% Studien zum offiziellen Gebrauch 
der Kaisertitel in spdtantiker and friihbyzant-ir-n-i-s-cNer Zeit, 
(Wien 1978), pp-110-116 and St. Maslev, 'Die staatsrechtliche 
Stellung der byzantinischen Kaiserinnen', Byzantinoslavica, 
27 (1966)., pp-322-23. 
2. T-heophanes 1, p-473- 
3. ibid., pp. 473-74. 
4. ibid., p. 473. 
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plan was revealed in time and as a result he was very 
severely wounded. Many people were hoping that he would 
14 live and become emperor, but he dLed shortly afterwards. 
This suggests that Stauracius might have thought of assuming 
the supreme power and becoming an emperor himself. Since 
a woman with only ambition as her qualification had 
already achieved it, why should a capable eunuch, like 
Stauracius, not become emperor? Though Stauracius died 
in 800, Aetius' plans were not to succeed either. One 
thing, however, remains clear: all these plots and intrigues 
can be taken to mean that in the eyes of the Byzantines, 
the roblem of the imperial office had not been solved by 
Irene assuming sole rule in 797. 
The way in which-Irene ruled and handled the various 
problems of the Empire, does not seem to have been 
successful either. In her domestic policy, trying to 
regain her lost popularity, she granted remissions from 
taxes to certain categories of people. Judging from the 
enthusiastic way in which Theodore of Stoudios welcomed 
the measures, 
2 
the monks must have been one group of 
people who benefited from these measures. A certain tax 
paid by the inhabitants of'Constantinople was abolished, 
3 
while the import and export taxes paid at the two main toll 
stations of the capital, i. e. at Abydos and Hieron, were 
reduced. 
4 Modern scholars see these economic measures as 
the result of a lax policy, which weakened the Byzantine 
economy to an unacceptable degree. 
5 P. Speck, nevertheless, 
sees these measures of Irene, not only as a demagogic policy 
1. Theophanes 1, p. 475. 
2. Theodore of Stoudios, Epist., 1,6, P. G. vol-99, cols 929 sq. 
3. Theophanes 1, p. 47S: " 13VjO(VT%'O%. $ To, "vS noAt'rivCOUS (, YOEfI6OCTv CbOp*Vru 
4. ibid. r& '444cTov wta", -ro; j 'i"a; rk A*ec'2tA6v-x wvjt%fP'<%* 
'6-tt 
064160-vý% 
S. See for example, J. B. Bury, E. R. E., p. 212: G. Ostrogorsky, 
History ... (op-cit. ), p-182- 
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in favour of the iconodules, but also as an effort made 
by the Empress to meet the demands of the domestic trade. ' 
Speck's argument is based mainly on the already mentioned 
letter of Theodore of Stoudios, where a remission or, 
perhaps, an abolition of taxes paid not only at ports 
but also at road toll stations is reported to have taken 
place. 
2 In other words, as the measures are described 
by the abbot of Stoudios, they seem to have applied 
+0 
and 
to have affected sea and land trade, too. This, of 
course, might be true. The question, however, is not of 
how far people, or categories of people, stood to gain from 
the measures, but how far these remissions and abolitions 
served or damaged the interests of the state finance in the 
long term. It is mainly from this point of view that 
Irene's measures might be reckoned weak and demagogic in 
intent. 
The situation of the Byzantine Empire with regard to 
its neighbours during the last two decades of the eighth 
century had not been particularly favourable either. 
Even if the number of the Arabic raids launched against 
Byzantine territory cannot be estimated precisely, they 
were growing in number and intensity. The Greek sources, 
as might be expected, record many fewer raids than our 
Arabic ones do. However, even the latter ones do not 
agree between each other. For instance, the number of 
the incidents recorded by Tabarli is much smaller than the 
ones which we hear about from Ya'Kubi. In fact, the 
latter speaks about an Arabic raid almost every year 
during the period 780-802). 
3 The Empress Irene tried 
1. P. Speck, Kaiser Konstantin VI (op. cit. ), p-383; see also, 
S. Runciman, 'The Empress Irene the Athenian' in 
Mediaeval Women, Oxford 1978, pp. 114-15. 
2. Theodore of udios, Epistola 1,6 (loc-cit. ), 99, col. 932C. 
3. Problems connected with the sources all-d-tHe-ir better 
exploitation are discussed lengthily in. the chapter on 
foreign policies, and more precisely in the section 
under the title: Byzantium and the Arabs, pp. 247-48. 
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to avoid an open war against the Arabs by signing a peace 
treaty in the year 782. Here again, while Theophanes 
speaks only about a peace treaty signed by the two sides, 
the Arabic sources suggest that the Byzantine Empress 
undertook the obligation of paying an annual tribute to 
the Arabs. 1 It is worth noting that the young Emperor 
Constantine VI is reported to have undertaken three 
2 
campaigns against the Arabs, one of which seems to have 
been successful. 
3 
After the blinding and the deposition of Constantine 
in 797, the situation on eastern fronts remained more or 
less unchanged. It is very likely that the Arabs further 
strengthened their position, with their campaigns 
penetrating deeply into Asia Minor; in 798 as far as 
Malagina. Since from that year until the fall of Irene 
(802) our sources do not record any hostilities between 
the two sides, 
4 
one might assume that the Empress agreed 
once again to pay some tribute to the Caliphate. 
Along the northern borders of Byzantine Empire, the 
situation was no better. During Constantine V' s reign 
(741-775), the Bulgars had been repeatedly defeated, but 
they do not seem to have been totally weakened. Under 
the leadership of Cardam, they again began causing 
considerable disturbances in the northern borders of 
Byzantium. In the year 788, the strategos of Thrace, 
1. Al Tabari in E. W. Brooks: ' Byzantines and Arabs in the 
time of the early Abbasids' , E. H. R., 15 
(1900), p. 739. 
Unless otherwise stated, I refer to the Arabic sources 
by using Brooks' article. 
2. Theophanes dates these camp aigns in the years 793,795 
and 797, shortly before his deposition. 
3. The one of the ye ar 795 (Th eophanes 1, p-469). 
4. On the exceptions formed by Ya'ýUbl (E. W. Brooks, 
'Byzantines... ', (loc. cit. p. 742) and Michael the Syrian 
(J. B. Chabot, Chronique de. .. op. cit., vol. III,, p. 12), 
see the chapter o n foreign policies p-253, note 3. 
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Philetus, was defeated and killed by the Bulgars somewhere 
in the Strymon region. 
1 Four years later the young 
Emperor Constantine VI leading a campaign against Cardam, 
reached the fort of Probaton, where he met with the 
Bulgarian forces. Theophanes who reports this event 
lets us assume that the two armies did not really fight 
each other. After a skirmish which took place in the 
evening hours, the Byzantines were the first to have 
deserted the place during the night and 'returned shamefully' 
2 
because of cowardice. The Bulgars thinking probably that 
this could have been a well planned trap, did not dare to 
pursue the Byzantine army preferring the safe return to 
their territory. 3 The next year (793), Constantine again 
took the initiative against the Bulgars. He reached and 
rebuilt Marcellae, a very important fortress at the borders 
with Bulgaria. The consequences of the total defeat of 
the Byzantine army which followed 
4 
seem to have been 
enormous, not only because the Byzantines lost a very 
strong outpost on their northern borders, but also and 
mainly because, to some extent, it proved Byzantium's 
incapacity to defend its northern border line properly. 
It would seem that the Bulgars realized this weakness and 
tried to exploit the situation by becoming more and more 
aggressive towards Byzantium. Cardam's strong position is 
proved by the message he sent three years later (796) to 
Constantine VI. According to Theophanes, the message was 
presumptuous, saying: 'Either you pay me tribute, or I will 
reach the Golden Gate and I will ruin Thrace'. 
5 It is 
1. Theophanes 1, pp. 463-64. 
2. ibid, p-467- 
3. ibid. 
4. For the consequences of that defeat of Constantine VI 
for his own popularity among the army and the populace 
cf. above P-63. 
S. Theophanes 1, p-470- 
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true that Constantine's reply to such a demand was equally 
proud. Furthermore, the Emperor did not wait for the 
Bulgarian Khan to attack Byzantine provinces, but he 
himself led an army against the Bulgars somewhere near 
Versinicia. For a period of seventeen days, Constantine 
kept challenging the Bulgarian army, but Cardam carefully 
avoided a battle. 
1 Finally the two armies returned to 
their territories without having clashed and thus the 
situation at the borders between Byzantium and Bulgaria 
remained unclear. Theophanes who is almost our only 
source for events in the region, does not record any 
further incidents during the sole reign of Irene and the 
first four years of Nicephorus' reign. It would seem that 
during this period, the Bulgars were occupied with the 
succession to Cardam, as well as with the war against 
the Avars in central Europe. 
2 
Finally the relations of Byzantium with the Franks 
during the period 780-802 went through a more dramikic 
fluctuation than the ones with the Arabs or even the Bulgars. 
Already one year after the death of Leo IV (780), 
ýis 
widow Irene, acting on behalf of her son Constantine VI, at 
the time a child of eleven,. tried to build strong 
connections between the Byzantine Empire and the rising 
power in the West. She made arrangements for a betrothal 
of the child Emperor to the daughter of Charlemagne Rotrud 
j? -j The agreement was concluded and an educated 
eunuch., named Elissaios, was left at the palace of 
Charlemagne in order to teach the young Princess the Greek 
language and introduce her to the habits and customs of the 
1. Theophanes 1, p-470. 
2. For the elevation of Krum and the expansion of the 
Bulgars to the West, see the chapter on foreign policies 
(section C., Byzantium and the Bulgars) , pp. 288-89. 
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Byzantine court life. 
1 That betrothal, however, had no 
future. It was broken off six years later (autumn 787), 
when Irene, in her effort to strengthen Byzantine 
influence in Italy, sided with the Beneventans, who were 
enemies of Charlemagne. W. Ohnsorge, however, suggests 
that the reason why Charlemagne broke up the betrothal 
was the restoration of the icons by the Nicaean synod of 
787,2 with which the Frankish king disagreed. Less than 
six months later (spring of 788), the relations between 
Byzantium and the Franks worsened still more; to the point 
of full-scale war. Irene tried to defend Byz, -ntium's 
rights in Italy against Charlemagne's ambition, in the 
peninsula. It seems that iýe ý*ui at -Ne 1or^A1-*-J kýo'v% 
S, %eve-'. %At, had asked the Byzantine government to help him 
against the Franks. Irene promptly sent him a detachment 
of troops under the leadership of John, the Sacellarius 
and Logothete of the Stratiotikon, with the order to save 
what he could save from Charlemagne. Theodore, the 
strategos of Sicily, had also received orders to co-operate 
3 
with John and A jot #'S. However, no matter how much 
importance the Empress of Constantinople had attached to 
this expedition, it appears that it resulted in a 
catastrophe for the Byzantine army. John himself was 
among the captives and was killed by the Franks. 
4 
For a period of thirteen years, i. e. until the spring 
of the year 801, we do not hear of any action taken by 
either side. During that time Byzantium had been mostly 
occupied with the wars on its eastern and northern borders, 
as well as with the internal rivalry between mother and 
son for the supreme power. The intrigues among the various 
1. Theophanes 1, p-455. 
2. W. Ohnsorge, Das Zweikaise 
(Hildesheim 19477, p-19. 
3. Theophanes 1, p-464. 
4. ibid. 
roblem im früheren Mittelalter 
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ambitious dignitaries and eunuchs of the court were also 
another important element of Byzantine political life 
at this time. 
In the meantime., a change at the top of the western 
church occurred. Some time late in the year 795, the Pope 
Hadrian died and Leo III succeeded him. This change, 
though totally normal, must have been of great significance 
not only for the ecclesiastical, but also for the political 
history of the period. The coronation of Charlemagne as 
emperor of the Romans at Christmas Day of 800 seemed to 
have been planned and worked out by the new Pope. In 
order to understand this, one has to consider more closely 
the events in Rome during the year previous to the 
corona-1--ion. In April 799, relatives of his predecessor, 
the late Pope Hadrian, reacted against the new Pope in ca 
strange way. They attacked Leo, they arrested him and 
tried to put out his eyes. So far as we know., their 
motives remain obscure. They definitely tried to deprive 
Leo of his papal throne, but it is not known infavour 
of whom. At any rate, the Pope asked for Charlemagne's 
help, who, punishing his enemies, reinstated him on the 
throne. Theophanes who reports the incident, suggests that, It> 
by crowning Charlemagne in 800, Pope Leo III repaid a 
favour he had received more than one year ealier 
1 from 
the Frankish king. Relying on the similarity between 
the attack against Pope Leo III and the blinding of 
Constantine VI., P. Speck considers these two events 
as being strongly interconnected and as forming decisive 
factors for Irene's sole rule and for Charlemagne's 
emperorship. 
2 But this seem to be pressing the evidence 
much too far. 
1. Theophanes 1, p. 473. 
2. P. Speck, Kaiser Konstantin VI. (. 2, E. cit. ), p. 372. 
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Unfortunately, we do not hear anything about the 
Empress Irene's immediate reactions, if there were any, to 
the shocking news that a second Roman emperor had been 
proclaimed in the West. As for Charlemagne himself, he 
seems to have been very careful in handling the situation 
created by the events of Christmas Day 800. A few months 
after his coronation (early in the year 801), Charlemagne 
was planning a naval attack of Sicily, but then, on second 
thoughts, he abandoned these plans and decided to adopt a 
more effective policy. It was already summer or early 
autumn of 802 when the delegation of Charlemagne reached 
Constantinople. Their proposal for a marriage between 
the Frankish Emperor and the Byzantine Empress, so that 
the eastern provinces (, xc'3L t`%j-p? oL ) could be joined to the 
western ones (-r4'ýL 'i"(pne"p i (m ). was really very tempting to 
Irene. Had Aetius not prevented the marriage, the 
ambitious Empress would have accepted the proposal. 
1 
But, as has already been said, the powerful eunuch wanted 
to secure the Byzantine throne for his brother Leo. 
2A 
marriage of Irene to Charlemagne would have ruined Aetius' 
plans. However, it would be more appropriate to suggest 
that Aetius was not the only person at Byzantine court who 
was opposed to the marriage. It is very likely that 
other officials at Byzantium for various reasons were 
also strongly against it. To the eyes of the proud 
Byzantines such a union would have been very humiliating 
for the eastern Empire. They would not have minded, of 
course., if a Byzantine prince was about to marry a Frankish 
princess, but the case which was now before them was just 
the opposite. A very ambitious Frankish emperor wanted 
1. Theophanes 1, p-475- For a discussion on this delegation, 
cf. W. Ohnsorge, 'Orthodoxus Imperator. Vom religi6sen 
Motiv fUr das Kaisertum Karls des Groýen', in his 
Abendland und Byzanz (Darmstadt 19S8). p. 73; P. Classen., 
Karl der Grosse, das Papstum... (qE. cit. ), pp. 60-62; 
S. Runciman, 'The Empress Irene the A-THenian', (loc-cit. ), 
(Oxford 1978), p-115; J. B. Bury, E. R. E., p. 5. 
2. Theophanes 1, p. 475. 
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to enlarge his Empire, this time by peaceful means. 
The Byzantines were probably afraid that their Empire 
was in danger of being absorbed by their western rival. 
Therefore., it appears that from the very moment the arrival 
and the purpose of the Frankish delegation was known, the 
machinery for the dethronement of Irene was put into 
operation. In such circumstances the deposition of the 
Empress must have surprised nobody. But who was to be 
appointed as Irene's successor? Now that Stauracius was 
dead, one would have expected the powerful eunuch Aetius to 
elevate his brother Leo to the imperial throne. However, 
Aetius did not have enough support from the officials for 
such an enterprise. They seem to have had their own 
reservations about Aetius and his family. Some of them 
might have been sympathizers of the late Stauracius and 
therefore opponents of Aetius. The memory of their 
leader and the way in which he was killed were, no doubt, 
still fresh in their mind. Other dignitaries of the court 
were certainly disappointed by Aetius' inappropriate 
behaviour against them. According to Theophanes, after 
Stauracius' death, Aetius became too arrogant and kept 
insulting and humiliating other court officials. it 
would seem that such provocative behaviour on the part of 
an eunuch, not only speeded up the procedure for the 
dethronement of Irene, but also turned the preference of 
the electoral body towards Nicephorus, whose candidature 
was thus greatly strengthened. Therefore, no matter how 
well Nicephorus himself had paved his way to power, it 
appears that circumstances and coincidences also favoured 
his elevation to the imperial throne. 
1. Theophanes 1, p. 475. 
7S 
But who was really behind the fall of Irene and the 
elevation of Nicephorus? The Empress' failure to exercise 
any firm policy over domestic and foreign affairs does 
not seem to have caused very much anxiety among the 
populace. In reference to that, one needs to remember 
that Irene's supporters, the monks, were always at her side, 
ready to influence the people in favour of the Empress by 
reminding them of her role in the restoration of the icons. 
Furthermore, a certain part of the population were 
probably pleased with the fiscal remissions introduced 
by Irene in the course of the previous year. Therefore 
it becomes clear that the populace did not play any role 
in the Empress' dethronement. Theophanes is, more or less, 
specific about its organilers. It was a, coup dletat 
planned and executed entirely by high rank officials in 
the court and in the army. By saying that it was carried 
""v -Teý- imp. out by the I. I )c o"i T er the chronicler 
probably means all those who still had some power and some 
influence over political and military affairs (i. e. the 
important officers and dignitaries). Among them, the key 
figure was probably the Domestic of the Schools Nicetas 
Triphyllius who, two years before, had been Aetius' main 
partisan in the latter's rivalry with Stauracius. 
2 it 
appears, however, certain that, -by now, Nicetas 
had broken 
with Aetius and decided to destroy the plans and the 
ambitions of the influential eunuch. But what were the 
reasons for this conspiracy against Irene? It does not 
seem to have anything to do with the unlucky Constantine VI 
who seems to have been forgotten after 797. Nor does the 
rivalry between Stauracius and Aetius seem to have been a 
1. Theophanes 1., p. 475. 
2. ibid. , p. 474. 
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factor, since it had come to an end with the death of the 
former two years earlier. There is absolutely no 
evidence to suggest that the conspirators who backed 
Nicephorus I had been partisans of Stauracius. In fact, 
the very reverse, since two of the conspirators, as we 
shall see, had been opponents of Stauracius. According 
to Theophanes the real reason behind the conspiracy was 
Aetius' abuse of power and his desire to make his brother 
emperor. The plot had already been hatched before the 
arrival of the Frankish envoys with their famous marriage 
proposal, which Irene was apparently inclined to accept. 
This was not to the liking of Aetius, as it was a threat 
to his ambitions for his brother. The conspirators behind 
Nicephorus I were forced to put their plan into immediate 
operation., not so much because they opposed a possible 
marriage alliance with the Franks, more because they feared 
that Aetius would overthrow Irene, before they could do so. 
But such precipitate action may mean that Nicephorus was 
a last minute choice, and those who appointed the new 
Emperor meant him to be a mere figurehead, while the real 
power would still be exercised by them. It seems that 
this last point would provide us with some explanation for 
the internal unrest attested during the first months of 
Nicephorus' reign. In other words, events such as the 
death of Nicetas Triphyllius in April and the rebellion of 
Bardanes Turcus in July 803 should be seen as a result of 
the Emperor's failure or refusal to meet the demands of 
those who elevated him to the imperial throne a few months 
earlier. Returning to the plot itself, it can be argued 
that it was not so much a conspiracy against the Empress 
Irene, who was very ill anyway; 
' it was more an action 
against Aetius' specific plans and aspirations. 
1. Theophanes 1,474 and 478. 
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The dethronement of Irene occurred on 31 OCýOber 802 
1 
and it was more or less well organized. Theophanes names 
six patricians who participated in the move, among them, 
Nicetas, the already mentioned Domestic of the Schools 
2 
and 
the Quaestor 3 Theoctistus. Two other participants, the 
Patricians Peter and Theodore Camulianus, are known to us 
from the year 790. At that time., they supported the 
Emperor Constantine VI's efforts to get rid of the then 
powerful eunuch Stauraciu. s. As we have already seen 
above, 
4 their plan was revealed in time to Stauracius, 
and as a result the Emperor himself was flogged and these 
two Patricians were insulted and dismissed from their posts. 
5 
It would seem that by participating now in the Empress' 
dethronement, these two Patricians took revenge on behalf 
of Constantine VI for the events of the year 790 and, of 
course, for those of August 797. 
According to Theophanes these six Patricians cheated 
the guards of the Great Palace by saying that Irene herself 
had sent them to elevate Nicephorus to the throne, just 
because the Empress could no longer stand Aetius' demands 
for the elevation of his brother Leo to the throne. 
6 Irene 
was taken by surprise. Some of those involved in her 
deposition were among her previous close collaborators. 
These dignitaries went over to Nicephorus, not 'because of 
1. Theophanes 1, p-476- 
2. On the dignitary of the Domestic of the Schools cf. 
J. B. Bury, The Imperial... (ap. cit. ), pp-49-57. In the 
Kletorologion of Philotheos, he is fifth in the list of 
high officials of Byzantium. 
3. On the Quaestor sacri palatil see also J-B. Bury, 
E-cit. ), p-73-77. In the already The Imperial... (2 -F 
mentioned list by Phflotheos he runs thirty fourth. 
4. Cf. above, p. 60. 
S. Peter was at that time magister (Theophanes 1, p-465). 
6. Theophanes 1, p. 476. 
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avarice', as our main source for the events suggests, 
1 
but for the common good. Furthermore, Theophanes speaks 
of a dialogue between the deposed Empress and the new 
Emperor Nicephorus. The conversation took place the 
day after Nicephorus' elevation and the chronicler records 
it, in order to indicate that rumours about Nicephorus' 
plans to dethrone Irene had previously reached the Empress' 
ears on many occasions, and, although she could have 
had easily killed the ambitious Logothete, she did not do 
So. 
2 However, in reference to such hypothetical plots 
on behalf of Nicephorus, one can argue that they never 
really occurred. They are probably Theophanes' invention, 
in his effort to illustrate Irene's character in contrast 
to that of Nicephorus, whom the chronicler wanted to 
denigrate. We reach this conclusion by taking into 
account Irene's brutal actions against the unhappy sons of 
Constantine V. She clearly had no compunction in dealing 
with any threat to her position. After her dethronement, 
Irene was sent into exile, first in the Prince's island 
called Proti, and later to the island of Lesbos, where 
she died shortly afterwards (August 803). 
3 
Unfortunately, very little is known about the background 
of the new Emperor. It is of interest that four of our 
sources present Nicephorus as being of Arabic origin. 
They all suggest that this Byzantine Emperor was the 
descendant of a noble family, perhaps even the Ghassanids, 
and that for various reasons his ancestors deserted the 
Arabic land and went over to Byzantine territory 11 the 
province of Cappadocia. There they became Christians. 
1. Theophanes 1, pp-476-77. 
2. ibid. p. 478. 
3. "i"Fli-d .p. 480. 
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Judging from this unanimity, one would be tempted to 
argue that these four authors derive their information 
from the same source and if we believe Tabarl, that source 
must have been a Greek one. Tabarl says that 'the 
Romans record that this Nikephoros was a descendant of 
Gafna of Ghassan'. 
1 There is, however., one point on 
which these reports do not agree. This is the name of 
Nicephorus' hypothetical ancestor who abandoned the Arabic 
territory and fled to the Byzantine Empire. Thus Michael 
the Syrian traces the origins of Nicephorus' family to a 
certain prince from Yemen, named Djabalah, who was first 
Christian, then in Mohammed's time became Muslim and 
finally crossing the Byzantine borders returned to 
Christianity and settled himself in Cappadocia. 
2A 
similar story is reported by Bar Hebraeus, in whose record 
nevertheless, Nicephorus' ancestor is named Cabbala. 
3 
Finally the Arab historian Mas'udi expresses two 
possibilities: according to the first, the Emperor 
Nicephorus was a descendant of the family of Djafnah the 
Gassanid, which sometime in the past had become Christians. 
4 
The second suggests that Nicephorus' ancestors were 
Christians who emigrated from Mesopotamia to the Byzantine 
Empire. 5 If one can trace some elements of truth in 
these reports, then it might be assumed that the new 
Emperor's far ancestors had been perhaps Christian Arabs. 
The Arabic descent of the Emperor under consideration 
is not reported by any known Greek source, but his origin 
from the eastern provinces of the Byzantine Empire is 
1. E. W. Brooks, 'Byzantines and Arabs ... I (loc-cit. ), p-7. +.,. 2. J. B. Chabot, Chronique de Michel le Syrien, (22-cit. ), 
vol. 3, p-lS. 
3. Bar Hebraeus, (op-cit. ),, Amsterdam reprint, p. 121. 
1 Le livre de l'avertissement, (op. cit. ), p-228. 4. Mas I ud 
5. ibid. 
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suggested by Theophanes. Although the chronicler does 
not say that Nicephorus was a Cappadocian, he asserts 
that the Emperor was a close neighbour of the Athinganoi, 
who were inhabitants of Phrygia and Lycaonia. 
1 Therefore, 
it would be reasonable to believe that the person who in 
October 802 rose to the supreme power of the Empire, was 
a Cappadocian, Such an assumption would be in line with 
Michael the Syrian's opinion on the background of 
Nicephorus. 2 
However, more important than his origin, is the post he 
was holding before he became an emperor. He was General 
Logothete 3 and it appears that his service in this crucial 
section of the Byzantine government had made him an expert 
on fiscal and economic issues. For how long he had served 
in that post, is not known. Certain factors, nevertheless, 
provide us with some clues that Nicephorus, before 
becoming emperor, had already served the Empire for a 
long time: the first hint in this direction is provided 
by the fact that no other General Logothete is mentioned 
for a period of more than twenty years (780-802). The 
second piece of information is again provided by our two 
Syrian sources, i. e. Michael the Syrian and Bar Hebraeus. 
The latter, in this case, seems to have copied Michael. 
These two sources narrate that, when Abd al-Malik, an Arab 
commander 'entrusted with war against the Byzantines', 
4 
1. Theophanes 1 p-488. 
2. J. B. Chabot, Chronique Michel ... (2R. cit. ), vol-3, p. 12: 
"... Alors les Romains voulurent faire re'gner sur eux 
Nicephorus le Logothýte, Cappadocien". 
3. On the post of General Logothete see J. B. Bury, 
Imperial... (22-cit. ), pp-86-90; F. D61ger, Beitrdge 
zur Geschichte ... (pp-cit. ), pp-19-21 and 47-91. He 
supervised and collected the taxes of the Empire; see 
also, G. Millet, 'L'origine du. Logothbte General, 
M61anges d1histoire du Moyen Age,. Offerts ýL M. F. Lot 
(Paris 1925) , pp. 563-73. 4. J. B. Chabot., Chronique Michel. (op-cit. ), vol. 3, p-15. 
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heard about Nicephorus' elevation to the imperial throne, 
he asked Elpidius, the ex-strategos of Sicily who had 
fled to the Arabs, 1 whether he had known anything about 
Lhe new strong man at Constantinople. Elpidius' reply: 
'If Nicephorus rules, then you should throw away the silky 
2 clothes you are wearing and be prepared for war'. The rý-atd; -, es. ý 
and mainly the certainty of this reply might be taken to 
suggest that Elpidius himself had experience of Nicephorus, 
abilities and qualifications and that he had not simply 
heard about him from somebody else. Now, keeping in mind 
that Elpidius had been named strategos of Sicily in the 
year 781 
3 
and fled to the Arabs about one year later, 
4 
one might be entitled to argue that already from that 
time, Nicephorus had shown his potential and determination 
to play an important role in the public affairs of Byzantium. 
One further remark: in Byzantine history, plots, 
uprisings and rebellions are more or less a common story. 
Most of them were organized either in favour of high ranking 
military officers or of members of the imperial family, 
whose rights to the throne were considered to have been 
neglected. The events of October 802, however, form an 
exception to that rule: army officers supported the 
elevation of i. e. of somebody whose military 
background is at best questionable. To this development 
two possible explanations can be given: firstly that, as 
previous remarks suggest, the new Emperor, though a 
politician, had also the reputation as a man of a warlike 
disposition, and secondly that Nicephorus had been successful 
1. Theophanes 1, p-455- 
2. J. B. Chabot, Chronigue Michel... (op. cit. ), vol-3, p. 16; 
E. A. W. Budge, The Chronography of Bar Hebraeus, (op-Lit. ), 
Amsterdam reprint, p-121. 
3. Theophanes 1, p-4S4- 
4. ibid., p. 455- 
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in the post of General Logothete and perhaps he had 
carefully and for a long time laid his plans. Such a 
preparation must have included the creation of a good 
reputation as a competent minister of finance, and the 
establishment of strong connections with army, 
administration and court circles. 
Nicephorus was married to a wife, about whose name or 
background we do not know anything. Perhaps she was 
already dead at the time of his elevation to the throne. 
In any case, she had left him two children, a daughter, 
Procopia, and a son, Stauracius. Procopia had been 
married before her father's elevation to the throne. Her 
husband was Michael Rangabe, the future Emperor Michael I. 
Her father-in-law Theophylactus 1 Rangabe, having served as 
Drungarius of the Dodecanese under the Emperor Leo IV, 
lost his post and was sent into exile at the very 
beginning of the reign of Constantine VI and Irene, because 
he had been involved in a movement, which tried to elevate 
to the throne Nicephorus, Irene's eldest brother-in-law. 
2 
Unfortunately the motives of that plot escape us, but 
several reasons could have caused it. One needs to 
remember that members of Irene's staff had been found with 
icons during the lifetime of Leo IV, which suggests that 
her iconodule sympathies were already from that time 
common knowledge. In connection to this it would be also 
1. Masludi's (Le livre de l1avertissement, op. cit., p. 229) 
record, according to which the name of Procopials 
father-in-law was George, is not founded on any other 
data. On the contrary, the fact that Michael Rangabe 
named his first son, Theophylactus (Vita Ignatii, 
archiep, C. P. Migne, P. G., vol. 105, col-492C) forms, 
I believe, a clear indication, if not a proof, that his 
father's name was also Theophylactus; and this, of 
course, is in line with Theophanes (1, p. 454). 
2. Theophanes 1, p-454. 
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reasonable to believe that, by plotting against Irene and 
Constantine VI in 780, Theophylactus Rangabe and his 
collaborators were upholding the rights which Irene's 
brother-in-law had to the imperial throne. Their 
action against the child Emperor and his mother was perhaps 
motivated by the former's tender years and the 'Latter's 
scheming nature. At any rate, according to the tenth- 
century Continuator of Theophanes, Theophylactus 
1 
was 
recalled from exile - we are not told when - and was 
named curopalates. 
2 The important thing in this story 
appears to have been that, by giving his daughter Procopia 
as a wife to Michael Rangabe, the future Emperor Nicephorus 
established powerful connections with magnates, definitely 
capable of helping him in his aspirations. Stauracius, 
whom Nicephorus crowned as co-emperor at Christmas of 803,3 
got married to Theophand, a kinswoman of the late Empress 
Irene on 20 December 808.4 Stauracius and Theophan6 
were childless, but Procopia had given birth to five children, 
the fourth of which, Nicetas, the future Patriarch 
Ignatius, was fourteen at the time of his father's 
deposition in 813.5 This can be taken to mean that 
1. Theophanes Continuatus, ed.. I. Bekker, C. S. H. B. (Bonn 1838), 
p-3: in Vita Ignatii, (Migne, P. G. 105, col-489C). 
Theophylactus is called simply patrician. 
2. ibid., on the curopalates cf. J. B. Bury, Imperial..., 
ýa_. cit. ), pp. 33-35. According to Theophanes (1, p. 492) 
and to Vita Ignatii, (loc. cit., col. 489C), Michael 
Rangabe himself, beforý7_-Secoming emperor, held the 
dignity of curopalates in the reign of his father-in-law. 
Later, in the tenth century, it became a practice that 
the title of curopalates was bestowed only on a relative 
of the emperor (J. B. Bury, Imperial... o_E-cit., p-34). 
3. Theophanes 1, p. 480. 
4. ibid., p-483. 
S. Vita S. Ignatii, (loc. cit. vol. 105, col. 492B). According 
to his Vita, Nicetas had been put by his grandfather, 
already at the age of ten at the head of the Hikanatoi 
'a body which was created at that time' (ibid. ). For 
more about the origin of the tagma of the Hikanatoi 
cf. J. B. Bury, Imperial ... (22. Cit. ), pp-63-6T. The 
other four of Nicephorus' grandchildren were: Georgo, 
Theophylactus) Stauracius and Theophand (Vita Ignatil, 
loc. cit. col. 492A). 
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Nicephorus was not that young at the time of his 
elevation to the imperial throne in 802. Such a 
conclusion can also be derived from Nicephorus' physical 
description which is preserved in the so-called Chronicle 
of 811. The anonymous author of that short report 
attributes to the Emperor Nicephorus characteristics of 
an old person, such as a very white beard, 
1 
etc. J. B. Bury 
who, working on the age of Nicetas, has made some 
calculations, argues on good grounds that, when he 
ascended the throne, Nicephorus must have been forty-five 
at least. 
2 He was probably older. But more important 
than his age, are the problem;, domestic and foreign, 
facing the new Emperor immediately after he seiZed the 
supreme power. 
A: DOMESTIC PROBLEMS 
1. The situation in the army 
Problems connected with the army should not be limited 
only to those created by, or related to, the strategoi or 
the officers in general. We have already seen that in 
the year 787 the Empress Irene removed the tagmatic army 
from the capital and, sending them to the eastern provinces, 
replaced them with soldiers from the European themes, who 
were of iconodule convictions. One must also remember 
the brutal way in which Constantine VI treated the army 
of the Armeniac theme, simply because they had rebelled 
in favour of him and against his mother, the Empress Irene. 
All these caused division, bitterness, and disappointment 
1.1. Dujýev, 'La chronique... ' (loc. cit. ), p. 216: "Rpofiwinoy 
2 of %ý 
exwv v%o%cL t4laLt y4vtiov noAv Tl(-q A 
2. J. B. Bury, E. R. E., p-14, fl-2. 
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among the soldiers. Now., if that disappointment is 
combined with the demoralization caused by the defeats 
on the eastern and northern borders, as well as by the 
humiliating peace treaties, which Irene had concluded 
with the enemies of the Empire., one can easily see 
that the condition of the Byzantine army at the turn of the 
eighth century was far from being satisfactory. it 
hardly needs to be emphasized that the reasons which 
caused military unrest during the last two decades of 
the eighth, were not automatically removed at the beginning 
of the ninth century. Therefore one is entitled to expect 
that the same trends would normally be prolonged, not 
only into the short period in which Nicephorus I ruled, 
but certainly into much later years, let us say, into the 
whole first half of the ninth century. 
Furthermore, one cannot be sure about the extent of 
the new Emperor's military experience. This, of course, 
is of some significance, because the Byzantine emperor was 
the head of the imperial army. Some of the strategoi and 
the domestics, who were in charge of the themes and the 
tagmata, were nevertheless, ready to accept a politician 
at the top of the army. Others, however, would not 
tolerate it, and they would use the Emperor's inexperience 
of military affairs as a pretext for trying to fulfil their 
own aspirations. The rebellion of Bardanes Turcus only 
months after Nicephorus had been in office, provides a 
good example. 
Another problem was the way, in which new soldiers 
were recruited up to that time. It would seem that up 
to the beginning of the ninth century, the recruitment of 
new soldiers had been made only among those who could provide 
at least their own military equipment and in some cases a 
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horse. 1 Such a law., or a custom, discriminated against 
those who wanted to join the army, but whose poverty 
prevented them from being enrolled. This automatically 
limited the social strata from. which new soldiers were 
recruited, thus creating a source of injustice for the 
poor of the Empire. Furthermore, as J. Haldon has 
pointed out, 
2 there must have been a category of people 
who, although registered for army service, were not called 
up, or called up again, because of their poverty. Such 
problems needed to be faced and solutions found, which 
could take into account another difficulty, that of the 
shortage in military manpower which clearly existed at 
the very beginning of the ninth century. 
2. Problems caused by the Slavs of the Empire and 
especially those of the Peloponnese 
It will be demonstrated below 
3 that from the end of the 
sixth century, the Slavs were well established in various 
parts of the Empire, which were called Scla 
' 
veniae. The 
Peloponnese appears to have been heavily affected by these 
settlements. The Slavs should not be considered to have 
been real enemies of the Empire, but they formed close-k-,, + 
communities, keeping their own identity and from time to 
time rising up against the central government of 
Constantinople. Under the reign of Irene, some efforts 
had been made to bring these people under Byzantine control. 
The campaign of Stauracius, who in the year 783 reached 
1. More about the army service in Byzantium in the chapter 
on domestic policies, below, pp. 114-16. 
2. J. F. Haldon, Recruitment and Conscription ... (op-cit. ), 
pp. 50-51. 
3. Chapter on domestic policies, section under the title: 
Reconquest of Greece, pp. 123-24. 
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the Peloponnese, had been, of course, victorious. However, 
judging from the plot of Acamer, organized and put forward 
by the Slavs of mainland Greece in March of 799.1 it might 
be inferred that the Slavs of Greece had managed to 
regain their strength at a time of lax supervision of the 
peninsula by the government at Constantinople. 
3. The creation of the monastic party 
Another problem facing the new Emperor in the year 802, 
was the daily increasing influence and strength of the 
radical monks at Byzantium. The foundation of the so- 
called monastic party dates from the year 787 and, as it 
will be shown elsewhere, 
2 between the years 787 and 802 the 
monks were already demonstrating signs of their uncompromising 
attitude, in opposition to the Patriarch Tarasius' 
moderate policies. They sided with the Empress Irene 
against her son, the unlucky Constantine VI. Therefore, 
having overthrown Irene, the Emperor Nicephorus would need 
to be cautious, if he were not to provoke the monks. 
- of the Normally some opposition to his policies on the part 
monks would be expected. But the strength of their 
opposition could not have been foreseen. However, given 
the immense influence of the orthodox church on Byzantine 
society, it was likely that the division within the church, 
caused by the monks, would be reflected in Byzantine 
society, too. 
4. Fiscal and economic situation 
Problems related to the fiscal and economic conditions of 
the Empire in 802 remain to be discussed at the end of the 
1. On the movement of Acamer, see above, p-66. 
2. In the chapter on Nicephorus' religious policies, 
below, pp. 197-99. 
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list of the domestic difficulties facing Nicephorus, 
because the department of finance seems to have suffered 
more than any other sector during Irene's reign. Although 
Irene's fiscal measures 
1 have not yet been studied in any 
depth and although some good elements, such as the 
stimulation of trade, 
2 
can probably be traced in them, one 
is left with the impression that the Empress' underlying 
motives were at best questionable. Moreover, it appears 
that these were random measures, and not part of a 
concerted economic and fiscal strategy. Finally, the 
favouritism towards certain groups of population, notably 
towards the monks, can besingled out as a weak point of 
the measures. In brief, the tribute to be paid to the 
Arabs, and perhaps to the Bulgars too, but mainly the 
abolition and remission of some taxes, which the Empress 
granted to the populace in March of 801 in order to gain, 
or to regain, popularity, weakened the financial stability 
of the Empire to an unacceptable point. According to 
Treadgold's calculations Irene paid the Arabs on average 
45,000 nomismata a year for a period of twenty two years 
(780-802). 3 This would mean that the total amount of 
money she paid to the Caliphate reached 0190,000nomismata 
which was more than half of the yearly state budget at 
her time. 4 One needs only to remember that it was in 
support of Irene's minister of finance, that the plot of 
October 802 broke out, and this cannot have been a mere 
coincidence. 
1. For a more lengthy discussion of these measures, cf. 
above, pp-67-68. 
2. S. Runciman, 'The Empress Irene... ' (loc-cit. ), 
pp. 114-15; also P. Speck, Kaiser Konstantin VI 
(op. cit. ), p-383- 
3. W. Treadgold, The Byzantine State Finances ... (op-cit. ), 
p. 84. 
4. ibid., p-119. 
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B: PROBLEMS WITH BYZANTIUM'S NEIGHBOURS 
1. The situation in the eastern and northern borders 
"ý; Tf -the Empire 
Byzantine political life lacked stability during the last 
two decades of the eighth century. This had its 
repercussions on Byzantium's relations with its 
neighbouring states, namely the Arabs and the Bulgars. 
Taking advantage of the Empire's internal disturbances, 
both went on the offensive. They launched raids and 
mounted campaigns against Byzantine provinces, both in 
the East and in the North. The aim and character of 
these raids is to be discussed elsewhere. For the 
moment, it would be sufficient to say that they resulted 
in a destabilization of the whole situation there, so 
that the imperial government could not be sure about its 
eastern and northern fortresses and outposts. Though 
Constantine VI also undertook some campaigns against the 
Arabs and the Bulgars, it had become obvious that he 
intended not to attack them in their own territories but 
to stop them from invading and destroying Byzantine 
provinces and, in most cases, just to push the enemies 
beyond the borders, releasing and relieving the peoples of 
Thrace and Asia Minor from the presence of foreign troops 
there. More important,, it is tempting to suggest that 
Constantine VI's campaigns, or at least some of them, were 
undertaken, more or less, for internal consumption: 
he wanted to strengthen his cause against his mother. 
All these indicate that in the wars against the Arabs 
and the Bulgars in the final decades of the eighth century, 
the Byzantines took a defensive role and, although it 
cannot be arped that the Empire lost any specific 
provinces to these two neighbouring states, some events 
1. For these, see the relative sections in the chapter on 
foreign policies, pp-277-78 and 294-95. 
90 
and some defeats of the Byzantine army, which took place 
in Asia Minor and in Thrace, revealed a certain weakness 
and a certain inability of Byzantium to defend its eastern 
and northern territories properly. The loss of imperial 
prestige and the disadvantageous position in which the 
Byzantine Empire found itself vis-a-vis the Arabs and 
the Bulgars at the time, is, I think, well illustrated 
by the fact that both these two enemies demanded the 
payment of ri c>- x -r tDt. - tribute - if they were to stop 
invading and plundering the Byzantine provinces. It is 
also possible, at least in some cases, that the government 
at Constantinople itself offered to pay the Arabs tribute, 
in order to persuade them to withdraw their forces from 
Asia Minor. All these concessions indicate that by the 
year 802, the once powerful Byzantine Empire found itself 
in a weak position in relation to its two most powerful 
neighbours. 
2. Byzantium's situation in relation to the Franks 
The threat from the Franks was not of the same order as 
that from the Arabs and the Bulgars. The Franks were 
Christians, while the other two enemies of Byzantium weree 
Muslims or pagans. Furthermore, Charlemagne, the king of 
the Franks, managed to dominate the Italian peninsula at 
a time when the area, at least for the most part, was not 
considered as Byzantine territory any more. Furthermore, 
territorial disputes between East and West seem to have 
been solved by a treaty which had been signed by Charlemagne 
and Irene in 798. By this treaty Byzantium acknowledged 
Charles' lordship over Istria and Beneventum, while he 
probably recognized the rights of Constantinople over 
Croatia. 1 This treaty, though not reported by any Greek 
1. J. B. Bury, E. R. E., p-317. 
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source, shows that up to the end of the year 800, the 
two sides were prepared to solve their differences by 
peaceful means rather than by military confrontation. 
However, it would seem appropriate to suggest that 
such a view applies only to the period up to the events 
of Christmas of 800. It would appear that, at that date, 
a dramatic change in the relations between the two states 
occurred. From that time the Frankish Empire was not 
simply a rival power to Byzantium in its interests in the 
West. Charlemagne was probably also seen as a usurper 
of the title 'emperor of the Romans', which until that 
time had been taken to apply exclusively to the Byzantine 
emperor. The peaceful means through which Charlemagne 
tried to have his new title recognized by the eastern Empire, 
or perhaps even to become a supreme head of both the 
Empires, failed, because the hardliners at Constantinople 
proved stronger than those prepared to compromise, or 
perhaps even to yield to the aspirations of Charlemagne. 
It was the task of Nicephorus, and his government to salvage 
as much prestige as possible in the face of this Frankish 
rival. 
This provides an outline of the problems in both 
domestic and foreign affairs, with which the Emperor 
Nicephorus was faced at the time of his accession to the 
imperial throne in 802. In relation to these problems, 
P. Speck suggests that the situation of The Empire 
during the last twenty five years of the eighth century 
has been presented in more or less as negative light under 
the influence of Nicephorus' propaganda, who, in this way, 
wanted to justify his elevation to the throne in 802.1 
1. P. Speck, Kaiser Konstantin VI (op. cit. ), p. 305. 
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But, such an argument can be dismissed as having little 
foundation. There might, of course, have been some 
propaganda spread by the new Emperor, but the last person 
to have believed it, would have been our main source of 
the period Theophanes, who was strongly pro-Irene and 
fanatically anti-Nicephorus. If the Confessor had been 
persuaded by the posited propaganda, then he certainly 
would not have remained such a biased critic of all aspects 
of Nicephorus' reign. 
In the following three chapters it should become 
apparent whether tlCese problems were tackled successfully 
and whether the new Emperor fulfilled the expectations of 








1 1- Changes in the Government 
On Easter Monday 799 the Empress Irene emerged from the 
church of the Holy Apostles, 'bestowing consular favours 
lavishly'. 1 She was borne away on a gold chariot drawn 
by four white horses, which were led by four patricians: 
Bardanes, the strategos of Thrakesion, Sissinius, the 
strategos of Thrace, his brother Nicetas, the Domestic 
of the Schools, and Constantine Boilas. They were 
clearly high in Irene's favour, but with the exception of 
Constantine Boilas, of whom nothing more is heard, they 
continued to serve under Nicephorus. Two of them, the 
brothers Sissinius and Nicetas,, who were from the 
Triphyllius family, were leading members of the conspiracy 
which brought Nicephorus to the throne. Nicetas died 
six months later (30 April 803) 
2 
and it is not known who 
succeeded him as Domestic of the Schools. It is possible 
that the post was left temporarily unfilled, since Bardanes, 
the strategos. of Thrakesion, was appointed monostrategos 
of the five eastern themes. As such, he may have been 
entrusted with the responsibilities of the Domestic of the 
Schools. At the end of Nicephorus' reign the post was 
held by the Patrician Stephen. He survived the disaster, 
1. Theophanes I, p-474. 
2. ibid., p-479- 
9s 
which cost the Emperor his life., and was instrumental in 
having the Emperor's son Stauracius proclaimed emperor at 
Adrianople. 1 
Another of the conspirators who brought Nicephorus 
to the throne was the Quaestor Theoctistus. He was 
promoted to the rank of magister. 
2 By 808 the post of 
quaestor was held by Arsaber. He was probably of Armenian 
origin. The future Emperor Leo V the Armenian was his 
son-in-law. 
3A 
plot was organised in 808 in his favour. 
The conspiracy was revealed in time and the poor Arsaber, 
whom Theophanes calls 'pious' and 'most intellectual'.,, 
4 
was forced to become a monk and live in exile in Bithynia. 
S 
Since Aetius had been one of the targets against whom 
the plot of 902 had been hatched, normally we would expect 
him to have disappeared after Nicephorus' elevation to 
the throne. However, there is some uncertainty about 
the future of this eunuch., for Theophanes reports that a 
patrician, Aetius by name - we cannot say for certain 
whether it is the same person, but it is more than a 
possibility - was among those killed in the disaster of 
July 811.6 If this report is combined with what we 'nave 
already implied, i. e. that the new Emperor soon after he 
seized power broke with those who supported his coup and 
who were, consequently., opponents of Aetius, then it might 
be argued that a reconciliation took place between Irene's 
'prime-minister' and Nicephorus. If there was such a 
1. Theophanes 1, p-492. 
2. ibid. ý pp. 492 and SOO. 3. Genesius, Regnum Libri quattuor (Berlin 1978), p-16; 
Theophanes Continuatus (Bonn 1838), p-35. 
AO I Lj**T4Xr 0 %1 4. Theophanes 1, p. 483: 
"CXvjpcL f, ý6ta; Kcx% 
5. ibid. 
6. I= cl. ,p-491- 
c 
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reconciliation, it may well have been connected with the 
rebellion in 803 of Bardanes Turcus. Nicephorus had 
appointed him monostrategos of the five eastern themes at 
the beginning of his reign. These must have included 
the themes of Opsikion and AnatOlikon, which Aetius had 
controlled at the end of Irene's reign. Bardanes' 
rebellion would have brought home to Nicephorus the value 
of a reconciliation with Aetius. 
The career of the Patrician Bardanes is of great 
interest for our period. We hear about him for the first 
time in the year 796, already occupying the high post of 
the Domestic of the Schools. At that time Bardanes, 
together with the count of the Opsikion theme, were sent 
by the Emperor Constantine VI to the monastery of Sakkoudion, 
in order to arrest its abbot Plato who had strongly opposed 
and protested against the 'adulterous' second marriage of 
the Emperor-' Three years later Bardanes holding the 
post of the strategos of the Thrakesion theme was one of 
the four patricians who led the four horses of Irene's 
ceremonial chariot on Easter Monday 799.2 Bardanes can 
almost certainly be identified with Bardanes Turcus who, 
being the monostrategos of the five eastern themes in the 
spring of 803, rebelled against the central power and 
tried to overthrow Nicephorus. The rebellion failed and 
Bardanes becoming a monk asked for the Emperor's forgiveness. 
Though an amnesty was initially granted to him, later 
Bardanes Turcus had his eyesight put out by a band of Lyca- 
oniaas., whom Theophanes making a pun calls lycanthropous, 
'wolf-men'. 3 
1. Theophanes 1, p-470-71. 
2. ibid., p. 474. 
3. ibiJ., p. 480- 
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Among the dignitaries whose career had started under C) 
Irene and was prolonged into the reign of Nicephorus, the 
Patrician Peter has also to be mentioned. According to 
the Greek Menologia, Peter, having served as Domestic 
of the Schools under Irene was later transferred by Nicephorus 
I to the office of Domestic of the Hiýanatoi, participated 
in the fatal battle of July of 811, survived it and later 
becoming a monk founded a monastery somewhere near - 
Constantinople. 1 In Theophanes also we come across a 
certain patrician called Peter who helped Nicephorus seize 
supreme power in 802 and later quelled a rebellion of the 
soldiers at 5ardica in 809,2 participated in the campaign 
of 811 and was among the numerous killed at that time by 
the Bulgars. 3 Theophanes, however, does not tell us in 
which post the Patrician Peter served the Empire either 
during Irene's or during Nicephorus' reign. Nevertheless, 
his exact post is less important than the fact that., 
like other high officials, Peter too, went on serving the 
Empire, regardless of the change which occurred on the 
Byzantine throne in 802. 
The case of the Patrician Leo,, brother of the eunuch 
Aetiu. 5, is even more obscure. It should be remembered that 
until the year 802 Leo had been a sort of monostrategos 
at the head of the two main European themes, those of 
Macedonia and Thrace and that Aetius intended to secure for 
Leo the imperial throne after Irene's death. 
4 Keeping 
in mind that the new Emperor adopted a policy of conciliation 
1. Nikodemou tou Hagioritou, Megas Synaxaristes (in Greek), 
vol. 2., (Athens 1868), pp-240-41; on the monastery founded 
by the Patrician Peter, cf. R. Janin, La Geographie 
ecclesiorstique, lere partie, (Paris 1953), p-415- 
2. Theophanes 1, p-48S; Peter acted together With the 
Patrician Nicephorus, of whom we do not hear again. 
3. ibid., p. 491. 
4. ibid., pp-473,475,476. 
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against all those who served his predecessor and that 
Aetius himself probably survived the change, one might argue 
that Leo too was not likely to have been dismissed by 
the Emperor Nicephorus either, In any case, he does not 
seem to be identifiable with Leo the Armenian, the future 
Emperor Leo V. If he had been, one would have expected 
Theophanes to have stated clearly either that Aetius 
was an Armenian or that the Emperor Leo V was Aetius' 
brother. To our knowledge there is no such statement 
or even a hint. But there is more: The Continuator of 
Theophanes asserts that Leo theArmenian's career until 
the year 803 had been a humble one and that his abilities 
and circumstances favoured his brilliant way to power 
afterwards. 
1 
This quick review of some high dignitaries who were 
the Emperor's collaborators after 802, suggests that 
Nicephorus did not dismiss anybody from his post for the 
mere fact that he had served under his predecessors. Some 
persons were moved, of course, from one post to another, 
but others kept their previous positions. Nevertheless, 
it has also to be stressed that a few persons were elevated 
to vital posts for the first time in their life under the 
reign of Nicephorus. Since these dignitaries enjoyed the 
Emperor Nicephorus' special confidence, their careers seem 
to be essential for the administrative structure of the 
Empire under the reign of this Emperor. 
To begin with, the Spatharius Bardanes Anemas seems 
to have been an official on whose loyalty Nicephorus could 
rely. In the year 807, the Emperor started a campaign 
against the Bulgars. When he reached Adrianople, he 
learnt that a plot was being hatched against him. He was 
of 1) 1. Theophanes Continuatus,, C. S. H. B. (Bonn 1838), p-10: ev 
I CL 0 Nrfi'gAiEnTol CVCXQ&%*%S 1<(XTCX T%AV 
-rz; v 
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forced to abandon the campaign and return to the capital, 
but not before he had sent Bardanes Anemas to Thrace in 
order to arrest some people, probably involved in the plot, 
and to collect the annual taxes. 
1 However, the most 
faithful and close collaborator of the Emperor Nicephorus 
was definitely the Patrician. and Primiscrinius Theodosius 
Salibaras. In one case (809) Theodosius revealed the 
names of the ringleaders of the uprising of the soldiers 
against the Emperor, because they did not want to work as 
masons., helping to rebuild Sardica. 
2 When, shortly before 
his departure for the fatal war against the Bulgars, 
(May 811) the Emperor Nicephorus asked the General Logothete 
Nicetas to increase the contribution of churches and 
monasteries to the public finance and to demand an eight 
year backdated basic tax from the archontes,,, 
3 
it was again 
Theodosius Salibaras who informed Nicephorus 'on behalf of 
all the populace', 
4 
about the general dissatisfaction. 
Other officials about whom we hear for the first time 
during the reign of Nicephorus are the Patricians Arsaber, 
5 
Nicetas, 6 Nicephorus, 7 Romanus 8 and Stephen. 
9 Finally the 
future Emperors Leo V and Michael II also seem to have 
1. Theophanes 1., pp-482-83. 
2. ibid., pp-485-86. More about this event see below, 
pp. 108-11. 
3. ibid, p. 489- More about that measures see below, p-143. 
4. ibid. 
S. On Arsaber and his P10-L cf. Theophanes 1, p. 483; 
R. Guilland 'Contribution a la prosopographie de llempire 
Byzantin: les patrices du regne de Leo III l'Isaurien 
(717-741) au rbgne de Michael 11 (820-29)', Byz., 40 
(1970), p. 337- 
6. The General Logothete in the year 811. He should not be 
confused with Nicetas Triphyllius who had already died 
in 803. 
7. We only know about him that in the year 809 he acted 
together with the Patrician Peter in mitigating the 
rebellion of the soldiers at Sardica (Theophanes 1, p-485). 
8. Romanus was the strategos of the Anatolikon theme in 811 
(Theophanes 1. p-491). 
9. On the Patrician Stephen cf. above, p. 95-96. 
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started on their way up by 803. They are both reported 
to have been adjutants of the Monostrategos Bardanes 
Turcus in 803. But during the latter's revolt in the 
summer of that year,, Leo and Michael abandoned his cause 
and went over to the Emperor Nicephorus. As a reward Leo 
was given the post of the commander of the foederati 
and Michael that of the comes -Tý. s Kop-rvjs (count of the 
tent). 1 Sometime between the years 803 and 811 Leo was 
once again promoted and became strategos of the Armeniac 
theme. But in February 811 he was guilty of negligence 
and not only dismissed from that post, but also condemned 
to banishment for life. 2 It was not until the elevation 
of Michael Rangabe to the throne, that Leo was recalled 
from exile. When he himself became emperor in 813, Leo 
gave Michael the Amorian the post of th, -=, Patrician and 
Domestic of the Excubitores. 
3 
The 'fresh blood' in the rank of the patricians and 
the appearance of new persons on the political scene during 
Nicephorus' reign should not surprise anybody. It came 
as a consequence: 
1) of the Emperor's. own persuasions and policies, 
the execution of which definitely needed 
officials completely dedicated to them and, 
at the same time, totally devoted to the 
ruler and 
2) of the several rebellions and plots which took 
place during Nicephorus' reign and after which 
persons involved in them were necessarily 
replaced. 
1. Theophanes Continuatus, (loc-cit. ), p-9i Genesius, 
(op-cit. ), p. 8. 
2. Theophanes Continuatus, (loc. cit. ), p. 11. 
3. Genesius (pp. cit. ), p. 10; on the Excubitores (&ji<oujjTopjq 
or . <c)u A%T co cf. J. B. Bury, The Imperia ... (op. cit. ), pp. 57-58. They formed a body of palace 
guarTs-. 
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2. Towards Innovations 
Administration in the Byzantine Empire had, outwardly 
at least, an unchanging character. Byzantines preferred 
adaptation rather than reform. It would have been 
inconceivable to suggest that this general view does not 
apply to Nicephorus' reign. If a spectacular change in 
administrative system had taken place during our period, 
the sources would not have omitted to report it. However,, 
one might argue that the fiscal reforms introduced by the 
Emperor Nicephorus should necessarily have involved 
changes in adminstration too. As a basis for such an 
argument the establishment of a new court of justice at 
Magnaura should be mentioned. We hear about this 
institution only from Theophanes who, there is no need to 
say, is trying to blacken it. It was created in the very 
first year of Nicephorus' reign 
1 
and at the end of his rejay, 
it was still functioning. Though Theophanes attributes 
the creation of this court to the Emperor's greediness and 
avarice, 
3 the chronicler lets drop the Emperor Nicephorus' 
own views on the matter. According to Theophanes, by 
creating the court of Magnaura, Nicephorus pretended to 
show that he wanted to put an end to injustice and to give 
to the poor what they deserved. 
4 The chronicler does not 
seem to doubt the Emperor's intentions. But he argues 
that the operation of the court had results ("W'S 
'T OL CC k tA (X T (X which were either disappointing 
1. Theophanes 1, pp. 478-79. 
2. ibid., p-489- 
3. 
4. 
ibid., p. 478. " AV ibid., pp-478-79; it reads-., cL 
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TZL 5%'Kc(lcx 
ý a)no*T % 
Now cx , vcj S '1,61 % ' . % >k Dej, rov '%ý VTUJ I-jpiiAOCLTCXtvLjX&e 3,, Cx T "t fvv TA41 TOVS 
% TlkA (X ct 6oA -TE wtoc, 
Ew-, PTOV CL lRcL v-l(% tk & Ti- \0*ý Kk -1 
S. ibid., p. 479. 
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or exactly the opposite of those claimed by Nicephorus. 
1 
Biased as he is against this Emperor, Theophanes says 
that the court of Magnaura was unfair, 
2 but in another 
reference to the same institution the Confessor admits 
that some of the cases brought to this court were dealt 
with justly. 
3 Furthermore, the chronicler seems to 
connect, indirectly of course, the establishment of the 
court of Magnaura with Nicephorus' fiscal reforms and he 
argues that the Emperor brought into this court all cases, 
4 'so that nobody could escape his impious doings' . The 
liveliness with which Theophanes tries to defame it, shows 
titUt4 -probably p- that it was an important ins Lon which layed 
a decisive role in the application of the Emperor 
Nicephorus' fiscal and economic reforms. Unfortunately 
we are not in a position to know the people's opinion on 
this institution, but if there was a popular outcry against 
it, Theophanes would not have omitted to include it in his 
record. But there is more: Nicephorus' successor Michael I 
is not reported to have abolished the court of Magnaura. 
He would certainly have done so, if the institution had 
been considered to have been an unpopular one. 
When evidence is provided in insufficient quantities, 
other indications need to be taken into account. In this 
case the indications are that not only did the court of 
Magnaura fulfil its objectives, but also that Nicephorus 
forced governmental officials into a more rigorous 
application of laws and decrees and into a more effective 
exercise of their own duties. In other words, the fiscal 
1. Theophanes 1, p-479- 
2. ibid., p. 478. 
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reforms undertaken by this Emperor do not inevitably 
involve changes in the general administrative system of 
the early ninth century Byzantium. They do, however, 
presuppose a greater degree of efficiency in the way 
imperial policies in various fields were carried out 
while Nicephorus I was in office. 
B: THE ARMY 
1. Military Unrest 
We have already seen that the last decade of the eighth 
century had been marked by a degree of military unrest 
which was, not simply prolonged into, but intensified, 
during the reign of Nicephorus I. This intensification 
might be partly attributed to the Emperor's ambiguous 
background, a disadvantage which Nicephorus tried to 
overcome. He took personal command of several campaigns 
against the Empire's two main enemies, i. e. against the 
Arabs and the Bulgars. Nevertheless, one somehow feels 
that our Emperor never managed to gain the hearts of the 
soldiers, who regarded themselves as professionals and 
had little time for a civilian. Certainly not totally 
irrelevant to this, is Nicephorus' constant fear of plots 
hatched against him either in the capital itself or in 
the provinces.. However, it should not be taken for 
granted that the Emperor's questionable military background 
was the only reason for the plots and the military unrest 
which can definitely be attested during the period 802-811. 
The first serious threat to Nicephorus' throne appeared 
already in the first year of his reign. On 19 July 803 
Bardanes, the monostrategos of the 'peratic' themes, i. e. 
the themes of Asia Minor 
1 
rebelled against the central 
1. Theophanes 1, p. 479; Theophanes Continuatus, (loc-cit. ), 
p-8: on the lperatic themes' cf. A. Cameron, Circus 
Factions (Oxford 1976), pp-87,90,94. 
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government and was proclaimed emperor by the soldiers of 
four Asiatic themes. 1 The fifth 'peratic' theme, however, 
the Armeniacs, remained loyal to Nicephorus. 
2 Its army 
refused to join the rest of the Asiatic themes in a 
domestic conflict. This refusal must have been the rebel's 
first disappointment. Whether Bardanes Turcus rose 
against the Emperor simply because he intended to fulfil 
his own ambition or he was forced to accept the leadership 
of the rebellion., as the anonymous author of the thirteenth 
century Synopsis Chronica seems to believe, 3 remains 
unclear. Based on a story, that Bardanes had consulted 
a monk on his prospects of becoming emperor, 
4 W. E. Kaegi 
suggests that the monostrategos 'may have aspired to become 
emperor for a long time'. 
5 However, such a story, which 
was probably invented afterwards in order to illustrate 
Leo V's and Michael II's way to power, does not provide 
solid ground for such a suggestion. The Continuator of 
Theophanes speaks of two main reasons for the uprising. 
The first one had to do with the oppressive fiscal measures 
taken by the new Emperor. The tenth-century authors 
suggest that Bardanes exploited the indignation of the 
6 
populace caused by these measures. A second reason given 
by the Continuator of Theophanes concerns the division of 
booty that Bardanes had made among the soldiers. The 
1. Theophanes 1, p-479. 
2. Theophanes Cont inuatus (loc. cit. p. 8: ", TCo-i tA (-Vt aw,; )v 
ýf wF15( O'V GTe a ZiL fp \'-') TI F% CE 4 CL 1) 
3. Synopsis Chronica, ed. by K. Sathas, in Mesai6nike 
Biblioth&kd, vol. 7, p. l29Nd-a'4ov'To 4*t6%Ae'*E 
4. On this story see Theophanes Continuatus, (loc-cit. ) 
pp. 7-8; Genesius, (pE. cit. ), pp-6-7. 
5. W. E. Kaegi, Byzantine Military ... p. 245. 
6. Theophanes Continuatus (loc. cit. ), p. 8. 
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division seems to have been made not equally among the 
participants in a battle against the Arabs, but according 
to the actual efforts of each one of them. 
' Of these 
two reasons the first one seems to be less plausible than 
the second, since it speaks of fiscal reforms undertaken 
by Nicephorus during his very first months in office. But, 
as has already been observed, it is also possible that the 
rebellion of Bardanes is connected with the death of 
Nicetas Triphyllius on 30 April of the same year. 
2 Both 
men, Nicetas and Bardanes, had been among those who 
brought Nicephorus to the throne. Theophanes says that 
Nicetas Triphyllius did not die of natural causes, but 
was poisoned by the Emperor. 
3 If this is true, then it 
would be seen that during his first year in office, 
Nicephorus deliberately broke with those who had supported 
his elevation a few months earlier and tried to establish 
himself in power and put his own people in office. Though 
the evidence for such an interpretation is limited, the 
rather curious circumstances under which Nicephorus came 
to power, as well as the succession of plots and rebellions 
hatched against him afterwards, make it very likely that 
Bardanes' rebellion should be seen as part of a reaction 
by those who felt that they had been deceived by the 
Emperor, for, instead of being content to act as a 
figurehead, Nicephorus. had taken steps to strengthen his 
hold on power and put his supporters in key positions. 
During the course of the rebellion Bardanes met with 
great difficulties. But even so the rebel advanced as far as 
Malagina and then on to Chrysopolis. Here, after eight days 
of negotiations 
4 Bardanes was rejected by the city and this 
1. Theophanes Continuatus (loc-cit. ), pp-8-9. 
2. cf. above, p-77. 
3. Theophanes 1, p-479- 
4. ibid. 
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rejection was his second disappointment. Returning to 
Malagina, the monostrategos became sceptical as to how 
useful it would have been to risk the blood of Christians 
for his sake. It was probably at this stage that 
another blow was dealt to his ambitions. Two of his 
associates,, the future Emperors Leo the Armenian and Michael 
the Amorian deserted his cause and went over to Nicephorus. 
After that it became obvious that the rebellion no longer 
had any possibility of success and Bardanes thought 
seriously of abandoning his efforts to seize power. Thus 
his revolt which lasted fifty days (until 8 September) 
finally collapsed and the Emperor promised an amnesty to 
the rebel and his followers. Here again Theophanes 
accused Nicephorus of inconsistency and argues that it was 
on the Emperor's initiative that Bardanes was later 
deprived of his eyesight by a band of Lycaonians. 
2 This 
occurred at the monastery which Bardanes had built for 
himself and to which he now retired having become a monk. 
His property was confiscated. 
3 It is certainly worth 
noting that during Bardanes' rebellion the two sides 
carefully avoided bloodshed. 
The rebellion of Bardanes was supported by the thematic 
army of Asia Minor. Another plot, however, in the year 
807 was staged by the tagmata and. the 'imperial men'. 
4 
The incident took place while the imperial army with the 
Emperor Nicephorus at its head was at Adrianople campaigning 
against the Bulgars of Krum. The motives of the plot 
remain obscure. W. E. Kaegils suggestion that by acting 
in this way the tagmata showed their resentment at 
1. For the rewards which they received for their action 
see above, P-101. 
2. Theophanes 1, p. 480. 
3. ibid., pp. 479-80. 
4. ibid., p. 482. 
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'the recent execution of the Domestic of the Schools 
Nicetas" is without foundation, in the first place 
because the death of Nicetas was not recent (he had 
died four years previously in April 803), and secondly 
because it is not clear at all whether Nicetas 
Triphyllius was poisoned by Nicephorus, as Theophanes 
asserts 
2 
or whether he d ied of a disease. At any rate, 
the plot was revealed in time and extinguished, again 
without any bloodshed. Nevertheless, the Emperor found 
it wiser not to proceed further against the Bulgars, but 
to return safely to the capital. The ringleaders of 
the plot were punished by exile, confiscations and flogging. 
3 
Unfortunately we find ourselves unable to say for sure 
whether the army forces were involved in the conspiracy 
which took place one year later, in February 808, in 
the capital itself in favour of the Quaestor and Patrician 
Arsaber and which had the same outcome as the previous ones. 
4 
However, the most open and massive opposition to 
Nicephorus on the part of the army occurred in the year 809. 
In the spring of that year the Emperor needed to rebuild 
the fortress of Sardica, which had been totally dismantled 
by the Bulgars a few weeks earlier. At first, desperate 
to have the fortress quickly and cheaply rebuilt, Nicephorus 
tried to appeal to his soldiers' patriotism. As the 
officers were on his side he prompted them to induce the 
soldiers to address the Emperor, asking for the restoration 
of the fortress. It appeared to be a spontaneous movement 
on the part of the soldiers, but in fact the Emperor himself 
was behind everything. He wanted the soldiers to work as 
masons. However, the soldiers were clever enough to 
realize what Nicephorus was 'staging' and in consequence 
1. W. E. Kaegi, Byzantine Military..., (pp-cit. ), p-247- 
2. Theophanes 1, p. 479. 
3. ibid., p. 482. 
4. ibid., pp-483-84. 
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they rose up against their superiors and the Emperor 
himself. They tore down the tents of the generals and 
the officers, and in front of Nicephorus they kept 
swearing against him and insulting him badly. 
To the refusal of the soldiers to rebuild Sardica, 
three possible explanations might be given: 
a) The soldiers did not want to restore the 
place, which was the most northerly outpost 
of the Empire and which, consequently, 
would have been very difficult to defend 
against the Bulgars. In other words, 
it was perhaps the thought of garrisoning 
the place which made the soldiecs 
irritated. The way in which 6)00 of 
their fellow soldiers had recently been 
massacred there, made it very much doubtful 
whether in their minds this place was 
worthy of restoration and defence. 
b) The soldiers wanted Sardica to be rebuilt, 
but they refused to work as masons 
themselves, simply because such a task was 
not included in their duties, and 
C) the soldiers would not have minded 
restoring the fortress on condition that 
additional pay would be given to them for 
this extra job, but they refused to 
work for nothing, 
Among these three interpretations, the last one looks most 
plausible, mainly because it seems to be closer to what 
Theophanes records. According to the chronicler, the 
soldiers, standing outside the Emperor's pavilion, were 
shouting that they would not endure his immeasurable 
avarice any longer. 
1 Their indignation was all the greater 
because a few days earlier Nicephorus had plundered Pliska, 
but had not given the soldiers their share of the booty. 
1. Theophanes 1, p. 485; the chronicler gives us the time 
of the event (tii: e-laae I r-J A" at noon) , but he does not 
provide us with the date, which would have been more 
useful for us to know. 
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At any rate, whatever the claims of the soldiers, two 
things become clear in the aftermath of this event: 
a) No matter what were the reasons for it, Nicephorus 
never managed to become popular among his soldiers and 
b) The soldiers tended to think and to act more and more 
as professionals. When they realized that their interests 
were at stake, they separated themselves from the body of 
their officers and generals and made their indignation 
very clear to the Emperor himself, whom they accused and 
insulted openly. Theophanes reports that all the soldiers 
were involved in the uprising and that this was the reason 
why Nicephorus was extremely scared of the event. 
Nevertheless on the following day the Emperor himself 
talked to the soldiers, making many promises and taking 
oaths to reassure them of his goodwill. In the meantime, 
following the Emperor's request two of the patricians, 
Nicephorus and Peter, 
1 had managed to calm the indignation 
of the soldiers. 
In any case, the Emperor does not seem to have restored 
Sardica. Although Runciman seems to have taken it for 
granted that the outpost was 'cheaply and quickly' 
2 
restored at that time, such a rebuilding does not appear 
very likely to have been done by a demoralized army. 
Theophanes asserts that the Emperor returned to Constantinople 
immediately ("-n OLp cx VT "w &1) af ter the events of Sardica, 
and it appears that he did so, because he wanted to punish 
the ringleaders, as he finally did. To suggest that the 
Emperor himself returned to the capital, but the army was 
left at Sardica with the task 4 rebuild: "the place, sounds 
unlikely. In such a case we are forced to believe that 
1. For the identity of these two patricians see: 
R. Guilland, 'Contribution ... les patrices', (loc-cit. ), 
pp-331-33. 
2. S. Runciman, The First ... (op-cit. ), p. 54. 
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the punishment was inflicted on the soldiers several 
months after their uprising, and such a punishment sounds 
improbable too. Furthermore, two years later (811) 
during Nicephorus' fatal campaign against the Bulgars, 
after having conquered and plundered Pliska for a second 
time, the Emperor was planning to march towards Sardica 
>0 11 
1 C%cvAoVA(rvaý 
ome, 4&Tv 'twc cxpJi scqs ) for a second 
time. It looks as if Nicephorus intended to deal once 
more with Sardicals restoration, which he had not managed 
to do during his first visit there in 809, because of the 
soldiers' refusal to co-operate. 
As has already been indicated, Nicephorus found it 
wiser to return to Constantinople. Nevertheless, before 
doing so, he asked the Patrician and Primiscrinius 
Theodosius Salibaras 2 to discover the ringleaders of the 
uprising, so that they could be punished for their action. 
Theophanes, of course, exploited the case in order to 
accuse Nicephorus of being inconsistent, because - we are 
told - although he had given solemn oaths not to punish 
them, the Emperor did not keep his word. When the returning 
army reached St. Mamas, a suburb of Constantinople, 
Nicephorus pretended that he wa-s going to give the soldiers 
their pay, but then punished them in different ways. 
3 
These were the cases in which the Byzantine military 
forces demonstrated their dissatisfaction and their dislike 
of the Emperor Nicephorus. A more careful look at the 
course of the events would reveal that in none of these 
crises was the right of the Emperor to lead the imperial 
1.1. Dujýev: 'La chronique... ' (loc. cit. ), p. 212- 
2. For Theodosius Salibaras see Theophanes (1,489), where the 
Patrician is called "kvý6ios 9(-f c(nwv"., good servant. 
Salibaras seems to have been a close advisor of the 
Emperor Nicephorus and a very good source of information 
for Theophanes, in regard to the court life during Irene's 
and Nicephorus' reigns (Theoph. 1,490-91). On Salibaras, 
see also R. Guilland, 'Contribution... les patrices', 
(loc-cit. ), pp-338-39; cf. also above., p-100. 
3. Theophanes 1, p. 486- 
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forces disputed. No hint of this appears in any source. 
The Emperor for his part managed to survive all three 
crucial incidents in a more or less easy way and, most 
significant, without any bloodshed. Though not popular 
among the army, Nicephorus proved to have been able to 
cope with difficult circumstances and internal conflicts 
in which military forces were involved. 
2. Reform of the System_of Military Recruitment 
At a time when Byzantium was compelled to fight on all 
fronts, Nicephorus realized that above all the Empire was 
suffering from a shortage of soldiers. The way in which he 
made good this shortage, is certainly of significance. 
According to Theophanes the Emperor introduced the 
recruitment of new soldiers from among the poor. 
1 In 
other words, people who, for various reasons, had proved 
unable to contribute to public finance, were now given the 
opportunity to join the army. They were not expected to 
pay for their military equipment nor to meet any 
obligations to pay taxes to the treasury. It was their 
more prosperous neighbours, who had to undertake the 
obligation to pay, not only the tax imposed on the land 
of the newly recruited soldiers, but also, and perhaps 
more importantly, eighteen and a half nomismata per new 
soldier recruited from the community. 
This seems to be the first time that such a measure 
was introduced into the Byzantine Empire. Although the 
reform seems straightforward enough, there are some vital 
questions to be posed. 
.0 1. Theophanes 1, p-486: "-. IIIFOGeT4Xýf- 6rtvCLTC--uEOPCXl nTWx0'ZvS KCL*'% tjonjo- 
JEHOCILi novpm TZ V CP)C%4 ? ww, TWL? e; *v-roLS it ca's. Cc vc,; L 'Clz 
"6 4) V'r v0 NA "T vj, / T; " 0 
%, )A At ýA I CL 0,47KO06ij K01  OLAkv4ryVvJS TOE 
XVNV40filctý 
It appears that the word 
; Lý\vNAqXUWS is used here for 
the first time. 
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The first question might be formulated as follows: 
what exactly did this reform entail? Was it a mil; A-tary 
or an economic measure? In other words, what was the 
Emperor trying to do: to enlarge the number of soldiers 
or to ensure the treasury against loss? It looks as if 
he aimed at and achieved both. In fact Lemerle suggests 
that the only new thing about this measure was the payment 
of the 181 nomismata to the fisc for the coverage of a 2 
new soldier's military equipment and, perhaps, his pay too. 
To support his opinion Lemerle points out that the fiscal 
solidarity of a village was of long standing, going back 
at least to the 7th century, if not before. However, it 
seems that it was more than this. As both. D61ger 
2 
and 
Haldon 3 have already observed, Nicephorus' measure should 
be regarded as an extension of the principle of fiscal 
solidarity to another category of people, i. e. to the new 
soldiers and their properties. More important., as Haldon 
has shown 'military service was owed by individuals on a 
hereditary basis with their families providing their 
equipment and mounts'. 
4 This can be taken to mean that 
before Nicephorus' measure was taken, recruiting into the 
army had been, more or less, a private arrangement. 
Therefore, it appears that. the importance of Nicephorus' 
reform lies in the way that for the first time it ties the 
system of recruiting into the village community, by 
extending the system of fiscal solidarity to recruitment 
into the army of the themes. 
1. P. Lemerle, 'Esquisse... ' Part I, R. H., 219 (1958), 
p-73- 
2. F. D61ger, Beitrage... (a. cit. )., pp. 129-30; also in 
B. Z., 36 (1936), p-158. 
3. J. F. " Haldon, Recruitment and Conscription... (. 2p. cit. ), 
p. 50, note 87. 
4. ibid., p. 48. 
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Moreover, what was army service in Byzantium? Was 
it a privilege or an obligation and, in any case, who was 
entitled or who was compelled to join the army before 
Nicephorus' reform was issued.? It seems that any peasant, 
who could afford to equip himself and to own a horse, was 
entitled to become a soldier. Since dismissal from the 
army was considered as a punishment, 
1 being in the army 
should have been considered as a privilege, at least from 
a financial point of view. Although the following 
example refers to a period a few years after Nicephorus, 
it would have been characteristic: the biographer of 
St. Euth ymius the Younger does not say what occupation 
the Saint's father, Epiphanius, was purssAing, but evidence 
appears to suggest that he had-been a soldier 0 When, 
in 834, the latter died, his wife found herself in a 
desperate situation. She wanted very much to have a 
soldier in the family and, as she could not become a 
soldier herself, she enrolled her seven-year-old son in 
the army! 
2 From that Life, it becomes clear that 
soldiers had certain privileges which St. Eutfrymius' 
mother tried to keep for her family. It also seems to 
have been a hereditary status. 
It is obvious that the restriction of self-equipment, 
mentioned above, excluded many poor people, at least until 
Nicephorus came into power, from the army. 
3 Therefore, the 
1. That kind of punishment is provided by several articles 
of Military Law, (I. and P. Zepos: Jus Graecoromanum, 
Athens 1962., vol. 2, pp. 75-94). 
2. L. Petit, ed. 'Vie et office de Saint-Euthyme le Jeunel 
in Bibliothýque_Hagiographique Orientale, vol. 5 (1904), 
P. 18. 
3. The amount of money which a new soldier had to pay in 
order to buy his own equipment seems to have been quite 
high; according to Constantine Porphyrogenitus, (De 
cerimoniis, Bonn 1829,, 1., p. 459). the cost for a horse 
during the tenth century was twelve nomismata. And this 
was not, of course, the only expense which a soldier 
had to pay. 
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provision of equipment by their neighbours can certainly 
be considered as a sufficient incentive for them to join 
the army. Consequently, by issuing this reform, 
Nicephorus enlarged the social strata, from which soldiers 
were recruited, and this enlargement seems to have been of 
vital imporance. Bratianu 
1 
considered the measure as an 
effort towards the nationalization of the army and 
consequently directed against the use of mercenaries. 
In reference to this reform, J. F. Haldon has raised an 
interesting point: he argues against Ahrweiler 
2 that 
Nicephorus did not actually enrol into the army every 
impoverished landholder who volunteered, 'an act which 
would surely have inflated the army beyond manageable 
proportions and brought thousands of totally untrained 
men into the ranks', 
3 but, by this measure, the Emperor 
tried to help those who, although already in the military 
lists, had not normally been called out for service, because 
of their poverty. This problem is brought into relief 
by an incident recorded in the Life of St. Philaretos the 
Merciful, that well known Paphlagonian philanthropist. 
As the troops of the local theme (Armeniac) were mustered, 
the horse of one soldier, Mousoulios by name, died 
unexpectedly. Mousoulios was rescued from the desperate 
situation by St. Philaretos, who took pity of the soldier 
and gave him his own horse. 
4 This would seem to show that 
during the second half of the eighth century there were 
soldiers too poor to carry out their duties effectively. 
1. G. I. Bratianu, Etudes ... (op. cit. ), p-198- 2. H. Glykatzi - Ahrweiler, 'Recherches sur 1'administration 
de llempire Byzantin aux IX-Xje siýclesl, in B. C. H., 84 
(1960)p pp. 19-20. 
3. J. F. Haldon, Recruitment... (op. cit. ). p-51, note 87. 
4. M. H. Fourmy and M. Leroy, 'La vie de S. Philarýte', 
(loc. cit -), p- 12 7. 
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But how far can we draw general conclusions from a single 
incident contained in a saint's Life? One has to be 
careful not to press the evidence too far, but much of the 
material included in this Vita shows many of the traits of 
exempla: that is to say that they were selected for their 
general interest. They reflected current concerns, 
which the Saint's foolish generosity helped to alleviate. 
That not all was well with the military organization of the 
Amatolian themes is apparent from the comparative failure 
under Irene to oppose Arab incursions into these provinces. 
Impoverishment of the theme soldiers would seem to be a 
contributory factor. It could explain the need that 
Nicephorus had to reorganize the system of financing the 
armies of the themes. His first concern was to find the 
means to support those troops already inscribed in the 
military registers, who had become impoverished, but the 
practical implications of this measure were of a different 
nature: it opened up recruitment into the theme armies 
of poor peasants generally, giving the measure the character 
of an innovation, which Theophanes was quick to denounce. 
We must now turn to the specific details of Nicephorus' 
reform. Again one might be tempted to ask: what was the 
sum of eighteen and a half nomismata paid for? Bratianu 
argues that such an amount of money was a considerable one. 
However, it depends on what expenses that sum was supposed 
to cover. Unfortunately, the sources at our disposal do 
not say anything about whether the money under 
consideration was pai. d by the neighbours (homochoroi) 
of a new soldier only once, that is to say at the time of 
the latter's recruitment, or whether it was an annual 
contribution to the treasury established by Nicephorus, 
e 
G. I. Bratianu, Etudes. wo, ýOP-cit-), p-198. 
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because circumstances were very difficult. Nevertheless, 
the second case does not seem very likely, mainly because 
the second 'vexation' is mentioned only in connection 
with the enrolment of poor people into the army, which 
enrolment, of course, happened only once for each soldier. 
The only thing that we can be sure about is that this 
money cannot be considered as price of land possibly 
abandoned by the new soldier, because a) landed property 
varied in size and fertility and b) there is not any 
evidence that the new soldiers were forced to sell their 
own property before joining the army; unless they were 
to be resettled. On the contrary, from three novels 
issued during the tenth century, 
1 
we hear that soldiers 
needed to own landed property estimated to cost at least 
four pounds of gold, which property they were not allowed 
to sell while they were serving in the army. 
Furthermore, what did the second 'vexation' mean for 
the 'homochoroil? As has already been indicated, the 
rural community did no longer remain only a fiscal unity. 
Nicephorus made its inhabitants also responsible for the 
recruitment and the equipment of soldiers, the number of 
whom probably varied according to the size of the local 
population. In other words, -the neighbours of a poor man, 
who was about to join the army, had to pay much more for his 
recruitment than for covering his debts from taxation to the 
state treasury,, which would mean that they would still have 
him among them working in his fields. They had to pay his 
obligations to the state treasury anyway, whether he was 
about to stay in the community or to join the army. In 
fact, in the second case they had to pay an extra amount 
1. a) by Constantine Porphyrogenitus, b) by Romanus II and 
c) by Nicephorus II. They all can be found in I. and 
P. Zepos: Jus Graecoromanum, (Athens 1962), vol-1, 
pp-222-23.9,240 and 256. 
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of money which was fairly high. Apart from thaL., there 
were going to be fewer manual workers in the community, 
who, nevertheless, had to do the same amount of work as 
previously. Therefore, the easiest thing for the 
community to do, was to pay his debts and have him working 
in his fields. However, they do not seem to have tried 
to keep him among them, because they did not have that 
choice. 
In brief, it seems that by this reform, Nicephorus 
gave the poor people a unique opportunity of changing their 
lives, but at the same time the measu-re was definitely an 
attack against their prosperous neighbours. It was 
justified by the circumstance that it enabled the Emperor 
to heal the shortage of soldiers from which the Empire-was 
suffering. It enlarged the social strata from which 
soldiers were recruited. One last remark: as we hear 
from Constantine Porphyrogenitus, impoverished soldiers are 
sponsored by their rich fellow countrymen ( ruv;; 0rcxt 
in the mid-tenth century, 
1 
which suggests that Nicephorus' 
measure was found to be useful and, therefore, no one of his 
successors abolished it. 
C: PROVINCES 
The need for consolidation of Byzantine control over certain 
areas seems to provide a guide to Nicephorus' activities 
in the provinces. This is most obvious in his creation of 
new themes in key areas. 
Most scholars agree that at the beginning of the ninth 
century, the number of the areas under the direct control 
1. Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De Cerimoniis, (22. cit. ), 
1, pp. 69S-96. 
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of a strategos was increased by the creation of another three 
or four new themes. The first one must have been that of 
Cephalonia. In reference to the creation of the theme of 
Cephalonia., Constantine Porphyrogenitus contradicts 
himself in two of his works: in the treatise De Thematibus 
he asserts that Cephalonia had been united with the 
Peloponnese, l while in his De Administrando Imperio he 
states that at the beginning, this island was a subdivision, 
a *To-v'qVtcx , of the theme of Lombardia and that it was not 
before the reign of Leo VI that Cephalonia with the 
surrounding islands became an independent theme unit. 
2 
It would seem, however, that Constantine Porphyrogenitus is 
wrong in both statements. In the first case, he seems to 
have been trapped into an error by the Synecdemus of 
Hierocles, according to which the island of Cephalonia 
belonged to the proconsul of Achaia. 
3 He also seems to 
have been confused by the Tactica, according to which the 
bishopric of Cephalonia belonged to the metropolis of 
Corinth. 4 Even if at an earlier time Cephalonia was 
attached to the Peloponnese, such an attachment has nothing 
to do with the creation of the independent theme, known as 
theme of Cephalonia. Constantine Porphyrogenitus' 
second statement that Cephalonia was a tourma of the theme 
of Lombardia is definitely wrong, because, as A. Pertusi 
1. Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De Thematibus, ed. A. Pertusi 
(Le Vatican 1952), pp. 91-92. 
2. Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De Administrando Imperio. ed. 
G. Morarcsik - R. Jenkins (Budapest 1949), vol-1, 
p. 236: 'cfvrýdcov lo-tv w-N Ve ocLAA v, v% cx s err vp (wr tA)ft sýA %jv -TýL Vv%, 6%, (X ,%2r% 
AV 
-To n*tAfX%4*v rrAs 'NcqcP%p&, Lf, 4FrcLy-na 7(ir -to; Aýov'iCP 
ST co 
(1P%jf*)Cip%'6'TOv f3frb(%v'TCP%) kfg'gcVdp, --- 6'TqPCXTv%h(S'* 
3. E. Honigmann, Le Synecdemos dlHiýraklýs et 11opuscule 
geographique de Georges de Chy-pre (Bruxelles 1939), p. 18. 
4. H. Gelzer., Georgius Cyprius, (Lipsiae 1890), p-75, 
(no-1578). 
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has already shown the theme of Cephalonia was created at 
an earlier time, than the one of Lombardia-' It would 
appear that Cephalonia with the surrounding Ionian 
islands formed a theme as early as the first decade of 
the ninth century. The commander of the area., at least 
at that time., seems to have had two tasks: first to 
protect western Peloponnese and the entrance of the 
Corinthian gulf from the Saracens, 
2 
and second to confront 
Pepin, the son of Charlemagne and king of Italy, in the 
Adriatic waters. It was for this second purpose that 
in the year 807, Nicephorus sent to the area the Patrician 
Nicetas as head of a Byzantine fleet, in order to restore 
Dalmatia to Byzantium. 3 Two years later, i. e. in 809, 
the strategos. Paul is reported to have arrived with the 
Byzantine fleet first 11 Dalmatia and then '1,4 Venice. 
The author of the Annales Francorum, who reports the 
arrival, does not say of which theme Paul was the head; 
4 
but under the year 810 the same source clearly states that 
Paul was Praefectus Cefaloniae., i. e. strategos of 
Cephalonia. S Therefore, it is very likely that the combined 
threat from the Arabs and from the Franks was the 
determining factor behind the creation of the theme of 
Cephalonia during the first de. cade of the ninth century and 
most probably some time between the years 807 and 810.6 
1. Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De Thematibus, (2E. cit. ). p-174. 
2. An Arabic fleet is reported to have appeared in front of 
Patras in the year 807. (Constantine Porphyrogenitus, 
De Administrando Imperio, 9E. cit. , 1, p-228. ) 3. Annales Francorum, ed. by R. Rau, Quellen zur... (op. cit. ), 
p-84: 'Classis a Niciforo imperatore cui Niceta 
patriclus praeerat, ad reciperandam Dalmatian mittitur'. 
4* ibi .. P. 9o. 5. Tbid., p-94. 
6. Other scholars such as D. Zakythinos (ILe th6me de 
Cdphalonie et la defense de 110ccident', L'Hellenisme 
Contemporain, 8,1954, p-312), and M-V. Anastos, 
('Iconoclasm and Imperial Rule', C. M. H., 4A, p. 92) and 
J. Ferluga ('Sur la date de la Creation du th6me de 
Dyrrachium', Actes du XIIe Congr. Internat. des Etudes 
Byzantines., Beograd 1964, p. 84) also date the crea-E-16-on 
of the theme of Cephalonia at the time of Nicephorus' 
reign. 
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Several scholars attribute the creation of the theme 
of the Peloponnese also to the reign of Nicephorus I. 
J. B. Bury, 1 for example, argues that such a creation was 
caused by the Siavonic revolt which took place at Patras, 
while M. Dunn dates the creation to 805 and sees it as a 
preliminary action to Nicephorus' invasion of Bulgaria in 
807.2 Bury's statement that the theme of the Peloponnese 
is mentioned for the first time in Scriptor Incertus, 336, 
(A. D. 813) 3 does not seem to be based on solid evidess(e, since 
a strategos is mentioned stationed at Corinth already 
during the siege of Patras by the Slavs, an event which 
must have taken place some time between 806 and 807.4 
R. Jenkins also dates the theme of the Peloponnese to the 
reign of Nicephorus 1,5 while A. Bon agrees, though not 
directly, with such a dating. 
6 Finally, W. Treadgold 
also thinks that the creation of the theme of the 
Peloponnese should be ascribed to the Emperor Nicephorus 1.7 
There seems little doubt that the creation of the theme 
of the Peloponnese must be dated to the reign of 
Nicephorus I. Such a creation, after all, would be in 
line with his special interest showed to this area. 
Unfortunately the date of the creation of the themes of 
Thessalonica and Dyrrachium cannot be fixed precisely. 
The theme of Thessalonica is mentioned for the first time 
around 836 in the Life of St. Gregory the Decapolites, 
8 
1. J. B. Bury, E R. E., p. 224. 
2. M. Dunn, 'Evangelisation... (loc-cit. ), p-74. 
3. J. B. Bury, E. R. E., p-224, note 2. 
4. P. Lemerle, 'La chronique improprement... ', (loc. cit. ), p. 10. 
S. R. Jenkins, Byzantium: The imperial ... (pp. cit. 
T, pp. 92-93. 
6. A. Bon., Le P61oponnýýse Byzantine jusquIen 1204, Paris 
1951, P-89. 
7. W. Treadgold, Byzantine State Finances... (op. cit. ), p. 71. 
8. F. Dvornic, La vie de Saint Gregoire le Decapolite et 
les Slaves Maa-cedoniens au IXe siZýcle (Paris 1926), 
pp. 36 and 62 sq. 
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arid that of Dyrrachium in the 
' 
Tacticon of Uspensky, 
composed between the years 845 and 856.1 F. Dvornik 
suggests that the theme of Thessalonica was created during 
Nicephorus' reign, 
2 
and that of Dyrrachium at the time of 
Theophilus (829-842). 3 Ostrogorsky, though not committing 
himself to an exact date for the creation of the two 
themes, says that they must have been created together 
4 
and he seems to propose as the time of their creation the 
beginning of the ninth century. 
5 M. V. Anastos thinks 
there is a strong possibility that the creation of the 
two themes goes back to the reign of Nicephorus 1.6 
Finally J. Ferluga, thoigh not committing himself to a 
definite date for the creation of the theme of Thessalonica, 
suggests that the theme of Dyrrachium was created by 
Nicephorus I, in order to form a solid Byzantine basis at 
the entrance of the Adriatic Sea. 
7 
Problems associated with the creation of the theme of 
Strymon seem to be much more complicated. The history 
of the region has been studied by P. Lemerle 
8 
and by 
M. Rajkovic. 9 Lemerle does not date the creation of the 
theme of Strymon before the middle of the ninth century. 
1-. N. Oikonomidýs, Les Listes de Presdance Byzantines des 
IXe et Xe Sibcles (Paris 1972T) p-49- 
2. F. Dvornic, ' Les 16gendes de Constantin et de M6thode 
vues de Byzance, Byzantinoslavica, Supplementa, 1, 
Prague 1933, p. 99. 
3. ibid., p. 12.. 
4. G. Ostrogorsky, History... (op-cit. ), p. 194, note 4. 
S. ibid. 
6. M. V. Anastos, 'Iconoclasm... (loc. cit. ). p-92- 
7. J. Ferluga, 'Sur la date de la c. 'reation du thbme de 
Dyrrachium', Actes du XIIe Con rYs-International des 
Etudes Byzantii-n-es II, Beograd 1964, p-92- 
8. P. Lemerle, Philippes et la Mace'donie orientale, Paris 
1940.9 127 
9. M. Rajývic-,, *'La r6gion du Strymon et le theme d% Strymon', 
Sbornik Radova, 5 (1958), p. 7. Of the article, written 
in Serbo-CTo-at, I have consulted only its summary in 
French. 
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Rajý'ovi ' c agrees with Lemerle but at the same time he 
admits that between the years 809 and 812 Byzantium 
showed a particular interest in the region. However., 
one might add that such an interest was shown in the region 
of Strymon before the year 809. As we will see elsewhere, 
OL Byzantine army was stationed there at least as early 
as 808.1 There is even an unnamed strategos. mentioned 
there for that year. 
2 But, since the region of Strymon 
as a theme unit fails to appear in the early 
, 
Tactica, 
it would be more reasonable to suggest that at the time of 
Nicephorus I, the district of Strymon still formed a 
Kleisoura. 3 
These scattered pieces of information on the creation 
of new theme units during the re; i,. gn of Nicephorus I, provide 
circumstantial evidence that our Emperor took particular 
pains in strengthening several key regions by promoting 
them into independent military units. These were in the 
European provinces of the Empire, and this interest 
coincided with the Emperor's sensitivity on the Slavic 
issue. But more on Nicephorus' rection to the threat from 
the Slavs will be included in the following section. 
D: RECONQUEST OF GREECE 
The demographic conditions in Greece had been bad since 
the last years of the sixth century. It was in the sixth 
year of the Emperor Mauricius' reign that the Slavs flooded 
into many parts of the peninsula. From the so-called 
1. On this cf - below, p-129. 2. Theophanes, 1, p-485. 
3. A. Toynbee (Constantine 
- 
Porphyrogenitus and his World, 
London 1973, p-268) actually points out that the area 
of Strymon must have been a kleisoura already since 
the reign of Justinian II and more preci5wly since 
688-89. 
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chronicle of Monemvasia, we learn that the Slavs of the 
area were not subject either to the Byzantine Emperor 
or to anybody else. 
1 The region most seriously affected 
by Slavonic settlement seems to have been the Peloponnese, 
where the Slavs remained for some two hundred and eighteen 
years, 
2 
i. e. from 588 until 806. This!, however, should 
not be taken to mean that other districts of the Greek 
peninsula, and especially of northern Greece did not 
suffer from the Slavic settlements there. As A. Toynbee 
has pointed out, 'geographically the Slavs' penetration of 
Greece went far'. 
3 It is only that the situation in the 
Peloponnese is illuminated better than in other districts 
by the sources at our disposal. At any rate, the 
Peloponnese was one of the regions which concentrated much 
of the interest and energy of the Emperor Nicephorus I. 
His aim was to reconquer and rechristianize Greece. 
During the fourth year of Nicephorus' reign., the strategos 
of the region Skleros - of Armenian origin - won an 
important victory over the Slavs of the Peloponnese (806). 
4 
This victory as well as the victory of the inhabitants of 
Patras over the same tribe some time in the course of the 
same or of the next year, 
5- 
prompted the Emperor Nicephorus 
1. P. Lemerle, ILa chronique ... 1, (loc. cit. ), p. 10. On the Slavonic settlements in Greece d'urlnF-the middle ages see: 
M. Vasmer, Die Slaven in Griechenland, (Berlin 1941); 
C. Amantos., 0j . 1, Ac%. 6c% 415, Ti; v 'F_),, )%, c'LJTcx, B. N. G. J. p 17 (1944) pp. 210-221; D. Zakythinos, Ocl' T_Jýci_6oi 7V 
EA I. L51 Athens 1945; St. Cyriacides, f3t)j. (xvTivaj me. - 
LZ TO I: 0-F-SA Si A01v 
Tj' C-A 9 ri avvv, 6 . 7hessalonica 1947; P. Charanis, 'On tFFe Question. -.. ', (loc. cit. ); 
.9 
cit id. 'Observations on the History ... (loc, 
7T 
id., 'The Chronicle of Monemvasia and th-eQuFs-tion of the 
Slavonic Settlement in Greece'., Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 5, 
1950, pp. 141-66; A. Toynbee, Constantine-, (op. cit. ). 
pp. 619-51. 
2. P. Lemerle., ILa chronique..., ' (loc. cit. ), p. 10. 
3. A. Toynbee, Constantine..., (2. p. EIT. ý_, p. 619. 
4. P. Lemerle, ILa chronique ... 1, 
joc. cit. ), P. 10. 
5. ibid.; On this event see also CoE_s_taH_t_Tne Porphyrogenitus: 
De administrando Imperio, (21. cit. ), pp. 228-232, where the 
victory over the Slavs at Patras is attributed to the 
miraculous intervention of St. Andrew., the holy patron of 
the city. 
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to take a series of measures aimed at strengthening the 
Byzantine control and at the christianization of the 
areas, which up to then had mostly been populated by the 
Slavs. The significance of these measures has been 
properly emphasized in an important article by P. Charanis, 
who comes to the conclusion that the Emperor Nicephorus 
should be considered as the saviour of Greece from the 
Slavs. 1 According to the chronicle of Monemvasia and to 
the so-called Scholion of Arethas, the measures aiming 
at the hellenization and the christianization of the 
Slavs of the Peloponnese included rebuilding of towns and 
churches which had been destroyed by the heathen Slavs, 
as well as the promotion of Patras from an archbishopric to 
a metropolis. Three other cities of the Peloponnese, 
those of Lacedaemon (Sparta), Methone and Corone, were 
given the rank of bishopric. 
2 But what seems to be the 
main means by which Nicephorus tried to regain control 
over the Slavs, not only in Peloponnese but also in other 
parts of Greece, was a transfer of population from other 
parts of the Empire into those regions of Greece, which 
were heavily populated by the Slavs. 
3 Theophanes also 
reports the transfer, though not in order to praise but in 
order to defame Nicephorus. Thus Theophanes accounts 
this transfer of population as the first among the ten 
'misdeeds' or Ivexations', committed by the Emperor 
Nicephorus. If his criticism of the Emperor is hardly 
surprising, the detail is impress-ive. However, the transfer 
of population from one place to another was not anything 
1. P. Charanis, 'Nicephorus I, the saviour... ', (loc-cit. ), 
p. 86- 
2. P. Lemerle., 'La chronique... ', (loc-cit. ), p-10; 
S. Kougeas, "Sn', ToG VLcLXovtt4-jov Y,? *\j\Ko5 -TG4S MOVGkA6OLb%Ocf " 





and, certainly not that terrible. 
Theophanes tells us that colonists were transported 
to areas known as Sclaveniae and dates the transfer to 
the year 810.2 On the other hand, the other two sources 
at our disposal - i. e. the chronicle of Monemvasia and the 
Scholion of Arethas - locate the areas to which the 
population was transferred,. as the Peloponnese and date 
the transfer during the fourth year of Nicephorus' reign. 
3 
It is difficult to say for sur. ewhether our sources, that 
is to say, the chronicle of Monemvasia and Arethas, on 
the one hand, and Theophanes, on the other, speak about 
the same event. The discrepancies make it seem more 
likely that these three sources report different events, 
which, however, in one way or another, resulted from the 
policies of Nicephorus towards the reconquest and 
christianization of Greece. 
1. For the transfer of population during the reigns of 
Justinian II and Constantine V, see the study by 
P. Charanis: 'The Transfer of Population as a Policy in 
the Byzantine Empire', Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, vol-3. part 2 (Mouton and Co. The Hague 1961). 
pp-140-154- As far as. the transfers by Justinian II 
are concerned, the following articles are also useful: 
P. Charanis: 'Ethnic Changes in Seventh Century 
25-44; Byzantium', D. O. P., 13 (Washington 1959), pp. 19ý 
A. A. Vasiliev: 'An Edict of the Emperor Justinian II, 
September 6881, Speculum, 18 (1943), pp. 1-13, and 
H. Gregoire: 'Un 6dit de llempereur Justinian, Byz-, 17 
(1944-45), pp. 119-124a. 
2. Theophanes, De Boor, 1,486. A slight, though important, 
difference existing in the two editions of Theophanes 
should not remain unnoticed: in the Bonn edition 
(op. cit., p. 755). we read that the transfer was destined 
while in C. de Boor's edition we 
come across a plural: "IenI T CXs 
I. 
&--, k m .6 Y% v 
The second one, undoubtedly, suits the case better. 
3. S. Kougeas, 7En'l roG v, (xAou"&vov --' (loc-c it. ), Ck - p. 475; see also P. Lemerle, 'La chronique. TEo: c-cit-), 
p. 10, where it reads: e-TI 
Tarasius died on 25 February 806. On this date cf. his 
Life, ed. by I. A. Heikel 'Ignatii Diaconi, Vita Tarasii, 
Archiep, C-P-', Acta Societatis Scientiarum. Fennicae, 
17 (1891)ý p-421. 
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In the first case, the Emperor tried to strengthen 
the population of the western and sou thern Peloponnese, 
by rebuilding the cities of Patras and Lacedaemon (Sparta), 
by ordering the refugees to come back from southern Italy., 
and also by transferring people from Asia Minor into the 
south Peloponnese. The creation of the metropolis of 
Patras and of the bishoprics of Lacedaemon, Methone and 
Korone should be considered as belonging to the same 
scheme of activity of the Emperor. 
However, Nicephorus was not the first emperor to have 
shown interest in Greece and the problems rising from 
its dominance by the Slavs. His predecessor Irene had 
also tried to gain control over the Slavs of Greece. In 
the year 783, she sent the Patrician and Logothete of the 
Drome Stauracius with a strong army against them. 
Stauracius reached Thessalonica and Greece, won an 
important victory over the Slavs, and subjected 'all of 
them' 
2 
to the Empire. Stauracius even invaded the 
Peloponnese, from where he returned with a great number of 
captives and booty. After that triumphant campaign of 
Stauracius, Irene with her son Constantine VI travelled 
3 to Berrhoea in Thrace which she rebuilt and to which she 
gave her name (Irenupolis). Irene also rebuilt Anchialus 
(783). 
About twenty years later, after the victory of Skleros, 
the strategos of the Peloponnese., over the same people, the 
1. P. Lemerle, 'La chronique... ' (loc-cit. ),, p-9- In the 
year 586, the inhabitants of Patras fled +0 Rhegium, 
while the inhabitants of Sparta are said to have been 
divided into two groups; from them, the first one 
travelled to Sicily and the second founded the city of 
Monemvasia. 
2. Theophanes, 1, p-456- 
3. This Berrhoea was located in the northern districts of 
the Empire, close to the borders with Bulgaria. 
Therefore, it must not be confused with the city of 
Northern Greece west of Salonica, but is to be identified 
with the modern Stara Zagora. 
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Emperor Nicephorus did the same with Patras and 
Lacedaemon. That entitles us to assume that Nicephorus, 
by rebuilding key places, extended and completed a policy 
inaugurated by Irene. What was new with Nicephorus' 
measure was the fact that, by transferring Christians into 
areas densely populated by the Slavs, he adopted a policy 
of christianization of pagan tribes in and around the 
Empire. That policy, which was about to be exercised 
systematically from the mid-ninth century onwards, had 
enormous consequences not only for Byzantium, but also 
for the whole of eastern Europe during the centuries to 
come. As it has already been stated, the transfer of 
population to the Peloponnese must have taken place during 
the fourth year of Nicephorus-1 reign (October 805 - October 
806), 1 definitely earlier than February of 806 
2 
and this 
is the transfer the Chronicle of Monemvasia refers to. 
Therefore the time limit of six months, put by Theophanes, 
does not seem to apply to that transfer. 
Now, given the political perspicacity of Nicephorus, if 
we still need to find certain other facts, which made and 
even urged the Emperor to take such a measure, it would not 
be groundless to presume that two events had played an 
important role in Nicephorus' decision. The first one 
was the effort of Acamer, the leader of the Slavs located 
in Belzetia, to depose Irene and proclaim one of 
Constantine V's sons as emperor., an attempt incited by the 
3 Slavs of continental Greece in 799. The second one was 
the siege of Patras by the Slavs and the 'miraculous' 
release of its inhabitants. This siege, although undated, 
seems to have happened immediately after the victory of 
1. S. Kougeas, ", En'4t -ro; w, (: LýC)u ... I (loc-cit. p. 474 . 2. See above, p. 126. 
k& 4-10 uI. - 
3. Theophanes 1, p-473-474; on this plot see above pp. 121) 
124. 
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Skleros, in an effort by the Slavs 'to recover the 
position which they had lost as a result of their defeat'. 
However, the Peloponnese was not the only district 
partly populated by the Slavs. From certain sources, we 
hear that there were also Slavs settled in northern Greece 
or more accurately in the north-western part of the 
Empire. As far as we can interpret a passage in the 
Life of St. Gregory the Decapolite, the hagiographer 
speaks about an uprising of the Slavs, obviously located 
near Thessalonica, where the Saint was at that time (early 
ninth century). 
2 Slavs were also established around the 
river Strymon, where Nicephorus later settled Christians. 
3 
Theophanes stated that the transfer was ordered 'after the 
campaigns by the pagans', 
4 
without giving us a definite 
date. Although such campaigns by the Slavs, the Arabs 
and the Bulgars had been very frequent during nearly the 
whole of Nicephorus' reign, two expeditions of Krum, one in 
808 and another in 809, must have played a decisive role. 
During the first of them, the Bulgars attacked the region 
of Strymon, killed many people including the strategos and 
the archontes and got away with 1100 pounds of gold and the 
belongings of the soldiers. The money was destined for the 
army's pay. 
5 The second expedition was directed against 
Sardica and it was definitely more disastrous for Byzantium 
than the first one. 
6 
1. P. Charanis: 'Nicephorus I ... I., (loc. cit. ), p-84- 2. F. Dvornik, La vie de Saint Gregoire...., (22. cit. ), p. 61. 
3. Theophanes 1, p. 496. See also the letter sent Fy the 
Emperor Michael II to Louis the Pious, where the founder 
of the Amorian dynasty asserted that Thomas the Slav 
enrolled his forces 'Thraciae, Macedoniae, Thessalonicae, 
et circumjacentibus Sc-laviniis-F FThe letter can be found 
in M. G. H., Legum sectio, III, Concilia vol. 2. pt. l. 
Leipzig 1900, p. 477). 
4. Theophanes 1, p-486- 
S. ibid., pp. 484-85. 
6. For the campaign against Sardica, cf. below, p-132- 
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In most cases, although a certain policy has already 
been adopted, measures are not taken without a definite 
cause and reason. After the above mentioned Bulgarian 
campaigns, Nicephorus decided to strengthen the north- 
western borders of the Empire by transferring population 
from the Asiatic themes. It is mainly this transfer, 
which Theophanes is referring to, and which took placeg 
during the last years of the Emperor's reign. Furthermore, 
for such a transfer the time of six months given by the 
chronicler would have been sufficient. 
A slight difference in the aims of the two transfers- 
should not remain unnoticed: the first one was aimed against 
the Slavs, whom the Emperor tried to turn into Christians 
and assimilate with the subjects of the Empire. The second 
transfer had more or less a defensive character and it 
was undertaken in the face of a serious threat from the 
Bulgars. The Emperor Nicephorus realized that apart 
from the fortresses of Sardica, Philippo polis, 
Adrianople and Develtus which formed a sort of border line 
with the Bulgars and aimed at barring advance 
southwards, some regions of northern Greece also needed 
to be strengthened against a possible attack by the Bulgars. 
It has already been indicated that these regions were 
heavily populated by Slavs who, as it will be demonstrated 
elsewhere, 
1 
were employed by the Bulgars and participated 
in campaigns against Byzantine territory. In other words 
northern Greece was in a way exposed to the combined threat 
of the Slavs and the Bulgars, and it is against such 
circumstances that the transfer of population to these 
areas by Nicephorus I should be viewed. 
1. Below, p-136. 
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My second point on this measure by Nicephorus concerns 
the people who were transferred. It would seem that the 
people, whom the chronicle of Monemvasia speaks about, 
were civilians. It is very likely that after the 
victories over the Slavs of the Peloponnese, Byzantium 
sought assimilation of those tribes through peaceful means. 
At least those people who came back to Patras from South 
Italy, were definitely civilians. It appears, however, 
that the same case does not necessarily apply to the 
people who were transferred to Macedonia, Strymon and 
Thrace. In his attempts to discredit Nicephorus' reign, 
Theophanes asserts that the Emperor ordered the transfer 
of the year 810 'because he intended to humiliate the army'. 
1 
Let us try to interpret things by putting a simple question: 
did Nicephorus have any particular reasons to humiliate 
the army? His controversial background does not seem to 
form a good reason why he should have been against the 
army. On the contrary, by introducing measures such as 
his so-called second 'vexation' 2 Nicephorus proved to have been 
much concerned about the army, which he certainly tried to 
strengthen rather than to weaken. Other facts and events, 
however, have to be taken into account, particularly the 
uprisings against the central government, uprisings in 
which the army was involved and which during Nicephorus' 
reign had become rather common.. What was the Emperor's 
reaction to these rebellions? Could it not be argued, for 
instance, that the transfer of soldiers from other places 
into the Sclaveniae could be seen as a kind of punishment 
of the soldiers involved in plots against the Emperor? 
The answer seems to be NO; the evidence at our disposal for 
1. Theophanes 1, p. 486. 
2. It concerns Nicephorus' reform on the way of recruitment 
of new soldiers. On this, cf. above, pp. 112-18. 
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such an argument is insufficient. Nicephorus did not take 
any strong measures against the army involved in Bardanes' 
rebellion in 803. He only deprived them of their pay 
(? 05CX The participation of the army in 
2 
the 
conspiracy of Arsaber (February 808), if any, was 
definitely unimportant. On the other hand the exile by 
which the Emperor Nicephorus punished some of the soldiers 
after their revolt at Sardica in 809 -ýl should not be 
confused with the transfer of army units mainly from Asia 
Minor into some of the Empire's European provinces densely 
populated by Slavs and being under constant threat from 
the Bulgars. Generally speaking, what Theophanes counts 
as Nicephorus' first 'vexation', was nothing more than a 
compulsory transportation of a good number of soldiers, 
which was after all of vital importance for the interests 
of the Empire to the areas called Sclaveniae. What 
happened in Sardica in the year 809 perhaps helps us to 
understand the situation better: in that year, Krum 
captured the city and 'massacred six thousand Byzantine 
soldiers, V% 0 If Cou. 4i%it the civilians' -4 It hardly 
needs to be emphasized that it was not possible for the 
Byzantine Empire to replace such a large number of soldiers 
by enrolling local people into the army, especially in 
such urgent circumstances for the north-western borders. 
Therefore, Nicephorus probably decided to transfer a 
certain number of military families from the eastern 
themes and to resettle them along the borders with the 
European enemies of Byzantium and, more particularly, in 
those areas which were densely populated by the Slavs. it 
1. Theophanes 1, p-480- 
2. Though our sources do not let us assume that soldiers 
were involved in that movement, G. I. Bratianu (Etudes 
byzantines...., 2p-cit-, p-197) seems to have taken it 
for granted. 
3. Theophanes 1, p-486- 
4. ibid., p. 485. 
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appears very likely that such a transfer was associated, 
in one way or another, with the creation of new theme units 
in Europe, already examined. In reference to this measure 
and the creation of the tagma of the Hikanatoi, also 
attributed to this Emperor, 
1 W. Treadgold has calculated 
that about ten thousand soldiers were recruited during 
Nicephorus' reign. 
2 Would it be unreasonable to suggest 
that some of these new soldiers were recruited from the 
transferred population? It is difficult to say, because 
it appears that three distinct measures, i. e. a) the 
creation of new theme units, b) the recruitment of new 
soldiers and c) the transfer of population, all aimed at 
the same target, that is the strengthening of the border 
lands and assuring control over the Slavs of the Sclaveniae. 
If we knew the chronological order in which these three 
measures were taken, it would have been, perhaps, easier 
for us to interpret them more confidently. 
However, in spite of all these considerations, it 
would seem that the only way in which Theophanes' statement 
on the purpose of the first 'vexation' falls in line with 
the Emperor's interest for the north-western parts of the 
Empire, is to take it for granted that those people, who 
were transferred into the Sclaveniae of northern Greece 
were soldiers with their families. Since some people 
had to be transferred anyway, it would have been more 
convenient for the Empire to order the resettlement of 
military families, so that their soliders would be added 
to, or form the core of the local thematic army in their new 
settlement. Moreover, military familes were perhaps more 
accustomed to moving their abode and could overcome 
1. Nicetas the Paphlagonian, Vita Ignatii, P. G., 105, 
col. 492B. 
2. W. Treadgold, Byzantine State Finances p. 71. 
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difficulties in their new settlement more easily. Finally, 
since recruitment into the army was a privilege, the 
possibility of resettlement might have been viewed by 
military familes as part of their obligations. From 
these considerations it becomes obvious that the term 
military family applies only to the thematic army and has 
nothing to do with the tagmata., the soldiers of which were 
professionals and stayed incamps in or around the capital. 
St. Euthymius, for example, with his mother and his sisters 
formed a military family and we have seen how he had to 
take on military obligations once his father had died. 
G. I. Bratianu, by arguing that the Emperor 'intended to 
create for the war against the Bulgars, new military 
forces attached to the land', 
1 
almost came to the same 
conclusion, but again he is probably talking about civilians 
who joined the army, and not about soldiers who were 
transferred from one place to another. To come back to 
the purpose of that transfer, one should say that Nicephorus 
ordered it, not because he intended 'to humiliate the army', 
but because, as it has already been indicated above, the 
north-western parts of the. Empire were short of soldiers, 
although the situation there was very critical, with 
Krum invading the Byzantine provinces. By talking about 
a humiliation of the army taking place, Theophanes probably 
meant the compulsory character of the transfer and the 
bitterness felt by the soldiers who had to be resettled. 
Does this transfer mean that the military forces in 
the eastern themes were weakened? Not at all. Nicephorus 
at the same time introduced his reform in the way the 
recruitment of new soldiers was made. Those soldiers who 
1. G. I. Bratianu, Etudes..., (op-cit. ), p. 197. 
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were transferred into the European provinces of the Empire, 
were replaced by the enrolment into the army of poor 
people, who could not afford to pay the taxes, imposed 
on their land. Moreover, we must keep in mind that the 
eastern provinces of Byzantium were usually flooded by 
foreigners, Armenians, Persians, etc., seeking a career in 
the imperial army. On the other hand, given the fact 
that during the first decade of the ninth century 
Byzantium was deeply involved in wars against the Arabs 
too, we cannot presume that Nicephorus would dare to 
withdriw a number of soldiers from Asia Minor and to 
transf. ýr them into European provinces. For such an 
enterp-ise, a certain period of peace, especially in the 
eastern themes, was needed. If not a peace, at least a 
truce came with the death of Harun al Rashid in March 809. 
It looks as if the Byzantines took advantage of the Caliph's 
death, not only by recovering Camacha, 
1 but also by being 
able to withdraw some forces from the eastern themes in 
order to have them available for the war against the 
Bulgars. 
Is there any way of telling how effective the transfer 
of population into the Peloponnese and into northern 
Greece' proved? Here again one needs to differentiate 
the two areas in which people were resettled. It would 
seem that the resettlement of Christians into the Peloponnese 
had very good results for the assimilation of the Slavs of 
the district. Though there are a few exceptions, 
2 
one 
1. E. W. Brooks: 'The struggle with the Saracens (717-867)', 
in 
, 
C. M. H., vol. 4a, (Cambridge 1923), p-127. 
2. See, -for example, Constantine Porphyrogenitus, (De 
Administrando Imperio, p. 232), where it is stated that 
during-the reign of Michael III the Protospatharius 
Theoa-iStus was named strategos of the theme of the 
Peloponnese. With a"strong army from all western themes, 
Theo0istus tried to subject the Slavs of the area. He 
succeeded against all the Slavic tribes of the region 
except the Melingi and the Ezeritae. 
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might argue that by these transfers Nicephorus restored 
Byzantine control over the area. The same argument, 
however, does not apply for the Slavs of the north- 
western parts of the Empire. The Slavs of that region 
kept their identity and independence against Byzantium. 
It was there that Krum, the Bulgarian K_'han, twice 
enrolled Slavs in his army. The first case was just 
before Nicephorus' fatal battle against the Bulgars in 
811 1 and the second during Leo V's reign in the year 814.2 
Although the Slavs were numerically superior to the 
Bulgars, the latter provided the leaders. Thus, the 
Slavs of that area, or at least some of them, did not have 
any objection to participating in a war against Byzantium, 
especially if they were well-paid. We also hear from 
Theophanes that the people, who had been resettled by 
Nicepholass around Strymon, did not stay there long. 
Because of a Bulgarian expedition in 812, during which Krum 
extended his occupation of Thrace and Macedonia, they left 
their new settlement and went back to their previous 
homes. 3 The passage of the Chronographia which speaks 
about that flight appears to be of particular interest 
for the following reasons: first because it demonstrates 
the Emperor Nicephorus' own opinion about the transfer of 
population to the Sclaveniae of northern Greece. To be 
precise, Theophanes says that the Emperor spoke very proudly 
about that measure. 
4 Secondly, because among the places 
1- Ivan Duicev, 'La Chronique ... 
(loc. cit. p. 212: IA i (vi; w- 
6cxjAe-vat "Agakpour wgzlo ri'ks nertF ZbcAct4biv#'cxr, ý 
It appears certain that Krum paid the Avars and the Slavs, 
in order to help him in that particular war. 
2. Scriptor Incertus de Leone Bardae, C. S. H. B. (Bonn 1842), 
p. 347; the text reads: ", C) Vpov'vAcs "j6Ted-r(-v6tv Au 'j r1OX%jV 
6OVcy. 9PO%'(bCX. S Kol't TOU 6&pt(C KC(% f%ctG4xS V%vt *Lfý "A 3. Theophanes 1, p-496- W-ý. cc
4. ibid. 
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abandoned by their new settlers the fortress of Probaton 
and 'some other strongholds' (oxvpdDiýC(TM) are included, 
and this, of course, strengthens the possibility that those 
settled there were rather soldiers than civilians. 
Finally, because the special mention by Theophanes of the 
region of Strymon, again as a place from which its new 
settlers fled, demonstrates Nicephorus' special interest in 
a valley of strategic importance for the defence of 
northern Greece against the Bulgars as the event of 808 
had already shown. 
But, equally significant is the flight itself. it 
shows that, no matter how sound it looked on paper, the 
measure of resettlement itself proved to have been rather 
unpopular among the soldiers who were transferred. One 
wonders whether a good reason for the military 
dissatisfaction with Nicephorus could not be traced to the 
measure of the transfer of population he adopted. 
These events, however, should not be taken to mean 
that Nicephorus' policy in the north-western borders of 
the Empire failed. On the contrary, it seems that even 
there, the first steps towards a more concerted policy 
towards the Slavs and the Bulgars had already been taken. 
E: ECONOMY-FINANCE 
1. The Preliminaries 
The fiscal and economic reforms, which the Emperor 
Nicephorus introduced in order to strengthen public finance 
and secure the state treasury against any loss, are of vital 
importance. These measures are criticized by Theophanes, 
who lists them under the general name Ivexations'. 
1. Theophanes 1, p-496. 
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Regardless of the authority's bias with his report on the 
matter, Theophanes gave modern scholars the opportunity 
of examining the fiscal policy of Nicephorus in depth 
and allowed them to draw some useful conclusions concerning 
the economic and social conditions in Byzantium during the 
early ninth century. After a more careful study of 
Nicephorus' fiscal policy, elements of sound administration 
have been discovered. This is, of course, a broadly 
accepted general view on this Emperor's economic policy, 
Nevertheless, one or two problems connected with the measures 
introduced or adopted by Nicephorus still remain to be 
answered. 
First, there is the question of the sources. Theophanes 
is, of course, always our main source for Nicephorus' 
fiscal administration. However, as Theophanes is at the 
same time the leader of the critics against him, we need 
to hear the opinion of the altera pars, i. e. of those 
contemporary sources mainly hagiographers, who, being less 
biased than Theophanes, speak in favour of Nicephorus. 
At the end of the short chronicle which covers the events 
of 811 in Bulgaria, the anonymous author asserts that 
Nicephorus was 'very prudent and cunning and very clever in 
understanding public affairs,,, overparticular with details 
and too avaricious'. 
1 Although this reference is very short 
and general, it is of some importance, because the author 
appears to have been an impartial observer of the 
circumstances. Now,, if that assessment is matched with 
what the monk Theosterictus. recorded about the same Emperor, 
then we do not need to rely only upon modern scholars in 
our effort to find apologists of Nicephorus' reign. In 
the Life of St. Nicetas of Medikion, Theosterictus calls 
1. Ivan Dujc'ev: 'La chronique... ', (loc. cit. ), p. 216. 
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Nicephorus 'very pious, a friend of the poor and a friend 
of the monks'. 
1 We have also seen that the Patriarch 
Methodius (843-847) was another near contemporary who 
has left us a favourable account of the Emperor Nicephorus 1.2 
Methodius, of course, does not refer especially to 
Nicephorus' economic measures, but the whole account he 
gives us on this Emperor's policies is enthusiastic. 
The second main problem to be answered concerns the 
fiscal policy of Nicephorus in connection with economic 
measures taken or cancelled by his predecessors. In 
other words, the point up to which Nicephorus I was a real 
reformer, needs to be made clear. Some of the measures he 
took were nothing more than a reaction to Irene's demagogic 
policy. Others were either the restoration of some 
measures, which had been current in Rome or in early 
Byzantium and were cancelled some time afterwards, or the 
extension or alteration of measures, which at Nicephorus' 
time were already in use. It would also seem that in 
some cases the only thing that this very Emperor did, was 
to force government officials into a more effective 
application of laws and decrees, which had been almost 
forgotten because they had been so long unenforced. What 
I am trying to say is that in many cases it is not the law 
itself, but the degree of its enforcement which is of 
significance. 
2. Restoration of Fiscal Order 
Dealing with Nicephorus' fiscal policy, both R. Monnier3 
and G. I. Bratianu 
4 
adopted the order of Ivexations' 
1. Vita St. Nicetas of Medikion, AASS, April 1, p. 262- 
2. D. Spyridonos, 'B(cs -ro-5 krra,, m%- 09 VO-j (loc. cit. ), pp-144-45. 
"&. % 0%A0ý0g4-TO; 
etoo 
3. R. Monnier, however ('Etudes de droit byzantin... ', 
loc. cit., pp. 59-103), because not all the Ivexations' are 
oT-tH-e-same interest for the left the second and 
ninth ones to discuss at the end of his survey. 
4. G. I. Bratianu: Etudes. -. (. 2p. ýLit. ). pp. 183-216. 
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introduced by Theophanes. However, regardless of the 
order in which the Emperor's measures will be examined, 
an overall assessment of Nicephorus' policies must not 
be neglected: what objectives had he in mind, what 
principles did he follow? These vital questions must 
be answered through an examination of the 'vexations', 
either one by one, or en bloc as a whole financial strategy. 
To begin with, Nicephorus increased the tax paid by 
every subject of the Empire and restored another tax Of LWO 
ceratia (1/12 of the nomisma), 
1 
which, having been first 
introduced by Leo III, had probably been abolish(d by 
Irene, in her effort to gain popularity among th( populace. 
Among the chroniclers, who recorded this mea-, ure, 
M. Glycas 2 does not seem to have used Theophanes as his 
main source. That is perhaps why, although Theophanes 
and the other chroniclers, who copied him or who used him 
as their main source, use the word 'chartiaticon. ' for the 
two ceratia tax reinforced by Nicephorus., Glycas does not 
do so. He only states that the 'diceraton' was reimposed 
by the Emperor, because the latter wanted to repair the 
walls of Constantinople, which at that time had become old 
(meaning: unstable). 
3 However, ast"'. Glycas is the only 
authority from whom we have such information and as he 
is not a contemporary one, 
4 
we cannot rely upon him. He 
is probably muddling this measure with the tax imposed by 
Constantine V. The tax under consideration, at least 
during Nicephorus' reign, should have something to do with 
the new lists, on which the names of the people, subjected 
to taxation, were written, or the receipts given to them by 
1. Theophanes 1, p. 486. 
2. Michaelis Glycae: Annales, C. S. H. B. (Bonn 1836), 
pars IV, p. 530. 
3. That task was undertaken some thirty years later by 
Theophilus. 
4. He lived in the mid-twelfth century. 
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government officials. It looks as if Nicephorus ordered 
the revision of the lists of tax payers. At about the 
same time, uncials were progressively abandoned and the 
cursive minuscule was introduced. 
1 It is reasonable 
to believe that the revision of the lists of tax payers 
was not an entirely innocent act. It aimed at an 
increase of taxation, at least for those people, whose 
contribution to the state finance was not considered to 
have been sufficient. In any case, the word 'chartiaticon' 
meant a tax imposed on the Ichartes', the paper, and it 
was considered as a very important one by the Emperor, who 
intensified control over all citizens, so that nobody could 
cheat the authorities and pay less than he had to. 
Was Ichartiaticon' the essence of Nicephorus' third 
'calamity'? It is difficult to give a positive answer. 





two ceratia were paid by each taxpayer and not in the 
nomisma. 
6- He also argues that the chartiaticon' was the 
only increase in taxation reimposed by this reform of 
Nicephorus. In his first argument, Bury is probably right, 
1. On this see G. Mango, 'La culture grýcque et Voccident 
au VIII siýclel, in Centro Italiano di Studi Sull'Alto 
Medioevo, XX (1973), pp-716-17. 
Z. G. I. Bratianu, ('Etudes... ', ap. cit-, p. 202) expressed 
the opinion that T-helchartiaticon' was imposed, because 
perhaps at that time the official tax lists and documents, 
made of papyrus, were replaced by others, made of parchment. 
Although we do not know when the Byzantine government 
abandoned the fragile papyrus and adopted the much better 
material of parchment, the fact that leather costs a lot 
of money, makes Bratianu's theory possible. 
3. J. B. Bury: E. R. E., p. 214. 
4. R. Monnier: 'Etudes ... 1, (loc. cit. ), p. 67. S. G. Finlay: History of the Byzantine Empire, (London 1853), 
p-116. 
6. G. Ostrogorsky (History., op. cit., pp. 187-88), also 
thinks that the charge of two ceratia was paid per nomisma, 
i. e. 1/12 or 8 1/3%, and it was imposed for being 
entered on the tax-roll. 
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but in the second one he seems to have missed the point 
of the measure. As the texts of the chronicles stand, 
one could also interpret them to mean that those two 
ceratia were paid by each taxpayer in addition to a general 
increase of the basic tax, about. the amount of which 
unfortunately we are not told anything. In other words, 
it is not quite clear what Theophanes understood by what he 
recorded. If the second clause: nafýxovTmj Ka1)(CLfT1Ct11KwV CWV(a ýVa 
VCe? (Y. -riwv explains the infinitive 
&vcc4i6 
<X 
'to increase', of the first clause, as Bury 
1 
argues, then 
these two ceratia were the only increase in taxation meant 
by this measure. However, the Greek word vc ýý %, land'. 
following a verb or a verbal form - as, in this case, 
the participle ncc-94(-Aov-Tcx5 - has a clear meaning 'in 
addition to', 'apart from', 'besides'. Bury's 
interpretation is backed by the fact that,, apartfrom these 
two ceratia, no other amount, or percentage of increase is 
mentioned by the chroniclers, as well as by the fact that 
Theophanes did not use harsh language when he described 
the reform under consideration. However, a better word 
by word translation of the Greek text, would make us believe 
that, apart from these two ceratia, a general increase of 
the basic tax was also introduced by the Emperor. 
Unfortunately, the amount or percentage of this increase 
remains unknown to us. 
With another reform, Nicephorus increased the amount of 
money paid by those people and particularly institutions, 
to whom a remission had previously been awarded. 
2 
Theophanes speaks about the increase of K O\j q*% 6\A 0 
Although the word o -U 4,6 kk O. S, remission', mainly applies 
to remissions awarded to churches, monasteries and other 
1. J. B. Bury: E. R. E., p. 214. 
% 2. Theophanes 1, p-486: "... -TOvc, oE, vho; J nvrcxc &x4, - 
3c-rapm% 
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institutions connected with the church, Nicephorus' 
reform, known as fourth 'vexation', seems to have been 
also extended to other categories of people, not 
necessarily related to churches and monasteries. Perhaps 
this measure is better illustrated by another passage, 
again of Theophanes: according to the chronicler, the 
Emperor Nicephorus, at the time of his departure (May 811) 
for the fatal war against the Bulgars 'ordered Nicetas, 
Patrician and General Logothete, to increase the taxes 
paid by churches and monasteries and ask for the payment 
of eight years I back taxes by the 0K 01 of the 
'2 dignitaries'. 
As regards the higher rate of taxation on 
ecclesiastical and monastic property, Theophanes seems to 
have recorded the same measure twice. To believe that 
the Emperor, whom other sources call I friend of the monks 
3 
increased that amount twice in a rather short reign, is out 
of question. To me the thing is quite clear. Since 
'the properties of churches and monasteries were in 
principle normally liable to taxation', 
4 it was probably 
Irene., who awarded them a partial exemption, i. e. 
S 
a reduction in the amount of money they had to pay. When 
in 802 Nicephorus came to power, he accepted the situation, 
so that during almost the whole of his reign, he did not 
change anything. It was only during the last year, in 
fact during the last months of his reign, when, because of 
the critical circumstances produced by the war against the 
Bulgars, the Emperor decided to cancel the remission under 
I 
1. The word cOA 0I here should be translated 'families' 
(with a broad perhaps meaning). 
2. Theophanes 1, p-489- 
3. The monk Theosterictus in his: Vita St. Nicetas..., 
(loc. cit .), p. 29. 4. G-. Ostrogorsky:,, Histor ... (OP. Cit. ), P-188. S. The infinitive (xv(x6%6ckT(, (, 9(%%, 'to increase' , lights up 
the problem very well. 
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consideration. That was also the time, when Nicephorus 
expressed his wish that 'the valuable holy articles of 
the churches should be used for the benefit of the 
populace'. 
1 Although Theophanes, of course, grasped 
the chance to defame Nicephorus once more, it looks as 
if the Emperor considered his campaign against Krum as 
one of vital importance and perhaps, as Heraclius had done, 
as a crusade. 
Now, we come to the second category of people affected 
by this reform of Nicephorus. These were the 
dignitaries from whom, as it has already been said, in the 
year 811 the Emperor demanded a payment of eight years 
backdated taxes. The eight years retrospection allows us 
to assume that to these people, an exemption had been 
awarded by Nicephorus himself immediately after his accession 
to the throne. 
2 Furthermore, this has to be connected 
with what Theophanes recorded about the events of October 
802: 'Those, who had been in the very confidence of her 
(of Irene), went over to him (to Nicephorus), because 
of avarice'. 
3 Now, always keeping in mind that the 
supporters of Nicephorus' accession to the throne were 
certain officials and dignitaries, we are entitled to 
presume that those people, before they did so, had been 
given, or had been promised, some financial incentives. 
1. Theophanes 1, p-489- It is, of course, worth remembering 
that all charitable institutions were under the church's 
patronage. They were also wealthy and in the early 
seventh century able to subsidize Heraclius' campaign 
against the Persians. 
2. It is worth noting that in reference to this measurep 
The ophane s do es no t us e the ve rb CM 4M 161 6 Ck JC- 0 ýx i any 
more, but he asserts that the Emperor demanded for the 
I- le anjr. 2 ov e: I f, j OL I 'back dated basic taxes' , to be 
paid by the c)'11 v, oi of the archontes. It seems to 
me that here we are faced with a total exemption from 
the basic tax. 
3. Theophanes 1, pp-476-77. 
144 
Such incentives, of course, had probably been given to 
only a few high officials, but it looks as if the exemption, 
established by Nicephorus in the first year and revoked 
by himself in the last year of his reign, was a more 
general measure, covering governmental officials and other 
dignitaries. As has already been said, this exemption, 
together with the remission in favour of churches and 
monasteries were the last privileges to be revoked by the 
Emperor. The abolition of this privilege definitely 
caused some discontent among those whose interests were 
damaged. Even the Patrician Theodosius Salibaras, 1a 
very faithful ser-vant to the Emperor, protested against 
this abolition. 
2 
But high officials and ecclesiastical and monastic 
properties were not the only ones affected by Nicephorus' 
effort to put =L order in the state finance. The same 
measure, or a similar one to that, was directed against 
a group of peasants, those who, although civilians, had 
been, in one way or another, attached to ecclesiastical or 
monastic property, as well as those, who had been working 
for various charitable institutions, such as orphanages, 
hostels, almshouses. etc. These people are included by 
Theophanes under the general term n OL P01KoI. and the 
tax from which they were now no longer exempted is named as 
the kapnikon, 'the hearth tax'. 3 
But what was the kapnikon? G. I. Bratianu divides the 
taxes into two main categories: poll taxes and land taxes. 
The hearth tax certainly belonged to the second group. 
Bratianu also noticed correctly that the kapnikon was 
imposed not on persons but on hearths, i. e. on families. 
1. On Salibaras., see above, P. 100. 
2. Theophanes 1, p-489- 
3. ibid., pp. 486-87. 
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It seems, however., that by claiming that this tax was 
paid only by serfs, Bratianu went too far. He asserted 
that the hearth tax was nothing else than an indication 
of a servile condition for those who paid it 'car les 
paysans libres paraissent en avoir et6 exemptes'. 
I 
However, it would seem that the kapnikon had been too 
important a tax to be left for payment only by serfs. 
One is tempted to argue that to that tax other groups of 
people were also liable. 
2 Such an argument is supported 
by the decision taken a few years later by the Emperor 
Michael II; whereby half of the hearth tax was remitted 
to the people of two themes, those of Opsikion and 
Armeniac, as a reward for their loyalty to the Emperor 
against the rebel Thomas the Slav. 
3 It would sound quite 
unbelievable, either that an emperor in such a case would 
have taken a measure which benefitted only a small 
proportion of people, or that during the first quarter of 
the ninth century soldiers were recruited only among serfs. 
Since both these two explanations seem rather unlikely, it 
would appear more plausible to suggest that the remission 
of kapnikon has all the marks of a solemnion to a charitable 
institution. Their dues would go to the institution and 
not to the state. Therefore the revocation of this 
remission by the Emperor Nicephorus could probably be seen 
as a way of strengthening state control. Furthermore,, it 
also needs to be remembered that by the end of his reign, 
Nicephorus revoked all remissions which had been awarded to 
1. G. I. Bratianu, Etudes..., (op. cit. ), p. 203- 
2. Among the chroniclers it is only Zonaras (Annales, Bonn 
1897, vol-3, pp-306-307) who records that the heýirth 
tax 'was imposed on the serfs of churches, almshouses 
and monasteries as well as on everybody who did not 
have either land or tax' (meaning: who did not have 
anything else to be taxed). He. too, uses the word 
Q. F0% %K a 1. 
3. Theophanes Continuatus., C. S. H. B., (Bonn 1838). p. 54- 
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several categories of people either by Irene or by himself 
at an earlier time. The difficult situation with the 
Bulgars would not permit such exemptions. 
So far we have been concerned with the ending of tax 
remissions. However, if we are to believe Theophanes' 
account of the fiscal policy of Nicephorus, then we must 
assume that he also resorted to the confiscation of 
ecclesiastical and monastic property. Probably the 
Emperor could not tolerate the fact that in such a 
difficult period for the Empire, the church and the 
monasteries owned vast areas of land, from which they 
obviously profited. Therefore, he chose the best and 
the most fertile of these properties and attached them to 
the imperial lands. 
1 
The taking away of these lands was, of course, a real 
blow to the church and the monasteries, but it became 
unbearable because of the Emperor's final decision, accord- 
ing to which the church, the monasteries and the foundations 
dependent on them, were forced to pay the land tax even 
for the properties, which had been taken over by the 
Emperor! Such a measure, of course, would seem 
unbelievable, unless we suppose that it was only a matter 
of paying taxes to the state; the monasteries continued 
to enjoy the usufruct of these lands. The chroniclers 
do not say for how long they had to continue paying taxes 
on these properties, but it- was probably until the state 
would find somebody else - for example, the sailors of 
the ninth 'vexation' 
2_ 
to buy the lands. On the other 
hand, keeping in mind that by the eleventh century there 
were a series of charitable institutions under imperial 
II Sk cm et S -T "q 1. Theophanes 1, p. 487: V. fo E-% TTO V (X -T,; )V KTVI, ýA 
"TWV 
%. I KOV? CL'TO*P%CX-1 cXYfP664D(X% ITCL ýA&VTOI T4v, cxV'TZV 
'Ti-kc, t%Jc)LjJOýAa%"vcL(2%%) fils, rovs cx Uv cus V Mýi 715 ONIKOVS KT%ft/ýAc(61 ttcL'% 
Ijafc%'w, oiS, i; )S cT%r%A*; 6? aA x\akxýw'-. - T' -v I &I 
"IN, 
TZV 03"K"6&%, *v 6TI-vOvHj. Vwv., v' 
2. ibid.; on this see below, p-lS4. ' 
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control, we can consider this reform of Nicepliorus as a 
first step towards the secularization of these foundations. 
Nothing is said about the 11cxFol Koi, possibly attached 
to these confiscated 
1 lands, but they probably stayed 
working there, whoever the nominal owner was. However, 
Theophanes, indirectly of course, lets us assume that 
some of them abandoned the land, to which they were attached. 
Perhaps, taking advantage from Nicephorus' reform on 
the recruitment of new soldiers, they preferred to join 
the army. 
Theophanes records that after the conspiracy by 
Arsaber (808), among those who were beaten, banished and 
those whose properties were confiscated, there were 
bishops, monks and clergymen of the great church, the 
syncellus, the sacellarius and the chartophylax. 
2 The 
involvement of-clergymen and monks in a purely political 
issue can be given two possible explanations: 1) The 
Emperor had already in 808 taken some of his fiscal 
measures against the ecclesiastical and monastic property, 
and 2) Those clergymen and monks probably belonged to the 
Studite party, which had, of course, opposed Nicephorus 
since the year 806, because of the election of his namesake 
to the patriarchal see of Constantinople and because of the 
restoration of Joseph, abbot of Kathara, to the priesthood. 
3 
After a more or less careful study of the Emperor's 
attitude towards ecclesiastical and monastic property, it 
becomes clear that Theophanes, especially as a representative 
of the interests of the clergy, was after all, entitled to 
use the word 'vexation' referring to the confiscation of 
monastic properties. 
1. J. B. Bury, E. R. E., (p. 215) prefers the term 'compulsory 
sale' than 'confiscation'. 
2. Theophanes 1, pp. 483-84. 
3. The so-called Moechian Schism, caused by this restoration, 
is discussed in the chapter on Nicephorus' religious 
policies., below, pp. 205-15. 
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Nicephorus tried to ensure the state against any 
loss from treasure trove finders2l as well as against 
those, whose fortune had changed in a short time from 
poverty to riches. 
2 Theophanes asserts that the Emperor 
became suspicious and considered as treasure trove finders 
those who had found a vase., even if it was empty. 
3 From 
the existence of such a vase in a house, the authorities 
would have inferred that the owner of the container must 
have found some money in it some time ago. It was not so 
much a matter of how much money the state could claim, more 
a way of preserving the state's rights to treasure trove. 
This tax on treasure trove finders was to apply over the 
previous twenty years. It looks as if the 'twenty' was 
chosen not for any particular reason, but because it was a 
conveniently round number. 
Those who inherited from parents or grandparents (direct 
line of kinship) were also taxed by Nicephorus. 
4 Here 
again the tax was backdated twenty years. As the text of 
Theophanes stands, it gives us the impression that 
Nicephorus taxed something which had not been taxed before. 
Bratianu, however., asserts that Justinian's successors 
re-established the 5% tax on a direct inheritance, which he 
had abolished. 
5 As Theophanes rarely gives us percentages, 
it is difficult for us to know for sure whether Nicephorus 
created a new tax or increased an existing one, which must 
have been tolerable. In the second case, we would like, of 
course, to know the percentage of the increase. Possibly 
1. Theophanes 1, p-48 
" 
7: . 
(nFv6*-T CUIT6 4) 6 KontT(oami Aotpcýx 'TWV 6, vPcx-rv%ko%;, ITWV To'ý'V`S CEDI? OWS LW n-TWXU%'Cxl (%VCXWvN60EtA4VvVS K% 
I Qt% 
rot 2. ibid. 
v 3. Theophanes 1, p-487: To\) 'AfOVWV KCLI k4(-jcei 
nIa ov vl% 6 %A (-; j oS ofl 10 VV Ka %)L! #Tol)S 6JOL(; ýVle% 
11 ., IJ, 4. ibid, Q-TOW C-Vý liOnnwv tý llcXT(. ewV 
4\1 W'4 v CLI (IN f0( WT 4XIT(- V) 
S. G. I. Bratianu) Etudes ... . (op-cit. ), p-207- 
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the word cT % cx E. 9 j, '%jT cxsl divided I, provides us with .0 
some kind of an answer, especially if it is connected 
with the word n *' %j vi -r (x s, poor' - To be more precise, 
if somebody was the only heir of his father or his 
grandfather, then, as he probably was about to inherit the 
entire property, he did not mind if he was forced to pay a 
small amount of it to the state treasury. This, however, 
did not apply to the case, when there were a number of 
heirs who had to divide the inheritance into small pieces. 
In such a case, unless the inheritance had been a huge 
property, which is quite improbable for the period under 
consideration, 
1 
the heirs would-have had to earn their 
livelihood from a very small property. Therefore, they 
would have become poor, so that any taxation imposed on 
them would have been unbearable. These people do not 
seem to have been paying any tax for their small 
inheritance so far, and, therefore, no matter how heavy 
the new one was, they considered it as a vexation. 
By another measure, Nicephorus established a custom tax 
connected witOOslave trade. 
2 This tax consisting of two 
nomismata was now imposed on each slave, 
3 
who was sold 
4 
outside Abydos and particularly in the Dodecanese. 
1. The sources at our disposal do not speak about many 
magnates or about very rich people of the period. Saint 
Philaretos' case was probably an exception. 
2. Theophanes 1, p. 487: CL'1 -T 0, %j S 
ýj V V% V Ov S6r 
ý461%')Jov 6W/VACXTCE 011AV%KC*L) LV& 41 VOkA(6k4Cx-TWV 7&Ai&CX-A "foo6j- 
'rCLIN, V40L% %eaik6-r(x TO%US KCXTC*')L 'r%"%V 
3. Here one can spot clearly the attempt by Theophanes to 
avoid the 'bad' word 'slaves', by using the moderate words 
6wt&cx"TcL o%vcrc"x%Ka/L. Instead of protesting against 
slavery itself, the representatives of the eastern church 
avoided the use of the word, and this was, of course, 
considered to be a contribution to the battle against 
social inequality! 
4. Neither R. Monnier, ('Etudes de droit..., 
, 
loc-cit.., p-82), 
nor H. Antoniades-Bibicou, (Recherches sur les Douanes a 
Byzance, Paris 1963, pp. 200-01, Map), include Rhodes in 
the Dodecanese. 
iso 
Although Theophanes records that these two nomismata 
were paid by those, who had bought (the chronicler used 
a past participle: I oQs Lv v) (. cx tA j-v(po I) slaves outside 
Abydos, he does not say for certain whether this measure 
applied retrospectively, as some previous ones had done. 
Furthermore, why were these two nomismata imposed as a 
tax only on the slaves sold outside Abydos and not on 
those sold outside Hieron too? It hardly needs to be 
observed that the aim of this measure was to tax something 
which had not been taxed so far. It is reasonable to 
believe that a tax was already being paid for slaves 
imported to Constantinople either from Abydos or from 
Hieron. We do not hear anything about the amount of that 
tax because it had been imposed at a time much earlier 
than that of Nicephorus'. Our Emperor did not alter 
this tax. He only introduced a similar one, that of two 
nomismata per slave, to areas where such a tax previously 
did not apply. These areas were the Aegean Sea islands 
and especially the Dodecanese. From Theophanes' reference 
to that measure., it becomes clear that slaves who were sold 
in the Euxine regions, if any, were exempted from that tax. 
Based probably on this differenciation, Bury argues that 
Aegean Sea ports and especially the Dodecanese were the 
market places of slaves destined for light work, such as 
waiters, chamberlains, dancers, etc. 
1 Slaves for heavy 
work were 'recruited' in the Black Sea ports and consequently 
they were imported through Hieron. Therefore, it would 
seem that the two nomismata was a sort of luxury tax. 
As has been observed, 'slaves were one of the most 
important articles of trade during the Middle Ages ,-2 
1. J. B. Bury, E. R. E., p-217. 
2. R. S. Lopez and I. N. Raymond, Medieval trade in the 
Mediterranean World, New York - London 1961, p-115. 
On the traTe- of slaves see also: A. Chadjinicolaou- 
Marava, Recherches sur la vie des esclaves dans le 
monde byzantin, Athens 1950, especially the sections 
under the titles: La loi et Vesclavage, (pp-22-28) 
and Le commerce des esclavages (pp. 8'9-94). 
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There were even fixed prices for different categories. 
1 
In brief, slavery had been so broadly spread that Theodore 
of Stoudios thought it necessary to stress that monks 
were not allowed to own a slave: 'like marriage, (the 
ownership of slaves) is allowed only to laymen'. 
2 
However, since slavery and city life of antiquity went 
together, and since Byzantium proved to have been not 
an urban but a rural society, it must be concluded that 
consumption of slaves in the Byzantine Empire was limited 
to Constantinople itself and, perhaps, to only a few 
cities, let us say Thessalonica, Ephesus and Rhodes. 
Most of the slaves imported into Byzantium could have gone 
to work in the capital. But, among the other three 
provincial cities, the last one needs to be treated with 
special consideration, not so much for its consumption of 
slaves, as for its activity in the slave trade. Rhodes 
in the early middle ages is interesting- It clearly 
serves as a commercial post between the Byzantine Empire 
and the countries of Islam. There is. a passage in the 
Rhodian Sea Law which speaks about the following case: if 
a slave is about to be transferred by ship to another 
destination, then his owner finds either a merchant or a 
passenger on the same ship, to whom he entrusts the 
guardianship of the slave. Suppose that the latter somehow 
manages or is permitted to escape, the person who had 
1. During Justinian I's reign, ordinary adult slaves were 
bought at the price of 20 nomismata, artisans 30, and 
slaves with professional qualifications, such as 
notaries or doctors, 50 or 60 (Cod. Just. VI 43,3). 
From the Life of St. John the Merciful, we hear that in 
the first half of the seventh century, educated slaves 
cost in Jerusalem up to 30 nomismata (H. Gelzer, 'Leontios' 
von Neapolis, Leben des heiligen Johannes des Barmherzigen, 
Erzbischofs von Alexandrien' ' Sammlung ausgewählter Kirchen- und dogmengeschichtlicli-er Quellenschriften 5, 
Freiburg und Leipzig 1893, p-44). 1 2. Theodore of Stoudios, Epistolae, T, 10, (loc. cit. ), 99, 
col-940D. 
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undertook the obligation to guard him -a contract sealed 
by payment - is responsible to the slave's owner. 
1 
This passage would seem to confirm the importance of the 
slave trade passing through Rhodes. But, the growth of 
Rhodes as a centre of the trade of slaves meant that the 
Empire was likely to be losing out as far as taxes were 
concerned. It would seem that in the Emperor's mind, 
such a growth contributed to the economic independence 
of the island from the central governmentý It was this 
that Nicephorus was to check. Furthermore, given the 
Emperor Nicephorus' sensitivity over economic and fiscal 
issues, as well as his tendency to supervise all aspects 
of economic life, it would appear that he was mainly 
interested in concentrating commercial activity in 
Constantinople and clamping down on provincial trade, 
simply because it was difficult to supervise. Therefore, 
the two nomismata tax, put on each slave sold outside 
Abydos can probably be seen as a measure taken not so much 
against the trade of slaves itself, but against the growth 
of the provincial slave trade and especially that of Rhodes. 
3. State Control of__Shipping ' 
After the transfer of population from all themes into the 
Sclaveniae, the enrolling of poor people in the army, the 
secularization of the best ecclesiastical and monastic 
fields and the confiscation of properties, for even simple 
offences, it is not surprising that suddenly the state 
became the owner of huge properties, especially of land. 
1.1. and P. Zepos, Jus Graecoromanum (op. cit. ), vol. II, p. 99. 
2. R. Lopez, ('Trade in Seventh -Century Byzantium', D. O. P., 
13,1959, p. 79) also suggests that. the naukleroi at 
Rhodes were, more or less, independent traaers. 
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As he was very experienced in these matters, Nicephorus 
immediately realized that, if all these lands remained 
under governmental ownership for long, the loss for the 
state treasury would have been triple. Firstly., it 
would have been a loss of the tax to which land was 
subjected. Secondly, as there was a shortage of manual 
workers in Byzantium, it was most likely that these lands 
would remain uncultivated and especially in Mediterranean 
climate, uncultivated land loses its fertility. Finally, 
as a 'sales tax' was basic to Byzantine fiscal system, 
the state treasury would have been found to lose the tax 
on agricultural products, sold on the market. Therefore, 
the less time these properties remained under state 
ownership, the better. Nicephorus found buyers, even if 
it meant the use of force. It was the shipowners and 
sailors in general, who lived on the coasts of Asia Minor, 
and who were forced to buy land from the government at a 
price fixed by its officials. 
1 In brief, these people 
were coerced into taking up a second profession 'to which 
they were not accustomed', 
2 
as the chroniclers complain. 
However, this was not the whole of the essence of that 
reform. H. Antoniades-Bibicou 
3 
argues that the measure 
should not be considered apart from the so-called tenth 
'vexation'. according to which the government offered to 
shipowners at Constantinople a kind of loan at a high 
interest rate. It would seem, however, that it is closer 
in principle to the reform., by which Nicephorus recruited 
poor people into the army (Theophanes' second 'vexation'). 
N% 1. Theophanes 1, p. 487: -*T()US TMS 
ýk 4: ý, k % 6-T CL -It 1; K jpjL S 4L CX. S V CE U 14A $4 f OV. C y v% J'&O'n oT4& 0 V% K ý; l S 
r, CLV T CX vC 0 IV 'I Cc 5Z V10% (3DCEA W. TQ v V. CXeO)aAv n 'V-Twi-e OEOTý vt 
I 
%a 
Da CT K'T &TW'l V'J -% CL %1 ft %'f"T CK'6-T'; Aý 
2. ibid., G. Cedrenus: Hist-Compendium (Bonn 1839) vol. 2, p. 38. 
Zonarae: Annales, C. S. H. B., vol. -')'.. (Bonn 1897), p-307/- 3. H. Antoniades-BiSicou: Etudes d1histoire maritime de 
Byzance a propos du th6me de Caravisiens, Paris 1966, p-110. 
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By issuing that measure the Emperor tried to ensure the 
state against any shortage of soldiers. By forcing 
the sailors to buy land property, he wanted to protect 
the Empire from a possible future lack of sailors. It 
is worth remembering that Constantine VII will regularize 
the custom, according to which sailors, like soldiers, 
needed to own a property of the value of either four or 
two pounds of gold according to their case. 
1 
All the fiscal reforms undertaken by Nicephorus 
aimed at the strengthening of the public finances. With 
almost all of them., the Emperor transferred money from the 
pockets of Byzantine citizens into the state treasury. 
To this rule, however, the last reform - Theophanes' 
tenth 'vexation' - can be seen as an exception. Now 
it is the government 14Uýý who offers money to a certain 
category of people, i. e. to Constantinople's ship owners, 
as a loan at a high interest rate (16.6% approximately). 
2 
Dealing with this measure, one notices from the very 
beginning a difference, which exists in the verb used by 
Theophanes and the one used. by Zonaras: the first one 
recorded that Nicephorus 4T vi w cý v3 'he gave', 
4 
while the second asserted that the Emperor AP06c-e? nT E- 
that is to say 'he threw at them forcefully', the amount of 
twelve pounds of gold. This difference of expression by 
the two chroniclers has caused a great deal of discussion 
among scholars. The question they tried to give an answer 
might be formulated as follows: How far was this measure 
compulsory for the ship owners? J. B. Bury put an end 
1. Constantine Porphyrogenitus, Nov-VIII, in I. and P. Zepos, 
Jus Graecoromanum, I, p. 223., 
> '0 2. Theophanes 1, p. 487: ". .. 'TO's " WwvGýToLV'T%lj(), jn6Att v(x, )- KXv<f'Ov% 6uVc)L&OEýw%%f c3eJwv#.. j 2t-n*% *ro' Cl ;4 1- to (A T%p % 00 
cp 6(,! T To votAlat4of 
OLVOL 14? \JGb% OU ýITVPZV Jw,; tvccg T&AQ\)VTOq KAI 09 T b\W%012v% KwýAO-p%(10t4 3. ibid. 
4. Zonarae Annales (op. cit. ), 3, p-307. 
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to these arguments by confirming that the ship owners were 
not forced to accept the loan,, whether they wanted it or 
not, but, if they wanted a loan, they had 'to borrow a 
fixed sum from the state and from no one else; other 
lenders were excluded by the law, forbidding private 
usury'. 
1 J. B. Bury seems to have been right, because, if 
Nicephorus had forced the ship owners to accept an unwanted 
loan, Theophanes, would not have used the moderate verb 
'he gave', but he would have found another word, stronger 
even than the one used by Zonaras. Gr. Cassimatis 
2 
also 
argued that no force took place in that reform and that 
Theophanes considered as a vexation Nicephorus' . 
inconsistency, because the Emperor abolished a law 
created by himself and also because his decision was 
against the church's doctrine. On the other hand, the 
possibility, expressed by Zonaras., that the loan was 
imposed not on each ship owner but on each ship, 
3 has not 
been accepted by modern historians. One can object that 
Theophanes also gave us such a clue by recording that 
Nicephorus during his last year 'extended... lending with 
interest (imposed) on ships ... 1.4 However, as this phrase 
cannot be taken as referring to taxes imposed on cargoes, it 
appears that Theophanes here repeated more or less what he 
had already said in his record on the tenth 'vexation'. 
Nevertheless, despite all these considerations, one vital 
question remains unanswered: why-did Nicephorus take such 
a measure? 
The interest of 16.6% was, of course, very high for 
the period. The highest rate until that time seems to have 
1. J. B. Bury: E. R. E., p-217, note 1. 
2. Gr. Cassimatis: 'La dixiMe "vexation" de 1'Empereur 
Nicephore', in Byz-, 7 (1932), pp. 149-160. 
3. Zonarae Annales, op-cit-3. p-307. 
4. Theophanes 1, p-488. 
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been 8% ('besses usurae') provided by Justinianic Law, 
1 
and it was only merchants who were allowed to lend money 
at that rate. Therefore, we cannot see the loan given 
to the Ic ni#r. v, t^ at ship owners of Constantinople as an 
incentive for them to build and equip more ships. This, 
of course, does not mean that Nicephorus did not want a 
strong merchant fleet to be built; on the contrary, he 
was wise enough to realize the immense importance of a 
strong fleet for Byzantium. In relation to this point 
one needs to remember that the 'navicularii', i. e. state- 
controlled shippers, so prominent in earlier periods, seem 
to have disappeared at the end of the seventh century. 
2 
During the whole of the eighth century things for the 
imperial navy became progressively worse. Thus, when 
Nicephorus seized power, the situation was more or less 
crucial. He realized that something had to be done. 
The late Roman legislation had made the 'naviculariil the 
main stay of the merchant marine in the Mediterranean. 
Therefore, it would not seem groundless to suggest that, 
by issuing his tenth 'vexation', Nicephorus tried to make 
the ship owners active again as they used to be in earlier 
times. Nicephorus was thus trying to reverse the Empire's 
recent policy of attracting foreign merchants to 
Constantinople and to strengthen the Byzantine merchant 
navy. Considering, as he did, the state as the embodiment 
of all power, 
3 he thought in terms of state control and 
sought to achieve his ends by state intervention. it 
would therefore seem that Nicephorus gave to the ship 
1. Codex Justinianus, IV, 32,26. 
2. A. Lewis, Naval P ower and Trade in the Mediterranean, 
A. D. 500-1100 (Princeton 1951), p. 83. 
3. Theophanes 1, p. 489. 
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owners twelve pounds of gold as a loan at a high interest, 
because he wanted the state to be involved in the 'ship- 
business'. It was a matter of prestige for Nicephorus. 
He seemed to believe that the state should exercise 
control in every field of private activity. But state 
control over shipping may well have been undermined, in 
the meantime, especially by Irene's measures. Its 
restoration, however, seems to have been an issue of 
vital importance in the mind of the Emperor. Thus, by 
issuing this reform, he is probably trying to reverse 
the tre, 
-., 
d which had seen trade escaping state control. 
In brief, the spirit. of the tenth 'misdeed' was the 
spirit of control and power. Whether Nicephorus in fact 
had this power, is unimportant. Apart from that, we should 
always keep in mind that in the event of war, the merchant 
ships undertook military action. 
4. General Assessment 
Nicephorus is mostly known from the series of economic and 
fiscal measures he took during his short reign. After a 
survey of these reforms, the vital question which still 
needs an answer is: was there any grand economic 
'strategy', uniting these measures, or did Nicephorus act 
out of necessity, because of the rather lax policy of his 
predecessor? 
The answer to such a question is not going to be 
simple. To begin with, let us see what the Emperor under 
consideration thought about his predecessors. According 
to Theophanes, Nicephorus 'accused all those who ruled 
before him of having been bad administrators without any 
exception'. 
1 However, the last three words of the 
quotation must be considered as an exaggeration added by 
the chronicler, always ready to defame Nicephorus. 
1. Theophanes 1, p. 489. 
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Because, how could Nicephorus have condemned a certain 
number of brilliant rulers, whose policy or policies, 
up to a certain point, he himself followed? He probably 
detested Irene's administration, because during the latter's 
reign, two eunuchs were the real rulers of the Empire. He 
was also worried about the critical situation, which 
Byzantium was faced with, in relation to the Empress' 
external policy. The prestige of the Empire had been lost 
as a result of a series of concessions made to the Arabs 
and to the newly established Roman Empire in the West. 
However, it would seem that even in such a disorganized 
reign, Nicephorus found some elements of good policy, 
which he followed and extended. What Theophanes calls 
first 'vexation' of Nicephorus, was more or less a 
continuation of Irene's policy about Greece. 
Nevertheless, Nicephorus, had his own convictions. He 
had also a standard against which he tried to judge his 
predecessor's reign. That standard seems to have been the 
ideal one of the late Roman practice, which he now was 
trying to re-establish. In connection with that, in 
several of his reforms (3,7,8) Nicephorus applied measures, 
which, although they had been introduced by good 
administrators, such as Justinian I and Leo III, had been 
allowed to lapse or had been abolished by others. By 
issuing his tenth 'vexation', Nicephorus was also trying to 
reactivate the late Roman legislation about the 
InaviculariiI = ship owners. 
Do all these adaptations mean that Nicephorus lacked 
real initiative for a better economic and fiscal 
administration? On the contrary; the fact that he made 
fiscal legislation effective in cases where previously it 
had fallen into disuse, and the fact that he restored and 
extended measures concerning the financial welfare of the 
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Empire, proved him to have been a pragmatist, an expert 
in controlling finance. Apart from that, he was himself 
an innovator. By introducing the 4th, Sth, 6th and 9th 
tvexations'. Nicephorus tried to create a stable base for 
the Byzantine economy. We see him spending money in 
order to rebuild the cities of Thebasa, Patras, Ancyra, 
Andrassos and Sparta. Like Irene, he too, paid a tribute 
to the Arabs, though of a smaller amount and for much 
shorter a period. His loss of 2400 pounds of gold, 
captured by the Arabs and the Bulgars at Euchaita and 
Strymon correspondingly, was not such a small amount. 
More important, the creation of new themes definitely 
entailed considerable expense. But, by issuing his fiscal 
reforms, Nicephorus not only managed to meet these expenses, 
but, when killed, he certainly left the state treasury 
full. 1 It should not go unnoticed that no source presents 
the Emperor abusing his power by spending money on luxuries 
and donatives. Pragmatist as he was, Nicephorus realized 
that army and economy were the two pillars of the Empire. 
Thus, it was towards these two targets that the Emperor 
directed his measures. It was not a mere coincidence that 
the first two and the last two of his reforms affected the 
army and the navy, either directly or indirectly. 
Who suffered, or who suffered most, because of 
Nicephorus' tough fiscal policy? It looks as if, among 
the ten measures listed by Theophanes, it was only one, the 
third, which applied to vast categories of the populace. 
That one concerned a general increase in taxation and the 
restoration of the Idiceraton'. The rest of the reforms 
concerned certain groups or classes of people, who, 
according to the Emperor's opinion, could and should 
contribute to the state finance more than they had previously 
Theophanes 1, p. 494. 
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done. Therefore, it is very doubtful whether the verb 
'to suffer' describes the situation adequately. It would 
be better to say that it was the economic interests of 
some groups that were damaged. Those who were resettled 
forcibly into the Sclaveniae could be considered, perhaps, 
as sufferers. Monks, officials and dignitaries were 
also definitely among those people who were now no longer 
exempted from certain taxes. To be more specific, we 
have to say that all kinds of privileges were directly or 
indirectly abolished and this, of course, can be taken to 
mean that Nicephorus went back to the late Roman 
christian ideal that privilege meant responsibility, and, 
above all, responsibility for paying taxes! 
Who benefited from these reforms? The difficult 
circumstances and the external danger, which the Empire 
was facing-with at his time, do not seem to have been the 
only forces that urged Nicephorus to take these vital 
economic measures. More careful study and an overall 
view of Nicephorus' policies and goals leads us to the 
conclusion that his fiscal policy was not only a result of 
past and contemporary events and coincidence, but it also 
looked to the future. 
One would need to remember that Nicephorus I was the 
first emperor to have applied 'austerity' measures with 
success and this becomes of particular importance since 
such measures were fully. justified by circumstances. In 
order to achieve this, in some cases, Nicephorus needed to 
reactivate Roman and Byzantine. legislation on certain issues. 
In other cases, let us say the transfer of population, 
Nicephorus applied methods which had already been used by 
emperors of earlier times. But even so, the transfer under 
Nicephorus seems to have been of a slightly different 
character from those made by his predecessors. Furthermore, 
the enrolment of poor into the army, a measure applied for 
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the first time by our Emperor, should be seen as a 
decisive step against social inequality. However, 
regardless of their originality2 the fiscal and economic 
measures undertaken by Nicephorus demonstrate a proper 
application of laws and an incentive to civil servants to 
carry out their duties more effectively. In other words., 
it would seem that during Nicephorus' reign people felt 
the presence of the central government in almost all 
aspects of their lives, with all its consequences. 
To conclude, if a grand economic strategy cannot be 
traced in the measures taken by Nicephorus, then their aim 
and their target might help us to form an overall view of 
his reforms: they all aimed at the strengthening of the 
economy of the Empire and one could hardly deny that this 
goal was finally achieved. The Emperors of the second 
Iconoclasm (815-842). although they do not seem to have 
been fiscal reformers, OW managed to maintain an 
economic stability, just by adopting Nicephorus' fiscal 
policy, or, more accurately, by reaping the benefits of it. 
Perhaps, it is not too much to suggest that the surpluses 
under Theophilus (97,000 pounds of gold) 
1 
and under his 
2 
wife Theodora (197,000 pounds of gold) had their roots 
in Nicephorus' prudent handling of the imperial economy. 
Generally speaking, his fiscal and economic policies seem 
to have been sound and no one else, except the state 
treasury, benefited from them. 







A: ICONOCLASM - HERESY 
To the question whether the Emperor Nicephorus' attitude 
towards the church or the rei; gious parties forms a clear 
cut policy or is a reaction dictated by circumstances, 
a direct answer does not seem to be the suitable one. 
It would be, perhvýps, more appropriate to say that 
Nicephorus' very character and persuasions, have something 
to do with the policies he adopted or tried to follow 
on this issue. According to Theophanes, Nicephorus 
considered all his predecessors as 'unable to govern', 
and giving in a way the gold rule for governing, he used 
to say that 'if the ruler wants to be safe on his throne, 
he should not let anybody else excel the emperor's power'. 
2 
His desire for supremacy is evident in his domestic and 
foreign policies. No nqOLfP4=r CIO VCy -*,,, Vis 
mentioned during his reign, in contrast to Irene's sole 
rule, while Nicephorus' desire for supremacy becomes of 
particular importance in his attempt to deal with 
ecclesiastical issues. 
Before saying anything regarding Nicephorus' actions 
against the two main religious groups of the time, usually 
referred to as the 'Politicians' and the 'Zealots' (or 
Moderates and Radicals), we should perhaps first consider 
this Emperor's policy towards images. 
1. Theophanes 1, p-489- 
2. ibid. 
164 
As it has already been stated above (the chapter on 
the sources), Theophanes accuses Nicephorus of many evil 
actions. However, the chronicler does not state openly 
that the Emperor was an iconoclast. The portrait of 
Nicephorus sketched out by the hagiographer of St. George, 
Bishop of Amastris is that of a believer. It is recorded 
for example, that the Emperor, a friend of the Saint, 
used to put on sacerdotal clothes, which occasionally he 
preferred to the imperial ones, and to spend whole nights 
in praying etc. 
1 Though this piece of information comes 
from a Vita which, as I. ýevý-Ienko has shown, is an 
iconoclast one, 
2 it is of some importance, since it shows 
that for other contemporaries, Nicephorus was a pious 
orthodox. It appears that the Emperor Nicephorus' neutral 
attitude over the iconoclastic issue, gave grounds for 
speculation about his religious views and stand. For the 
moment, it would be fair to say that the Vita of St. George 
of Amastris points in the direction that iconoclasts were 
well disposed to Nicephorus, though this does not mean that 
he was an iconoclast. In regard to the Emperor's religious 
convictions one needs to bear in mind that Nicephorus did 
not alter the settlement of the iconoclastic controversy 
made by Irene in 787. Other contemporary sources also 
stress the fact that, at least formally, Nicephorus was not 
an iconoclast. 
3 But Nicephorus was hardly an iconodule 
either. He seems to have been tolerant of almost any 
religious movement inside the Empire. J. B. Bury suggests 
that 'he was little interested in religious matters except 
in relation to the state'. 
4 Such an opinion might be 
1. Ano ymous, Vita St. George of Amastris (loc-cit. ), pp. 15S-56. 
2.1. 
Kvýenko, 
'Hagiography ... 1, (loc. cit), pp-121-25. 
3. Michael the Monk, Vita A Theodore of Stoudios, (P. G. 99, 
153 D); see also Vita Tarasii, Archiep, C. P. by Ignatius 
the Deacon (joc-cit. ), p-420, where it reads: cxýavf- 
x(JOS m1 6-T%705 5% *I j-x-Jo I -f (V% % OW * 0 -, also Vita St. Ignatii 
Archiep. C. P., P. G. 105Y 489 C where it reads: "---qrOW. n1/CL R9N -ro; O-L%16,16oý#s 044PT4 4v((#1AePLm-r , finally Vita Nicetas, by Theosterictus (AASS, April 1, p. 261 EF) 
where Nicephorus is called "pietissimus, pauperumque 
et monachorumque amantissimus". 
4. J. B. Bury, E. R. E., p-38. 
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dismissed as a mere generalization, but it does justice 
to his refusal to take measures either in favour of or 
against the icons. However, the Emperor's intervention 
in some ecclesiastical or semi-ecclesiastical issues 
suggests that Nicephorus felt it one of his duties to 
maintain peace within the church. Where this peace was 
broken, the Emperor did not hesitate to act as the 
Idiscipli narian' of the church, even if he had to 
displease certain groups of the populace. His tolerant 
behaviour towards the iconoclasts definitely irritated the 
advocates of image-worship. Theophanes accuses Nicephorus 
of lshelteriný' an iconoclastic monk, named Nicolas, and oý 
alloweql him tc preach his ideas. 
1 For Theophanes, of 
course,, such an attitude by the Emperor exceeded the 
permissible limits of toleration toward Iconoclasm. But, 
if we believe Theophanes' account of Nicephorus, then we 
must assume that the Emperor almost joined the heresy of 
Paulicians. 2 Fol. lowers of this sect inhabited the eastern 
provinces of the Empire and it seems that during the 
uprising of Bardanes in 803, they sided with the imperial 
forces against the usurper. This, however, does not mean 
that Nicephorus managed to put down the uprising by the 
employment of'sorceries which were in use by them, as 
Theophanes implies. 3 It appears that the Emperor's 
tolerant attitude against the Paulicians and the Athinganci 
1. Theophanes 1, pp. 488-89. 
2. On these heretics, see: Ch. Astruc, 'Les sources 
gr6cques pour 11histoire des Pauliciens dlAsie Mineure', 
T. M., 4, (1970), pp. 1-226; J. Gouillard, 'Llheresie dans 
1'empire byzantin des origines au XIIe si6clel, T. M., l, 
(1965), pp. 299-324; N. Garsoian, 'Byzantine Heresy. 
A Reinterpretation', DOP, 25 (1971), pp-85-113; 
P. Lemerle, 'L'histoire es Pauliciens dlAsie Mineure 
d'aprbs de sources grecques', T. M. S, (1973), pp-1-144. 
3. Theophanes 1, p-488- 
166 
irritated Theophanes more than Nicephorus' similar policy 
towards the iconoclasts. In connection with that, one 
needs to bear in mind that, when in the year 811 the 
Emperor Michael I was uncertain as to whether to annihilate 
these heretics or to give them a chance of repentance 
sparing their lives, Theophanes calls 'bad advisers' 
1 
those who suggested and finally persuaded the Emperor to 
adopt the less hard line of policies towards the Paulicians 
and the Athinganai. Perhaps, in the eyes of the chronicler 
the toleration of a heresy was tantamount t, o a heresy 
itself. 
Why did the Emperor follow such a tolerant policy 
towards these heretics? Unfortunately the sources at 
our disposal do not provide sufficient information in order 
to give a direct answer to this question. However, relying 
again on the negative way in which Theophanes speaks of the 
Emperor's attitude towards the Paulicians, as well as on 
Nicephorus' broad views about religious issues, one might 
possibly suggest that the Emperor did not think of the 
Paulicians as heretics! But, even if that was not the 
case, Nicephorus' plan to use them against the Arabs. 
cannot be ruled out. What is, nevertheless, certain is 
that the Paulicians' readiness to fight side by side with 
the imperial forces against Bardanes Turcus in 803, played 
a prominent role in Nicephorus' benevolent attitude to 
them. He had cause to be grateful to them. Moreover, 
if we keep a close eye on the whole scene of events at the 
very beginning of the ninth century, we would have to admit 
that Nicephorus was very clear about his priorities: in 
the complex situation he faced when he came to power, 
problems connected with the church or with religious sectors 
were not of primary significance. Foreign affairs, fiscal 
1. Theophanes 1, p-495. 
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reforms and army command were of much greater urgency 
than ecclesiastical problems. The way Nicephorus acted 
in an undoubtedly difficult period was justified by 
circumstances and therefore suggests that he was, if not 
a great believer, at least, a clear-minded ruler. 
B: NICEPHORUS AND THE PATRIARCH 
Two persons occupied the patriarchal throne of Constantinople 
during Nicephorus' reign. Tarasius, who had been patriarch 
since 784, held the highest ecclesiastical post of the Eas-L. 
till his death in 806. In that year the empty throne was 
filled by another layman, the Emperor's namesake Nicephorus. 
The Emperor's relations with his two patriarchs have to be 
considered separately. The mere fact that Tarasius was 
the patriarch who crowned Nicephorus as emperor in 802, 
while the latter selected his namesake as patriarch in 806, 
suggests that the Emperor's dealings with the former were 
bound to have a different character from those with the 
latter. 
1. Nicephorus and Tarasius 
When the General Logothete Nicephorus overthrew the Empress 
Irene in 802, Tarasius had already been sitting on the 
patriarchal throne of Constantinople for eighteen years. 
During that period he had established himself very firmly in 
the post and had gained a very high reputation. His great 
role, even if he did not take the initiative, in the 
restoration of the icons in 787,, was of vital importance for 
his popularity. Tarasius seems also to have been a key 
1. On his appointment to the patriarchal throne see below, 
PP-183-86. 
168 
figure in the political life of Byzantium, not only during 
the first years of Nicephorus' reign,, but much earlier, 
ever since his accession to the patriarchal throne of 
Constantinople in 784. His ideas regarding the need to 
reform the clergy are echoed by many sources. 
1 Tarasius 
had established a monastic communityto, serve as a nursery 
for new priests and bishops. The hagiographers of the 
period particularly speak of the efforts made by this 
Patriarch to end the practice of purchasing ecclesiastical 
offices. The lavish lifestyle of the secular clergy was 
also something which Tarasius could not tolerate any longer. 
2 
In his effort to abolish these practices and to make the 
body of the church 'healthy', Tarasius elevated many monks 
not only to priesthood but also to bishoprics. Among 
those owing their priesthood to this Patriarch, St. Macarius 
of Pelecete, St. John the Psychai 
""' 
te and St. Nicetas of 
Medikion must be mentioned. But Tarasius above all needed 
good bishops ready to adopt and extend his plans on reform, 
giving them permanence. At least four bishops, i. e. 
St. Michael of Synada, St. Theophylact of Nicomedia, 
Emilian bishop of Cyzicus and Eudoxius bishop of Amorion, 
were appointed to their bishoprics by Tarasius. To those 
four, another two, Euthymius of Sardis and Joseph of 
Thessalonica, must be added. These two, though they were 
not ordained by Tarasius, belonged to his group. Euthymius 
of Sardis and Michael of Synada are well known to us, because 
they served on important diplomatic missions under the 
Emperors Constantine VI, Irene, Nicephorus I and Michael I. 
1. See for instance., I. A. Heikel, lIgnatii Diaconi Vita 
Tarasii ... 1, (loc-cit. ), p-406; A. Vogt, 'St Theophylacte de Nicomediel, in A. B. 50 (1932), p. 74. 
2. Vita Tarasii, (loc-cit. ), p. 406. 
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Everybody seemed to respect St. Tarasius' name. 
Even the Studites, though disagreeing with his pathetic 
silence on the second marriage of Constantine VI, 
l 
carefully avoided coming to an open clash with him. 
Furthermore, Tarasius had 'survived' the reigns of two 
emperors, the most difficult one having been, of course, 
that of Constantine VI. Therefore we might assume that he 
was definitely not prepared to become just a figure-head 
or a tool in the hands of a third emperor., no matter 
how determined the latter was to rule over the church. Such 
an unyielding attitude on the part of this Patriarch applies 
especially to the reign of Nicephorus, because Tarasius 
seems to have played a prominent role in the accession of 
this Emperor to the throne in October 802. After all, he 
was the one who put the imperial crown on the head of the new 
strong man of the state. Referring to this coronation 
Theophanes states with some bitterness that the people of 
Constantinople were cursing both, the one who was crowning 
(i. e. the Patriarch) and the one who was being crowned (i. e. 
Nicephorus) .2 
Unfortunately very little information covers the church 
and state relations during the period from the elevation of 
Nicephorus to the throne (October 802) until the death of the 
Patriarch Tarasius (February 806). In the course of this 
time the Patriarch seems to have concentrated primarily on 
religious issues. He probably went on with his efforts 
to reform the clergy, so that they carried out their pastoral 
duties more effectively. Neverthel. ess there exists one 
event during these years, which demanded that Tarasius 
declare himself, either in favour or against the Emperor. 
This event was the attempted usurpation of the imperial throne 
1. On this see below, p. 179. 
2. Theophanes 1, p-476. 
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by Bardanes Turcus in 803. What is of particular 
importance for us here, is that some bishops who were 
supposed to be under Tarasius' influence, somehow sided 
with the usurper. These bishops were Euthymius of Sardis, 
Theophylact of Nicomedia and Eudoxius of Amorion. All 
three were punished by exile. Thanks to Tarasius' efforts 
two of them were soon released and reinstated, but 
St. Euthymius remained in exile for a long time. 
1 
It would seem that such an attitude on the part of 
Tarasius' group, taught the Emperor a valuable lesson: 
he realized that he could not rely on them and also that 
the only way for him to survive political usurpations arl 
ecclesiastical intrigues, was to toughen his policies in 
all directions. Though Tarasius himself seems to have 
remained loyal to the Emperor, it is easy to see that the 
group of bishops under his patronage lost credibility in 
the eyes of Nicephorus and probably their influence on 
ecclesiastical issues too. Under these circumstances it 
is unlikely that less than three years later, when Tarasius 
died in February 806, the same group of bishops exercised 
any influence on the Emperor as far as the election of the 
new patriarch is concerned. They were probably consulted, 
but the final decision was made by Nicephorus himself. 
2, 
The Emperor Nicephorus' tolerance towards some 
iconoclasts might also have shadowed the state's good 
relations with the church. According to Theophanes, for 
example, by covering up the iconoclastic activities of the 
monk Nicolas and his group, Nicephorus provoked the Patriarch 
1. J. Gouillard, 'Une oeuvre inconnue du Patriarche M6thode: 
La vie d'Euthyme de Sardes', in B. Z., 53 (1960), p-38- 
2. K. Ringrose, Saints, Holy Men and Byzantine Society, 726 to 
843 (Ph. D. 1976, Rutgers University, New Brunswick p. 110), 
suggests the opposite. However, no sufficient evidence seems 
to be given for it. As the author of the thesis honestly 
admits, her conclusion is only an inference 'based on the 
many similarities between Saints Nicephorus and Tarasius, 
the continuity of their policies and the continuing 
importance of the role played by the followers of 
St. Tarasius during the reign of St. Nicephorus as 
patriarch' (ibid. ). 
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Tarasius' iconodule feelings. However, even if this 
4 
report by Theophanes reflects true events, .t would appear 
that such incidents, if any, were rather rare and they do 
not necessarily disturb the good relations between 
Nicephorus and Tarasius. Such incidents, nevertheless, 
might reflect the Patriarch's inability to influence the 
Emperor towards his own iconodule views. 
Trying to outline and summarize the relations between 
church and state during the last three and a half years 
of Tarasius' patriarchate and the first three and a half 
years of Nicephorus' reign, it would be best to say that 
their relations were marked by cautious respect. They 
were very careful to avoid provocation. Furthermore, it 
seems that a sort of independence of each other also existed 
and, most important, no interference by either side is 
reported by the sources. The Emperor, though he keenly 
wanted to, did not ask the Patriarch to restore the 
-ýe Skandalon, i. e. Joseph of Kathara, to priesthood. As 
P. Alexander points out, a third shift on the same issue 
made by the same patriarch would have been too much. 
2 The 
Emperor realized that on this very affair he would have to 
wait until the death of the Patriarch and so he did. 
Finally Tarasius, after having sat on the patriarchal 
throne for twenty two years, died on 25 February 806.3 
Referring to his death and to his funeral, Tarasius' 
hagiographer, Ignatius the Deacon, draws our attention 
especially to the Emperor's reaction and behaviour to this 
event. According to this author, the Emperor Nicephorus 
surrendered himself to a deep grief, and during Tarasius' 
1. Theophanes 1, pp. 488-89. 
2. P. Alexander., The patriarch Nicephorus ... (pE. cit. ), p-87. 3. Vita Tarasii, T=loc-S. Lt. ), p-421; Theophanes (1, p-481) 
it that tarasius died on 18 February 806. 
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funeral, having embraced his coffin and having covered 
it with the imperial purple robe, he kept crying and 
calling the dead Patriarch, shepherd, father, assistant in 
ruling, source of light, sleepless guide of the state to 
the better, holy teacher, invincible supporter in the 
expeditions, etc. 
1 This information should be considered 
as valuable, for the following three reasons: first, 
because it comes out of a very reliable source; secondly, 
because these words are among the very few, spoken by 
the Emperor Nicephorus which have survived, and thirdly 
because, so far as we know, Nicephorus was very prompt 
to accuse, but slow to praise. Furthermore the mere fact 
that this Emperor lavished such praise on the dead 
Patriarch, can also mean two things: first that Nicephorus 
owed Tarasius a great deal - probably more than his 
elevation to the throne - and secondly that during the 
short period 802-806 church and state co-operated more or 
less happily. 
2. The Two Nicephori 
After the successful patriarchate of Tarasius, it is quite 
understandable that the election of his successor raised 
great interest at court as well as among all political and 
ecclesiastical groups at Constantinople. A capable 
patriarch would act, not only for the benefit of the church, 
but for the welfare of the state, too. The Emperor knew 
that all too well from his experience of Tarasius' 
patriarchate. He was a person, broad-minded enough 
2 to 
1. Vita Tarasii (loc-cit. ), p. 420. 
2. The hagiographer of St. Nicephorus, Ignatius the Deacon, 
asserts that the Emperor Nicephorus was-5' 
(P. G. 100,61D). 
13'- ý Y, I VON) bV OLT OS " 
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realize that, in the long term, the interests of both, 
the church and the state, would be better served with a 
strong man on the patriarchal throne. However, it 
remains very doubtful whether Nicephorus was prepared to 
appoint a patriarch with an equally strong, and perhaps 
even stronger personality.,, than that of Tarasius. Such 
an appointment would definitely have been against the 
Emperor's own convictions, regarding the supremacy of 
imperial authority over every other power in the state or 
in the church. 
1 
It is also possible that Nicephorus was already thinking 
of having Joseph of Kathara restored to priesthood. if 
this was the case, then the new patriarch would need, not 
only to be a rather weak character, but also to belong to 
the party of the Moderates. 
The division of the ecclesiastical forces at 
Constantinople into Moderates and Radicals 
2 
goes back to 
the eighth century. Tarasius had been head of the 
Moderates since his election to the patriarchal throne 
(784). Leaders of the Radicals were in order, Sabbas 
and Theoctistus of Symboli, Plato of Sakkoudion and, of 
3 
course, Theodore of Stoudi0s. 
Different opinions had been expressed by the two 
parties for the first time during the seventh oecumenical 
council of Nicaea (787) on the question of the lapsi, i. e. 
those who, during the first phase of the iconoclastic 
controversy had yielded to Iconoclasm. 
4 The Radicals, 
1- Theophanes 1, p-489- 
2. On this see P. Alexander (The Patriarch Nicephorus... 
p. 80 sq. ), where the terms 'secular and monastic clergy' 
are used. I prefer the names 'Moderates' and 'Radicals', 
because, after the Emperor Leo IV allowed the monks to 
become bishops, several members of the i! -.. onastic clergy 
abandoned the harsh line of their leaders and yielded 
to Iconoclasm. 
3. Theodore of Stoudios, Epist. 1,38 (P. G. 99,1044A). 
4. I. D. Mansi., Sacrorum Conciliorum... (ýE. cit. ), vol. 12, 
1115-18. 
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founding their argument on St. Athanasius' works, 
1 
demanded that the backsliding bishops., at least the 
ringleaders, should lose their sees, while the Moderates 
would prefer to see the decisions of the fourth oecumenical 
council repeated, and, thus, they adopted a conciliatory 
policy, with which the Radicals finally agreed. 
2 
The second issue on which the two parties opposed 
each other again, was that of the Simoniacs. 
3 Under 
this name both, those who had paid money in order to be 
ordained as priests or bishops, as well as those bishops 
who had received money to ordain priests, were included. 
We are told that this issue was left to be discussed after 
-4 the seventh oecumenical council. During the discussion 
the Moderates proposed that Simoniacs. could be restored 
after having received at least one year of penance. 
Theodore of Stoudios implies that the proposal was accepted 
and enacted by the Patriarch backed by some monks, whose 
names are not mentioned. 
5 It should be emphasized that in 
regard to the issue of Simoniacs the Patriarch found himself 
in a rather dramatic situation. He was standing somewhere 
between the Empress Irene and the Radical monks. Irene 
insisted on the restoration of the Simoniacs, after one year 
of penance. But to such a restoration the radical party 
strongly objected. The Patriarch yielded in turn, first 
to them, by denying that he had ever granted penance to the 
1. Mainly his letter to Rufinianus, P. G. 26p 1180 sq. 
2. I. D. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum... (op. cit. ), vol. 12,1118. 
3. On this see Theodore of Stoudios, Epist. 1,38 (loc. cit. ), 
col-1044 BC. 
4. ibid, 1044 B. 
5. ibid. It reads: &UV v)% V4OV(% 6'f CX S%WV CfdkAtA IL 
Atý* IV TO( 
6V Cý'k^ M -r CL, Here again a proportion among the monks 
did not side their rigorous leaders, but preferred to 
join the Moderates. One might be entitled to assume 
that these monks formed the core of the monastic group 
around the Patriarch Tarasius and that a number of them 
were later promoted to bishops. 
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Simoniacs, and secondly to the Empress, when at the 
festival of Theophany (6 January) of the year 788., he held 
communion with the Simoniacs., whose time of penance had 
been completed. 
1 Two years later Irene was deposed by 
her son, and Tarasius grasped the chance to denounce his 
earlier deeds by saying that he did not have communion 
with a person whom he knew to be a Simoniac. It looks as 
if the Radicals had accused a great number of bishops of 
Simony and the Patriarch was demanding proof. But proof 
was available only'for a few cases and thus the Rigorists 
had to limit their demands for deposition to only those 
bishops, who had publicly admitted to having bought their 
see. 
In short the difference between the two parties in 
regard to the Simoniac issue might be formulated as 
following: they both denounced Simony. The radical monks 
could not accuse the Patriarch of the opposite. 
2 They 
both fought against any Simoniac ordination after the 
second council of Nicaea. They both wanted the purification 
of the body of the church-from the Simoniacs. But how 
many bishops ought to lose their sees for the sake of this 
purification? The Radicals asked for a great number, 
perhaps the majority of them, while the Patriarch 
compromised, by limiting matters to only a few well known 
cases. In principle, the victory went to the Rigorists, 
-Ae who brought the matter into open and managed to have certain 
bishops deposed. However, in reality the Moderates can 
hardly be called losers. To a certain degree they 
managed to connect Simony with Iconoclasm and presented 
1. Theodore of Stoudios, Epist. 1,38,, (loc-ci-L. ),, col. 
1044 C. 
2. Theodore of Stoudios, Epist. 1,53 (loc. cit. ), col. 
1105 D: (x vnw ýqw OT% -Tctlpcx. 6%c)S c%)w jtA"qtj 
x? v'i%&%)L6j )tErt(poxoy CL 
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it (Simony) as a result of the iconoclastic policy of 
previous emperors. The radical monks were told that for 
the sake of unity against Iconoclasm they should make 
a concession and moderate their hard line against the 
Simoniac bishops. They did so probably with some 
bitterness. A few bishops lost their sees and thus the 
Simoniac issue ended in a compromise solution. Perhaps, 
such an outcome did not satisfy either side, but neither 
was it rejected by either side. 
The two parties clashed for a third time on the issue 
of the second marriage of the Emperor Constantine VI and its 
implications. The so-called Moechian controversy was 
to be renewed and prolonged during the reign of Nicephorus I, 
and it did not end before the reign of Michael I. But, 
let us take the events one by one. 
We have already seen 
1 
that in the year 781 Constantine 
VI, being only eleven, was betrothed to Rotrud, daughter of 
Charlemare. 2 That betrothal, though favoured by both 
sides, was broken off in 787 
3 
and one year later (788), 
Constantine VI was forced by his mother to marry Maria of 
Amnia, the granddaughter of a rich landowner fr om 
Paphlagonia, who is known as St. Philaretos the Merciful. 
From this marriage a daughter was born, who later became 
the wife of the Emperor Michael II. But, like the betrothal 
of Rotrud, the marriage of Constantine to Maria was also 
of short duration. Seven years after he had been married 
(i. e. in 795) the Emperor divorced his lawful wife and in 
August of the same year he married Theodote, a lady-in-waiting 
5 
1. See above, p. 71. 
2. Theophanes 1, pp. 455,463. 
3. More about this betrothal and its breaking off, cf. 
above, pp. 71-72. 
4. On the background of Maria see M. H. Fourmy - M. Leroy, 
'La vie de S. Philarete', (loc. cit. ), pp-85-170. V OF 
%% 
S. 
Theophanes 1, p. 470: "K0\)6%j<0UjCLp&'0Lq, jj'S ctu aU (0T Cc V. 
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of the Empress. 
' This employment of Theodote in Irene's 
chamber as well as the fact that the young Empress was a 
cousin of Theodore of Stoudios has led P. Speck to imply 
that Theodote should be seen as the instrument - unwitting 
perhaps - which both Irene and the Studites, used in 
order to destroy Constantine VI. 
2 Joseph, the abbot of 
Kathara, performed the wedding ceremony and an unnamed 
catechist tonsured Maria into the monastic life. 
Though Tarasius himself was not directly involved in 
this matter and though the new Empress Theodote was a cousin 
of Theodore, at the time abbot of Sakkoudion, a new conflict 
between the two parties burst out. This clash, known as 
Moechian Schism or Moechian controversy, 
3 
was more severe 
than the previous ones. It divides into two stages. The 
first phase was rather short and covered the years 795-797, 
while the second, which is going to be discussed in a later 
section, extended over the period from 806 to 811. 
During the first period Plato and his nephew Theodore 
accused the Emperor, whom they called new Herod, 
4 
of 
1. Theophanes (1, p. 469)-implies that the Empress Irene 
was behind Constantine's decision to divorce Maria 
and force her to become a nun "---s lcx%rTo, ý 
j-4VjTf0%, S T%; S. &fPX1; S AVOS TC%P K(XT0L 0 4X VU069AVýXl On' n `V-rWV 
Though this is our only source for such an information, 
the extraordinary ambition of the Emperor's mother 
allows us to assume that she would have done - as 
she actually did - everything in order to assert 
herself against her own son. Moreover, Constantine VI 
was a rather weak character,, open to suggestions. 
Furthermore he does not seem to have been clever 
enough to foresee the consequences and the repercussions 
of what he was up to. Finally he does not seem to 
have ever loved his wife Maria. 
2. I. P. Speck, Kaiser Konstantin VI, (op. cit. ), - pp. 
255-56. 
3. On the Moechian issue see Theoplianes 1, p. 470; 





having committed adultery.. 
' they directed their indignation 
against the abbot of Kathara, and they also accused the 
Patriarch Tarasius of having permitted the unnamed 
catechist to tonsure Maria and Joseph to perform the 
wedding ceremony and of holding communion with him 
(i. e. with Joseph) after that. 
2 The Radicals separated 
themselves from the secular clergy and they abstained from 
communion with the Patriarch. Once again Tarasius found 
himself caught between two powers. Once again the 
Radicals condemned his conciliatory policy. 
1. In Theodore of Stoudios, Epist, 1,25, (loc. cit. ), vol. 99, 
col-989 B, it is argued that Constantine VI had already 
committed adultery with various persons even before his 
second marriage. In the same letter Theodore is 
emphatic that Joseph, though he knew about those relations 
of the Emperor, went on giving the Emperor holy communion, 
sharing his dinners and, in general, behaving toward him 
as if nothing immoral was happening, According to the 
same letter, this was the reason why the abbot of 
Kathara, when asked, did not hesitate to perform the 
unlawful second marriage of the Emperor. To my knowledge 
this is our only source for these 'activities' of 
Constantine VI outside his marriage. Regardless of 
its validity this information reveals two things: 
first that even the Emppror's private life would not have 
escaped the attention of the Studites, and second that 
Joseph of Kathara had been equally popular with both 
Emperors, Constantine VI and Nicephorus I. 
2. There were rumours circulating that Tarasius, in 
permitting Joseph to perform the wedding ceremony, was 
acting under duress, given that Constantine VI had 
threatened to renew Iconoclasm., unless his demand for 
second marriage would be met. These rumours are echoed 
by three sources, the earliest of which seems to be 
Theodore-of Stoudios, Epist., 1,36 (loc-cit., vol. 99, 
col. 1032D) where it reads: . -TOG /I a" V%% jA04XL--Sf&%V 'V'% k; the second source is the anonymous 
Narratio iesanctis patriarchis Tarasio et Nicephoro 
(P. G. 99,19'-52D), and the third the Life of Theodore of 
Stoudios (P. G. 99,144 A). However, one might argue 
that, if such a threat had really been made by the 
Emperor, Theophanes would not have omitted to record 
it, in order to support Irene's attitude against her 
own son in August 797. 
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At the beginning of the dispute Constantine tried to 
win over the Radicals by persuasion. In the name of their 
kinship, Theodote sent Theodore some valuable presents, 
while the Emperor himself undertook the humiliating step 
of visiting the monastery of Sakkoudion. 
1 But all was in 
vain. The monks refused to accept Theodote's presents and 
ignored Constantine's arrival in their neighbourhood. 
2 
Such behaviour on the part of the monks irritated the 
Emperor enough to order the flogging of Theodore and of 
the most courageous among them and the dispersion of the 
monastery. Theodore was exiled with another ten monks to 
Thessalonica. 3 
Less than two year-s later (15 August 797) Constantine VI 
was deprived of his eyesight and deposed by his mother, 
4 
who from now onward reigned as the sole ruler for a period 
of five years, i. e. until October 802. The balance of 
forces changed. Irene took measures in favour of the 
1. Michael, 'Vita of Theodore of Stoudios'A, (P. G. vol. 99, 
col. 140 A). There was a source of curative hot water in 
Sakkoudion's neighbourhood and according to this author 
Constantine used his visit to the source as a pretext to 
speak with the monks on-the purpose of conciliation. 
2. Such a refusal to welcome the Emperor would sound 
unbelievable, if one of our sources did not provide a sort 
of explanation: it is Michael, Theodore's hagiographer, 
who suggests that for Theodore and for his monks 
Constantine was not an emperor any more! By committing 
adultery he automatically lost his imperial throne; he 
became ig wnTw TOS., i-e- fallen ('Vita Theodore of 
Stoudios', loc. cit. vol-99, col-137C). 
3. Michael 'Vita of Theodore of Stoudios'A, (Joc. cit. ), 140 B; 
see also TH-e-odore of Stoudios, Epist. 1,3 (loc-cit. ), 
916C-917C, where their route to Thessalonica"is 
described. 
4. Theophanes 1, p-472. We are not told much about the 
rest of Constantine VI's life, but he must have died 
some time before the year 80S. On this, see 
E. W. Brooks, 'On the Date of the Death of Constantine 
the Son of Irene'. B. Z., IX (1900), p. 65S. 
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Rigorists and against Joseph of Kathara. The Radicals 
returned from their exile almost immediately. 
' On his 
return to Constantinople, Theodore was welcomed as a hero. 
The Patriarch Tarasius and the Empress herself were there 
at the entrance of the city to welcome him. 
2 Joseph was 
deprivedothe priesthood. Since the Skandalon was removed., 
friendly relations between the radical monks and the 
Patriarch were resumed. 
Soon after these developments Theodore left Sakkoudion 
and established himself at the old monastery of Stoudios 
inside Constantinople. 3 It was a move reportedly made at 
the request of the Empres. s Irene and the Patriarch Tarasius. 
4 
For a period of about nine years, there was peace in 
the body of the church. During this time Theodore seems 
to have dedicated himself completely to the task of 
reorganizing monastic life in Byzantium. 
5 The two parties 
did not clash again, at least until after the death of the 
moderate Tarasius in 806. This reconciliation, however, 
should not be taken to mean that the differences separating 
the two parties had been removed. The differences remained 
more or less unchanged and the two sides stuck to their 
convictions. Given the occasion they were certainly ready 
to clash once again. 
This sketch of the internal strife of the church is a 
necessary introduction to the whole ecclesiastical 'climate' 
at Constantinople and the dilemma the Emperor Nicephorus was 
faced with., when he came to appoint St. Tarasius' successor 
in 806. 
1. Michael, 'Vita of Theodore of Stoudios' A, (10c. cit-), 
141 nacj2, ctvT%'tcct A4iki Talis ncxTqpcx'6%v '3ne-po(2(%Xvr 
2. ibid. 
3. Michael,,, Vita of Theodore of Stoudios'A (loc-cit. ), 
144 CD. -Un-the reasons which caused týe transfer, 
see also below, pp-197-99. 
4. ibid., col-144D. 
S. On this see, J. Leroy, 'La r6forme Studitel, (loc. cit. ). 
pp. 201-206. 
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A fair number or sources refer to the election of the 
new patriarch. 
1 However, though all sources agree on the 
name and the background of the person, who was finally 
elevated, the proceedings of the election or appointment 
remain vague. As the Book of Ceremonies 
2 has it, the 
appointment of a new patriarch took place in two stages, 
the first one being the election itself ( %V %I v* o 4, OF, -'c)t ) 
and the second the liturgical ordination (ieE-, 1pco-T*v1"cx 
of the nominee. 
3 The enthronement was the final step 
and took place the same day as the ordination, which day 
ought to have been a Sunday or a holiday. The already 
mentioned passage from the Book of Ceremonies., which is a 
rather detailed one, speaks of an assembly of the 
metropolitan bishops, held at the church of St. Sophia. 
The purpose of the meeting was to elect three candidates 
and to submit their names to the emperor. As the final 
word belonged to him, the emperor either appointed one of 
these three, or he rejected all of them and expressed his 
preference for somebody else. In the second case his 
choice, of course, prevailed. In the year A. D. 933, 
to which the passage refers, the powerful Emperor Romanus 
Lecapenus appointed as patriarch his own son, Theophylact, 
though his name does not seem to have been among the three 
forwarded by the metropolitan bishops. 
4 Nothing is said 
1. Theophanes 1, p. 481; Vita Nicephori by Ignatius the 
Deacon (P. G. 100,61B-64B; Theodore of Stoudios, 
Laudatio Platonis (P. G. 99,837 BC) and especially his 
Epist. 1,16, (P. G. 99, col. 960-61). 
2. Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De Cerimoniis. (op-cit. ), 
vol-I, pp. 564-66. 
3. For bibliography see mainly, K. Lubeck, 'Die Patriarchenwahl 
in der griechisch-melkitischen Kirche', Theologie und 
Glaube, VI (1914), pp-730-40; L. Brehier, 111investitute 
des patriarches de Constantinople au moyen dge', Studi e 
Testi, CXXIII (Miscellanea G. Mercati, 111,1946), pp. 
368-72; id., Institutions (2nd vol. of Le monde byzantin), 
pp. 477-82; P. Alexander, The Patriarch 71'cephorus... 
(2p. cit. ), pp. 65-66. 
4. On t! T'ls see. G. Ostrogorsky and E. Stein, 'Die 
Kr6nungsurkunden des Zeremoniebuches', Byz., VII (1932), 
pp-185-233- 
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about any role, played by the lay element in this election. 
According to I. Pargoire la part du peuple dans cet acte 
(i. e. elections of bishops) tend a se restreindre"' and 
P. Alexander suggests that 'even ordinary bishops had no 
vote in this matter'. 
2 It seems that the participation of 
the laity was restricted to the acclamation only. But 
the acclamation was a clear stage itself, totally separated 
from the election. In addition to this, the acclamation, 
which was made by the senate, usually at the Magnaura, does 
not seem to have been an essential part for the procedure 
of the election of a new patriarch. From what has been 
said, it becomes obvious that the intervention of the 
emperor took place either during the actual election 
(%Vv%4ocbcP91'ot) or after that, between the election and the 
acclamation. Undoubtedly such an intervention was 
uncanonical, but strong emperors did not worry much about 
canon law. 
Coming back to the year 806, the sources at our disposal 
allow us to assume that in this year the election of the new 
patriarch was done in a more or less unprecedented, not to 
say peculiar, way. No assembly of metropolitan bishops 
is mentioned as having taken place and consequently the 
Emperor did not need to choose between three candidates. 
From what the sources report, it seems very likely that 
Nicephorus took the initiative from the very first moment. 
Making a careful inquiry, he wrote to all distinguished 
priests, monks and senators, asking each one of them to 
indicate his preference. 
3 We possess neither the total 
1. J. Pargoire., Eglise Byzantine de 527 ý- 847 (Paris 1905) 
p-57. 
... (2p. cit. ), p. 66. 2. P. Alexander, The Patriarch Nicephorus 3. Vita Nicephori (loc. cit. ), cols, 61B-64A; Theodore of 
Stoudios, Laudatio Platonis (loc-cit. ), col-837B; id., 
Epist. 1,16 (loc-cit. ), cols. 960A-961A. 
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number, nor the names of those asked to vote. Two persons, 
however, Plato and his nephew Theodore, the leaders of the 
Studite movement, are known to have been asked. 
From Theodore's reply to the Emperor, a letter which is 
an invaluable source for the history of this period, it 
becomes clear that Nicephorus asked those consulted to 
indicate, not three, but only one candiate. Theodore 
himself did not propose anybody specifically. 
1 He only 
referred to the general qualifications, which an appropriate 
candidate ought to have, and he went on to say that the 
person to be elected should alread7 be in holy orders. 
2 
Though he does not say it directly, fr(m the context of 
the letter it becomes clear that Theodore refused to 
consider the candidature of a layman. 
Plato's reply to the Emperor on the same issue is not 
preserved. We learn about it from the Laudatio Platonis, 
delivered by Theodore, on the occasion of his uncle's 
funeral in 814.3 From this speech one might assume that 
Plato considered himself a suitable person to put forward 
a candidate. He nominated a person, whose name Theodore 
carefully avoids mentioning. But, is not such coyness an 
indication that it was Theodore himself who had been 
nominated by Plato as a candidate for the patriarchate? 
At any rate,, the name of the person, proposed by Plato, 
is not something of vital importance., at least at this stage 
of our research. More significance can certainly be 
attached to the fact that those consulted did not agree on a 
unanimous proposition. Theodore of Stoudios has it that 
not five, but many persons had been proposed by those 
1. Theodore of Stoudios, Epist. 1,16 (loc. cit. ), col. 
kA C-0a 960B: -Ov glAvw (x 'r a 2. ibid., 960C. 




1 What has also to be stressed is that the key 
to the issue was always the Emperor himself, about whose 
behaviour and mentality certain questions arise. First, 
did he not know, for instance, that, given the existing 
divisions within the church, he could not expect an 
unanimous choice? Second, was it not the Emperor's 
intention to appoint his namesake Nicephorus to the 
patriarchate, even before he undertook the task of making 
his thorough inquiry? And third, would the Emperor be 
prepared to accept anunanimous choice, made by those 
consulted, if this went against his own preference? 
Nicephorus' whole character and outlook point in the 
opposite direction. He would have undoubtedly ignored 
any advice which did not fall in line with his own wishes. 
At any rate, from what we read in the Patriarch 
Nicephorus' Vita, 2 it is clear that the Emperor did not 
indicate his preference from the very first. It was only 
after the disagreement of those asked, that he made his 
decision public. 
3 We do not know how many, if any, of 
those asked for their opinion, nominated the Emperor's 
namesake Nicephorus as patriarch. It. in any case, seems 
unlikely that even a simple majority in favour of one 
candidate was achieved. 
4 No doubt such a disagreement 
provided the Emperor with a good pretext, to ignore their 
choices. 
Theophanes' account that Nicephorus (the Patriarch) was 
elected nmv-r'Os -ro; ýmoýj L<at -[Z-j fset-wv, np'os N %, Cmli TZV 
J& 4DL r. %X ew V does not shed much light on the problem for 
1. Theodore of Stoudios, Laudatio Platonis, (loc. cit. col. 
837B: "---T 4x" %# v% 6 %-* 6 
or 
(x -r cx "t n't n oA A*vs ol n QA A cp 
( w- s le" w cx 6, ro r ?I 
'L(-V k CX T (")L d) % -ý aL V 
lk &A 4Se% Cx V-ý 
2. Ignatius the Deacon, Vita Nicephori ... (loc-cit. ), col. 64A. 3. ibid. 
, col. 64AB: -T 6 lX -TO 
TOV VVý SP(X6T%AelOV 
%)OlOV%"Y-Q'j t3%v'vACb 'p 'Fp Ov-. % 
4* Theodore of Stoudios, Laudatio Platonis (loc-cit. ), col. 
837 B. 
5. Theophanes 1, p-481- 
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the following reasons: first, because it is very 
general and does not go into any details regarding the 
work preliminary to the election., second, because he is 
%I biased against the Emperor and by saying qp *, 5 j, & v< cc"% 
Tý) q .6 (X 61A er'"i V,, 
1 he gives us the impression that the 
Emperor Nicephorus and his son Stauracius were the last 
ones to have an opinion on the matter, and thirdly, 
because, as it stands, it seems very likely that 
Theophanes I account ref ers not to the W ui i*, * (* o (X 
itself, but to later stages of the whole procedure of the 
election, i. e. to the acclamation and the ordination. it 
is significant that the author of the Chronographia 
does not say that the new Patriarch "was elected" 
ell but he goes straight to the ordination 
using the verb ? o-rcv", "Q%n (he was ordained). 
It is true that Theophanes uses the word W 46L, ý 
(by the vote) too, but from the whole context it becomes 
10 jQ1QG J((X*l T; J, 4 116p"' clear that the phrase TIO(VT'O%S T07J t Vi V 
(by the vote of all the populace and the clergy), 
2 he 
refers to the acclamation and not to the actual election. 
Nevertheless the Chronographia i, s useful, though not 
the only-source, for the background of the person, who 
obtained the Emperor'S preference for the patriarchate. 
His name too was Nicephorus; he was a high ranking civil 
servant., asecretis, 
4a 
post from which he had already 
retired with the intention of becoming a monk. At the 
time of his election Nicephorus was at the head of a 
poorhouse in Constantinople. He resided somewhere outside 
the capital, where the Emperor sent messengers to persuade 
4 
1. Theophanes 1, p. 481. 
2. ibid. 
3.17-id.; Vita Nicephori (loc. cit. ), col-49A. 
4. Tb--id., col-64BC. 
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him to accept the honour offered to him and accompany 
them to Constantinople for the rest of the proceedings. 
It should be noted that Nicephorus' Vita records two 
elections (W vj cb ooo? I (x 1) : the first one, which is 
identical with the Emperor's preliminary inquiries - also 
known to us from Theodore of Stoudios 
1- 
and in which 
those asked did not agree on the person to be appointed, 
2 
while the second took place after the Emperor had already 
made his preference clear. This second inquiry, if it 
ever took place, 
3 does not seem to have been as thorough 
as the previous one. It is very likely that it was only 
those ready to fulfil the Emperor's wish that were asked. 
It needs now to be emphasized that this time their vote 
was totally in accord with the Emperor's already known 
wishes. 
4 
But., what made Nicephorus, the Emperor, decide upon his 
namesake for the patriarchate? 
Though the latter's hagiographer, Ignatius the Deacon, 
attributes a number of qualifications, fulfilled by his 
Saint, 5 these do not seem to have played any role of 
importance for his appointment. His background as a high 
civil servant., however, was just the same as that of 
Tarasius, his predecessor. Tarasius had been a successful 
patriarch, at least in the Emperor's eyes, 
6 
and one might 
assume that this similarity of backgrounds would have meant 
much to the Emperor. Furthermore, Nicephorus himself, 
before becoming emperor, had been General Logothete, i. e. 
a minister in Irene's government, and it is more than 
1. Theodore of Stoudios, EPist. 1,16 (loc. cit. ), col-960B; 
id., LajAdatio Platonis, (loc. cit. ), col. 837B. 
2. Vita Nicept-)hori (loc. cit. ) col. 64A: "c; ýAcs "04 E*AdPO 0 
3. ibid., col. 64AB. Here again it is possible that 
Ignatius the Deacon takes the acclamation as a second 
election. 
4. ibid. , col - 64B: 
"K(x*% nf, %Os ')f%tfrTjc). j Oe&v ncfvTcLv eýuvv,, 'AG(V%jtv. "' S. ib -id . 6. See above, pp. 172-73. 
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likely that as such he was already acquainted with his 
namesake, the asecretis, though no positive proof can be 
adduced. 
By appointing Nicephorus, the Emperor probably rejected 
other candidates, some of whom certainly did not belong to 
the party of the Studites. 
Four days were enough for the appointee to be ordained 
as deacon, to climb up the steps of ecclesiastical hierarchy 
and become patriarch on Easter Sunday 806. Two 
archbishops, Nicolas of Caesarea in Cappadocia and Thomas 
of Thessalonica, and one metropolitan bishop, Leo of 
Heraclea in Thrace, performed the consecration. 
1 The 
Emperors were also present. The Studites not only did not 
participate in the ordination, but they strongly opposed the 
appointment of a layman. They were probably preparing 
some sort of a demonstration and thus the Emperor thought 
it necessary to imprison their leaders, Plato and Theodore, 
for twenty-four days, i. e. until the whole procedure had 
been gone through. 
2 This imprisonment can definitely be 
seen as the renewal of the struggle between the Moderates 
and the Radicals. In the years to come the two parties 
would clash again, perhaps more vigorously than earlier. 
From what we have seen so far, it becomes more or 
less clear that the new Patriarch was totally 'Emperor 
made' and as such he could hardly oppose the will of his 
master. 
However, the way in which Nicephorus was appointed does 
not seem to be the only factor that determined his future 
as patriarch. His weak character as well as the lack of 
support from the populace, appears to have played their 
1. P. Alexander, The patriarch Nicephorus... p. 69. 
2. Theodore of Stoudios, Laudatio Platonis, (loc. cit. ), 
col. 837D. 
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role in the course of his patriarchate. On the other 
hand, the Emperor Nicephorus revealed his intention of 
dominating the new Patriarch almost immediately after 
the latter's consecration took place. It would seem 
that some issues, which were normally regarded as purely 
religious, were in his eyes mainly of political 
significance. In two of these issues the new Patriarch 
was forced to act not as the head of an independent church, 
but as a minister of religion and public worship, 
definitely under the command of the Emperor. 
The first of these affairs was the relations between 
eastern and western Christianity. 
It had been a custom for a newly elected patriarch at 
Constantinople to send a letter to the Pope, reporting his 
own election and enthronement. That letter contained 
also a confession of belief and an outline of the ecclesias- 
tical policy, which the new patriarch had it in mind to 
follow. The Patriarch Nicephorus, though he badly wanted 
to report his enthronement to the Pope Leo III, was not 
allowed by the Emperor to fulfil his desire until the 
death of the latter in the year 811. The letter which 
at that time the Patriarch sent to the Pope is preserved 
and serves as an excellent example of how the ecclesiastical 
power yielded to the secular, not only in the East, but 
also in the West. 
2 
From the letter's context one might assume that the 
Emperor at Constantinople did not intend to humiliate the 
head of the eastern church. He simply wanted to punish 
the Pope for his role in the events of Christmas 800. 
1. J. B. Bury, E. R. E., p-31; id., The Constitution of the 
Later Roman Empire, (Cambridge 1910), p. 32. 
2. St. Nicephori patriarchae, Epistola ad Leonem III papam, 
P. G.., 100, cols-169A-200C. 
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The letter goes on to say that in the eyes of the Byzantine 
Emperor, Pope Leo III, by anointing Charlemagne, 
1 
separated the papacy from the whole body of the church, 
2 
i. e. he created a schism. Thus, Nicephorus the Emperor 
considered the issue of the relations between the two 
churches primarily political and on this ground he prevented 
his Patriarch from entering into any official communication 
with the Pope. In other words, in the Emperor's mind 
political interests of the eastern Empire were of more 
significance than respect for ecclesiastical customs. 
Although his namesake the Patriarch, did not share the 
views of his master, he realised that he had to compromise 
and behave according to the will of the Emperor. The 
impression which we get from the letter of enthronement 
( 'Ttx 6 1) v oclIK01L ), sent du-. ring the reign of Michael I 
some time at the end of 811, is that the Patriarch 
abstained from an old ecclesiastical custom, not out of his 
1. The unction of Charlemagne is also reported by 
Theophanes 1, p. 473. Western sources, however, state 
that it was only Charlemagne's eldest son, also called 
Charles, who was anointed. See, for example, Liber 
Pontificalis, Vita Leonis III, § XXIV (vol-II, p. 7 
ed. L. Duchesne) where it reads: "et pontifex unxit oleo 
sancto Karolo, excellentissimo filio eius rege, 1 ipso 
die Natalis domini nostri Jesu Christi. 7. The explanation 
provided by E. Amann (L'epoque carolingienne, in A. Fliche 
and V. Martin, Histoire de 1'Eglise, (Paris 1937), VI, 
p-161, n-3, that eastern sources confused the two 
Charles, is,. of course, likely, But it should not go 
unnoticed that even a western source, Johannes Venetus 
(Cronaca Veneziana, ed. Monticolo, Fonti per la storia 
d7Italia IX, 1890,100) speaks of an unction of 
Charlemagne: "ab apostolico coronatus et unctus est in 
impe atore". Alexander, The Patriarch Nicephorus... 
(p. 107, n. 3) attributes this statement to a probab'ility 
that J. Venetus used a Byzantine source. On the events 
of Christmas 800, see among others, P. E. Schramm, 'Die 
Anerkennung Karls des Grossen als Kaiser', 
Historische Zeitschrift, CLXXII (1951), pp. 449-515. 
St. Nicephori, Epistola ad Leonem III (loc. cit. ), col. 
197AB. It reads: " 1< CX'j ;ýS6ý, &ýs 
C %* Iý 0('T 
T%; S "P-KKAv%6t%S' 
ECYLUITOUS CLIR(-P? IA 
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own freewill. 
1 At a time when the Emperor Nicephorus 
was already dead, he did not need to hide his feelings. 
He is probably expressing his indignation at the late 
Emperor's dominance by saying: V6( Of S6 1q,, p Cit K CX 
t2 OLfAIIAIK10% C-1j? VT0*1VfV6f i(VAVf1V 4V&S Ids's 4 pt-Volf oeb; 6900 jVV%TjV%% 
One might draw attention to the fact that by the year 811 
the political relations between East and West had also been 
improved and it might be possible that the Patriarch sent 
the letter as a result of this improvement and not simply 
because he felt free from his namesake Emperor. To such 
an argument the answer can be that the relations between 
the two Empires had started improving even before the death 
of the Emperor Nicephorus. In fact, it was this very 
Emperor, who under the threat. from the Bulgars started 
negotiations with the West. If the r. jv0 OT ,K ;L had M 
been sent at that time, it would have definitely helped the 
normalization in the relations, not only between the two 
churches, but also and mainly between the two Empires. 
Therefore, under normal circumstances, we would have 
expected the Emperor Nicephorus in the last years of his 
reign, not only not to hinder his Patriarch from sending a 
letter of enthronement to the Pope, but to urge its 
implementation himself. The fact that the Emperor of the 
East stuck to his refusal until his death (July 811) 
might be explained by a suggestion that in Nicephorus' 
mind Pope Leo III shared the greater part of responsibility 
for the events of Christmas of 800. 
Soon after his election in 806, the new Patriarch was 
forced to yield to the secular authority for a second time. 
1. St. Nicephori, Epistola ad Leonem III (loc. cit. ), 197B: "jv'vct- 
694XI r*%)t%'j6tAoYe-f 'J(. &6ýýgXj -ro-q Of 3 
2. ibid., 197A. 
6kAO%0%C 
Tl&(P%ntnTOV61%f OL60VJIA Yw 
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It will be remembered that Joseph, the abbot of Kathara, 
had been excluded from any religious performance since the 
year 797. Now, nine years after this exGe, &,; oq, the Emperor asked the newly elected Patriarch Nicephorus to 
restore Joseph to priesthood. As Bury has it, by doing 
so the Emperor Nicephorus 'proceeded to procure a definite 
affirmation of the superiority of the Emperor to canonical 
laws'. 1 It looks, however, that such an explanation 
of the Emperor's desire for the restoration of the 
Skandalon is not sufficient, because in this particular 
case two sources speak of other reasons. 
The first source is Michael, the hagiographer of 
Theodore of Stoudios. He says that the Emperor ordered 
the restoration of Joseph, because the latter 'is said to 
have caused peace and to have made arrangements for the 
proper solution to the crisis', 
2 but he does not say any- 
thing about the actual crisis. To this problem much more 
light is shed by our second text, the Synodicon Vetus, a 
compilation written during the patriarchate of Photius. 
3 
The passage which is of interest for us here states clearly 
that Joseph the Presbyter and Oeconomus of the great church 
of Constantinople mediated between the Emperor Nicephorus 
and Bardanes Turcus, during the latter's uprising in 
803.4 Furthermore the anonymous author adds that the 
assault of Bardanes was scattered without bloodshed, 
5 
1. J. B. Bury, E. R. E., p. 34. 
2. Michael, 'Vf-ta of Theodore of Stoudios' B., P. G. 99, 
J# col. 265CD 11 w. Ls rIcx(p-cx%-r%, ov ýeeov6-rm %%p1nvv%v d; w%6%v 
ý<m`% 'ro-G Au6cri-AoGwros 
3. P. Alexander, The Patriarch Nicephorus., p. 86. 
4. The Synodicon Vetus Ced. and transl. by J. Duffy and 
J. Parker) (CFHB ) (Washington D. C., 1979), pp. 128-29. 
S. The Synodico-n--Výetus (loc. cit. ), p. 129. 
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and here his account agrees with Theophanes who stresses 
the fact that the Empire had been spared a civil war. 
' 
If the already mentioned two sources are of value., then it 
is easy to see why the Emperor Nicephorus was so eager 
to restore Joseph to priesthood. The abbot of Kathara 
had served the interests of the state in a very crucial 
situation and, consequently, he deserved his reward. 
More precisely, Joseph's exclusion from religious activities 
(797) turned him towards politics. He acted as mediator 
between the Emperor and-the rebel in 803. One wonders, 
of course, why Joseph of Kathara should have been chosen 
to mediate, but the sources at our disposal do not provide 
more facts about this 'political' abbot. Unfortunately, 
we are not told whether Joseph intervened in the conflict 
on his own initiative, or he was asked to do so by the 
Emperor Nicephorus. On the other hand, it is quite 
understandable why the Emperor waited until after the 
death of the Patriarch Tarasius before instituting his 
restoration. Tarasius had already been criticized for 
his inconsistency in this matter and, therefore, nobody 
could expect him to change his mind yet again on the same 
issue. Perhaps the Emperor had already asked Tarasius to 
restore Joseph. If this is the case, then Nicephorus 
SUppoSit4 met with Tarasius' refusal. But such Lons cannot 
be proved. What seems to be certain is that Nicephorus 
the Patriarch was much more compliant with the Emperor's 
will than his predecessor. The new Patriarch probably 
did not want the restoration of Joseph either. This 
seems to be the reason why in the year 811, after the 
death of the Emperor Nicephorus and the elevation of 
Michael I, the Patriarch Nicephorus did not object to 
deposing and excommunicating Joseph again, as his 
predecessor Tarasius had done in the year 797. 
1. Theophanes 1, p. 479. 
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Returning to the events of 806, we have to assess 
whether Nicephorus the Patriarch surrendered to the imperial 
will, because he was convinced that the restoration of the 
.7/ 
00 abbot of Kathara was a matter of dispensation 
(01 
K0V0 %A 
or simply because he could not oppose %a the Emperor's 
designs. Although no source gives a direct answer to 
the dilemma, after a very careful examination of the letter 
sent by the Patriarch to Pope Leo III in 811, as well as 
of some crucial letters of Theodore of Stoudios, 
1 
it 
would seem that the Patriarch Nicephorus, being a rather 
weak character, could not oppose his namesake the Emperor 
for the additional reason that he owed him his appointment. 
He will oppose, of course, the iconoclastic policy of 
Leo V in 815, but at that time another emperor was in 
office 
2 
and the issue was certainly of much greater 
importance than the restoration of a priest. 
Now given the Patriarch's tendency to yield before 
imperial pressure, another question remains to be answered: 
to what extent did the Emperor Nicephorus exploit the 
situation to make his namesake Patriarch a mere tool of his 
own will? Though such an exploitation seems to have 
taken place, it remains, however, very doubtful as to whether 
the Emperor saw it in that way. It would be more correct 
to say that the humiliation of the Patriarch, though not 
intended on the Emperor's part, took place as a result of 
the latter's desire to exercise real influence on 
ecclesiastical affairs. 
1. See for instance the letters: 1,25,26,31,32, 
33,43,48. 
2. This nevertheless should not be taken as an argument 
that Leo V was less determined to rule over the church 
than Nicephorus I. But as far as the Patriarch 
Nicephorus is concerned, it seems that by the year 815, 
he was tired of his 'moderate' policy. A time comes 
for everybody to say a great 'No' in his life. For 
the Patriarch Nicephorus this time came relatively late, 
after he had been in office for nine years. 
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Thus, in the year 806 a synod of fifteen bishops was 
called, 
1 
which decided on the restoration of the stormy 
Joseph of Kathara to priesthood. As Theophanes says 
nothing about this synod, we hear of it mainly from the 
letters of Theodore of Stoudios. The reaction of the 
Studites to such a 'notorious' rehabilitation will form 
part of our next section of this chapter. 
C: THE EMPEROR AND THE STUDITES* 
In a theocratic state like Byzantium, religious groups and 
especially monks would be expected to have played quite an 
important role in the everyday life of both the ruling 
elite and the populace. For various reasons the monks 
were particularly influential in our period and this 
demands a detailed explanation. When Nicephorus line I 
came into office in 802, the monks had already established 
themselves both as a religious and as a political force 
in the Byzantine Empire. Not long before that, their 
leader had abandoned his previous monastic establishment-at 
Sakkoudi-on and settled himself with his monks, or at least 
with most of them, at the old monastery of Stoudios, inside 
1. On the date see V. Grumel, Le patriarchat byzantin, serie i: 
fasc. 2., (Chalcedon 1936), no-377. The names of the 
bishops-participants in that synod escape us. 
The name 'Studites' is used here more or less as an 
alternative to the term 'the monks'. This is because 
of the prominent role played by the Studites during the 
last years of the eighth and the beginning of the ninth 
century. Other monastic communities outside 
Constantinople or those on Mountain Olympus in BithNnia 
are definitely of minor significance for the political 
and religious scene of the Empire during the years under 
consideration. 
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Constantinople itself. 1 The threat from the Arabs., who 
at the time were almost continuously invading and plundering 
Asia Minor is given by the sources as the main reason for 
their removal. 
2 However, it would seem that such a threat 
could only have been used as a mere pretext. Other monastic 
institutions scattered in all parts of the peninsula were 
flourishing at the same time. The Arabic raids do not 
seem to have bothered them very much. Furthermore, as 
J. Leroy has shown, Sakkoudion was never completely 
abandoned. A group of monks remained there and, after 
Theodore's departure, life went on at the monastery as if 
nothing had changed. 
3 Leroy does not, in fact, accept 
the Arab raids as the real reason behind the move. He 
argues that a Studite monastic order was in the course of 
developing, with a number of monasteries coming under the 
leadership of a single abbot. 
4 Patrick Henry suggests 
that an Arabic raid took place, but it was an ephemeral one, 
which did not disturb for long life at Sakkoudion. 
5 
Therefore the real reason, why the monks of Sakkoudion moved 
to the capital, must be sought elsewh-ere. The framework 
of the relevant events and circumstances appears to suggest 
that Theodore was determined to play a more decisive role 
in Constantinople itsel. 
- -F and to 
impose his party on the 
political scene of the Empire. Furthermore, perhaps, he 
wanted to connect his name with a monastery, other than that 
of Sakkoudion, with which Platols, his uncle's, name had 
been associated. Moreover, as Michael the Monk, the 
1. Michael the Monk, 'Vita. of Theodore of Stoudios, A% 
(loc-cit. ), col. 144D. 
2. ibid. 
3. J. Leroy, ILa R6forme studite', (loc. cit. ), pp-201-206. 
4. ibid. 
S. P. Henry, 'The Moechian Controversy and the 
Constantinopolitan Synod A. D. 809', Journal of 
TheoloRical Studies, N. S. vol. XX pt. 2, October 1969, 
p-504, footnote 1. 
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hagiographer of Theodore of Stoudios, has it, the Empress 
Irene and the Patriarch Tarasius made a request to Theodore, 
at that time abbot in Sakkoudion, to transfer his monastic 
establishment to Constantinople. 
1 It was only a few 
months earlier (August 797) that Irene had undertaken the 
decisive step of blinding and deposing her own son 
Constantine VI, in order to govern the Empire alone! 
No woman had ever dared to execute such an atrocity in 
Byzantium's previous history. The army was mostly devoted 
to the deposed Emperor and consequently hostile to his 
mother. Therefore, Trene badly needed any kind of support, 
and Theodore could be considered as one of the best 
sources of moral supp-)rt. His willingness to provide 
Irene with the support she needed is proved by the letter, 
which he sent to her four years later. 
2 In this letter, 
Theodore could not have found more extravagant words with 
which to show his app. rova-1 of the Empress, for the tax 
concession which she granted to the inhabitants of 
Constantinople in A. D. 801. 
But Irene's need for support, no matter how strong, 
cannot be the only reason for the transfer of the monks-to 
Constantinople. The mentality and the ambitions of 
Theodore must also beý taken into account. By the year 797 
Theodore had definitely established himself as the leader 
of the Rigorists among the monks. This particular monastic 
grouping acquired vital importance at the turn of the eighth 
and for most of*the ninth century. We have already seen 
3 
that their leaders had suffered their first exile because 
of their strong opposition to the marriage of the Emperor 
Constantine Iftr VI with Theodote. It can hardly be argued 
1. Michael, 'Vita of Theodore of Stoudios', A, (Joc. cit. ), 
col-144D IIcyjL- t<cxA X%nccfoG6%-j CL6TO"J, IEkKk7OM; T%; S 
To; T-TOU; (OU yC-VOf69CC% 
2. The letter can be found in Migne, P. G. 99,929B-933B. 
3. Above, p. 180. 
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that their opposition to this marriage had been unsuccessful. 
Irene's attitude in this matter can be seen as an adoption 
of the hard line followed by the Rigorists. The first 
step of the Empress, after she had become the sole ruler 
of the Empire in 797, was to recall the radical monks from 
exile and to excommunicate Joseph, the abbot of Kathara, 
who had performed the adulterous wedding. It should not 
be allowed to pass unnoticed that, at this stage, the 
excommunication of Joseph, meant a humiliation of the 
Patriarch Tarasius. In other words, in the year 797 Irene 
made her choice. She decided to back the Rigorists 
against the Moderates, not only because her deposed son had 
done the opposite, but probably and mainly because these 
bold monks were at that time the strongest body on which 
she could rely. 
We do not know the exact number of the letters written 
by Theodore, at that time abbot of Sakkoudion, during his 
first exile. Such a knowledge would enable us to estimate 
Theodore's contact with people outside his monastic order 
and, more particularly, with dignitaries of the civil 
hierarchy. At any rate, it seems that the letters belonging 
to this early period of Theodore's correspondence are not 
that many. Baronius dates only six letters from that period, 
and this small number entitles us-to believe that. at that 
time, Theodore had not yet built up his influence outside 
his monastic order. Nevertheless, he was definitely in the 
process of doing so. On the other hand, his eagerness to 
play a prominent role in both, the ecclesiastical and the 
political scene of Constantinople, is beyond dispute. 
However, it must be remembered that the distance between 
Constantinople and the monastery of Sakkoudion was certainly 
an obstacle to such ambitions. Theodore realized that, if 
he really wanted to exercise some influence on more people 
than he had done so far and if he wanted to be in the centre 
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of the events during the years to come, he ought to be in 
Constantinople. The only way of achieving this, was the 
transfer of his institution from its remote place to the 
capital itself. He did so probably at the end of the 
year 797 or I&& early 798,1 and his influence on the 
Empress until her fall in 802 can be taken for granted. 
Therefore, when Nicephorus I came to power, he was confronted 
with a monk, who had been used to exercise influence on 
both the political and the ecclesiastical affairs of the 
Empire. Moreover, the number of the monks of the 
monastery of Stoudios grew rapidly. Less than four years 
later, (i. e. in 806) it had almost reached the thousand 
mark. 
2 
Under these circumstances it becomes quite understandable 
why in the year 806, at the time when the Patriarch 
Tarasius died and the empty patriarchal post was about to 
be filled, the Emperor Nicephorus, in his thorough 
preliminary inquiry, could not afford to ignore Theodore 
and his uncle Plato. In regard to this inquiry the 
following question arises: did the Emperor ask for the 
opinion of the Stuclites out of mere concern about the church 
or did he only use it as a pretext,, in order to show himself 
impartial towards all spiritual movements, while in the 
meantime he had already made his own decision on the 
appointment of his namesake Nicephorus to the patriarchate? 
Although every answer to such a question seems to be quite 
risky, it is certain that the relations between the Studites 
and the Emperor, during the first four years of the latter's 
reign were, if not friendly, at least not hostile. This, 
however, by no means suggests that the Emperor Nicephorus 
1. The date of the transfer cannot be fixed precisely; but, 
since it is connected with Arabic incursions, it must be 
noticed that Theophanes (vol. 1, p. 473) records an Arabic 
raid in the vicinity of Sakkoudion under the year A. M. 
6291 (A. D. 798). 
' Stoudios' B, (loc-cit. ), col. 2. Michael, 'Vita Theodore al, 
260C. See, however, Theophanes A. M. 629T-71 2p 481), 
where the number of the Studite monks is estimated to 
about seven hundred. 
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was prepared to appoint Theodore, probably named by Plato, 
to the empty patriarchal throne. 
1 The reply of Theodore 
to the Emperor? s inquiry is preserved 
2 
and forms a very 
good source, if not for the relations between church and 
state, 
3 
at least for the relations between the Emperor and 
the Studites. It certainly reflects Theodore's views 
about the rights of the Emperor in the governance of the 
church. It sheds light on the question of how far Theodore 
could be seen as an advocate of church's full independence 
against the state. Had it been written under different 
circumstances, this letter would have been an invaluable 
source: that is to say that, since the abbot of Stoudios 
was writing at a time when he himself probably hoped to 
ascend the patriarchal throne, he refrained from expressing 
his real views on church-state relations. 
Theodore begins his reply by saying that Nicephorus' 
elevation to the imperial throne should be seen as a proof 
of God's care for the church. The text goes on to say that 
before Nicephorus' accession-to the throne, the political 
situation of the Empire was bad, but now it was beginning 
to improve; church affairs were correspondingly on the 
mend. In other words, ecclesiastical matters too, will be 
better with Nicephorus as Emperor than the y had been during 
Irene's reign. While J. B. Bury 
4 
considers these somewhat 
surprising sentiments as an effort by Theodore to flatter the 
Emperor, P. Henry attributes it to Theodore's 'coolness' 
and ability to appreciate efficiency and competence more 
than temporary favours. 5 The opening would surely have been 
1. Theodore of Stoudios, Laudatio Platonis (loc-cit. )., col. 
837B: 'he gave a vote, but for whom, I will not say'. 
2. It is his Epistola 1,16, P. G. 99,960A-961A. 
3. P. Henry, (Theodore of Stoudios...., op. cit., p-55) 
argues that it is misleading to see this letter as 
concerned with the problem of church and state. 
4. J. B. Bury, E. R. E., p-32- 
5. P. Henry, 'The Moechian Controversy', (loc. cit. ), p-505. 
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different, if the letter had been written on a different 
occasion, when there was not the possibility that Theodore 
might become patriarch. In any case, what is certain, 
is that Theodore does not deny to the Emperor the right 
to supervise the patriarchal election, which a valiant 
defender of church's independence might well have done. 
Furthermore, the letter suggests that, since the political 
affairs had already partially improved, ecclesiastical 
matters were now in turn to attract the Emperor's 
attention. The improvement of church affairs will start 
with the proper 
1 
election of the new patriarch. Such a 
statement, however, would mean that the Studites were. 
never fully satisfied with Tarasius' patriarchate. They 
had their own reservations about him and the party of 
the Moderates. 
Though the procedure which Theodore proposes for the 
election of the new patriarch is of little interest here, it 
has to be stressed that according to the abbot of the 
Studites, the Emperor should take the initiative in the 
choice of an electoral body to be made up of prominent 
members of each of the following ecclesiastical groups: 
bishops, abbots, stylites, reclujes, and clergy, 
Representatives of these groups will. form the electoral 
college. But, here again, it will be the Emperor who, 
in consultation with this body, will choose the best 
candidate. It would seem that Theodore was willing to 
give the Emperor the final word on the election. What is 
difficult to say is whether, by doing so, the abbot of 
Stoudios was simply respecting tradition or only hoping to 
benefit from flattering the Emperor. But references to 
any tradition on the matter do not exist in Theodore's 
letter. On the other hand, the fact that he does not 
The Greek word, used in the letter, is 
"v%21 
ýA % I^ os 
the exact translation of which 'legal' does not fit in 
the context. 
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include laymen in the electoral committee should not 
surprise anybody. The role of non-ecclesiastical elements 
in episcopal elections appears already to have been 
eliminated. 
1 Thus, in Theodore's view, the only layman 
to be involved in the election would be the Emperor. 
2 
Finally a few words must be said about the qualifications 
that Theodore demands of the proper candidate for the 
patriarchate. He says that the patriarch should be able 
to claim God's rights. 
3 Furthermore he needs to have risen 
gradually from lower to higher (ecclesiastical) position, to 
have gone through everything, so that from the sufferings 
he himself experienced, 
4 he could help those, who need 
him. In a word, the new patriarch should excel other 
people in the way that sun is brighter than other stars. 
These were, of course, Theodore's views. However, it 
would seem that in the Emperor's eyes, such an overqualified 
candidate would perhaps make too independent a patriarch. 
But an independent patriarch could easily be a rival to 
the imperial power and a challenger and an opponent of 
the Emperor's tendency to keep an eye on church's affairs: 
a consideration which ruled out the possibility of a Studite 
becoming patriarch. Thus, their reaction to the appointment 
of a layman, the Emperor's namesake Nicephorus, to the 
patriarchal throne did not surprise anybody. 
It was not only 'respect for church tradition with a 
touch of jealousy', 
S that made the Studites irritated. By 
the election of a moderate layman their hopes of strengthening 
1. J. Pargoire, LIERlise byzantine (op. cit. ), p-57- 
2. P. Alexander's (The patriarch Nicephorus..., p. 67) 
argument that 'distinguished laymen were consulted in the 
election' does not appear to be based on solid evidence. 
3. Theodore of Stoudios, Epist. 1.16 (loc. cit. ), col-960C. 
Though it is not indicated against wFo-m, one might assume 
that here a hint for the distinction between 
and 06 tx rv t cx- is given. 
4. Theodore of Stoudios, Epist. 1,16 (loc. cit. ), col. 960C. 
If Theodore considered himself as the ideal candidate, 
then here is a clue, for he and his followers had 
suffered exile under Constantine VI. 
5. J-B. Bury, E. R. E., p-33. 
202 
their presence and gaining influence among high officials 
in church and state, were dashed. It was obvious that the 
new Patriarch was very much 'Emperor-made', and as such 
he would bend to the Emperor's wishes. The monks saw the 
patriarchate as the key post, through which they would have 
been able to impose their policies on-various issues and 
to influence society in a more effective way. It must be 
remembered that the Studites had good reason not to be 
satisfied with the 'moderate' Tarasius. It can be argued 
that the late Patriarch had submitted in turn to the will 
of three consecutive emperors, but not once to the pressure 
of the radical monks. In brief, the election, or better 
the appointment,, of a new 'moderate' to the patriarchal 
post, was a real blow for the ambitions of the Studites. 
Therefore they reacted against it and opposed the appointment, 
on the ground that the nominee was a layman. But the 
reaction on behalf of the Emperor was equally strong.. First 
he thought of dispersing the Studite community and sending 
their leaders, Theodore and Plato, into exile. But, on 
second thoughts the Emperor was content with the 
imprisonment of the two monks for twenty-four days, probably 
until the whole process of Nicephorus' ordination and 
enthronement was over. 
1 
Thus, with the election of the 'moderate' layman 
Nicephorus, the prestige of the Studite brotherhood was 
ignored. The Radicals probably realized that the Emperor 
in power was not amenable to their influence. This,, 
however, does not mean that the Studites were ready to 
abandon their hard line and to moderate their policies. 
They went on trying to preserve - and perhaps to extend - 
their influence on the populace. It would also seem that 
they adopted a policy of reconciliation with the newly elected 
Theodore of Stoudios, Laudatio Platonis (loc. cit. ), 
col. 837C. 
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Patriarch Nicephorus. From four of Theodore's letters 
1 
we hear that the Studites accepted Nicephorus as patriarch. 
They prayed for him as well as for the Emperor, and they 
mentioned their names in every religious service. Such 
an attitude was dictated not so much by the need for 
compromise, more from the belief that. a person ordained to 
the highest post of priesthood had already the grace of 
God bestowed upon him. 
2 
At the same time Theodore's brother, Joseph, was 
appointed archbishop of Thessalonica, the Empire's second 
biggest city. This appointment as well as the affair of 
the monastery of Dalmatou can certainly be seen as a 
gesture of goodwill and as an effort for conciliation on 
behalf of the new Patriarch. 
3 We learn about the affair 
of the monastery of Dalmatou, Ile plus ancien de la 
capitalel, 
4 
mainly from the Vita of St. Hilarion the 
Younger who, after spending the first ten years of his 
monastic life in this monastery, moved to that of Kathara. 
5 
This took place at some point after 806 while the abbot of 
the monastery of Dalmatou was dying. The monks reported 
the situation to the Patriarch Nicephorus and demanded 
that Hilarion should return to the monastery of Dalma-Lou 
and become abbot. The Emperor Nicephorus became involved 
in this issue and finally managed to persuade Hilarion to 
1. Theodore of StoudioSp Epist. 1,25,989 AB; 1,28, 
1001 C; 1,30,1008 ABC and 1,32,1016 C. 
2. This belief applies to the elevation of a person to the 
imperial throne too. In Byzantium nothing was done 
without God's approval. 
3. P. Alexander, The patriarch Nicephorus..., p-71. 
4. R. Janin, ' La G-e7"o-&raphie eccl7-siastique de 1'empire 
byzantin, vol. 3 (Paris 1969), p. 82; see also., 
D. Stiernon, 'Notice surS. Jean Higoumene du 
monastere de Kathara', REB, 28 (1970), pp. 111-27, 
espec. pp. 114-23. 
S. Vita St. Hilarioni Junioris, AASS, June 1, p. 747. 
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come back to the capital and 'become abbot and 
archimandrite according to a custom issued by a synod'. 
' 
D. Stiernon, relying on: 1) the Vita of St. Hilarion, 
2) the Vita of St. John, 
2 
abbot of Kathara, who was initially 
ordained as priest at the monastery of Dalmatou, and 
3) on an unpublished catechism of Theodore of Stoudios, rela- 
tive to the monastery of Kathara, has shown that strong 
connections between these three monasteries existed at the 
beginning of the ninth century. 
3 These relations will 
later result in an alliance between them against the 
iconoclastic policy of Leo V. Therefore, it might be 
argued that in the case of St. Hilarion, the two Nicepl, ori, 
Emperor and Patriarch, yielded to the demand of the monastic 
party, and this for the sake of unity of all religious 
forces in the Empire. 
These two issues, i. e. the appointment of Joseph, 
Theodore's brother, as archbishop of Thessalonica and the 
appointment of Hilarion as abbot at Dalmatou, seem to have 
been of a purely ecclesiastical nature. However, in 
regard to another affair, which might be called Isemi- 
political', the Emperor Nic-ephorus did not show the same 
readiness for compromise with the Radicals. As has 
already been stated, 
4 he initiated the restoration of 
Joseph, abbot of Kathara, to the priesthood. It will be 
seen that this rehabilitation led to a further widening of 
the gap, already existing between the two sides. 
The synod of the fifteen bishops which restored Joseph, 
took place very soon after the ordination and enthronement 
1. Vita St. Hilarioni Junioris, AASS, June 1, p-747. 
2. On--tTiis Vita, see AASS, Tr7o7py-faeum Novembris (Brussels 
1902), cols-631-34. 
3. D. Stiernon, 'Notice sur... ' (loc. cit. ), pp. 118-23). 
4. See above, p. 192. 
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of the new Patriarch Nicephorus in 806.1 It is 
definitely noteworthy that Theodore does not seem to 
have ever recognised that assembly as a legitimate synod. 
In his letter sent to the Patriarch Nicephorus 
* 
in 808, the 
abbot of Stoudios does not hesitate to call it 'small 
gathering, or I do not know how to call it,, 
2 
while in 
another letter addressed to the Magister Theoctistus, 
Theodore argues that such an assembly could not be 
considered to have been a synod, because without any 
respect for canon law decided against God's will. 
3 At 
the first stage the reaction of the Studites to the event 
was unexpectedly mild. In fact, it took them two years 
before they came to an open clash with the abbot of Kathara 
and his main supporters, i. e. the two Nicephori, Emperor 
and Patriarch. 
Though the Radicals called this delay 'economy', it 
comes as a surprise that they felt it necessary to wait for 
two years on a matter, for which they had already suffered 
floggings and exile. There are possible explanations for 
such behaviour on the part of the Studites. The first 
is that Theodore was himself probably present at the small 
synod which restored Joseph to the priesthood. There are 
two passages from two different letters of Theodore of 
Stoudios that suggest this: the first is letter 1,25, 
addressed to the Patriarch Nicephorus. The letter was 
written in 808, at a time when the conflict between the two 
men had already come into the open. Theodore says that he 
was just out of prison, 
4 
at the time the synod took place. 
1. Theodore of Stoudios, Epistola 1,24 (loc. cit. ), col. 985B. 
2. Theodore of Stoudios, . Epistola 1,25 jo-c. cit. ), col. 989C. 
3. Theodore of Stoudios, Epistola 1,24 (joc. cit. ), col. 985BC. 
4. He refers, of course, to the twenty-four days imprisonment, 
which he and his uncle Plato went through during the 
election, consecration and enthronement of Nicephorus 
(see above, p. 188 ). 
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To suggest that the leader of the Rigorists was released 
on the condition that he participated in such a synod, 
would be going too far. It is, nevertheless, clearly 
stated that Theodore witnessed those, who had previously 
consented to the Emperor Constantine VI's adultery, 
embracing Joseph, who had performed the wedding ceremony. 
The letter goes on to say that at that moment Theodore 
thought it wiser not to say anything, because 
circumstances were 'unpropitious'. 
2 But one may argue 
that this letter is deliberately rather obscure to disguise 
Theodore's presence at the synod. To such an objection 
letter 1,43, addressed to his brother Joseph in 809, comes 
as an answer. In this letter Theodore gives the impression 
that he now feels remorse, not only because he was present 
3 
in the synod of 806, but also because, in a way, he gave 
his consent to the restoration of the abbot of Kathara, 
whom he cleared from the accusations that he had officiated 
at the adulterous wedding. 
4 This consent and clearance 
had, of course, come about as a result of Theodore's 
silence, 
5 
which, nevertheless, comes as something of a 
surprise. The text also implies that the decision for 
adopting the policy of toleration of 806 was not only 
Theodore's. Other members of the Studite community and 
most probably his brother Joseph were also to be blamed for 
the inconsistency. 6 Furthermore, the letter says that 
Theodore's bitterness was even greater, because of the fact 
1. Theodore of Stoudios, Epist. 1,25 (loc. cit. ), col-989CD. 
11 C/ %. 2. ibid., 989D C)TI bCCxI(70%S novv%POS 'rEC5t%'V-" 
3. Theodore of Stoudios,. Epist. 1,43,106SA: 
"rICXfIC*)*VTOS 
Vo-V 
4. ibid.: " 
Epist. I., 43ý 1065A: '16iwn "6(XVTe: -; -4 S. TF-e-odore of Stoudios, 
Ot 6. ibid. The phrase could 
easily be taken to mean: '(I behaved) according to the 
decision, which we had taken'. 
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that later his opponents reminded him of his silence in 
the year 806 and on this ground they tried to restrain 
his protest in 808.1 Therefore, the first reason why the 
Studites exercised 'economy' during the period 806-808 was 
the lack of any reaction by their leader, though present 
in the synod of 806, against the rehabilitation of the 
Skandalon. A possible second reason can be posited after 
a careful interpretation of the events, by taking into 
account the mentality of the protagonists. Let us make 
one thing clear: the fact that the Studites did not 
achieve the election of one of themselves as patriarch does 
not mean that they abandoned every effort to bring influence 
to bear on the Emperor. They sought to work through the 
latter's kinsman, the monk Symeon. 
2 In other words, in 
806 it was difficult for the Studites to estimate the extent 
to which the new Patriarch. would become merely a figure-head: 
a pawn in the hands of the Emperor. During the period 
806-808 the Radicals entertained some serious hopes of 
overcoming difficulties and again playing an important 
role in the church and in court. Theodore's participation 
in the synod of 806 as well as the acceptance by his brother 
of the archbishopric of Th essalonica a few months later, 
ceases to be mysterious. It hardly needs to be stressed 
that these two reasons for the mild behaviour of the 
Studites during these two years are more or less 
interdependent. Theodore participated in the synod, 
because he and his followers believed that noteverything had 
yet been lost by the election of Nicephorus, and that things 
could still be handled to their satisfaction. But then 
1. Theodore of Stoudios, Epist. 1,43,106SA: ý-4s(6, wnqs)vx% c7(Dot- 
TCX'vAevol Oct C-1 t\lCL\n%, Ms, ws all, v'L%%40LS '201(ripýJvTo -tqs 6-v6-r 1 Ct 6 
2. Theodore of Stoudios., Epist. 1.21 and 22 (loc. cit. ), 
cols. 969C-980C. 
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their policy until the year 808 was, of course, dictated 
by their attitude towards the synod of 806. In short, it 
took the Studites two whole years to realize how things 
were turning out. During those two years they demonstrated 
their disapproval of Joseph's rehabilitation by avoiding 
communication with him and with all those who concelebrated 
the liturgy with him, including the Patriarch, whom, 
nevertheless, they went on mentioning in their masses 
and prayers. 
1 
In the course of the above mentioned two years 806-808, 
Joseph of Thessalonica visited Constantinople several times. 
It seems that according to custom, bishops from the 
provinces, who were visiting the capital, joined the 
patriarch in a concelebration of the liturgy or in other 
ceremonies at St. Sophia. Joseph carefully abstained from 
these concelebrations for the additional reason that after 
his restoration to priesthood his namesake Joseph of 
Kathara was officiating in this very church. 
2 But such an 
attitude on the part of the archbishop of Thessalonica 
revealed the true reaction of the Studites. It so 
irritated the state authorities that, when in the year 808 
the Emperor was leaving for a campaign, Theodore was not 
allowed to participate in the Emperor's ceremonial departure 
from the capital. 
3 Only a few days previously the Emperor 
had denied an audience to the abbot of Stoudios. 
4 Thus 
by now it had become more than obvious that the Emperor 
felt it necessary to toughen his attitude against the 
Studites. 
1. Theodore of Stoudios, Epist. 1,25 (loc. cit. ), 989AB. 
2. R. Devreese, 'Une lettre de S. Theodore Studite. -"ýloc-cit-) 
p. 55. It reads:, E1%'fiKf %"vSTqCX% ncK i&fPo\)F4vjý-jV L-v a6r4 
K cx 901 %K v- 6 (X%% I 
3. Theodore of Stoudios, Epist. 1,23 (loc. cit. ), 980D. 
On the date of this campaign which is not reported by 
other sources, see P. Alexander, The Patriarch 
Nice. phorus..., p. 73, n. 7. 
4. TTieodore of Stoudios, Epist. I, 26 (loc-cit. ), col-993A. 
209 
During the Emperor's absence Theodore did not give up 
his efforts to avoid a final break. Among the letters 0 
he wrote to this end, the most significant ones seem to 
be those addressed to the monk Symeon, 
1a 
relative of the 
Emperor, and to the Patriarch Nicephoruse 
2 But, ironically 
for him, these two persons were probably the only ones who 
could not, or perhaps did not want to, act as mediators 
between the Emperor and the Studites. This is because 
they had both already sided with the Emperor and therefore 
Theodore's activities were for them something of a nuisance. 
Symeon appears to have replied to. Theodore's letters, but 
the answer was not satisfactory. Referring to him 
elsewhere, Theodore says that Symeon was of the same opinion 
and of the same will as the Emperors. 
3 However,, Theodore's 
bitterness is even greater, because of the behaviour of the 
Patriarch on the issue, for not only did he not reply to 
Theodore's letter, he also made it clear that he did not 
want to receive his messages either. 
4 
It was probably during this time that Joseph of 
Thessalonica had a decisive interview with a very high 
imperial agent, the logothete of the drome. The logothete 
asked the Archbishop: 
'Why have not you communicated with us and the 
Patriarch, although so many feast days have 
passed? State the reason freely! 'S 
Joseph replied: 
'I do not. have anything against our devout Emperor 
or against the Patriarch, but only against the 
Steward, who wedded the adulterer and who for 
this reason, was deposed by the sacred canons. ' 
The logothete replied as follows: 
1. Theodore of Stoudios, Epist. I., 21,, 22,23. 
2. Id... Epist. 1,25. 
3. Id., Epist. 1,26, col-993A: 30 E (b bI CIL dt VIT vi sT OT s 4PL T C) 
4. Theodore of Stoudios, Epist. 1,26 (loc-ýýjt. ), col. 992D: 
is tA 14T4ý k 6( ov dTi anc V4. w cx vi a kA%4re e9(-', kc, 4Ta &vtcs%fty 074fot&ýcIA, 
"TOL tA % &V StAdvov nl6vTct 
S. Id., Epist. 1,31 (loc-cit. ). col-1009B. 
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'Our pious Emperors have no need of you, 
either in Thessalonica or elsewhere. 'l 
Theodore of Stoudios, who reports the interview in a 
letter addressed to the brotherhood of Sakkoudion only 
thirteen days after it took place, expresses his anxiety 
about the consequences of his brother's brave answer. 
It would seem, however, that nothing happened until the 
Emperor's return from the campaign. But as soon as the 
Emperor was back, decisive events took place. 
In what appears to be an effort of intimidation, the 
monastery of Stoudios was surrounded by troops, so that in 
Theodore's words, 'the monks could scarcely breathe'. 
2 The 
bishops of Chrysopolis and Nicaea came to Stoudios and tried 
to convince Theodore and his followers to stop protesting 
against Joseph of Kathara. 
3 The formula proposed by the 
two Bishops was that the Steward performed the wedding 
ceremony of Constantine VI and Theodote after he had been 
allowed to do so by the ex-Patriarch Tarasius. Such an 
argument could, of course, have been very convincing, since 
by now Tarasius was among the saints. Therefore, had 
Theodore the slightest doubt whether the- ex-Patriarch had 
given his concession, the abbot of Stoudios would have been 
persuaded to give up his protest. But Theodore was more 
Theodore of Stoudios, Epist - 1,31 (loc. cit. ), col . 1009B; P. Alexander, The Patriarch Nicephorus ... p. 91., n. l., finds the iogothete Is rýply "0Z e6fof-W; 40MAOS v"%IA; 4 UFN611 60V 0VJK'&9Vd1'/ T/ 
OUT# %4 Gc-f,, 6atAov%xn,, 91T*-. " very similar to the words spoken 
bylthe Emperor Leo V to the Patriarch Nicephorus in 815: 
It a, '6 V, %kx v-, 6, ýX'-" U ýC'X(2 '4y. C-% b*IJ W-e*%"4XV W% % 
(Vita Nicetae by Theosterictus, AASS, Aprilis I, XXXB) 
and wonders : iýhether this sort of phrase was not the 
formula of deposition. Such a possibility cannot, of 
course, be rejected completely. However, regardless 
of the literary similarity of the two phrases, it looks 
that in the case under consideration, Joseph remained 
archbishop of Thessalonica until the synod of January 
809. It was at that time that he was dismissed as a 
result of his judgement bythat very synod (see below, p-213 
2. Theodore of Stoudios, Epist. 1,48 (loc. cit. ), col. 1073B. 
3. ibid. 
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than sure that Tarasius had been faced by a fait accompli 
and had never really approved the adulterous wedding. 
Thus, the efforts of the two Bishops were in vain. As 
a consequence of that, Theodore, Joseph of Thessalonica, 
their uncle Plato and an unnamed leading Studite, called 
simply Kalogeros, were taken away from Stoudios and held 
in custody at the monastery of St. Sergius. Here our 
prisoners were given their last chance for compromise, 
when the Emperor's kinsman, the monk Symeon came twice, 
in an attempt at reconciliation. But like the one made 
by the two Bishops, Symeon's efforts also proved to be 
fruitless. 1 It was probably at this monastery that the 
synod of January 809 took place. 
We hear about this synod mainly from the letters of 
the man (i. e. Theodore of Stoudios) against whom it was 
convoked. 
2 All scholars agree that the assembly was 
called on imperial initiative. The presence of the 
Emperor in the synod is, nevertheless, not mentioned by 
any source. The number of the participants is also 
unknown. Theophanes simply records that the Emperor 
gathered many bishops and abbots. 
3 The presence of 
governmental officials in the synod is testimony to its 
primarily political character. 
Theodore, Joseph, Plato and the Kalogeros. were brought 
before the council. The main accusation against them was 
that they did not accept the 'economy' of the saints. 
Joseph of Thessalonica was also accused of joining the 
Radicals by celebrating the liturgy at the monastery of 
Stoudios. 4 In the course of the synod some participants 
1. An account in detail of these events is provided in 
Theodore's, Epist. L, 48, cols-1069C-1084B. 
2. Mainly from his 
, 
Epist. 1,34, (1021C) and Epist. 1,48, 
(1073C-1076A). 
3. Theophanes 1, p-484. 
4. Theodore of Stoudios, Epist. 1,48, col-1073D. 
212 
4 testified that the ex-Patriarch Tarasius, by now among 
the saints, had allowed Joseph of Kathara to perform the 
wedding ceremony of Constantine and Theodote. 
1 
It would seem that the synod reached the four following 0 
decisions. 
1) It confirmed the earlier restoration of 
Joseph of Kathara to priesthood. 
2) It anathematized anyone who did not accept 
the 'economies' of the saints. 
3) It reduced the Archbishop of Thessalonica 
to the rank of priest, and 
4) It sent the leaders of the Studite 
brotherhood into exile. 
No matter how severe these punishments were, it appears 
that for the Emperor Nicephorus, a re-establishment of 
communion between his namesake Patriarch and the Studite 
community was very important. That is why, when the synod 
was over, he decided to give the Studites a last chance 
for compromise. First he called the whole brotherhood 
into his presence and then he tried to win over the leading 
members privately. When this attempt failed, he promised 
clemency to the whole group, on condition that they would 
re-establish communion with the Patriarch. As the 
Emperor was standing in the middle, he called all those 
who wanted the reunion with the Patriarch to place themselves 
at his right side, and those who did not want to fulfill his 
wish, to move to his left hand. Without any hesitation 
all the monks went to the Emperor's left. 
2 
As a result of their boldness, the Studites were 
dispersed by imperial order and exiled to various places, 
either near the capital, or as far distant as Cherson or 
1. Theodore of Stoudios, Epist. 1,48, col. 1073D. 
2. Michael, 'Vita B of Theodore of Stoudios', (loc-cit. ) 
col. 269 BCD. 
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the Lipari islands off Sicily. Some of them were 
imprisoned in monasteries, the abbots of which treated 
their prisoners with special hardness. 
1 The persecution 
seenis to have been extended to some people who did not 
belong to the Studite community, but they certainly 
sympathised with the strict stance adopted by Theodore 
on the Moechian controversy. The abbot of Stoudios speaks 
of the abbot Theosostos with his monks at Thessalonica, 
who suffered punishment, simply because they refused to 
communicate with the man who had succeeded Theodore's 
brother as archbishop of that big city. 
2 Another abbot, 
3 
also at Thessalonica, was flogged, probably for the same 
reason. 
The sufferings of the Studites and their sympathisers 
went on for a period of more than two and half years, until 
Michael Rangabe, Nicephorus' son-in-law, came into power 
(September 811). In that year the radical monks, not 
only came back from their exile, but they became very 
influential with the new Emperor. This influence on both., 
political and ecclesiastical affairs, was definitelywhat 
the Studites would have dreamed of exercising during 
Nicephorus' reign too. This, however, did not happen, 
partly because of their boldness, but mainly because the 
Emperor Nicephorus seems to have been very suspicious about 
the existence of strong religious movements in the Empire. 
It might be that the rebellion of Arsaber in 808, an 
event in which many clerics are reported to have been 
4 involved, made it plain to the Emperor that these groups 
could easily be used against the imperial authority itself. 
1. Theodore of Stoudios, Laudatio Platonis, (loc. cit. ) 
cols-840C-841A. 
2. Theodore of Stoudios, Epist. 
. 
43, col. 1068BC. 
3. Theodore of Stoudios) Epist. 
4. Theophanes 1, pp-483-84. 
1., 48, col-1072C and I, 
1,48, (loc. c-i-t. ), col. 1072C. 
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On the other hand it is reasonable to believe that in the 
Emperor Nicephorus' eyes the rehabilitation of Joseph 
of Kathara was, or had become, a purely political issue, 
in which ecclesiastical groups ought not to have been 
involved. One more point: the Studite demonstration 
against the restoration of Joseph of Kathara was indirectly 
directed against the Patriarch Nicephorus' moderate and 
conciliatory attitude. It would-seem that the Emperor 
Nicephorus took it as a matter of prestige to protect his 
Patriarch from the strong Studite opposition, which he 
decided to break. In doing so, he was very tactful. 
Constantine VI had sent the Radicals into exile, just by 
giving an order. Nicephorus dispersed the Studite 
brotherhood by convoking the synod of January of 809. 
This more tactful policy proves that the Emperor did not 
want to show himself as a tyrant over any ecclesiastical 
group. In that year, although his will was fulfilled, it 
was the official church and not the Emperor, who sent his 
opponents into exile. 
D: GENERAL ASSESSMENT 
While Theophanes has blackened the Emperor Nicephorus' 
fiscal and economic policies, Theodore of Stoudios has spoken 
against his religious principles. Because these two main 
sources are biased against this ruler, it makes a fair 
judgement of his actions difficult, 
To begin with, it needs to be remembered that, when 
Nicephorus I came into power in 802, he did not inherit 
problems connected only with political issues at home and 
abroad, but also a more or less bad situation with respect 
to the Byzantine church and the religious groups at the 
time existing and operating in different parts of the Empire. 
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It has been seen that in his controversial reply to the 
Emperor's inquiry in 806, the leader of the Studite movement, 
Theodore, admitted that the ecclesiastical situation was 
far from being satisfactory and that a certain improvement 
was definitely needed. 
1 Although it remains questionable 
what Theodore meant by the improvement he was suggesting 
to the Emperor, it could not be denied that elements of 
truth could be traced in his statement. The situation in 
the Byzantine church since 787 had been more or less 
chaotic. From what has been seen so far, the Emperor 
Nicephorus intervened in ecclesiastical or politico- 
ecclesiastical issues several times. It would seem that 
if ecclesiastical affairs appear to have been of minor 
importance beside purely political issues, then this was 
testimony to the Emperor's skill in handling the church. 
He was able to hold the Studites in check. His very 
success would be reflected in the bias of the largely pro- 
Studite sources against him. They present Nicephorus 
as having adopted a ruthless stance in his relations to the 
church, though this is not supported by any concrete 
evidence. Theophanes' statement that the Emperor 
Nicephorus urged military officials to treat bishops and 
clergymen in general as servants 
2 
refers to the strictness 
with which the Emperor taxed ecclesiastical and monastic 
property. Therefore, it would, be, perhaps, more reasonable 
to suggest that Nicephorus' intervention in ecclesiastical 
affairs could be seen as a desire on the part of the Emperor 
to bring some order to the confusion reigning in the 
Byzantine church during the last years of the eighth century. 
In Nicephorus' mind the church was the state's 'department 
of religion', 
3 
and as such ought not to cause any internal 
1. Theodore of Stoudios, 
' 
Epist. 1,16 (loc. cit. ), col-960 AB. 
2. Theophanes 1, p. 489. 
3. J. B. Bury, The Constitution ... (22. cit. ), p. 32. 
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disturbances. Such an obligation should have applied 
equally to para-ecclesiastical groups, i. e. the monks 
and their party, against whom the Emperor did not hesitate 
to adopt a rather harsh stance, involving imprisonment 
and exile. Furthermore, it would also seem that 
Nicephorus was convinced that in a theocratic state like 
Byzantium, even purely religious, or better ecclesiastical, 
issues would not be totally separated from politics. Thus, 
none of the religious parties and movements, existing at 
the time, enjoyed a complete independence from the state 
during Nicephorus' reign. It looks as if the Emperor 
kept an eye on ecclesiastical issues, because he wanted 
to keep a balance between the various religious forces of 
the Empire. His constant fear of internal disturbances 
had, perhaps, something to do with the Emperor Nicephorus' 
attitude towards both the Radicals and the Moderates. 
He simply tried to avoid, or to eliminate, problems 
originating from ecclesiastical and monastic sources. 
4(e Finally, iconoclastic emperors were against papacy, 
because the Popes of the time supported the iconodules. 
Nicephorus, though not an iconoclast, had, nevertheless, 
good reasons for adopting not only the same, but even 
harder a policy toward the Pope Leo III. Here again it 
can be argued that Nicephorus considered relations between 
the eastern Empire and the western church as a primarily 
political issue. After all, it really was an affair of 
political significance. As such, these relations will be 







A: NICEPHORUS AND THE WEST 
1. The Preliminaries 
In comparison with the interest shown by the Byzantine 
chroniclers in the Empire's relations with the Arabs and 
the Bulgars, the negligence with which events in the West 
are treated comes almost as a surprise. With the exception 
of Theophanes and Constantine Porphyrogenitus, Byzantine 
authors do not seem to have bothered to know and to record 
information concerning the newly created Frankish Empire 
of Charlemagne. It is also noteworthy that even Theophanes 
who is the unique contemporary Byzantine source to report 
the events of Christmas 800, refers to the coronation of 
Charlemagne in a rather odd way. Theophanes seems to have 
been impressed not by the coronation itself, which was 
after all of great importance, but by the way in which, 
according to his source of information, it was performed. 
He says that at the same time as the coronation was taking 
place Charlemagne was anointed from head to foot, 
1 
something 
which by Byzantine standards was quite unusual. 
2 Modern 
scholars have discerned traces of mockery in the way 
Theophanes reports Charlemagne's coronation as emperor 
>%C. 1 
Theophanes 1, p. 473: K&, tg,, Aj, 6wi nojZv. " 
2. For the difference in the way in which emperors and 
co-emperors were installed in Byzantium. and in the West, 
cf. J. L. Nelson, 'Symbols in Context: Rulers' 
Inauguration Rituals in Byzantium and the West in the 
Early Middle Ages', in Studies in Church History, 13 
(1976), pp-97-119- 
219 
in 800.1 It is not, however, clear whether it was the 
Confessor's intention to mock the way in which the Frankish 
King was promoted to the imperial dignity or whether he 
was simply ill informed about the character that unction 
possessed in the West. In other words, it seems very 
likely that Theophanes was in a way trapped by his source 
because it was not Charlemagne, but his son, also called 
Charles, who was anointed during his father's coronation. 
But the unction itself does not seem to be of great 
significance and P. Classen points to three occasions on 
which Charlemagne had been anointed before becoming 
emperor. 
2 However, Theophanes' records on the events of 
Christmas 800 are of interest because of the way that they 
reflect the Byzantine reaction on Charlemagne's coronation. 
It would seem that a certain coolness and mockery mixed, 
perhaps, with some slight anxiety and indignation, were 
the feelings of the populace at Constantinople, after the 
news of Charlemagne's coronation had reached the capital. 
The coolness and the mockery were derived from a definite 
self-confidence and from an assurance that only the emperor 
on the banks of Bosphorus could claim to be the heir of the 
Roman Empire. Therefore, had Charlemagne aspired to 
become imperator Romanorum, it would have been at 
Constantinople and not in Rome that he would have had to 
be acclaimed as basileus. But the Byzantine views of the 
Franks are perhaps better illuminated by what the tenth 
century source Constantine Porphyrogenitus has to say about 
them. In his treatise De Administrando Imperio, the 
imperial author displays real respect for Charlemagne. 
Constantine VII considered the reign of this Frankish king 
1. See for instance, F. D61ger, ByzarA und die europdische 
Staatenwelt (Speyer am Rhein 1953), p-297. 
2. P. Classen, Karl der Grosse ... (op. cit. ), p-48. 
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so crucial that, while before him his country is called 
simply Frankia, from Charlemagne's reign onwards is 
called Great Frankia (M6y cLA" (3> p oc (x The 
De Administrando Imperio puts emphasis on the fact that 
'Charles was sole ruler over all the kingdoms' 
1 
and that 
'in his days none of the other kings dared call himself a 
king', 2a statement which reflects the respect in which 
he was held by the Byzantines. 
Byzantine views of the Franks can only be fully 
appreciated, if the eastern interests of Charlemagne are 
taken into consideration. These interests are echoed by 
several of our main sources, one eastern and the rest 
western. The record of the De Administrando Imperio is 
rather short, saying that Charles 'sent much money and 
abundant treasure to Palestine', 
3 
while Einhard refers to 
Charlemagne's activities in the East, more in detail. 
From this contemporary Latin source we hear that the 
Frankish king took care of all Christians who at that 
time were living outside his Empire. With a certain 
exaggeration the biographer names Syria, Egypt, Africa, 
Jerusalem,, Alexandria and Carthage. 
4 As one can easily 
see, these districts were under Muslim rule and, although 
Charlemagne's activities in these regions were mostly 
limited to charity in favour of the Christians, such an 
involvement seems to have been a sign of increasing Frankish 
1. Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De Administrando Imperio, 
ý. 2p-cit. ), P. 109. 
2. ibid. 
3. ibid. 
4.2" rd V*e de ameleel^oLirwe of MI1 -9 - YtvtOp4eo) vI 
(e4 ILpI 
Pck-f; S 19 #7, p- 19 - 
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prestige. F. L. Ganshof suggests that the correspondence 
between Charlemagne and Hirrun al-Rashid started in 797-98 
with the former sending an embassy to the East. 
2 The 
departure of this embassy is reported by Einhard who, 
however, does not provide us with any dating, 
3A Jew, 
Isaac by name, seems to have been either the head of the 
embassy or its only survivor. In any case, the participation 
of a Jew in a delegation which was sent 'with offerings 
to the most holy sepulchre of our J., ord and Saviour and to 
the place of his resurrection', 
4 
underlines its mainly 
political rather than ecclesiastical character. Isaac 
returned to the West in 801 with presents and with an 
elephant, all sent to Charlemagne by the Caliph. 
5 
It can hardly be ignored that Charlemagne enjoyed 
6 
close and friendly relations with Harun al-Rashid, at a 
time when the latter was involved in more or less constant 
rivalry with Byzantium. These pointed to a foreign policy 
which enjoyed greater success, perhaps, than the one of 
the Byzantine emperors. There is no way of telling 
whether Charlemagne's overtures to Irene would necessarily 
have jeopardized his good relations with the Caliphate. 
1. In connection with this devotion of Charlemagne, 
A. Gasquet (L'empire byzantin et la monarchie franqu , 
originally published 1888, New York reprint 1972, 
pp-293-94), emphasizes the truth that in such a way the 
name of the Franks became known in countries where nobody 
had known anything about them previously. 
2. F. L. Ganshof, The Carolingians and the Frankish Monarchy 
ýp. cit-), p. 1-86, note 40. 
3.1; %% tmtrd VLe - (i e 
ki at ree tv-. ffj %-e (o e. iL4. ), p-4 ,-. 4. ibid. AM --- I 
S. Annales regni Frankorum, (ed. R. Rau, op. cit. ), years 
-802; see also Annales Mettenses Priores, in M. G. H, 
Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum in Usum Scholarum 
Separatim Editi, vol-10 (Hannover 1979), years 801-02. 
3k 1 &4 ý (X ed ,ie0 
(_ Ift 
Qf f 4e 6. ý -4"- (OL - 4; 1- JIVP- 444 - 44- f; 
6n this see also 
W. Buckler, fiarun al Rashid--an- Charles the Great 
(Cambridge, Massawk. 1931), pp. 17-42. 
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Finally, in contrast to the very close relations 
between Charlemagne and Pope Leo III, Byzantium seemed 
to have lost all influence over the papacy from the mid- 
eighth century. 
1 
Therefore, given the aspirations of Charlemagne and 
all the evidence which points to a definite strengthening 
of his position, the Emperor Nicephorus would have, from 
the beginning, been extremely wary in his dealings with 
the West. 
2. NiCephorus and the Papacy 
From Einhard, the main biographer of Charlemagne, we 
hear that the Frankish king did not actually seek his 
coronation in the year 800, but 'he made it clear that he 
would not have entered the cathedral that day at all, 
although it was the greatest of all the festivals of the 
church, if he had known what the Pope was planning to do'. 
2 
This statement reflects the fact that already from the mid- 
eighth century onwards, the Popes in the West had become 
much more influential in political terms than the 
patriarchs at Constantinople. This influence, exercised 
on behalf of the papacy reached its peak at the turn of 
that century. To say that the Pope played a decisive role 
in the events of Christmas 800 would be to state the obvious. 
W. Ohnsorge suggests that Leo III was playing off 
Charlemagne against Irene and this game marked the end of 
the peaceful relations with Byzantium which had been 
established during the last years of the eighth century. 
3 
1. D. H. Miller, 'Byzantine-papal Relations During the 
Pontificate of Paul I: Confirmation and Completion of 
the Roman Revolution of the Eighth Century'. in B. Z. ) 
68 
(1975), p. 51. 
it 2. IýILj cý4-), p. Vo,,, aLdPrrAaret se eo die,, ý p. 
3. W. Oknsorge, Das Zweikaiserproblem... (22. cit. ), p. 22. 
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It looks, however, that the whole context of circumstances 
does not allow us to approach the events of Christmas 800 
with such an over-simplification. Other modern scholars, 
such as P. Classen 
1 
and F. L. Ganshof 
2 
think that the key 
figure behind Charlemagne's coronation was Alcuin, the 
famous abbot of St. Martin's of Tours, who, from the year 
798 onwards in his correspondence with Charlemagne used 
the expression Imperium Christianum in order to indicate 
that 'Charles is master of almost the whole of western 
Christendom and Rome itself is subject to his protectorate'. 
3 
But, even so, as F. L. Ganshof has pointed out, Alcuin was 
deeply devoted to the Holy See, 4 and, therefore, it might 
be observed that the role he played after the events of 
25 April 799, i. e. the attack against Pope Leo III by 
his opponents, served the interests both of Charlemagne 
and of the Pope. At any rate, it would, perhaps, be more 
appropriate to say that since the end of the year 79S when 
Leo III succeeded Hadrian on the papal throne, the whole 
scheme of relations existing between the eastern Empire 
and the papacy changed completely, with the Pope now siding w*4 
the Franks. Such an argument is supported 'not only by 
what followed in Christmas 800, but also by the number of 
the letters addressed by this particular Pope to 
Charlemagne, either before the latter became emperor (three) 
or after his coronation (eleven). 
5 It is noteworthy that 
we do not possess any letter., sent at the same time by 
the same Pope to the emperors of the East or even to the 
1. P. Classen, Karl der Grosse_L das Papsttum... (2p. cit. ), 
pp-35-41. 
2. F. L. Ganshof., The Carolingians ... (op. cit. )., pp-45-48. 3. ibid., p. 45- 
4. IF -i-d . 5. TF-evy can be found in M. G. H.,, Epistolae, V, (Berlin 1899), 
pp-58-103- 
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patriarch of Constantinople. But, by acting in such a 
way,, what was Pope Leo III up to? Can it be, for 
instance, that he was trying to strengthen the position 
of the western church by bringing the two Empires into 
conflict with each other? It appears that such an 
assumption exceeds the evidence provided by our sources. 
It would seem more reasonable to say that Leo knew about 
the existence of the opposition against him even before it 
broke out in 799. He badly needed support and 
Charlemagne was considered by him as the best source of it. 
In relation to this we also hear from Notker the 
Stammerer 1 and Constantine Manas-s-es- 
2 that, before turning 
to the Franks, Leo had asked for help in his difficulties 
from the Byzantine Emperor Constantine VI and his mother 
from whom, however, he received no reply. The credibility 
of these two sources cannot be checked, though J. B** Bury 
thinks that the statement is in itself by no means 
incredible. 3 If that was the case, then Leo was, at 
least, equipped with a good pretext for his turning to the 
Franks. 
It appears that this change was only properly understood 
by the Byzantine government, at least after the elevation 
of Nicephorus I in 802. We would, nevertheless, not expect 
the new Byzantine Emperor to have taken any very decisive 
measures against the leader of the western Christendom. He 
could, for example, have aske d the then Patriarch Tarasius 
to excommunicate the Pope Leo III. Such a step was never 
taken, probably for the following reasons: a) the 
Byzantine Emperor must have realized that a sort of common 
front had been created in the West and, consequently, any 
1. A. J. Grant (edit. and transl. ), Early Lives (op. cit. ), 
p. 89. 
2. Constantine Manasses, Breviarium Historiae Metricum 
(ed. Bekker), Bonn 1837, p. 193. 
3. J. B. Bury, 'Charles the Great and Irene', in Hermathena, 
8 (1893), p-30. 
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measure taken against the western church would be 
considered as being taken against the newly created 
western Empire too, and this, of course, was something 
that Nicephorus did not want to happen., at least at an 
early stage of his reign. One needs only to remember 
that during his first year in power, the Emperor Nicephorus 
kept himself busy with internal events and with the 
situation on the eastern borders of the Empire. b) The 
Byzantine government could not have been sure about the 
possible implications of such a measure and about the 
reaction of the-monastic party at Constantinople, which 
still considered the Pope as the head of the church in its 
universal conception. 
1 Therefore, the Studites might 
have tried to protest on the grounds that an excommunication 
of the Pope was against canon law. Nobody could judge 
the Pope. c) Such a measure would have been contrary 
to the Emperor Nicephorus' own character and persuasions. 
In cases where the Byzantine territorial interests were not 
at stake, he preferred to compromise rather than to strain 
relations. 
Nevertheless, a proper answer to the papal intrigues 
was given less than four years later, at the time the 
Patriarch Tarasius died and the Emperor's namesake 
Nicephorus succeeded him in the ecclesiastical throne of 
Constantinople. By forbidding the new Patriarch to send 
the letter of his enthronement (Tcx roQvoJ%t(-c'L K? (x'tLtAgxr(x 
to the Pope, the Emperor Nicephorus showed his disapproval of, 
if not his indignation at, the role played by Leo III in the 
1. Theodore of Stoudios, Epist. 1,33, (loc. cit-)., 99... 
col. 1017B; for a discussion of Theodore's views and 
relations with the papacy, cf. C. Van de Vorst, 'Les 
relations de S. Theodore Studite avec Rome', in A. B. ) 32 (1913), pp. 439-47; see also, J. Gill, 'St. Theodore 
the Studite Against the Papacy? ' in Byzantinische 
. corschunge ,1 
(1966), pp. 115-23. 
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events of the year 800. In the letter of his 
enthronement, finally sent to Pope Leo III in 811, the 
Patriarch Nicephorus makes it clear that his namesake 
the Emperor did not permit him to enter into official 
communication with the head of the western church., 
because of the anointing that took place along with 
Charlemagne's coronation. 
1 If this information is 
combined with the unction of Charlemagne reported by 
Theophanes, 2 then, it might be suggested that considerable 
importance must have been attached by the Byzantines and 
by the Emperor himself not merely to Charlemagne's imperial 
status but even more to the rite of anointing -a rite 
which was then absent from the Byzantine coronation service. 
It seemed almost as though Charlemagne was claiming a divine 
sanction for his office that set him above the Byzantine 
emperor. Furthermore, it would also seem that, in the 
eyes of the Byzantine government, by having sided with 
the Franks in that crucial period, the Pope lost his 
position as primus inter pares among the five patriarchs, 
and was considered to have separated the western church 
from the rest of Christendom. Such a thesis is supported 
once again by Patriarch Nicephorus' letter of enthronement, 
in which it is clearly stated that this was one of the - 
grounds upon which the Emperor based his refusal to let his 
patriarch communicate with Rome. 
3 Furthermore, the 
participation of the archbishop of Zara in a delegation to 
Charlemagne in the same year 
4 
strengthens the possibility 
that political and eccle-siastical issues were considered 
1. The Patriarch Nicephorus, Epistola ad Leonem, P. G. 100 
col. 197A; it reads: ` I. CcrtcLn y&p -vjy e(pycvTo ica% ot&*p%A v%v 




For more about this 'Letter see above,, pp. 189-91. 
2. Theophanes 1, p-473, 
3. The Patriarch Nicephorus, Epist ad Leonem, P. G. 100 %. C. col. 197A: " wcxl WS 6tAE-15 Icis 
Cx 4F CL -r 6. 'GT % 6- 20 P V'. A I S- 
4. On this delegation cf. below, p. 238. 
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simultaneously. Though our sources do not shed much 
light on this episode, it is known that Dalmatia remained 
Latin and Catholic. Therefore, would it not be, perhaps, 
reasonable to suggest that the so called problem of the 
Illyrian provinces can also be connected with the Emperor 
Nicephorus' stand against papacy? 
Unfortunately very little is known about possible 
political activities of the Pope during the years 802-11. 
It is, of course, likely that Pope Leo III was behind the 
famous proposal for a marriage between Charlemagne and Irene, 
which, however, speeded up the dethronement of the Empress 
in October 802. We also hear that in the year 806 Leo 
sent a letter to Charlemagne, in support of the 
reinstatement of the pat, 60MA- og 6fcx6(0 Fortunatus, 
1 
against Christopher who was favoured by the pro-Byzantine 
party of the Galbaii. But, to our knowledge, Fortunatus 
was also the preference of Charlemagne himself and later 
he acted as mediator between the doge Obelierius and the 
Frankish Emperor. 2 Under these circumstances it would 
appear that the passive reaction of the Byzantine Emperor 
against Pope Leo III in 806, was fully justified. 
3. Reality Above Tradition 
When Nicephorus I deposed Irene and assumed supreme power, 
he was faced with a fait accompli, regarding the relations 
between East and West. If he did not like it lie had to show to 
his contemporaries, not only that there was a new emperor 
1. M. G. H., Epistolae, V, (Berlin 1899),, pp. 94-95. 
2. J. J. Norwich, Venice, the Rise to Empire, (London 1977), 
p-44; W. C. Hazl itt, The V, enFt---Lan Republic (London 1915, 
Repring, New York 196Z-), 1, p-37. 
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sitting on the throne of Constantinople, but also that a 
new more determined policy was about to be adopted and 
exercised against the western usurper. He had to dispel 
the feelings of dissatisfaction and anxiety, which had been 
growing especially among the courtiers in the capital. 
These feelings, after all, had been one of the decisive 
factors which brought Nicephorus into power. 
In dealing with Nicephorus' policy toward the newly 
created western Empire, it is of some importance to know 
whether or not the ideology of a single Roman Empire, was 
a reality in the mind of the Byzantine Emperor. 
A. Vasiliev argues that 'the idea of a single Empire was 
still alive in the year 800, when the famous imperial 
coronation of Charles the Great occurred in Rome'. In 
contrast to Vasiliev's interpretation, H. Glykatzi- 
Ahrweiler considers the iconoclastic era as the period 
during which the Byzantines developed a-national 
consciousness. This seýise ot first appeared to be 
'the Byzantine answer to the holy war of Islam'. 
2 it 
would seem, however, that when a certain degree of 4C 
"Jw-'re, develops, it is directed not only against one Sot 
enemy, but spreads to every place, where rivals exist. 
This sense of national feeling did not quite accord with 
the idea of a single universal Roman Empire. The 
Byzantines, of course, did not dislike the idea of being 
the heirs of the Roman world. They continued to call 
themselves Romans and their capital the Second or New Rome. 
What a gap, however, between theory and practice! The 
former western Roman provinces seemed to have been lost for 
1. A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire, (op. cit. ), 
1, p-265. 
2. H. Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, L'ide'ologie politique de llempire 
Byzantin (Paris 1975). p. 35. 
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Byzantium once and for all since the year 476. The 
tremendous efforts of Justinian and his generals to 
restore these districts to Constantinople, have been 
attributed by modern historians to a lack of pragmatism. 
However, if the sixth-century Justinian was lacking in 
realism, the ninth-century Nicephorus was pragmatist 
enough to estimate the situation properly. The western 
provinces of the old Roman Empire were now too distant, 
while at the same time the Arabs from the East and the 
Bulgars from the North were threatening Constantinople 
itself. In other words, the eastern and northern borders 
of the Empire were of much more crucial importance than the 
western ones. The memories of the Byzantine Italy lost 
to the Ostrogoths and to the Lombards were vague, while 
the memories of the eastern provinces lost to the Arabs, 
were, in a sense, still fresh. Furthermore, the Arabs 
during most of the eighth century did not stop trying to 
break the natural barrier of the Cilician mountains and 
occupy the whole of Asia Minor. Unluckily for Byzantium 
things became even more difficult towards the end of the 
eighth century, at a time when Harun al-Rashid and Krum 
ascended the Arabic and the Bulgarian thrones respectively. 
But here we are dealing only with the relations between 
Nicephorus and Charlemagne. Do we really come across a 
dynamic policy on the part of the Byzantine Emperor against 
his western rival? 
To begin with, one might argue that, before undertaking 
any action, Nicephorus tried to understand the way, in 
which Charlemagne himself would handle this new and rather 
complicated situation. It is true that the imperial title 
itself did not invest the Frankish king with any significant 
1. G. Ostrogorsky, History... (2E. cit. ),, p. 78. 
2 30 
political power. But, even if we consider it to have 
been only a dignity, it had of necessity to be recognized 
by the rival Empire of the East, if it was to have any 
validity. Charlemagne probably sought this recognition 
immediately after his coronation. Because, whatever the 
prestige of the title at the beginning of the ninth 
century, the long history behind it was a truth which it was 
not easy to obliterate. That was perhaps the reason why 
Charlemagne found it wise to avoid provocation. We would 
not, of course, expect him to abandon all the rights and 
privileges with whicli the events of Christmas 800 invested 
him. However, a mo-ement towards a peaceful solution had 
to be made, and Charlemagne did not hesitate to proceed 
to it. Thus, he did not use the title imperator Romanorum 




Was it a real modification of the title imperator Romanorum, 
as Pfister and Gansh. of 
2 
see it? Although the Latin 
language does not use any definite or indefinite articles, 
it looks as if there is a substantial difference between 
the phrase imperator Romanorum gubernans imperium 
3 
which 
was adopted by Charlemagne, and the hypothetical title 
imperator gubernans imperium Romanorum,. which he could have 
adopted, if he really wanted to be recognized as the only 
emperor of the Romans. In any case, both Emperors were 
clever and prudent enough to realize that a war betweenEast 
and West was best avoided. Charlemagne, of course, did not 
need to make much effort in that direction. His authority 
1. M. G. H., Diplomata Karolinorum, 1 (Hannover 1906), 
No. 19'7. 
2. F. Lot, Ch. Pfister, L. Ganshof, Histoire du Moyen Age, 
vol. l: (Les destinees de 1'Empire en Occident), Paris 
1928, p. 458. 
3. More about this title and its use, see in P. Classen, 
'Romanum gubernans imperium', in Deutsches Archiv fur 
ErfoPschung es Mittelalters, 9 (19Sl-52), pp-. 103-21. 
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over the West had never been challenged and, this was of 
much more importance: during the two last years Byzantium 
did not openly dispute his proclamation as Roman emperor. 
On the other hand, although the idea of a single Empire 
'is a historical anachronism from the modern point of view 
though not in the opinion of the Middle Ages', 
1 Nicephorus 
did not consider it worth fighting against his western 
rival, simply because Charlemagne had usurped the imperial 
title. This, nevertheless, should not be taken to mean 
that Nicephorus was prepared to make any major concession 
to the western Empire. It has been shown elsewhere that 
in his domestic policies this Byzantine Emperor is concerned 
to restore imperial authority, and this might imply that 
the question of the title must have been important to him. 
But, a war against the Franks, at least at this stage, was 
precisely what Byzantium had to avoid. After all, it was 
a matter of priorities, i. e. Nicephorus waited until he 
was well established domestically before turning his 
attention to questions of ideology. 
Are we entitled to assume that Nicephorus accepted more 
or less the situation, which had been created in the West 
after the events of Christmas 800? Instead of giving an 
affirmative or negative answer, let us try to follow and 
interpret the events, mainly the relations between the two 
Empires during the period 802-811 and then draw the 
necessary conclusions. 
From the Annales regni Francorum 
2 
we hear that at the 
time of Irene's deposition two envoys of Charlemagne, 
3 
had already been at Constantinople for peace negotiations 
1. A. Vasiliev, History... (a. cit. ), 1, p. 265. 
2. Annales regni Francorum (ed. R. Rau, 9E. cit. ), year 802. 
3. They were Iesse, Bishop of Amiens, and Count Helmgand. 
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with the Empress. According to Theophanes, 
1 these 
negotiations aimed at a marriage between Charlemagne 
and Irene, a marriage which could have achieved the union 
of the two Empires and 'might have greatly altered the 
course of history'. 
2 Unfortunately our western sources 
do not provide us with any information concerning such a 
proposal by-Charlemagne. They only say that peace was 
the aim of that delegation. 
3 Among these two different 
aims of the Frankish embassy to. -Constantinople, 
the one 
provided by Theophanes, is definitely stronger. This is 
not only because it exp lains better the almost immediate 
fall of Irene, but also and, perhaps mainly because it 
would sound a bit odd, were Charlemagne's delegates to 
claim that they were seeking to establish peace at a time 
when the relations between the two Empires were more 
peaceful than ever! Nevertheless, a combination of the 
information provided by both sources might give ground for 
a speculation that, had the planned marriage of Charlemagne 
to Irene been achieved, it would have been doubly useful 
to the Frankish Emperor, by uniting the two Empires under 
his power and, of course, by preserving peace! 
At any rate, whatever the main purpose of the arrival 
of the Frankish delegates to Constantinople, we would 
have expected them to try to get permission to stay for 
some time probably months after the deposition of the 
Empress, in order to realize and discuss the intentions of 
the new Emperor, as well as the feelings at Constantinople, 
concerning the relatively recent events in the West. In 
1. Theophanes 1, p-475. 
2. M. V. Anastos, 'Iconoclasm and Imperial Rule 717-842' 
in C. M. H. vol. 4,, part a, (Cambridge 1966), p-90. 
3. "ut pacem cum ea (Irene) statuerunt" (Annalfs regni 
Francorum), (ed. R. Rau, a. cit-7-, year 802. 
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reference to these circumstances, it is of particular 
significance to hear that Nicephorus replied to 
Chcarlemagne's mission by sending his own ambassadors to 
the West. 
1 Such an attitude of the Byzantine Emperor, 
can be taken to mean that: a) the proposed crucial 
marriage was not the only aim of the Frankish envoys, 
b) Nicephorus considered the western delegation as having 
been sent not to Irene personally, but to the supreme 
authority in Constantinople. That is why he did not 
'kick' them out of the capital immediately after his 
accession to the throne. c) Peace was prized above 
anything else by both the Emperors, 
2 
and d) the Byzantine 
Emperor had been probably informed about the 'existence 
of some alliance, or at least of a friendly understanding' 
3 
between Charlemagne and Harun a, l-Rashid. 
The Byzantine delegation consisted of: the Bishop 
Michael (probably of Synada)., the abbot Peter and the 
Candidatus Callistus. These envoys in fact accompanied 
the Frankish ones on their way back home. By the time 
they reached Italy, Charlemagne had already gone back to 
Germany. Therefore the Byzantine mission travelled to 
the North and met with him' at Salz. Although it is 
obvious that these ambassadors had been ordered to seek a 
conciliation, R. Jenkins argues that they rejected summarily 
the claims of Charlemagne. 
S However, Jenkins do, ýs not 
seem to have founded his argument in the contemp(7., rary sources. 
Nicephorus would not have sent his envoys, if there was not 
anything to be negotiated. The assertion by the sources that 
1. Annales regni Francorum, (ed. R. Rau), year 803. 
2. F-. Classen, Karl der Grosse ... (op. cit. ), p. 66. 3. W. Buckler, ffýa-rUn al-Rashtd... (op. cit. ), pp. 26-27. 
4. Annales regni Francorum, --Ted. R. Rau), year 803. 
S. R. enkins: Byzantium, the Imperial Centuries, (ap. cit. ), 
p-113. 
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he sent such an embassy, proves by itself that the new 
Emperor of Constantinople wanted to live in peace with his 
rival of the West. Moreover, the main text at our 
disposal speaks about a peace treaty, which was signed 
between the two sides at Salz'4@=V some time in 803.1 
The same statement is also made by the second biographer of 
Charlemagne Notker the Stammerer, who asserts that 'the 
delegates of the King of Constantinople had come and had 
told him (Charlemagne) that their master wished to be his 
faithful friend'. 2 Therefore, the argument of Buckler 
that 'these negotiations broke down ostensibly, on the demand 
of Charles to be recognized as the Emperor of the West, 
a condition unacceptable to the East'. 
3 does not seem to 
be based on solid grounds. In contrast to Buckler, 
W. C. Hazlitt argues that in 803 a peace treaty was signed 
between the two Empires in which it was agreed that the 
maritime towns of Istria and Dalmatia 'should be 
considered as forming an integral portion 
4 
of Byzantium, 
but he does not provide any evidence, either. 
We would have liked, of course, to know, whether the 
controversial title of Charlemagne-was di'scussed in these 
negotiations, but unfortunately we are not told of any 
details about the contents of the peace treaty. One might 
wonder whether the modification of the title by Charlemagne 
did not come as a result of mutual concessions made by 
both sides in their effort to avoid provocation and challenge 
for the sake of peace. The lack of any conflicts between 
1. Annales regni Francorum (ed. R. Rau, a. cit. ), year 803: 
Dactum faciendae Dacis in scriDt-0 susceDerunt". 
2. Einhard and Notker the Stammerer, Two Lives... (-2. p. cit. ) 
p. 124. 
W. Buckler, Harun al Rashid, (op. cit. ), p-27. 
4. W. C. Hazlitt, The Venetian Republic (a. cit. ), 1, p. 42. 
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the two Empires during the period 803-806 can also be 
interpreted as pointing to such concessions. 
In fact an absolute absence of information regarding 
the East-West relations governs this relatively short 
period. The only thing that we know about those years, is 
that Nicephorus was occupied with the conflicts against Harun 
al-Rashid along the eastern frontiers, and Charlemagne 
spent the same time dealing with various tasks. He 
transferred all Saxons, who were inhabiting the eastern 
banks of the river Elbe, as well as the district called 
Wihmuodi (a region between Elbe and Weser) and settled 
them together with their families in his kingdom (September 
804). In 805 Charlemagne established friendly relations 
with the Avars, whose leader (capcanus) was a Christian, 
named Theodore. During the same year the Frankish Emperor 
sent his son Charles against the Slavs of Bohemia. The 
campaign was successful for the Frankish army. Charles 
devastated and depopulated their whole land and even killed 
their leader, a certain Lecho. 
1 After Easter of 806 
the same son of Charlemagne had an equal success against 
another Slavic tribe, that. of Sobari, whose leader was also 
killed in the clashes. 
2 
However, it can hardly be ignored here that all thes e 
achievements of the Franks did not touch the Byzantine 
interests in the West. This permits us to assume that a 
compromise had been reached by both sides in 803 that 
they ought to respect each other's territorial rights. 
3 
So far the two Emperors had shown their goodwill and their 
intention to avoid any escalation of ill-will. However, 
1. Annales regni Francorum (ed. R. Rau, o-p-cit. ), year 805. 
2. Tb--id. 
, year 806. 3. Vita of Charlemagne by Einhard 
(EI14JýZ. -rd We 91, * C6(r? e#-mjvvA op-cit. ,- p-150) also 
confirms such an assumption. 
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there was still a problem waiting fot its solution. That 
was Charlemagne's imperial title, the recognition of which 
by the eastern Empire had yet to be achieved. 
4. Charlemagne Strengthens his Bargaining Po ition 
Some time during the first half of, the year 806 Charlemagne 
interfered in areas, which were always assu,,, ed to have 
been under Byzantine control, or at least under Byzantine 
influence. These were Venice and the Dalmatian coasts. 
1 
It would appear that by that year, a pro-Frankish party, or 
a pro-Frankish feeling had been created in the area of the 
lagoons. Whether the Franks themselves initiated such 
a movement,, is not known, but their intervention was partly 
caused by the brutal way in which the pro-Byzantine doge 
Giovanni Galbaii killed a prominent opponent., the patriarch 
of Grado. Therefore, it only remained for the Franks to 
exploit a situation which was turning in their favour. 
Thus Charlemagne was able to organize a 'coup d'Etat' in 
Venice, depose the doges loyal to Byzantium and replace 
them with two brothers, Obelierius and Beatus. 
2 
From now on, of course, the situation becomes much 
easier for the Franks in Venice. R. Jenkins suggests that 
1. Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De Administrando__Imperio. 
(2p, cit. ), p-120; J. Calmette (Cha lemagne, Paris 19S1, 
p-4 7-, however, argues that ", cette suzerannet6 n'etait 
que nominale". W. C. Hazlitt, (The Venetian Republic, 
op. cit., vol. 1, p-36), who suggests that, at least a 
section of the Venetians saw Byzantium as 'the more 
ancient ally and as the less dangerous neighbour', 
seems to have appreciated the situation better. 
2. A. Dandolo, Chronicon Venetum, in M. R. I. S., vol. 12 
(new edit. by G. Carducc'l, -7-. Fior-ini and P. Fedele 
(Bologna 1958), pt. 1, p. 128; F. Lot, Ch. Pfister and 
L. Ganshof, Histoire ... (21-cit. ), vol-1, p. 462. 
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the fact that the Byzantine embassy in 803 rejected 
Charlemagne's claims to imperial status, provoked a war 
with him, which Byzantium was certainly not prepared to 
face. 1 By no means, however, can the Frankish interference 
in Venice be taken as Charlemagne's automatic reaction 
to the Byzantine embassy of 803. Because, if the 
assumed negative attitude of the Byzantine envoys had 
provoked the interference of Charlemagne in Venice, then 
we would have expected his intervention to have taken place 
immediately after the conjectural fa ilure of the negotiations 
and not thr. ee years later. Furthermore, it has already been 
shown 
2 that the negotiations in 803 were far from unsuccessful 
for both Empires. Moreover, it appears that the period 
803-806 had proved decisive for the pro-Frankish movement at 
Venice, which Charlemagne only exploited in 806. Therefore, 
it would seem more reasonable to assume that the Frankish 
Emperor intervened in Venice in an effort to strengthen 
his bargaining position against the Byzantine government, 
with regard to the recognition of his imperial title. Later 
on Charlemagne will not miss the opportunity of playing the 
role of suzerain of the area, as well as that of mediator 
between his son Pepin, King of Italy (since 806) and the 
Byzantine forces, sent to the district by Nicephorus. 
Sometime early in the year 806 the two above-mentioned 
doges of Venice, i. e. Obelierius and Beatus, together with 
the duke and archbishop of Zara (Iadera), arrived at the 
court of Charlemagne. The aim of that visit is not clearly 
indicated by the sources, but J. Calmette suggests that they 
placed both Venice and Dalmatia- under Frankish protection. 
3 
1. R. Jenkins., Byzantium, the Imperial Centuries (22-cit. ) 
p-113. 
2. Above, p-235. 
3. J. Calmette, Charlemagne, (op. cit. ), p. 43. 
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It looks, however, that such a suggestion has inadequate 
support in the sources. What is recorded by our main 
source, is that Charlemagne arranged the situation in 
Venice and Dalmatia. 
1 Whatever the Frankish Emperor 
really did at that time, regarding these two regions, 
the information that envoys from both places went to him 
"cum magnis donis ,2 and asked for his intervention or 
supervision, speaks for itself. His authority was, no 
doubt, recognized as supreme by the smaller countries, 
which, after all, could hardly count on Byzantine support 
because of the distance and also. because at that time the 
Byzantine Empire was forced by circumstances to fight on 
other fronts, more crucial for its own existence. In any 
case, the situation in the area is partly illuminated by 
Constantine Porphyrogenitus who asserts us that from 
Heraclius' time onwards, the Byzantines neglected the 
western provinces of the Empire, and, as a result, during 
the reign of Michael 11 (820-29) the Dalmatians became 
independent and autonomous 'subjected neither to the 
Byzantine emperor nor to anybody else'. 
3 However, it 
appears that the assertion given by the tenth century 
Emperor, does not apply to*the period under consideration, 
because Nicephorus certainly did not abandon the Byzantine 
interests on the Dalmatian coasts. As soon as he heard 
about Charlemagne's intervention in Venetian and Dalmatian 
affairs, Nicephorus sent the Patrician Nicetas at the head 
of a fleet, in order to maintain the Byzantine rights in 
these two areas. Nicetas reached Venice some time before 
the end of 806 and stayed there for a period of one year. 
Annales regni Francorum (ed. R. Rau, 2E. cit. ), year 806. 
The text reads: "Et facta est ibi ordin'atio ab 
imDeratore de ducibus et DoT)ulis tam Venetiae quam 
Dalmatiae". 
2. ibide 
3. Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De Administrando Imperio, 
(op. cit. ), p. 124. 
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It seems that his presence in the districts had at least 
psychological effects for both the peoples, of Venice 
and of Dalmatia. Before leaving for Constantinople, he 
concluded a peace treaty (we are not told for how long) 
and a truce, bound to last until August 808.1 The 
confirmation of a peace treaty and a truce sounds a little 
odd. The usual situation is that, when a peace is 
signed, a truce is not needed;. unless we admit that the 
truce referred to Venice and the peace to Dalmatia, which 
is not after all impossible. The poor results achieved by 
Nicetas' presence at Venice, are attributed by Hazlitt to 
his unawareness or poor knowledge 'of the state of parties 
and the division of feeling' 
2 
among its people. It would 
seem, however, that the Venetians had already reached a 
point where they regarded their independence as more 
precious than any patronage and influence, either from 
Byzantium or from the Franks. In brief, the question 
concerning the value and effectiveness of such a treaty 
remains wide open. Moreover, the shortness of the period, 
for which the agreement was signed, permits us to assume 
that the rivalry between the two Empires over Venice and 
Dalmatia was far from ended. On the other hand, the 
haste of the Patrician Nicetas to leave the Adriatic 
waters and come back to Constantinople, might be given 
the explanation that he was sent there with only a few 
ships, in order to evaluate the situation and underline 
the Byzantine interests on the area. Thus, he could not 
be involved in a long conflict with the Franks. 
Nicetas left the Adriatic waters some time at the end 
of 807. About one year later (at the end of 808 or 
1. Annales regni Francorum, (ed. R. Rau, 2p. cit. ), year 807. 
2. . Hazlitt, The Venetian Republic, (op-cit. ), 1, 
p-43. 
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the beginning of 809) Paul, the strategos of Cephalonia, 
arrived in the controversial area at the head of a fleet 
and visited both districts., Dalmatia and Venice, where he 
spent the rest of the winter. In the spring of 809 a 
part of that fleet attacked the island of Commacchio, 
but the forces in charge of the island defended it 
successfully. It is a pity that eastern sources have 
almost completely neglected these events while the western 
ones present only the Frankish point of view. In the 
case under consideration they have Paul seeking a peace 
agreement with Pepin. Whatever the details, it 
looks as if the intervention of Charlemagne and his 
masterminding of the "coup dI Etat" in Venice three years prev4*ot,. s 11y, 
proved to have been a real blow to the Byzantine interests 
in the area. 
The two doges of Venice, Obelierius and Beatus, 
considered their position as not safe, because of the 
presence of the Byzantine fleet in the northern Adriatic. 
It is likely that, before starting negotiations with Pepin, 
Paul had demanded the replacement of the two puppets of 
Charlemagne, i. e. Obelierius and Beatus, with another 
two more likely to serve the Byzantine interests in Venice. 
However, Paul was not going to succeed at all in what he was 
planning. Obelierius and Beatus realized his intentions, 
resorted to intrigue and undermined the peace treaty. 
Bitterly disappointed, Paul returned to Cephalonia. After 
his withdrawal, Pepin turned his naval forces, originally 
1. Annales regni Francorum (ed. R. Rau, op-cit. ), year 809. 
Sincý--th-ere is not any evidence of Byzantine militaristic 
and imperialistic aspirations in the area, the only 
possible explanation for the attack of Commacchio, is 
that the Byzantines tried to regain control of an island, 
which in 806, like Venice and other Dalmatian cities, 
had been placed under Frankish protection or 
domination. But, since Commacchio is also a rival of 
Venice, it may be that, in this case, the Byzantine navy 
was acting on the demand of the Venetians. 
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aimed at Dalmatia, against the islands o-fVenice. Facing 
such a threat against their own freedom, the inhabitants 
of the islands came together, forced the two pro-Frankish 
doges to resign and under the leadership of Angelo Badoer, 
organized their defence successfully (809). Pepin returned 
to Italy in shame. The seeds of an independent state 
at Venice had been sown by its own people. The rivalry 
between the two Empires over Venice and the Dalmatian 
coasts seemed also to have come to an end. 
S. Towards Peace and Recognition of Charlemagne's 
Imperial Title 
From what we have seen so far, it becomes clear that 
Byzantium could not afford to be involved with all its 
forces in a war against the. Frankish Empire. The interests 
of the Byzantine state were threatened on other fronts 
much more than on the western one. Nicephorus himself 
led the campaigns against the Arabs of Harun al-Rashid 
and the Bulgars of Krum. At the same time he sent the 
Patrician Nicetas and later the strategos Paul not so much 
to start a war against the-Franks, more to secure Byzantine 
control and influence on the coasts of the Adriatic. 
On the other hand, it seems very likely that 
Charlemagne wanted to exercise control over Venice and 
Dalmatia., not for any particular reason, other than because 
he needed to be in a strong position during the negotiations 
to come with the eastern Empire. 
Thus, in the course of the year 810 everything was 
ready for a final peaceful settlement. In July a Byzantine 
delegation under the Spatharius Arsaphius, arrived in Italy in 
order to negotiate the terms. 
1 We hear more details about 
1. The other participants were, the Metropolitan Michael, 
the abbot Peter and the Candidatus Callistus. it is 
definitely worth remembering that these three envoys 
had been the members of the delegation sent to 
Charlemagne already in the year 803. (On that mission 
see above, p-234 .) 
242 
Arsaphius' mission from Charlemagne's 
1 
reply to Nicephorus, 
a letter which was sent early in 811. At least three 
points of that letter need to be emphasized: a) Charles 
the Great calls Nicephorus his brother. b) He refers to 
the Byzantine embassy as desiring peace, 
2a 
peace which was 
probably going to put an end to the cold war between the 
two Empires over the control of Venice and Dalmatia and 
c) Arsaphius' embassy was sent not to Charlemagne himself, 
but to his son Pepin. But Pepin had in the meantime 
died and, as a consequence of that event, the Byzantine 
envoys were received by his father. In reference to 
that third point, one might wonder whether Charlemagne, 
after the appointment of his son as King of Italy, had not 
considered himself as the mediator between Pepin and the 
Emperor of the East, or perhaps the suzerain of the coasts 
of the northern Adriatic. 
The Byzantine mission arrived at Aachen in October 
of 810, seeking a peace over the Venetian issue. 
3 Such 
a peace, according to the western sources, 
4 
was signed in 
the course of the same year and it seems that it was 
'bought' at a high price by Nicephorusý As a condition of 
peace, Charlemagne demanded Dalmatia and the Byzantine envoys 
had no choice but to comply. It is also worth noting here 
that Charlemagne does not appear to have raised the issue 
of the recognition of his imperial title. At this stage 
it had become obvious that time was on his side and therefore 
there was no need to hurry. Buckler's interpretation that 
1. M. G. H., Epistolae, IV, pp-546-47. The letter was also 
edited by H. Lietzmann in: Kleine Texte fUr Vorlesungen 
und Ubungen, (Berlin 1931), pp-35-37. 
2.77-G. H., Epistolae, IV, p. 547: "ad constituendam nobiscum 
pacem". 
3. F. Lot, Ch. Pfister, L. Ganshof, Histoire.... (a-cit. ) 1, 
p. 463. 
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Nicephorus was forced to recognize Charles in his new 
status as emperor, after he had failed to break up the 
friendly understanding between Aachen and Baghdad, 
1 does 
not appear to be supported by oevly evidence. 
Arsaphius stayed at Charlemagne's court until January 
of 811. On his way back to Constantinople, he was 
accompanied by a Frankish delegation, 
2 
sent to the East 
in order to confirm the peace treaty between the two 
Empires. By the time both embassies reached Constantinople 
Nicephorus had already been killed and thus his son-in-law 
Michael I had to continue negotiations from a rather weak 
poEition. He welcomed the Frankish delegates, but, as 
the final agreement was about to be signed at Aachen, they 
again left the capital of the eastern Empire, accompanied 
by the Byzantine negotiators. These were, the already 
mentioned Arsaphius, who had in the meantime been promoted 
to the rank of protospatharius, the Metropolitan Michael 
of Synada, participating in such a mission for a third 
time, and another protospatharius, named Theognostus, 
3 
Charlemagne received the Byzantine embassy at Aachen where, 
after a final agreement was reached and signed, they (the 
Byzantine envoys) called him officially and in the Greek 
language 'g c3e r. Iý f- jjos, %. 
4 According to the final 
arrangements, Charlemagne allowed Venice and the Dalmatian 
coasts to remain under Byzantine influence 
S 
and this as a 
reward for the recognition of his imperial title (812). 
1. W. Buckler, Harun al-Rashid... (2p. cit. ), p. 27. 
2. The Frankish negotiators were: The Bishop Haido, the 
Count Hug and a Lombard named Aio (Annales regni 
Francorum, (ed. R. Rau, op. cit. ), year 811. 
3. ibid. 
4. Annales regni Francorum (ed. R. Rau, 2E. cit. ), year 812: 
"scriptum pacti ab eo in ecclesia suscipientes more suo, 
id est-Graeca lingua, laudes ei dixerunt, imperatorem 
et basileum appelantes". 
ctaýýevll i Zv-'ýSA'e'l ý4? -GLIVOZ WIJ (, o4f o 1401414WO 011% ole) 4bo hed; oevo 
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6. General Assessment 
Now that the main events in the relations between the 
two Empires have been recorded, it might be argued that a 
really dynamic reaction of Nicephorus I against Charlemagne 
did not finally come about. He surely tried to save the 
prestige of Byzantium, but circumstances strongly opposed 
his efforts. Thus, under the pressure of the state of 
affairs he inherited and current events,, the idea of a 
single Roman Empire became more and more of a secondary 
importance. If the recognition of Charlemagne's 
imperial title in 812 became inevitable, Nicephorus I is 
certainly not the one to be blamed for it. But in regard 
to this recognition some further remarks must be added. 
It appears that Charlemagne wanted recognition only for 
himself and not for his successors too. Otherwise, he 
would not have divided the Frankish Empire among his sons, 
as he actually did, in 806. That division meant that no 
one of them would be called imperato-r Romanorum. In 
other words, Charlemagne sought recognition of his imperial 
title as a mark of his personal achievements, without any 
attempt to divide the single Roman Empire. Perhaps, in his 
mind there could easily be two Roman emperors in a single 
Roman Empire, at least for a short time. But, even so, 
Nicephorus was not at first prepared to recognize the 
Frankish King's imperial title. If he wanted to, the 
Byzantine Emperor could have proceeded to give his recognition 
some time between 802-811. The prolongation of the 
negotiations can only be explained by Nicephorus' refusal 
to grant the imperial title to Charlemagne. He was, 
probably, hoping that the already old Frankish monarch 
would die in the near future and thus the problem would 
come to an end by itself. But, ironically for the 
Byzantine Emperor, his own death occurred three years earlier 
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than his western rivalls. Nicephorus' successor., Michael 
Rangabe, had neither the competence of his father-in-law, 
nor the strength for further tough negotiations with 
Charlemagne. Nevertheless, after the final arrangement 
and the recognition in 812, Venice and Dalmatia were finally 
kept withi4the Byzantine sphere of influence, and that was 
of greater significance than, perhaps, the imperial title 
itself. 
In brief, moderation and understanding rather than 
extremism, governed the policy of the Emperor Nicephorus I 
towards the West, where he seems to have defended the 
interests of Byzantium more or less successfully. 
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B: BYZANTIUM AND THE ARABS 
1. The Sources 
In our effort to outline the Arab-Byzantine relations at 
the beginning of the ninth century, we are mainly dependent 
on the accounts provided by Arabic sources. The, Greek 
chroniclers, with the slight exception of Theophanes and the 
even slighter ones of George the Monk and Cedreni. ýs, 
ignore events along the eastern frontiers. Even Theophanes 
fails to provide a systematic account of the conflicts 
between Byzantium and the Caliphate during Nicephorus' 
reign. 
Another problem relevant to the sources, is that in some 
cases accounts of conflicts, recorded by the Greek 
chroniclers do not tally with the events, narrated by the 
Arabic sources. The Greeks, for example, mention no 
Arabic invasion in 803, while the Arab chroniclers do not 
record the defeat of Leo, the strategos of the Armeniac 
theme (the future Emperor Leo V) at Euc kexita in 811. 
Moreover, the reports provided by the Arabic sources 
are as a rule very general. They do not say much about 
the duration or even about the destination of the 
c--1 campaigns. Ya Kubi., for example, mentions three Arabic 
raids during the course of the year A. H. 187 (30 December 
802 to 19 December 803), but he does not say anything either 
about the places against which the raids were launched, or 
about their results. Under these cirumstances our most 
reliable guide, at least among the Arabic authors, seems 
1. E. W. Brooks., 'Byzantines and Arabs in the Time of the Early 
Abbasids', E. H. R. )lS (1900), p. 742. 
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to be Tabarli, who, although usually numbering fewer raids 
than YacKu-b-i, is more detailed in what he records. 
Nevertheless, as chroniclers in general are almost 
the only sources for the Arab-Byzantine relations during 
the period under consideration, their records are valuable 
to us, but only if treated with caution. Great care must 
be taken to find corroborating evidence. 
Our Syriac sources, though not contemporary with the 
events can definitely shed some light on events occurring 
in the Arab-Byzantine frontier zone, especially where the 
accounts provided by Greek and Arabic chroniclers contradict 
each other. 
Finally our Latin sources hardly touch events, taking 
place between Byzantium and the Caliphate. However, this 
should not be taken to mean that they can be overlooked. 
For it is mainly through them that we hear about the 
establishment of friendly relations between Charlemagne and 
the caliphs, and it would seem that these relations 
illuminate - to a certain extent - the whole political 
and diplomatic framework, in which the clashes between 
NicephOros and Harun al-Rashid must be put. 
2. The Historical Background of the Conflicts 
It is not certain whether, by having agreed to pay a 
tribute to the Arabs in 782,1 Irene had bought a permanent 
peace or simply a truce. It appears, in any case, that the 
period for which peace lasted, was rather short. 
Constantine VI was very anxious to prove that he was the 
real emperor and military success against the Arabs would 
I 1. Tabarl, in Brooks 'Byzantine$.... ' (loc. cit. ), p. /38. 41 - 
Theophanes (1, p-456) speaks about a peace without 
mentioning any tribute. 
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have been the best proof of this. Tabarl gives the 
truce a duration of thirty two months, during which, as he 
stresses, there was no summer raid 'on account of the truce 
1c-I 
made for that period'. Ya Kubi, however, reports that 
even during this time two Arab raids occurred, the first 
one led by al-Fadhi, the son of Salih, in the year A. H. 
167 (5 August 783 to 23 July 784) and the second by 
Muhammad, the son of Ibrahim in A. H. 168 (24 July 784 to 
13*July 785). 2 
It looks as if the peace treaty or truce had a personal 
achievement of the Caliph al-Mahdi, the father of Harun. 
However, it was the son's very successful rail (he reached 
the Bosphorus at the head of a raiding party), 
3 
which 
forced Irene to seek for a peace agreement. Harun at 
that time was an ambitious prince and the second heir to 
the throne. - However, it is possible that his rivals in 
Baghdad did not consider themselves obliged to respect 
such a treaty. This seems to have been the reason why 
they kept launching raids - if YacKu-b, 17 is correct - even 
during the period of the thirty two months, for which the 
truce lasted. Thus, it appears that the Arabic raids 
4 
were of two different sorts: the official ones, issued and 
directed from the court of Baghdad, and the unofficial ones 
undertaken occasionally by ambitious princes. However, 
both categories were directed against Byzantine territory. 
In a way a sort of rivalry existed between their leaders. 
Theophanes' silence on these raids cannot, of course, 
be taken as proof that they did not occur. His account is 
not usually so detailed as the one provided by Arabic sources. 
1. Tabarl in Brooks (loc. cit. ) p. 738- According to him the ium was2 90,000or 70,000dinars, but the Kitab al c Uyum 
(in Brooks loc-cit., p. 739) raises the yearly paid sum 
to 100,000 dinars plus 10,000 silk garments. 
2. In Brooks (loc-cit. ), p-739. 
3. Tabari, in 'E'rooks (loC-cit. ). p. 738. 
4.6n the character of the Arab campaigns, cf. 
H. Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, 'L'Asie Mineure et les invasions 
Arabes' in R. H... 227 (1962), p. 7. 
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Tabari's silence, however, must make us suspicious about 
the importance of the raids led by al-Fadl and Muhammad. 
It would seem that these two leaders acted on their own 
initiative and independently from the central government. 
c--. Unfortunately, Ya Kubi, who mentions the raids, does not 
go into any detail;. On the other hand, Tabarl does not 
report anything about these two raids, probably because 
they did not result either in any remarkable achievements 
for the Arabic army, or in any changes at the borders 
with the Byzantine Empire. 
At any rate, Tabari accuses the Byzantines of 
breaking the peace treaty, which they had signed with 
--1c-I Harun. Ya Kubils account does not tally with that of 
Tabarl. Under the year A. H. 167, he states that a. 1-Fadl, 
0 
2 
the son of Salih, conducted a raid. As Brooks has pointed 
3c 
out, if Ya Kubi is correct, then the rupture was the fault 
of the Arabs. Theophanes does not mention any hostilities 
until September of 788. 
After the year 785, in which the peace treaty is 
supposed to have been broken, the Arabs kept conducting 
raids against the eastern Byzantine provinces, each summer. 
These raids were launched under various leaders, but Harun 
himself (Caliph since the year 786) is not reported to have 
led any of them before the year A. H. 181 (5 March 797 to 
21 February 798). 
It is worth noting that Tabari does not mention any 
Arabic raid during the period 797-802, in which the Empress 
Irene was the sole ruler at Byzantium. One campaign of 
Harun, recorded by both Ya c Kubi and Tabari, seems to have 
occurred in the spring or early summer of 797, i. e. before 




the deposition and blinding of Constantine VI. However, 
it would seem that more crucial than the raid of the 
Caliph, was the expedition undertaken by al-Malik. 
1 This 
Arab leader reached Ancyra, where he captured a subterranean 
granary. 
2 This raid is dated by Tabaril in A. H. 181 
(5 March 797 to 21 February 798) and before the deposition 
of Constantine, which, according to the same Arab 
chronicler, took place in the year after (22 February 798 to 
11 February 799). Now, 'the same two events (campaign of 
al-Malik and deposition of Constantine VI) are reported by 
Theophanes too, though in a different order. According 
to him, the deposition of the unlucky Constantine VI took 
place on 15 August 797, and there is no doubt that in regard 
to this dating Theophanes is correct. As far as the 
expedition of al-Malik against Asia Minor is concerned, 
Theophanes reports him plundering Cappadocia and Galatia 
3 
some time after the deposition of the Emperor Constantine VI. 
It would seem that the only way to match the records provided 
by Tabarl' and Theophanes, is to admit that al-Malik launched 
his raid against Asia Minor some time in the spring or the 
early summer of 797. Theophanes narrates that in March of 
4 that year Constantine started a campaign against the Arabs, 
who had already penetrated Byzantine territory. That 
expedition, of course, was never going to reach the Arabic 
forces, because the plot against the Emperor had already 
been put into operation. Therefore, it appears that 
al-Malik took advantage of the internal disturbances at 
Byzantium during the summer of 797. He stayed in Asia Minor 
1. Theopýanes (1, p. 473) calls him "A 41 Vtc- ýt-x - 2- Tabari, in Brooks (loc. cit. ), p-741. 
3. Theophanes 1, p. 473: "At, -j- OkAt-VoV TOL V4e? v% Kanno(Joioa; fI 
4. Theophanes 1, p. 471. 
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and launched his plundering against various regions, but 
mainly against Cappadocia and Galatia. 
1 Since the 
Byzantine government could not react at that time, it is 
reasonable to believe that al-Malik was still there until 
September of the same year (797). By that time Irene was 
well established as the sole ruler of Byzantium and realized 
that she had to cope with the situation in Asia Minor. 
According to Theophanes, -the Empress Irene sent two 
clergymen, Dorotheos, an abbot from Chrysottpolis, and 
Constantine, the chartophylax of St. Sophia, as delegates 
for peace. The envoys failed to achieve a peace agreement, 
2 
and thus we find the Arabs in Asia Minor during the following 
year (798) too. 
In that year, however, the situation became even worse 
for imperial prestige. It appears that small Arab forces 
under various ambitious lieutenants again invaded Byzantine 
territory and acted independently. We hear from 
Theophanes that al-Malik's forces reached Malagina, a city 
of Bithynia, where Stauracius' horses were stabled. 
The horses and the imperial baggage train w ere taken away. 
3 
No opposition seems to have been provided by the Byzantines. 
Another Arabic army campaigned against Lydia and got away 
with many captives, while only a detachment of Arabs managed 
to defeat the combined armies of Opsikion and the Optimates, 
under the Patrician Paul, Count of Opsikion. 
4 In the same 
way as at Malagina, the Arabs took away the baggage train 
of the imperial army. Finally, we hear from Tabaril that 
in the year A. H. 182 (22 February 798 to 11 February 799) an 
1. Ancyra, especially mentioned by Tabarl, seems to have been 
the capital or the main city of Galatia. It belonged to 
the theme of Boukelarioi; on this city see C. Foss, 
'Late Antique and Byzantine Ankara' in D. O. P., 31 (1977), 




Arab detachment under c Abd al-Rahman, the son of al-Malik, 
reached Ephesus. Under these circums41-ances, we would 
expect the Empress Irene to have made another appeal for 
peace with the Caliphate. A peace treaty, however, is 
reported only by Mas c udli., who asserts that after Irene had 
become the sole ruler of the Empire "elle-entretint avec 
lui (Rashid) desrapports pacifiques, et il lui envoya des 
pr6sents". 
2 
(she maintained peaceful relations with him, and 
c- - he sent her presents). But, apart from Mas udi, no other 
source reports such a peace treaty or an agreement for 
payment of any tribute to the Arabs. It can only be 
inferred from the fact that neither Greek nor Arabic sources 
record raids from either side during the years 798-802.3 
This silence is the main, though not the only ground, which 
1. Tabarl, in Brooks (loc-cit. ) p-741. On this expedition ýf. Brooks (ibid. note 126) where two possibilities are 
put forward: the first that it was the same campaign 
which Theophanes ascribes to al-Malik ( Wcx-T ", A 90, v guiS, A vjt"(xs ) and the second that Arab authors some times 
were 
- 
confused between Ephesus and Arabissos. 
2. Mascudi, Le livre... (op. cit. ) p-228; M. Canard 
Ma prise d'Heraclee et les relations entre Harun 
al-Rashid et llempereur , 
Nicephore ler', Byz.,,, 32,1962, 
p. 346, note), relies on this passage to suggest that 
Irene agreed to pay a tribute to Hdru-n, but it hardly 
provides conclusive evidence. 
3. Yack5b-1, who reports one raid per year on the part of the 
Arabs during that period, is an exception. It would 
seem, however, that this Chronicler 
- 
does so out of a 
habit and, in any case, neither Harun himself, nor any 
of his close relatives were involved in these expeditions. 
Referring to the character of these raids, J. B. Bury, 
(E. R. E., p-251, note 2) calls them perfunctory. 
Ml'c---Ta--el the Syrian is another author, who a-lso records 
two Arabic raids during Irene's sole reign. In the 
first one (no exact dates are provided) Aetius won a 
victory against the invaders, but in the r-ew following vecxr 
he was defeated by the Arabic forces. Michael indirectly 
dates Aetius' defeat some time in the year 802-and 
assumes that it caused Irene's fall and the elevation of 
Nicephorus I to power (J. B. Chabot, Chronique..., op-cit., 
iii, p. 12). This report by Michael is of particular 
significance, because he himself is a reliable source and 
because, up to a certain extent, he used a common source 
with Theophanes. 
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has led most scholars to assume that in the year 798 Irene 
agreed to pay a tribute to the Arabs. The other reason, 
is the famous letter, which is supposed to have been sent to 
Harun by the Byzantine Emperor some time during Nicephorus 
I's first year in office. 
1 At any rate, whatever the 
arrangements made, it is clear that during the last 
four years of Irene's sole reign (798-802) the Byzantine 
Empire enjoyed a period of comparative tranquility in its 
relations with the Caliphate, 
3. Byzantium's Eastern Borders in 802 
Before we enter the details of the conflicts which occurred 
during Nicephorus' reign, it would be useful to try and 
plot the frontier line which had separated the two Empires 
since 798. That was the year in which the Arabs were 
spread over all Asia Minor and Irene was probably forced 
by circumstances to purchase peace with them by paying a 
yearly sum to the Caliphate. It would seem that the 
Arabs, at least at that time, were not really interested in 
annexing parts of Byzantine territory to the Caliphate. 
Thus, the main l. ine of frontiers between Byzantium and the 
Arabs remained more or less stable. 
The borders were shaped by a natural barrier, that of 
Taurus-Antitaurus range, which runs through the area from 
Cilicia to the Euphrates. Crossing these mountains there 
were two main passes. The first one is the famous Cilician 
GateS2 in the southern part of the range and the second was 
1. For a discussion on the letter, see in this section 
below, pp. 261-63. 
2. For a detailed description, cf. W. M. Ramsay, 'The 
Historical... (op-cit. ). pp. 349-56. 
2S4 
sited near Adata, on the road connecting Caesarea and 
Arabissos. 1 The Cilician Gates, known from ancient 
times, were decisive for the raids undertaken either by the 
Byzantines against Syria, or by the Arabs, as they started 
their campaigns from the well fortified cities of Tarsos, 
Adana and Anazarbos. 
2 The second pass was to be used by 
the Byzantine forces, when setting out from Caesarea to 
invade Mesopotamia, 3 or by Arabic army starting out from 
Germanicia or perhaps Melitene. 
It has been said that Harun took great care of the 
frontier line and fortified several of its key places, 
such as Germanicia., Anazarbos and Tarsos. 
4 It would be 
easy to see that such measures served two purposes: to 
secure the Caliphate against a Byzantine invasion, and at 
the same time to serve as garrisons for a number of troops, 
which in the case of Tarsos reached 8000.5 It is very 
likely that these forces participated in the raids against 
Byzantine territory. 
1. J. B. Bury (E. R. E., p-244) locates Adata on the road between 
Germanicia aTnid-Melitene, but it seems more probable that 
this city-fortress dominated the road between Caesarea 
and Germanicia and it was sited somewhere fairly close to 
Arabissos. As we shall see below (p. 280) Adata was 
attacked by the Byzantine forces in 807 and Harun himself 
went there in order to take care of the fortress and to 
post a lieutenant at the pass of Adata for its defence. 
It appears that Adata was one of the most remote western 
outposts of the Arabic frontier line. Bury himself 
(E. R. E. p. 244) admits that it was frequently attacked by 
tFe-Byzantines. For the location of Adata, see also 
J. G. C. Anderson., 'The Campaign of Basil I Against the 
Paulicians in 8721, in Classical Review X (1896), 
pp-138-9; and H. Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, *'L'Asie Mineure... ' 
(loc. cit. ), p. 4, map. 
2. F-ortE-ese places see W. Ramsay, The Historical, (9E-cit-) 
pp-349-56 and 386-87. 
3. J. B. Bury, E. R. E. p. 244. The possible routes in the 
area have beeTi-discussed by J. G. C. Anderson, 'The Road 
System of Eastern Asia Minor with the Evidence of 
Byzantine Campaigns' (with map) in J. H. S., XVII (1897) 
10 
p-28. 
4. J. B. Bury, E. R. E., pp. 244-45. 
S. ibid., p. 245. 
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Furthermore, in the year 796 Harun al-Rashid took up 
residence at Rakka, an event which, if it was not caused 
by, at least coincided with a certain upsurge of activity 
by the Byzantines along the borders. 
1 Although that year 
was already the Caliph's tenth in power and, disliking 
Baghdad, he had in the meantime established his residence 
in one or two other places, it appears that Harun chose 
Rakka as his chief residence, 'probably because of its 
proximity to the Byzantine frontier, where he was planning 
great things'. 
2 Such a view conflicts with that of W. Muir, 
who believes that the Caliph set up his court at Rakka 
3*0 'ostensibly to hold disloyal Syria in check'. Although 
there is probably some truth in Muir's opinion, the fact 
that Harun had left all the internal affairs in the hands 
of the Barmakids 
4 
suggests that considerations of foreign 
policy were uppermost in his mind. Moreover, one needs 
to remember that even before becoming caliph in 786, Harun 
had already led raids against Byzantine territory. It ist 
therefore, likely that from his experience at that time, 
Harun was convinced that a strengthening of the western 
frontier of the Caliphate was necessary. With a view to 
this end he established in the border area a new province, 
the c Awasim, 'whose resources. were to be devoted to 
frontier warfare'. Finally, it must be added that 
Harun al-Rashid was the first of the'Abbasid caliphs to 
1. M. A. Shaban, Islamic History 2, A. D. 750-1055, (Cambridge 
1976), p. 31. 
2. H. Kennedy, The EarlyýAbblisid Caliphate (Totowa, 
N. Jersey 1981T-, p. 120. 
3. W. Muir, The Caliphate, its Rise, Decline and Fall, 
(Oxford 1892, Reprint 1975), p-476- 
4. For a discussion on the abilities and the role played by 
the Barmakids family, cf. H. Kennedy, The Early... 
(op. cit. ), pp. 116-20. 
S. H. Kennedy, The Early... (op-cit. ), p-130. 
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become interested in and to organize naval warfare. 
1 
Should his choice of Rakka as his main residence, therefore, 
not be seen as a measure, which corresponded to Caliph's 
lively interest on Byzantine affairs? In any case, what 
seems to be of more importance is that with Haru-n moving to 
Rakkaj the line of Arabic fortresses between Tarsos and 
Lykandos, was stabilized, running, for the most part, along 
the eastern side of the Taurus-Antitaurus mountains. 
(See map on next page. ) 
On the other side of the range there was another line 
of fortresses, which underpinned Byzantine control of the 
area. This line extended from Sebasteia in the north-east, 
close to the borders with Armenia, to Heracleia in the 
south-west, close to the Cilician Gates. The main 
fortresses located between these two ends of the line, 
seem to have been Caesarea, Kyzistra 
2 
and Tyana. We are 
not told whether Irene and Constantine VI took any measures 
to strengthen this line of fortresses. Nicephorus does 
not seem to have had the time to fortify the eastern outposts, 
because, at least during his first year in power, he was 
absorbed by internal affairs. 
Thus, it would appear that the Taurus-Antitaurus 
mountains served as a sort of 'no man's' land between the 
Byzantine Empire and the Caliphate. There was, however, 
one fort, which was of crucial importance at least as far 
as the control of the Cilician Gates is concerned. That 
was the fortress of Loulon, 
3 located very close to Pdj'andas 
and dominating the road between Tyana and Heracleia as well 
as the narrow pass of the Cilician Gates. Control of this 
fort had passed to and fro from Byzantine to Arab, 
4 but, at 
the turn of the eighth-century it seems to have been under 
Arabic control. It hardly needs to be said that it was 
mostly around these two lines of fortressess that the main 
conflicts between Byzantium and the Caliphate in the early 
ninth century took place. 
1. On this, see in this section, below, pp. 276 and 281. 2. Not to be confused with Heracleia Kybistra. 3. For its identification cf. W. Ramsay, The Historical. 
(OP-Lit. ), pp. 351-52. 4* J. B. Bury., E. R. E., p. 245. 
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Before proceeding to the narration on the main military 
events, which took place at the borders or near the 
borders between the two Empires., it would be, perhaps, 
worth noting that war in general was the main, but, by no 
means, the only interaction between the two worlds during 
our period. Other sorts of relations, such as political, 
diplomatic., commercial and cultural continue to exist, 
1 
but the reports about them are usually very vague. The 
sources, either Greek or Arabic dedicate their accounts 
almost completely to military events and, even when they 
refer to other activities in which the two sides were 
involved, they do so as mere anecdotes. 
Through such clues we hear,. for example, that, although 
constantly at war, Nicephorus I and Harun al-Rashid found 
some time to exchange presents. 
2 As M. - Canard has noticed 
the objects exchanged as presents provide a very good 
indication, if not hard evidence, for the commodities 
imported and exported by and from either country. 
3 They 
seem to have been mainly textile goods, perfumes and jewellery. 
4 
As we hear from Tabarl, Harun al-Rashid sent to Nicephorus 
in 806 dates, figs, raisins and treacle, as well as 100 
silk garments, 200 embroidered garments, twelve falcons., 
four hunting dogs and three horses. 
5 
1. On these relations, see among others: M. Canard, 'Les 
relations politiques et sociales entre Byzance et les 
Arabes', D. O. P. )18 (1964)ý pp-35-56; G. E. von Grunebaum, 'Parallelism, Convergence and Inf. l. uence in the Relations 
of Arab and Byzantine Philosophy, Literature and Piety'. 
in D. O. P., 18 (1964), pp. 91-111; Th. Papadopoulos, 'The 
Byzantine Model in Frontier History: A Comparative 
Approach', in VIXe Congres International d'Etudes 
Byzantines, Actes II (Bucharest 1975)., 41S-19; 
H. Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, 'La frontiere et les frontibres 
de Byzance en Orient', ibid., 1,209-211. 
2. J. B. Chabot, Chronique de Michel (22. cit. ), III, p-16; 
Bar Hebraeus, (op. cit. ), p-121. 
3. M. Canard, 'Les relations ... (. loc. cit.. ), p-54. 4. ibid., p. 49- 
S. Tabari, in Brooks 'Byzantines ... (loc. cit. ), p. 746. 0 
259 
From another source 
1 
we have the information that at 
an unspecified time, Nicephorus asked the Caliph to send 
him the Arab poet AbU^'l- c Atdhija, whose poetry the 
Byzantine Emperor was very fond of. The Caliph was very 
keen to do Nicephorus a favour, but the poet himself 
refused to emigrate to Constantinople. After that 
refusal, partly disappointed, Nicephorus engraved two 
verses by that poet on the doors of his palace and on the 
main gate of the capital. 
2 Even if the narration of 
the Kitdb al-Aghani is mere legend, it does point to the 
existence of some kind of cultural relations between the 
two Empires during the period in question. These relations, 
of course, were further developed during the reigns of the 
Emperor Theophilus and the Caliph Mutassim. Moreover, 
there were always individuals, sometimes of high rank, 
willing to cross the border and seek their fortune on the 
other side. According to Greek reports, an engineer of 
Arabic origin played a decisive role in the capture of 
Mesembria by Krum in 812.3 
Among the Byzantine dissidents we should mention 
Tatzatius, the strategos of Boukellarion theme, who in 
782 went over to the Arabs, because of his hatred against 
4 StauraciuS. Elpidius, patrician and strategos of Sicily, 
who in the same year acted in the same way as Tatzatius 
(although for different reasons)-5 Thomas the Slav who did 
1. Kitab al-Aghdni, in M. Canard, ('Les relations ... loc-cit. ), p. 36, n. 5. 
2. On tM7 story cf. M. Canard: 'Quelques "a c6tV de 
Vhistoire des relations entre Byzance et les Arabes', 
in Studi medievali in onore d. Georgio Levi Della Vida, 
Rome 1956, pp. 103-104. 
3. Theophanes 1, p. 498; I. Zonaras, Annales (2p. cit. /3, 
p-315). 
4. Theophanes 1, p. 456. 
5. Theophanes 1, p-455; Michael the Syrian (2p. cit. /vol-3, 
pp-9,15 and 16). On the date and the circumstances in 
which Elpidius flew to the Arabs, see above, Chapter 2, 
p-82. 
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did the same thing at an unspecified date' and Manuel, 
who crossed the borders twice, to the Arabs and then back 
again, during Theophilus' reign. 
2 
Furthermore, ordinary people settled near the frontiers, 
would be expected to have communicated with each other, to 
have exchanged commodities, ideas, views, etc. 
4. The Conflicts 
The quiet period which seems to have marked the relations 
between Constantinople and Rakka at the turn of the eighth 
century, ended some time during the year 803 when both 
Greek and Arabic sources report growing friction which led 
to a resumption of hostilities. 
For the worsening of the relations between the Byzantine 
Empire and the Caliphate, the Arabic sources blame the new 
Byzantine Emperor, who is supposed to have sent a letter to 
3 Harun al-Rashid, letting him know that the new government 
at Constantinople was determined to adopt a tougher stand 
against the Caliphate, than the Empress Irene had done. 
4 
Although their authenticity i-s dubious, it is worth citing 
here both Nicephorus' initial letter and Haru-n's reply. 
The Byzantine Emperor wrote: 
1. Theophanes Continuatus, C. S. H. B. (Bonn 1838), p-51. 
2. ibid., pp. 118-20. 
3. Nicephorus I* 's letter., as well as Harun's reply can be 
found in: Gibbon's A History of the Decline and Fall of 
the Roman Empire, (FouHt-hedition, London 1906), Ch-52; 
G. Weil, Geschichte der Kahlifen, Mannheim 1846-62,11, 
p-159, and Jaldl al-Din al-Suy5ti, History of the Caliphs 
(transl. by H. S. Jarrett) Calcutta 1881., p-296. 
4. Tabarli, in Brooks (loc. cit. ) p. 743; the poet A'bduIr Aahman-b-Yusug,, in TaTldl al-Din al-Suyuti's (2E. cit. ) 
p. 296 and Mas udi, Le prair; es d1or (2p, cit. ), II, p. 337, 
Masc5d! however asserts that the correspondence was 
initiated by Harun and not by Nicephorus. 
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'From Nicephorus, King of the Greeks, to 
Harun, King of the Arabs. Irene had 
parted with the castle and contented 
herself with the pawn. She had paid 
you moneys, the double of which you 
should have paid to her. It was but a 
woman's weakness. Wherefore, return 
what you have taken, or the sword shall 
decide-'I 
To this letter the Caliph replied immediately: 
'From Harun, Commander of the Faithful, 
to Nicephorus, dog of the Greeks. I 
have read your letter, son of an 
unbelieving mother. The answer is for 
your eye to see, not for your ear to hear-11 
As we can easily see in Nicephorus' hypothetical letter, 
the Byzantine Emperor, not only stopped the payment of a 
tribute to the Arabs agreed by Irene, but he demanded the 
refund of what the Caliph had so far received. The 
letter is reported only by Arabic sources 
3 
and presupposes 
the existence of a state of peace and the payment of 
tribute in 802. As we have implied, a peace treaty was 
concluded during the second half of 798. It would seem 
that a letter like that may be the key to the solution of 
the crucial problem, concerning the relations between the 
two countries at the turn of the eighth century. Therefore, 
it is worth recapitulating the evidence for both, the 
possible peace treaty of 798, and the letter, which is 
supposed to have been sent to Harun by Nicephorus I in 803. 
The Greek sources mention almost nothing either about 
the treaty or about the letter. 
4 The Arab chroniclers do 
1. Jalal al-Din al Suyuti, History of the Caliphs, (2p. cit. ) 
p-296. 
2. ibid. 
3. Mi-cliael the Syrian (ed. J. B. Chabot, op. cit., vol. III, 
p-161 also says that Nicephorus wrote an insulting letter 
to Harun. 
4. The only letter reported by a Greek source is the one 
quoted by George the Monk and dated by the same chronicler 
in 806. It can be found in C. de Boor's edition, 
Lipsiae 1904, p-773- Although it is again a letter 
sent by the Emperor Nicephorus I to the Caliph Harun, 
its content is quite different to the content of the 
letter quoted by the Arab sources. 
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not report any peace treaty under the year 798 either. 
Thus, the information about it, is derived ý=F" 
exclusively from Nicephorus' dubious letter. 
It is true that the letter speaks clearly about the 
existence of a peace treaty and of a tribute paid to the 
Arabs in 802. But how reliable is the letter? E. W. Brooks, 
relying mainly on Theophanes' silence, regards both letters 
(the one by Nicephorus and Harun's reply) as 'spurious' and 
2 
as 'an Arab inventiont 0 Most modern scholars have 
carefully avoided committing themselves as to the 
authenticity of the letters. Nevertheless, they all 
seem to have taken it for granted that Irene had signed a 
peace agreement and had agreed to pay tribute to the 
Arabs, probably after the successful Arabic invasions in 
the year 798. It would appear, however, that the two 
issues, i. e. the first concerning the peace treaty of 798 
and the second the letters of 803, are closely connected and, 
therefore, one has either to accept or to reject both of 
them. We can easily see that a relation of cause(effect 
exists in the case under consideration. In other words, 
if such a humiliating peace had been signed in 798, then 
we would normally have expected Nicephorus to have reacted 
by adopting an intransigent policy towards the Arabs, 
either immediately after his elevation in 802, or some 
time in the course of the year 803. 
1. Masc udi, Le livre... (2]2. cit. ), p. 227, forms perhaps 
an exception-. In a rather general statemenit, which is 
not under a definite year, he says the following about 
Irene: "clest grdce a elle que la paix fut maintentAe 
entre les Grecs et les kalifes el-Mehdi, el-Hadi et 
el-Rechid", (thanks to her peace between the Greeks 
and the Caliphs al-Mahd7l, al-Hdd! and al-Rashild was 
maintained). 
2. E. W. Brooks, 'Byzantines and Arabs... (loc. cit. ), p-743. 
26-3) 
To go back to the year 798, one must say that the 
situation in the whole Asia Minor at that time was more 
or less chaotic. As we have already seen above (p. 253) 
Theophanes himself reports several Arab invasions which 
had penetrated the country and had reached the west coast 
of the peninsula at Ephesus. 
1 The central government of 
Constantinople could not react dynamically and effectively. 
It would seem that the only way in which. Byzantium could 
have driven the Arabs out of Asia Minor, would have been 
by signing a peace treaty and by agreeing to pay a tribute, 
probably imposed by Harun as a condition for the peace. 
The lack of any report provided by Greek sources concerning 
this peace agreement should not surprise anybody. Since 
these sources speak, almost unanimously, in favour of the 
Empress Irene, we would not expect them to have reported 
events, which impugned Irene's capacities and abilities 
to cope with external threats. Coming to the reign of 
Nicephorus I, the same Greek authors would certainly have 
been very reluctant to record the new Emperor's uncompromising 
attitude towards the Caliphate. 
At any rate, it appears that Nicephorus did not 
accept the fait accompli, with which he was confronted at 
the time of his accession. People are ready to pay for 
their own mistakes, but not willing to accept responsibilities 
for their predecessors' failures. There was no way of 
continuing the payment of any tribute agreed by the Empress. 
Such a humiliation went far beyond any possibility of 
forbearance. Nicephorus' reaction is found to tally with 
two of his most notable characteristics: a) His proud 
character and b) His great concern for money. 




The new Emperor of Constantinople found a way of 
making his intentions clear to the Caliph. Whether this 
was done by sending an embassy, or just by refusing to 
meet Harun's claim for the yearly tyibute, is not of vital 
importance. Nevertheless, it would seem reasonable to 
believe that there must have been some correspondence 
between the two Empires after Nicephorus had come into 
power. Under the current circumstances, such a 
correspondence would have started sometime in the earl), 
summer of 803. It appears that the first six months or 
so of Nicephorus I's reign passed quietly, and the Emperor 
spent most of his time dealing with internal issues. He 
needed to secure himself in office against possible rivals. 
We are not told whether Nicephorus I handled the economic 
and fiscal situation of the Empire immediately after his 
accession, but the possibility that some preliminary work 
was undertaken in that direction too, cannot be ruled out. 
Such considerations do not provide any exact date of the 
controversial correspondence between Nicephorus and Harun 
but there is, nevertheless, one event which, being of crucial 
importance itself, can also shed some light into our problem. 
This event is the rebellion of Bardanes Turcus, which broke 
out on 19 July 803.1 It is almost certain that Bardanes' 
uprising prevented the Emperor Nicephorus I from 
confronting the Arabic forces which invaded the eastern 
provinces of Byzantium during the month Shacban (25 July- 
22 August) of the same year. 
2 If these two datings are 
accurate - and there is no reason why we should not accept 
them as correct - and, if one remembers that according to 
Tabari, Harun al-Rashid marched against Heracleia 
1. Theoptanes 1, p. 479. 
2. Tabari, in Brooks... (loc. cit. ), p. 743. 
a 
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immediately after he received Nicephorus' letter, 
1 
then 
the correspondence between the two men must have started 
some time in late spring or early summer (probably in May) 
of the year 803. To suggest that the letters were exchanged 
as part of post-campaign negotiations, during which 
Nicephorus refused to accept Harunts terms., would be against 
the information provided by the sources. It is more 
reasonable to accept the order of the events provided by 
the Arab authors and to believe that Harun al-Rashid took 
Nicephorus' stand as a provocation, which led to the 
commencement of hostilities between the t, wo Empires. 
Among the first events - if we are to believe Tabarl - 
which marked the hostilities between the two countries 
during Nicephorus I's reign, was Harun al-Rashid's raid 
against Heraclela. 
2 Bardanes' rebellion, already in 
course., might have made things much easier for the Arabs. 
It appears very likely that they took advantage of the 
internal trouble of the Byzantine Empire and at the end of 
July or the beginning of August they invaded Cappadocia. 
The expedition was led by ýasim, son of the Caliph and 
prefect of C Awasim, 
3 
who besieged and blockaded Koron. 
4 
1. Tabarip in Brooks ... (loc. cit. ), p. 743. I 2. ibid.; for the location of Heracleia cf. W. Ramsay, 
TTFe-Historical... (op-cit. ), p. 339, where it is stated 
that Heracleia-Kybistra was part of Cappadocia all the time. 
3. M. Canard, 'Byzantium and the Muslim World to the Middle 
of the Eleventh entury', C. M. H., vol. 4a, p. 707. On 
the province of Awasim, cf. in this section, above, 
p-256. 
4. For its identification cf. W. Ramsay, The Historical... 
(op-cit. ) p-355. J. F. Haldon and H. Kennedy ('The 
Arab-Byzantine Frontier in the eighth and ninth Centuries: 
Military Organization and Society in the Borderlands', 
in 
, 
Sbornik Radova 19,1980, p. 86) locate Koron north 
of Tyana and point out that it was the military 
headquarters of Cappadocia. 
266 
This last campaign is mentioned by both our main Arabic 
c that is to say by Ya Kubi and Tabari, though sources 
with slightly different detail; - In YacKu-b-11s report 
neither the time, nor the destination of the raid is 
provided. He does, however, add the names of al-Malik, 
the son of Salih, and Ibrahim, the son of Uthman, 
which are mentioned beside that of 4asim, probably as senior 
advisers of the young prince during the expedition. 
Tabari asserts that al-Kasim's ambitions extended 
farther than Koron. He sent one of his lieutenants., 
al-Abbas, the son of Galfar, against the fort of Sinan, 
2 
which was also taken after a short defence. 
3 Nevertheless, 
al-Kasim's intention does not seem to have been the 
annexation of these two forts to the Caliphate. 
H. Ahrweiler's remarks on the character of the Arabic raids: 
IL'action militaire arabe prend sur terre la forme de 
11guerilla" et de "razzia"', 
4 
seem to apply to this case too. 
Now, what was Nicephorus' reaction, if any, to the Arab 
incursions? Since the two main events of the summer of 
803 intermeshed in one way or another, it seems that 
there was not much Byzantine opposition against the invader. 
Normally it was the armies of the Asiatic themes 
% %, 0'. 1 ("TaL ri C ? OCT %%, <a C- ýA cx Tcx" which should have 
confronted the Arabs, but the Emperor Nicephorus seemed to 
have lost control of these forces. They were commanded by 
the powerful monostrategos Bardanes, whose rebellion they 
unanimously backed and who directed them, not against the 
Arab invaders, but against the capital itself. Although 
c-- 1. Ya Kubi, in Brooks... (loc-cit. ), p-744. 
2. For*a possible location cf. E. W. Brooks, 'The Arabs in 
Asia Minor, from Arabic Sources', in J. H. S., 18 (1898), 
p. 205. 
3. Tabari in, Brooks (loc-cit. ), p-742- 
4. A. Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, 'LIAsie Mineure... ' (loc-cit. ), p-7- 
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the Emperor had realized the difficulty of the whole 
situation in time, there was not much he could do. it 
would have been considered very risky, to say the least, 
if he had transferred the rest of the thematic army and 
the tagmata to Asia Minor in order to fight against the 
Arabs at that time. In such a case the Emperor Nicephorus 
would perhaps have handed the whole army to the ambitious 
monostrategos 
, 
and, more importantly, he would-have left the 
capital itself undefended. Furthermore, even if the rest 
of the army and at least the tagmata. had remained 'Loyal 
to the Emperor, there was always the huge risk of initiating 
a civil war, the consequences of which would have been 
nothing less than a complete disaster for Byzantium. 
Nevertheless, some action was undertaken on the part of 
the Byzantines against the invaders. That action., although 
not reported directl,.,,,, took place at an unspecified time 
and it ended in victory for the Byzantine army. Such an 
assumption is based on Tabari, who asserts that, when 
at the end of the campaign season of 803 the two sides came 
to terms, three hundred and twenty Arab prisoners - we 
are not told when and where they had been captured - were 
released. In any case, since- the number is not big,. 
the incident cannot be very important either. After that 
arrangement al-Kasim retired in peace back to Arabic 
territory. It was probably already late autumn and, 
therefore, no further operations were expected by either side. 
It appears that the Byzantine Emperor himself did not 
undertake any campaign against the Arabs until the end of 803. 
Tabari, in Brooks... (loc. cit. ), p. 742- It is worth Aoting that YacKu-b'1 dates the release of these prisoners 
in 804 (A. H. 188). However, as Brooks ('Byzantines... ' 
loc. cit. p. 744, note 150) has pointed out., Tabari's 
dating (803) fits better into the whole context of 
the internal events of the Caliphate. 
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Whether Harun led an expedition against imperial territory, 
remains disputable. This is because, among the sources 
which cover our period, it is only Tabari who records such 
an event. According to him, when Rashid received the 
letter of Nicephorus, he himself marched immediately 
('the same day') 
1 
and reached the gates of Heracleia. 
The Byzantine Emperor, being occupied by Bardanes' rebellion 
and frightened by the Caliph's raid, sought for peace and 
agreed to pay a tribute imposed by Harun as a condition for 
it. Thus Heracleia escaped capture and remained under 
Byzantine control. However, when Rashid had retreated to 
Rakka, 2 Nicephorus broke the agreement and refused to pay 
the tribute. As a result of that refusal, the Caliph 
came back, notwithstanding the severe winter and invaded 
Byzantine territory once again. 
3 
Bury's interpretation of this story relies very heavily 
on Tabarl's original text. Thus he argues that, because 
he was too busy trying to suppress Bardanes' rebellion, the 
Emperor Nicephorus concluded a humiliating peace treaty 
with the Arabs in 803 and undertook the obligation to pay a 
--4 tribute to Harun. 
However, there are certain points, which should make 
us very reluctant to accept Tabarils account as far as 
I 
the personal expedition of Harun al-Rashid in 803 is 
concerned. 
In the first place, his account of these events is 
suspiciously close to his account of the events of 806. 
The only difference which can be spotted in the two passages 
is that in 803 Harun stopped his march in front of Heracleia's 
1. Tabarl, in Brooks ... (loc. cit. ), p. 743. 2. ibid. 
3. TF-j-U. 
4. J. B. Bury, E. R. E., p. 250. 
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gates., while in 806 he besieged and conquered the city- 
fortress. Otherwise, both accounts tell us that Rashild 
marched personally against the fortress of Heracleia, that 
Nicephorus was frightened and proposed to pay a tribute, if 
Harun would withdraw, that the Byzantine Emperor failed to 
honour his agreement and. that the Caliph came back to 
punish him very late on in the winter and under severe 
weather conditions. This last detail should make us 
particularly suspicious. 
As we shall see below, nobody so far has challenged 
the credibility of the sources in regard to the events of 
806. The accounts provided by all sources, Greek and 
A rabic for that year coincide, so that there is no doubt 
that they tell us the truth. But to believe that exactly 
the same events took place in 803 too, is out of question. 
If they did, then two other major questions will remain 
unanswered: a) As a result of the treaty, which is supposed 
to have been signed by the two sides in the summer of 803, 
Harun himself retreated to Rakka. However, in the meantime 
and definitely after the hypothetical treaty had already been 
signed - al-Kasim, his son, went on attacking and 
conquering places, well inside Byzantine territory. if 
such a peace treaty had been agreed, one might have expected 
Rashid to order his son to withdraw from hostilities too. 
Because otherwise al-Kasim. would also have been blamed 
for violation of a peace agreement. b) An expedition of 
the Caliph himself, which penetrated Byzantine territory, 
a peace treaty and a tribute imposed by the Arabs, all 
these were too important to have been ignored by the Greek 
sources especially Theophanes. To this last point, 
nevertheless, we must add an alternative reservation: since 
we follow the line that Theophanes does not record events 
favourable to the Emperor Nicephorus I, if he can help it, 
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then a failure on the part of Harun to capture Heracleia, 
might be omitted as reflecting too much credit on Nicephorus. 
In other words, it might be suggested that the Caliph may 
have attacked Heracleia in 803 too and was forced to 
withdraw not because he compelled the Byzantine Emperor 
to accept his terms and to pay tribute to the Caliphate, 
but because he failed to capture it. This is, of course, 
quite possible, but our sources do not provide much help 
in that direction either. It would, therefore, be more 
appropriate to say that there are no good grounds for 
accepting the existence of an expedition by Harun against 
Heracleia in 803. To sum up, it might be suggested that, 
because of Nicephorus' refusal to continue the payment of 
any tribute, hostilities resumed - though not on a large 
scale - in 803, but neither the Caliph nor the Byzantine 
Emperor participated in any expedition personally in that 
year. 
In the following year (804) it was the Arabs again 
who began hostilities. It is worth noting that from 
this year onwards, the conflicts between the two Empires 
are recorded by the Greek sources too. However, what is 
perhaps more important than this, is that the accounts 
given by the Arab chroniclers, on the one hand, and those 
provided by the Greek authors, on the other, cover, more 
or less, common ground and can, therefore, be matched with 
less difficulty. 
During that year the Byzantine hold on Asia Minor was 
still weak. This means that Harun did not need to 
undertake a personal expedition. He could still rely upon 
his capable lieutenants. According to Tabari, this time 
it was Ibrahim, the son of Gabriel, who conducted the 
summer raid entering Byzantine territory through the pass of 
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Al Safsaf. 1 Tabarl does not tell us how deeply into 
Asia Minor Ibrahim penetrated, but on this there is some 




According to these two chroniclers, Nicephorus was worried 
by the fact that the Arabs had reached as far as Phrygia. 
4 
Therefore, in August he himself led an expedition against 
them. The two armies clashed at Krassos, 
5 
where the 
Byzantines were defeated and the Emperor himself was lucky 
to escape being captured. Tabarl reports that 
6 Nicephorus I received three wounds, but Theophanes 
considered a narrow escape more humiliating than a wound 
received in the battle. In any case, one needs to be 
suspicious about Tabari's source, not only because a 
triple wound of the Byzantine emperor would have been very 
well reported by other sources too, but also because of 
the huge numbers given by him in regard to the imperial 
losses. There is, of course, very little doubt that this 
conflict was a disaster for the Byzantine forces. However., 
to believe that they lost 40,700 men and 4,000 beasts of 
burden, as Tabarl's source of information suggests, is out 
of question. Tabaril himself does not appear to have been 
very keen to accept these numbers. That is probably the 
reason why he is very careful in the way he records them. 
7 
1. W. Ramsay, (The Historical..., 2p. cit., p. 354, note), 
identifies it as Sideropalos, but J. B. Bury (E. R. E., 
p. 245, note 3) seems to believe that it was tF-esame 
as Loulon. 
2. Theophanes 1, p-481.0ý 
3. G. Cedrenus, Histor1rum, Compendium (Bonn 1839) 11, 
p-33- 
4. George the Monk also reports the Arabs in Phrygia 
(Amorium), but under the year 805 (De Boor, op-cit. 
pp. 772-73). 
S. Cedrenus, however, does not locate the battle 
specifically. For the location of Krassos in Phrygia, 
see map, p-258- 
6. Tabari, in Brooks ... (loc. cit. ), p. 744. 7. ibid. It reads: 'as (11-t) is recorded'. 
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In April of the next year (805) the Caliph found 
himself forced to leave for Persia, in order to deal with 
some internal disturbances. There he spent the whole 
summer and autumn. According to Theophanes, the 
Byzantine Emperor took advantage of Harun's absence and 
restored several fortresses in Central and Eastern Asia 
Minor. Among them Ancyra, Thebasa and Andrassos are 
singled out. Nicephorus I even took the offensive by 
s_ending a detachment to Syria, which - we are told - did 
not achieve anything. 
2 This, however, means that the 
Cilician Gates and the fortress of Loulon, places which at 
the turn of the eighth century were under Arabic control, 
changed hands but only for a few months during the years 
805-806. Because at the beginning of the year 806 the 
Caliph determined to crush the imperial forces once and for 
all and gathered together a huge army. Theophanes speaks 
about 300,000 soldiers., collected from Syria and Palestine 
and Libya. 
3 The source on which Tabarl's narration is 
based, raises the number of regularly paid soldiers to 
135)000. To these men, Tabarli comments, 'the camp- 
4 followers and volunteers and those who were not registered' 
must be added. No matter how inaccurate the numbers given 
by both chroniclers are, one thing remains sure: the Arabic 
army of 806 was huge and at its head was Rashid himself, 
full of self confidence. It appears that this campaign 
was intended as a triumphal procession -a propaganda 
exercise designed to impress his subjects. The Caliph 
meant it to be a great success. He entered Byzantine 
1. M. Canard, 'La prise... ' (loc. cit. ), pp. 355-56. 
2. Theophanes (1,481)., who reporTs the expedition, asserts 
that the Byzantines lost a great number of men. 
3. ibid., p. 482. 
4. Tabarli, in Brooks (loc. cit. ), p-745. 
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territory on 11 June 
1 from the Cilician Gates and made 
his way to the city-fortress of Tyana. This stood very 
close to the north entrance of the Cilician Gates and, 
more important., commanded the main road from Caesarea to 
Heracleia. Both our main sources for these events, 
Theophanes and Tabarli, seem to agree that Rashid spent 
some time at Tyana. According to Tabarl, he encamped 
2 
there, while according to Theophanes, he even built a 
mosque. 
3 If Theophanes' report is accurate, then such an 
action on the part of the Caliph can be taken to mean that 
he intended to annexe a part of south-eastern Cappadocia 
to the Caliphate and consequently Harunts activities there 
were not after all that innocent. Because, the building 
of a mosque is usually associated with conquest. 
From there Harun dispatched his lieutenants against 
other strong Byzantine fortresses of eastern Asia Minor. 
Thebassa, 4 Malacopea, 5 Sideropalos and Andrassos all came 
under Arabic control. 
6 In the meantime the Caliph himself 
concentrated his efforts on the siege of Heracleia which, as 
Theophanes reports., was very str-ongly fortified. 
7 We do not 
know for how long Heracleia was besieged, but according 
to Tabarl it was captured sometime between 20 August and 
8 17 Sep#ember. What appears to be of more significance, 
1. Tabarl, in Brooks (loc. cit. ), p. 74S. 
2. ibid. %) N6 
3. TH-eophanes 1, p-482: lfcx I C-A 9w v _T -6 Cz VCX 
I, 
K 00"'c'%4 A P-4 
OlKov Ti; & lXCXQvc*vjt4%'cxr =ZýTckiý: ' 
4. Tabarl's Dabsa. Ibn al-Athir's Dalsa or Dabsah cf. j. G. C. Anderson, 'The Road-System... ' (loc. cit. ), p. 32. 
S. Tabarils Malakubija, in Brooks (loc. cit. ), p. 74S. 
6. theophanes 1, p. 482. 
7. ibid.. "r6 yc)ý; l-Vk?, cxKAt"wS wc*L*(. T(70v *)E%; fpw-yOcTov nctvv T. 
Vn OC e. ýC 0 14'. 1 
8. Tabari, in Brooks, (loc-cit. ), p-745. 
0 
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is that with the fall of Heracleia, 
1 
the south-western part 
of the line of the imperial fortresses in eastern Asia 
Minor was completely destroyed and the Arabs now dominated 
the region. From Heracleia a strong detachment of 
Arabic forces 
2 
was sent as far as Ancyra, 
3 destroyed the 
Thus the*'Ofý' 
"t 
city and came back. ý`Festoration done by Nicephorus 
in the previous year proved to have been in vain. Although 
the Emperor Nicephorus I campaigned in person, he could do 
little but accept a fait accompli. Therefore, he sent an 
embassy of three churchmen 
4 to seek for peace. 
It harrIly needs to be emphasized that, victorious, 
Harun*imposedýhis conditions. According to Theophanes, 
he asked for a yearly tribute of thirty thousand nomismata, 
plus three nomismata which were considered a personal ransom 
for the Emperor himself and another three for his son 
Stauracius. S That last amount of six nomismata, 
especially mentioned by Tabarl' too, was probably supposed 
to symbolize the subjection and humiliation of the Byzantine 
Emperor to the will of the Caliph, and the latter seemed to 
have found this idea of subjection very attractive indeed. 
1. As M. Canard ('La prise*... I loc. cit. p-378) has pointed 
out, th, ý fall of Heracleia in 806--served very much as an 
inspiration for the contemporary Arab poets who, excited 
by Hdrfin's achievement, composed a great number of verses 
in order to commemorate, his victory. 
2. Theophanes (1, p-482) raises their number to sixty 
thousand soldiers. 
3. George the Monk (De Boor op. cit., p-773) says Amorium, 
and dates it in 805. 
4. Theophanes 1, p. 482; these were: Michael, metropolitan 
of Synada, Peter, abbot of Goulaion (Sylaion? ), and 
Gregory, the Oikonomos of Amastris. 
S. Theophanes 1, p-482; Tabarl (Brooks, loc. cit. p-746) 
provides us with different numbers. He says that the 
peace was agreed for a yearly sum of fifty thousand dinars, 
of which four were for the Emperor and two for Stauracius. 
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Another condition imposed by Harun, was that the Byzantines 
should not try to restore the fortresses, which had been 
dismantled by the Arabic forces. The great concern of 
Rashid about these fortresses leads us to suspect that 
they were not just fortified places, but, in a way, they 
were or they could be used as garrison quarters. In 
other words, Harun was probably afraid that such places, 
if they were well fortified, could later be used as the 
starting points for expeditions directed against Arabic 
territory. 
At any rate, Nicephorus can be blamed for inconsistency. 
When the Caliph retreated to Rakka, the Byzantine Emperor 
took advantage of his absence, broke the compact and 
restored and fortified the forbidden places. As a result 
of it, Harun sent his forces back to Byzantine territory and 
retook Thebasa. 
2 From Theophanes we hear that Rashid in his turn also 
broke the peace with regard to Cyprus, 
3 
where he sent a 
fleet, the men of which destroyed the churches and took 
many captives. Tabarl mentions two Arabic attacks 
against Cyprus in the course of the year 806. The most 
important of them was the one led by Humaid. The Arab 
chronicler asserts that the admiral took sixteen thousand 
captives, whom he brought to Rafica, near Rakka. 
4 One 
bishop, who was among the captives, provided two thousand 
dinars as a ransom, and thus they were freed. 
5 
1. On the garrison quartersý of fustat, cf. J. B. Bury, 
(E. R. E. ý p. 244)., where he argues that the institution hýi-dbeen introduced by the Omayyads and was continued 
under the early'Abbasids. 
2. Theophanes 1, p-482. 
3. On the neutrality of Cyprus see R. Jenkins, 'Cyprus 
between Byzantium and Islam, A. D. 688-9651, in Studies 
Presented to D. M. Robinson. 11, St. Louis 19S3, pp. 1006- 
1014. 
4. E. W. Brooks, 'Byzantines... (loc. cit. ), p-74S, note 163. 
S. Tabarl, in Brooks (loc-cit. ), p. 745. 
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Before prolonging our narration of the military events 
of the year 807, in which, as we will see, Nicephorus I 
took the offensive, the apparent ease with which the 
Byzantine Empire was able to recover from the disasters of 
806, needs some kind of explanation. 
As it has already been indicated above, 
' 
our sources 
record mainly, if not exclusively, military events, and, 
therefore, one is only left with more or less general 
considerations to provide a solution to this 'perennial' 
mystery. Because there is so little hard evidence, the 
best we can do is to take these hints into account and 
combine them with events and circumstances. 
In the first place, one has to keep in mind that the 
sources which covered the events of 806., are almost all 
biased against Nicephorus and favourable to Harun. This 
can be taken to mean that they exaggerate the achievements 
of the Caliph during that particular year. Secondly, the 
fall of Tyana and Heracleia in 806 should not be taken to 
mean that Byzantine resistance in the eastern provinces 
was totally paralyzed. The Byzantine army was still in 
possession of other strongholds inthe area, ready to act 
again, as we will see, in the course of next year. 
Furthermore, the character of the expeditions and the 
campaigns organized and launched by either side during these 
years, is, in a way, peculiar. From our main Arabic 
chronicler we hear that among the terms of the peace treaty 
between the Arabs of Harun - at the time successor-designate 
to the throne - and Irene in 782, there was one, according 
to which the Byzantines undertook the obligation to provide 
the Arabic army with guides - while campaigning in Byzantine 
1. In this section, p. 259. 
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provinces! - and with markets along the main roads, 
from where the invaders could buy their own provisions. 
This is, of course, quite an unusual agreement, but 
M. A. Shaban suggests that it also applied to the Byzantine 
army, when marching into the enemy's land. 
2 Under such 
circumstances the wars between the two countries took on 
a peculiar character. It became more of a formality; a 
procession, one might almost say. 
Moreover, the characters of the two leaders themeselves 
need to be examined thoroughly. What were they? Were 
they only warlike, or did they respect each other, and 
was a sort of mutual understanding built up? Apart from 
Tabari., on whose record we have already spoken above, 
3 the 
exchange of gifts between the Emperor Nicephorus I and the 
Caliph Harun al-Rashid, is reported by another three 
sources, though not contemporary. The first of them is 
Leo Grammaticus who reports that at an unspecified time 
Nicephorus sent his ambassadors with presents to Harun who 
was already campaigning and proposed peace negotiations. 
The Caliph, responding favourably to the proposals, in his 
turn., sent presents-: -tothe Byzantine Emperor and returned in 
peace admiring Nicephorus''prudence. 
4 A very similar 
S 
report is provided by George Cedrenus, who in this case does 
not copy Theophanes. Our third source is Bar-liebraeus., who, 
referring probably to the first year of Nicephorus' reign, 
records that the two leaders, whilst they were encamped, 
'by means of envoys and dispatches, were conversing and 
listening to each other. And ultimately they came toan 
I 1. Tabarl) in Brooks (loc-cit. ), p. 738. 
2. ý. A. Shaban, Islami-E--Hi-ýTtory 2 (op. cit. ), p. 25. 
3. In this section, p. 259. 
4. Leo&rammaticu; s, Chronographia, in C. S. H. B. (Bonn 1842), 
pp-203-04. 
S. Georgius Cedrenus (. 2p. cit. ) 2, p. 33. 
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agreement and they sent gifts to each other, and each 
returned to his own country'. 
1 Whatever the accuracy 
of these reports, it would seem that their essence must be 
taken seriously. In reference to the events of 806, 
W. Buckler suggests that by the end of 806 'the relations 
between Nicephorus and Harun were already restored to 
friendliness' 2 and that 'the coincidence of the sending of 
gifts to Nicephorus in 806 and the movements of Isaac 
raise the question whether it was not the gifts first meant 
3 for the Byzantime Emperor that ultimately reached Charles' 
Such considerations prompt some further remarks on 
Nicephorus' diplomacy and 'Diplomatic Service'. It appears 
that this Emperor had created a good diplomatic network which 
managed to deal successfully with very difficult situations. 
One of the three participants in the Byzantine embassy to 
Harun in 806, was Michael, Metropolitan of Synada, who 
seems to have spent very little time in his bishopric 
indeed. Most of his life he was travelling either to the 
West - we have already seen him negotiating with the 
Franks three times - or to the Caliphate, bound to solve 
complex problems caused by the frequent wars between the 
Byzantime Empire and its rival in the east. Michael and 
his companions were probably successful in carrying out the 
peace negotiations with Harun late in 806 too. Another 
issue in which the Byzantine diplomats under Nicephorus I 
would seem to have been also successful, was the 
controversy over the Holy Places, where the Christian 
population had been under Arabic rule. As we hear from 
1. Bar Hebraeus., The Chlronography. - (op. cit. ), p-121. 2. W. Buc*ler, Harfin. ** (. ol). cit. ). p. 46- 3. ibid.; on ifts groug7t by Isaac to Charlemagne cf. 
in : Ehis chapter section under the title: Byzantium and 
the West, p. 222- - Buckler's remarks, however, on the destination of these gifts, do not seem to reflect much 
truth, because, as we have seen, Isaac reached the West 
with Charlemagne's presents, already in 801, i. e. one 
year before Nicepiltorus' accession to the imperial throne. 
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a Latin source, 
1 Charlemagne was more than happy to be 
recognized as 'protector' of that area. Normally, however, 
this was a role that the Byzantine ruler considered his own. 
one might be entitled to believe that Harun al-Rashid had 
been willing., at least at the beginning of his Caliphate, 
to grant the right of 'protection' of the Holy Land to 
Charlemagne. Though our sources do not shed much light 
on that particular problem it would appear that Nicephorus 
I's 'Diplomatic Service' managed to keep these lands under 
Byzantine rather than Frankish 'protection'. In brief 
the year 806 saw an escalation of Arab activities agFinst 
the eastern provinces of the Byzantine Empire, but w. thout 
any clear cut success. 
In 807 the Byzantines were somehow successful. They 
won back control of the vital Cilician Gates and they 
defeated the Arab lieutenant Yazid- Rashid himself 
abstained from the action, but he stayed on the frontier 
line, at Adata. When he heard that the Cilician Gates 
had fallen to the imperial forces, he posted CAbd Allah, 
the son of al-Malik, at the pass of Adata to block it 
against a possible By-z. antine raid. 
2 Indeed the Caliph 
was right in his predictions. Tabari, to whose detailed 
account we owe our knowledge about the events, says that 
the Byzantine army came, but they retreated as they could 
not go through the pass. Thus, the northern pass of the 
Taurus-Antitaurus range remained under Arabic control. 
3 
Another Arabic source, the Kitab of al-CUyum, speaks 
about two clashes which occurred during the same year 
(807). In the first one the imperial army was very 
successful. The Arab leader Yazlid was among those killed. 
1. Annales Altahenses Majores, M.. G. H., Scri-ptorum, vol-20, 
p-783. 
2. Tabar-1, in Brooks (loc. cit. ). p. 747. 
3. ibid. 
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In the second, however, Nicephorus himself suffered a 
severe defeat. The Arabic forces this time were under 
Marthama, the son of Acyan. Tabarli confirms that a 
summer raid under this leader took place in 807, but he 
does not say anything about its results. 
2 At any rate, 
it does not look very likely that the Emperor Nicephorus 
himself was involved in a campaign in Asia Minor that year. 
Theophanes reports him as being occupied with an expedition 
against the Bulgars and with the plot against him which 
broke out while they were at Adrianople, on their way to 
Bulgaria. 
A naval attack against Rhodes under Humaid in 808 seems 
to have been of considerable importance. The admiral 
captured the city, but he did not have any success against 
the fortress. Humaid, nevertheless, got away with much 
booty, but as he touched Myra, a storm lost him several 
ships. 
3 
Harun al-Rashid died in the following year (809) and 
Nicephorus started being more and more pre-occupied with 
the wars against the Bulgars. The only serious event 
between Byzantium and the Caliphate, which, we are told, 
happened after Harun's death, is the defeat of Leo, the 
strategos of the Armeniac theme and future Emperor Leo V, 
at Euchaita in February 811. This time the Arabs got 
away with the soldiers"pay (pdja), which was 1,300 pounds of 
gold. 
4 Nevertheless, it appears that less than one and 
a half years later (August 812) the same Leo, who in the 
meantime had been promoted and transferred to the theme of 
Anatolikon, defeated an Arabic army under Thabit. 
1. In Brooks (loc-cit. ), p-747. 
2. Tabari, in -9-rooR-s-(loc-cit. ), p. 747. 
3. Theophanes (l., 483) who is our only source of information 
about the attack, attributes the storm to a miracle 
performed by St. Niýblas, whose tomb was at Myra. 
Surprisingly the Arab chroniclers ignore the naval 
expedition of Humaid in 808. 
4. Theophanes 1, p-489. 
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According to Theophanes Leo killed 2,000 Arab soldiers 
and captured some horses and weapons. 
The struggle among Harun's sons for the succession 
of the throne after his death lasted four years and was 
decided by the long siege of Baghdad and the execution of 
Amin (813). 2 During these four years Byzantium could 
not benefit from these internal divisions within the 
Caliphate because it was under threat itself. After the 
Emperor Nicephorus I had fallen in the disastrous battle 
of 26 July 811, Krum, the Khan of the Bulgars devastated 
Mesembria and Develtus. The new Emperor Michael I could 
do very little to stop further Bulgarian raids and 
threats against Thrace, Macedonia and the capital itself. 
Rather frightened by the situation, Michael I ordered the 
transfer of some forces from Asia Minor into Europe, 
3 
and thus not only was he not able to benefit from the 
anomalous internal situation of the Caliphate, but, at 
least temporarily, he weakened the eastern frontiers of 
Byzantium still further. However, luckily for him and 
for his two successors, hostilities between Byzantium and 
the Caliphate wete not be resumed until about 830. it 
hardly needs to be said that such a period of peace would 
profit both countries. 
S. General Assessment 
Among Byzantium's neighbouring countries, it was only the 
Arabs who, at the time of Nicephorus' elevation to the throne 
in 802, could be seen as an immediate threat to Constantinople. 
c-- 1. Theophanes 1, p. 497. Ya Kubi (in Brooks loc. cit,. p-747) 
also records a raid conduýted by Thabit i'n 812, but 
only as a perfunctory one. Nothing is said about Leo's 
victory. 
2. J. B. Bury, E. R. E.., p. 251. 
3. Theophanes 1, p-500. 
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The Bulgars seemed to have been devoted completely to 
internal affairs, trying to reorganize their state after 
the death of Cardam, while the Franks of Charlemagne 
represented a political and diplomatic threat rather 
than a military one. 
One could count several reasons why the Empire's 
rivalry with the Arabs was of crucial importance in 802. 
To begin with, Nicephorus probably inherited a situation 
in Byzantium's relations to the Caliphate, which could be 
characterized as unacceptable. Secondly, there were 
troubles along the eastern frontier by 803, so that 
Nicephorus was not given the time to secure himself on 
the throne and settle internal disturbances. In reference 
to that, one needs only to remember that by 802 Harun 
al-Rash"Id had already been in power for sixteen years, 
well established and not challenged by anyone else in the 
Caliphate. Furthermore, the constant Arabic raids 
against Asia Minor could result., if nothing else, in the 
loss of imperial border posts, blocking, in this way, 
the Byzantine route to Syria. Finally, it appears that 
the Byzantine Emperor was aware of Harun's friendly terms 
with Charlemagne and his readiness to recognize the Frankish 
Emperor as 'protector' of the Christians living in the Holy 
Land. In fact Einhard suggests that something more than 
a protectorate was involved: referring to a Frankish 
delegation sent to Harun at an unspecified time, 
Charlemagne's biographer asserts us that the Caliph, 'not 
only granted them all they asked, but also allowed that 
sacred place of our salvation to be reckoned as part of 
the possessions of the Frankish King'. 
1 It would seem, 
1. A. J. Grant (edit and transl. ) Early Lives ... (OP. Cit. ) 
p-29. 
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however, that such a major concession on the part of 
Rashild could hardly be kept secret from Nicephorus and, 
if that was the case, then an angry Byzantine reaction 
against the Caliph would have been fully justified. 
Under these circumstances, it can be argued that the Arabs 
represented not only the most immediate, but also the 
most serious threat to Byzantium, and, from what we have 
seen so far, it can hardly be denied that the Emperor 
Nicephorus took this threat from the Arabs equally 
seriously. 
During the end of the eighth and the beginning of the 
ninth century, the Arabs undertook more attacks against 
Byzantine territory than the imperial army did against 
them. The victories achieved by the Arabic forces also 
outnumbered those of Byzantium. It can be argued that at 
certain times, during the period in question, conditions 
seemed to have been ideal for the Arabs to push their 
frontiers further west, at the expense of Byzantine territory. 
Nothing is more surprising than the easelwith which they 
could penetrate deeply into Asia Minor and reach places 
like Ancyra, Krassos, Malagina, and even Ephesus. However., 
as has been stated above, these raids were directed 
towards certain cities and fortresses and aimed mainly to 
a show of power, to plundering and to fecxve trcxkfi'tAý. 
M. A. Shaban, nevertheless, believes that 'because of the 
strongholds on both sides of the frontiers, acquiring booty 
was so difficult that it was only attempted in exceptional 
circumstances'. 
1 Shaban's argument, though partly correct, 
appears to overstate the case. What happened at Euchaita 
in February 811,2 points, more or less, to the opposite 
1. M. A. Shaban, Islamic History, (2. p. cit. ), 2, p. 25. 
2. On this event, see above, p. 281. 
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conclusion. At any rate, no invaders are reported to have 
stayed at places captured by either side, for long periods 
of time. The raids were launched mainly in spring or 
in early summer, so that the invaders had enough time to 
withdraw before the winter. 
These remarks, nevertheless, by no means imply that 
Harun underestimated the situation or neglected the 
security of the borders with Byzantium. His particular 
interest in the Byzantine Empire was underlined partly 
by his removal to Rakka, but mainly by the establishment 
-C of the Awasim province, of which we have already spoken. 
If he undertook several raids against Byzantium, it was 
exactly because he respected the Byzantine Empire as a 
powerful neighbour and wanted greater security. In 
other words, it would seem that, in Harun's mind, the best 
defence against an enemy, was to take the attack to the 
enemy, and this appears to have been the policy adopted 
by the Caliph. Thus during Nicephorus' reign several 
places in Asia Minor had to go through some really very 
bad experiences, such as devastations, lootings., plunderings, 
captivities, etc. However, 'injuries' like these easily 
healed, especially because a rather long period of peace 
followed. What was more vital for Byzantium was that in 
811 the frontier line between the Byzantine Empire and the 
Caliphate was the same as it had been in 802. In order to 
achieve this, Nicephorus was forced to keep himself busy 
for long periods of time, dealing mostly with the relations 
between Byzantium and the Caliphate and fighting in the 
fields, both of war and of diplomacy. 
The hostilities between them, which slowed down in 
807, stopped almost entirely with the death of Harun in 
809. In reference to this event and to the war between 
his two sons for the succession, a tenth century Arabic 
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source, the Kitab al' Makafa'a (the Book of Recompense), 
'a collection of historical anecdotes of an ethical 
character', 
1 
makes the following remarks: 
'When the news was - 
brought to King Nicephorus 
of the death of Harun, he made that day a 
festival for the Greeks. Then he made 
a still greater festival on the day that 
he was informed of the outbreak of war 2 between Muhammad al-Amin and al-Malmiin. 
No matter how reliable such an anecdote can be, it reflects, 
perhaps, the truth that the Emperor Nicephorus turned his 
attention to the Bulgars only at a- time when he had already 
secured his eastern frontiers. 
1. B. Lewis, 'An Arabic Account of a Byzantine Palace 
Revolution'. in Byz-, 14 (Brussels 1939), p. 383. 
2. ibid. 
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C: BYZANTIUM AND THE BULGARS 
The state of relations between Byzantium and the Bulgars 
at the turn of the eighth century is best described as 
obscure. At first sight there seems to have been no 
immediate threat from the Bulgars when Nicephorus ascended 
the throne in 802. No conflicts between them and the 
Empire are reported to have taken place during Irene's 
sole reign (797-802). 
1 
The history of relations between Byzantium and the 
Bulgarian Kingdom at the time in question suffers from 
an absence of information about the internal history of 
Bulgaria during this time. Therefore, one might wonder 
whether it is not this lack of evidence which made things 
look easier along the north-western borders of the Empire 
than on its eastern frontier. 
Although apparently peaceful relations between 
Byzantium and the Bulgars continued during Nicephorus' 
first five years in power (until 807), this should by no 
means be taken to mean that the rivalry between the two 
countries ceased to exist during our period. Two factors 
point in the opposite direction: first, one needs only to 
remember that the first Bulgarian Kingdom had been set up 
(681) in the north-eastern corner of the Balkan peninsula, 
an area which was not situated that far from Constantinople 
itself. It is worth noting that before the Bulgars, other 
tribes, the Ostrogoths and Visigoths, for instance, had 
1. On the basis of this lack of clashes, J-B. Bury, (E. R. E. 
p-339) suggests that the Empress Irene had submitted to 
the payment of an annual tribute to the Bulgars. To my 
knowledge, such a tribute is not attested by any of our 
sources. 
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tried to settle in the same areas. The Byzantines eyed 
their settlement in these lands with alarm. Though 
losing an emperor (Valens) they finally succeeded in pushing 
them westwards. All this effort shows quite clearly that 
Constantinople considered these lands as imperial territory. 
Now, if this was true for the late fourth century,, one can 
see no reason why it should not have applied to the 
beginning of the ninth century too. The Byzantine Empire 
was forced to recognize the existence of the newly created 
state and trade relations between Bulgaria and Byzantium 
were established as early as the reign of Theodolius III 
(715-17). ' Bulgaria's proximity to Constantinople, 
nevertheless, produced a constant state of unease in the 
relations between the Byzantine Empire and its neighbour. 
Furthermore, it appears that relations between Byzantium 
and Bulgaria at the time under consideration, cannot be 
examined properly without taking into account the Slavic 
presence in or around the same area. The Emperor 
Nicephorus' sensitivity and great interest in Slavic affairs 
hardly need to be emphasized. It is in the light of this 
that the wars with the Bulgars of Krum have to be considered. 
2 Modern historians almost unanimously blame Nicephorus 
for having triggered off conflict between Byzantium and 
Bulgaria. 3 They are right, but only up to a certain point, 
1. Theophanes 1, p-497- 
2. See for example, J-B. Bury: E-R-E-ý p-340; S. Runciman: 
The First..., p. 52; D. OboleiTs9k. 'Byzantium and its 
Northern Neighbours, 565-10181, in C. M. H., 4, pt-1, p. 490; 
R. Browning: Byzantium and Bulgaria (op-cit. ), p. 49. 
3. Unfortunately our knowledge of the internal history of 
Bulgaria from 797-807 is very limited. We are also 
ignorant of Krum's background and of the date of his 
accession to the Bulgarian throne. However., as 
S. Runciman (The First..., p-51) puts it properly: 'more 
important than his birth were his ambitions and his 
ability'. For the various forms of his name see also 
S. Runciman (ibid., note). 
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because they seem to have oversimplified the whole 
situation along the north-western borders of the Byzantine 
Empire and to have overlooked certain facts. To begin 
with., we would expect Nicephorus to have scrutinized the 
crucial events and developments which had been taking place 
in central Europe. The main event was the complete 
destruction of the Avars and the way Krum had benefited 
from it. He had managed to extend his domination to the 
West as far as the eastern bank of the river Theiss, where 
he confronted the Franks of Charlemagne. 
_ 
Krum had also 
crossed the Carpathian Mountains, joined together the two 
Bulgarias, succeeded Cardam, and had established himself 
at Pliska. 
1 
All this must have awoken in Nicephorus concern about the 
future of the north-western provinces of Byzantium. Krum 
was in a position to challenge Byzantium's control of the 
Thracian lands. But perhaps more important was the question 
of who was going to control the Slavs. This was one of 
the key problems of the era. As is well known, they had 
spread widely and were occupying different districts 
extending from Cape Matapan to the Danube. The semi- 
autonomy they enjoyed allowed them to preserve a sense of 
a distinct identity, regardless of the race or place 
where their various tribes had settled. This became 
especially obvious at the turn of the eighth century and 
appears to have inspired the Slavs to seek for complete 
autonomy from the Byzantine Empire. They rose against 
Byzantine lordship in 799 with Acamer as their leader. 
1. On Pliska, see: I. Dujdev's observations in B. Z., 50 
(1957), p. S46; F. Dölger's observations in B. Z., 51 (1958) 
p. 485; V. Besevliev: 'Zur Geographie Nordost-Bulgariens 
in der Spätantike und im Mittelalter', in Linguistique 
balkanique, 4, (1962), pp. 57-80; S. Michailov, 
Pliska, die Haup§tadt des ersten BulgariscAien Reiches, 
Berlin 1960. 
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M. D. Graeber, by suggesting that 'Acamer was not breaking 
with Byzantium, but seeking a more influential role 
within the Empire', 
1 
presents a different opinion. 
However, a closer examination of the sources as well as 
more careful attention to the whole context and the 
framework of the circumstances surrounding it, would lead 
us to the conclusion that elements of Slavonic independence 
can be traced in Acamer's uprising too. They acted in 
the same way in 807 when they besieged Patras. Furthermore, 
from the anonymous author of a chronicle we hear that Slavs 
were recruited by Krum and fought against the imperial 
forces in Nicephorus' last and fatal battle of 811.2 In 
short, the Slavs were a race 'on whose fidelity no reliance 
could be placed'. 
3 It hardly needs to be emphasized that 
Byzantium always considered the Sclaveniae (the districts 
where the Slavs had settled) as Byzantine territory. it 
would seem that both, Nicephorus and Krum, were competing 
for control over the Slavs. The Byzantine Emperor would 
have liked very much to assimilate them and even to use them 
against the Bulgars, while Krum sought to enlarge his army 
by enrolling Slavs. He may also have envisaged the 
annexation of the Sclaveniae. If this was Nicephorus' 
assessment of Krum's plans, then the Byzantine Emperor's 
aggressive policy should not come as a surprise. The 
day by day enlargement of the new Bulgaria had to be checked. 
Bulgarian influence over the Slavs had also to be countered. 
The Emperor Nicephorus preferred to be accused of almost 
1. M. D. Graeber., The Role of the Slavs Within the Byzantine 
Empire, 500-1018, Rutgers University Ph. D. 1975, p. 92. 
2.1. Dujýev, 'La chronique byzantine de llan 8111, in T. M. J, 
(1965)lp. 212. 
3. J. B. Bury, E. R. E., p. 342. 
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anything but negligence of the threat from the Bulgars. 
The war against Charlemagne was more or less a matter of 
prestige. The Bulgars were a far more serious matter. 
Byzantine interests along the northern borders needed to 
be safeguarded. Therefore an expedition against Bulgaria 
would prove to be more or less a matter of time. 
In reference to the year that Nicephorus opened 
hostilities with the Empire's northern neighbours, one might 
be tempted to link Arabs and Bulgars by asking the simple 
question: Did the Byzantine Emperor only attack Bulgaria 
when he had secured his eastern frontier? Though the war 
against the Caliphate does not seem to have fully stopped 
before the death of Harun al-Rashid (809), hostilities along 
the eastern borders of Byzantium had apparently slowed 
down from the year 807. It is certainly of some interest 
to know that Theophanes does not record any clashes between 
the Byzantines and the Arabs during that particular year. 
Events which Arabic sources report as having taken place 
in 807., though of minor importance, are not, of course, 
totally insignificant. Nevertheless, although there is 
one source pointing to the. opposite conclusion, 
1 it seems 
rather unlikely that the Byzantine Emperor was personally 
involved in the war against the Arabs in 807. Now, if 
that fact is combined with the information, which we have 
from Theophanes, that in this year Nicephorus embarked upon 
an expedition against the Bulgars, 
2 
one might be entitled 
1. Kitab al-'Ugum, in Brooks (loc. cit. ), p-747. 
2. Theophanes 1, p. 482. Actually Nicephorus' campaign 
against the Bulgars is the only military event recorded 
by Theophanes under the year 6299 (Sept. 806-August 807). 
Keeping in mind that during the previous year the Emperor 
had occupied himself with the election of a new __ patriarch and mainly with the campaigns against Harun 
al-Rashid on the eastern front, we cannot date Nicephorus' 
expedition against the Bulgars earlier than the spring of 
807. 
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to argue that the Byzantine Emperor did not open 
hostilities with Krum before some kind of stability 
had been achieved along Byzantium's eastern borders. 
The Emperor Nicephorus soon discovered that there 
was opposition to his expedition against the Bulgars. The 
campaign was still at its very beginning. The Byzantine 
forces had only reached Adrianople, when the Emperor 
learnt that the troops were conspiring against him, 
Although Nicephorus managed to put the plot down, he did 
not proceed to his intended destination. The means he 
had used to cope with the conspirators were severe and, 
therefore, he could not expect the soldiers' morale to be 
high enough to fight against the Bulgars. Thus, he 
found it wiser to return to Constantinople. 
But, regardless of the end of the expedition, what was 
Nicephorus' real intention, when he started that campaign? 
Was it to provoke his rivals and force the two countries in 
a war with unknown consequences? It sounds a bit odd. 
It would be more reasonable to suppose that the Byzantine 
Emperor only wanted to use the expedition of 807, in order 
to demonstrate imperial strength, to visit the Byzantine 
garrisons along the northern frontiers and assure them about 
his support in the difficult times which might come. Such 
an expedition was not intended to provoke the Bulgars. It 
was more a matter of antic-ipating Bulgarian activity against 
the strong line of fortresses of which the key points were 
Develtus, Adrianople, Philippopolis and Sardica (the modern 
Bulgarian capital Sofia). 
1 Moreover, it appears that by 
setting out to invade Bulgaria in 807 the Emperor Nicephorus 
wanted to anticipate, or at least to eliminate, Bulgarian 
influence over the Slavs o, f the area. We are not told 
D. M. Lang, The Bulgarians (London 1976), p-51; 
S. Runciman, The First ... (2E. cit. ), p. 53. 
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whether or not Krum had it in mind to attack Byzantine 
territories, even before Nicephorus' initiative. One 
thing, nevertheless, becomes clear; a pretext for 
assault had now been given to him, if that was what he 
was waiting for. Surprisingly, the Khan does not seem to 
have reacted immediately. He needed some time, in order 
to assess the situation and to choose the route of his 
attack. Pliska, his capital, was situated quite close 
to the Black Sea and for this reason., perhaps, we would 
have expected Krum to adopt a route through Thrace for his 
attack against Byzantine territorie! -. But the semi- 
circular line of the fortresses the-e was too strong and 
thus Krum did not risk an assault against any of these 
garrisons or a march past them. 
However, it has to be emphasized that these fortresses 
had been built, in order to serve as a barrier against the 
Balkan Bulgars and. they had probably fulfilled this purpose 
so far. But by now, thanks to Krum, Bulgaria was no longer 
the little neighbouring country Byzantium used to know. 
It had grown in size and it had stretched into the western 
Balkans. This meant that it now possessed a much longer 
border with Byzantium, which Krum could probe for its weak 
points. I 
On his side Nicephorus seems to have been equally careful. 
He had realized that the Strymon valley might be used by 
Krum as a gate to the south and therefore, in order to 
defend the district against a possible attack through the 
valley, Nicephorus had transferred some men 
1 
there from 
the other themes, in order to help the local army to keep 
OF -T CL T c. L#TC)I mr xo vr es% 
') f 1. Theophanes (1,485) speaks about $- 
which in this case should be translated 'officers'. 
Needless, however, to say that it was military units 
and not only officers those who had joined the army of 
Strymon. 
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this approach closed to the Bulgars. There is no way 
of knowing whether 'the support of much of the Slav 
population' 
1 
was another factor which led the Khan to 
choose this route for his attack, as R. Browning believes. 
In any case, it looks as if Krum had already adopted a 
very effective war strategy., that of the sudden attack, 
and, at an unexpected time, he led his 'guerrillas' against 
the Byzantine units at Strymon. The attack was very 
successful for the Khan. The Bulgars defeated the 
Byzantine army, killing its strategos and many of his 
subordinates and taking with them 1100 pounds of gold, 
destined for the army pay (autumn 808), 
2 
as well as the 
baggage and perhaps the equipment of the local theme. In 
connection with this attack some points need to be made. 
First, it becomes obvious that Krum did not intend, at 
least at that time, to extend his territory. After the 
quick but very successful assault, he withdrew. It would 
seem that at this stage Krum did not have at his disposal as 
many soldiers as he needed for a real war against Byzantium. 
Therefore, he had probably already thought about recruiting 
soldiers among the Slavs.. For this purpose, as we shall 
see, he needed money and, therefore, his attack against the 
Byzantine army at the moment the soldiers at Strymon were 
going to have their pay given, was not perhaps a mere 
coincidence. That such a point of view is not groundless 
is demonstrated. by the anonymous author of the chronicle, 
who together with Theophanes refers to the Byzantine disaster 
of 811. The chronicler asserts that the Bulgars, before 
1. R. Browning, Byzantium and Bulgaria, (2p. cit. ), p. 49- 
2. J. B. Bury, (E. R. E. ), p. 340, was t first one to have dated 
that assault in 808, He seems to have given a good reason 
for his dating. It has to be noticed here that the attack 
of the Bulgars was successful, because it took the 
Byzantine army by surprise. However, the facts that 
people from the other themes were still there and that the 
soldiers had not been given their pay yet, but they were 
about to get it, do not allow us to adopt Runciman's dating 
'late in the winter, so late that no attack seemed likely' 
(S. Runciman, The First... a. cit., p. 53). 
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launching their sudden and successful attack against the 
imperial army, had recruited Avars and Slavs. The Greek 
word tA t (a 9 vi (*CX1t&&Vc; 1( used in this occasion implies 
any sort of payment, i. e. wages, salaries, etc., and that 
payment, of course, needed to be made in cash. That 
would lead us to the conclusion that, although the Bulgarian 
economy in itself had little place for money, there were 
cases in which Krum probably needed cash. Apart from the 
recruitment or perhaps the temporary employment of soldiers 
from among the Slavs, money might have been needed for 
another purpose too: taking it for granted that Krum had 
decided to achieve something against Byzantium, then he 
would have to start capturing cities and fortresses; in 
order to do this he would need siege engines and to acquire 
these he needed ready cash. Furthermore Krum would have 
needed money in order to pay the craftsmen who were about 
to design or to build the siege engines. One can assume 
that these craftsmen were not of Bulgarian origin. 
Theophanes records the case of a certain Euthymius or 
Eumathius, of Arabic origin, who was an expert in siege 
engines. According to the chronicler, Euthymius having 
become a Christian was recruited; oito the Byzantine army under 
the Emperor Nicephorus. 2 If we believe Theophanes, then 
it was the Emperor's meanness which forced Euthymius to go 
over to the Bulgars. We find him playing an important role 
in the capture of Mesembria by Krum in 812.3 
The second point arises from a more careful examination 
of Theophanes' account of the people who were killed by the 
Bulgars at Strymon. The chronicler, who is our only source, 
states that Krum massacred many people (inoý%)v XeLc/q 
1.1. Dujcev, "La chronique... "(loc. cit. ), p-212. 
2. Theophanes 1, p-498- 
3. ibid. 
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without making any distinction between soldiers and 
civilians. The word w of course, does have 
a general meaning and covers both categories of people. 
It is, however, of interest to see that the same chronicler, 
recording the capture of Sardica by the Khan, which happened 
only a few months later, and referring to the people, who 
again were killed by the Bulgars, does not use the general 
word Cx o5 but the more specific ones 6rp(xTE*V"jAO(Tc[ 
w ý4 a'( V Ot, (Roman army) We cannot, of course, take this 
slight difference of terminology in the record of 
Theophanes as an indication that Krum, during his assault 
at Strymon, killed mainly civilians rather than solders, 
but it appears very likely that a number of governmental 
officials were included among Krum's victims. Theophanes' 
description is very precise at this point. He 
differentiates between the soldiers and the lower civilian 
officials of the theme (ý at fa s), its higher dignitaries 
(OL(>Y-OVTC-S) 1 and the officers (Tcxjc/xTO% 'o/CF>Y-OVTC-C) 
of the army, which had been sent from the rest of the themes, 
in order to secure the Byzantine control of the area. 
2 
But Theophanes' rather exact description goes into more 
details and seems to be of further significance. The 
chronicler asserts that the strategos himself - we are 
not told of which theme - was among those killed by the 
Bulgars. 3 All these can be taken to mean that the area 
of Strymon had concentrated the Emperor Nicephorus' 
attention and as we have already seen the valley of Strymon 
1. For the internal structure of the themes see J-B. Bury: 
Imperial Administrative System... (2E. cit. ), pp-36-119- 
2. The presence at Strymon of an army, which perhaps 
belonged to other themes, should not be confused with 
the transfer of people from other themes into this area, 
which had not yet taken place. 
3. Theophanes 1,485. 
296 
formed an independent military unit, probably a Kleisoura 
as early as the reign of Justinian 11, (685-695). 
Nicephorus was clearly aware of the strategic impoiIance 
of the region. Vatitej 
The success of the Khan ivi gave him self - 
confidence. The Byzantine army was not, after all, 
invincible. Nevertheless, at this stage Krum was not 
concerned about annexing other provinces to his-kingdom, 
since Bulgaria at that time was large enough for its 
population. He tried to strengl4en and secure Bulgaria 
rather than extend it. However, it hardly needs to be 
said, that at the same time Krum was very keen on causing 
some more damage-to the Byzantine army. Therefore the 
Khan thought about another place, against which he could 
launch his second attack. The further away from 
Gonstantiniople this place would be, the better for Krum, 
since it would have been more difficult for the Byzantine 
army to send help. Sardica was one of the four fortresses, 
which formed a barrier against Bulgarian invasions in the 
south and south-west. 
1 S. Runciman suggeststhat they had 
all been refurbished by Constantine Copronymus. 
2 Krum 
did not risk a march southwards past these fortresses, but 
early in the spring of 809, before Easter, 
3 he marched against 
Sardica 'which seems at this time to have been the most 
northerly outpost of the Empire towards the Danube'. 
4 
The details of the attack are mostly unknown, but it looks 
as if Krum surrounded the city with his army and besieged it. 
1. For the other three, cf. above, p-292. 
2. S. Runciman, The First ... (op. cit. ), p-53- 3. Theophanes de Boor, 1,485; Bonn 1,753. 
4. Bury, E. R. E., p. 341. See-ýalso R-Browning (Byzantium,.. 
io* cit., p-49) where the author infers that among the Eou-r--Tortresses
of the line mentioned above, Sardica 
was the principal one. 
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We are not told anything about the period of that siege, 
but it does not seem to have been a long one. The Khan, 
realizing that the fortress was too strong to be taken by 
assault, employed fraud and deceit' and thus managed to 
conquer the place. The slaughter which followed was even 
worse than the one at Strymon a few months previously. 
Theophanes records that a total number of six thousand 
soldiers were killed, plus a certain number of civilians, 
It seems that Sardica had been an 'irritant' in Krum's 
eyes and thus he now wanted to get rid of it once and for 
all. The fortifications were destroyed and the town itself 
was probably burned. 
2 
When the government in Constantinople was informed 
about the events at SaAca, it was already too late. 
3 
4 Nevertheless, Nicephorus acted immediately. On Tuesday 
before Easter (April 3) the Emperor left the capital very 
determined to punish the Bulgars. Whether Nicephorus 
had been preparing a campaign against the Bulgars,, already 
before the events at Sardica, is something we are not told. 
Judging, however, from the Emperor's immediate reaction to 
the bad news, such an interpretation does not seem to be 
totally unfounded. After all, because of the winter, 
Byzantium could not respond any earlier to the blow against 
the Empire delivered by the Bulgars at Strymon. Furthermore, 
f 1.6 1 OP 
1- Theophanes 11485, : "... 3colly KCx 
2. Bury, E. R. E. 
J. p. 
341. 
3. This makes us believe that the siege of the town was 
very short, so short that no help could reach them, 
either from Constantiniple itself, or from a nearby 
fortress, let us say Phillippopolis. 
4. Runciman (The First..., p* 53) says Thursday, but 
OL Theophanes, by saying"-, rý%, ' T9% A%Aeptý GTO %A " 610.1 
r*w'Tv-%v%cP, 3 neigauslis specific enough. Furthermore, if 
it was Thursday, then Nicephorus would not have had 
enough time to reach Pliska before or at Easter day, as 
he finally did (Theophanes 1,485). Even five days 
(from Tuesday to Sunday) seem to be a very short time 
for covering the distance between the two capitals. 
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the prestige of the Empire and of the Emperor was at 
stake, so that Nicephorus could not have remained 
indifferent to such a disaster. It would seem that, 
before leaving the capital, Nicephorus already knew about 
Sardica, not only about its siege, but about its 
destruction too. Therefore, there was no need for him 
to march towards the north-west; nothing was left to 
be saved there. Thus, he made his way northwards, towards 
Pliska, Krum's capital. Nicephorus did not choose this 
route only because he was aiming at a pure counter-attack. 
A transfer of the main scene of the operations to Thrace 
was considered to be of great advantage for Byzantium, not 
only because the Byzantine line of the outposts there was 
much stronger, but also and mainly because the Byzantine 
fleet could sail northwards along the coasts of the Black 
Sea and give its support and help to supply the fighting 
army. The Emperor wanted to arrive at Pliska, 
1 before 
Krum's return from Sardica. As he did not come across 
any resistance, it did not take him long to reach the 
Bulgarian capital and as the city seems to have been 
almost undefended, the Byzantine Emperor celebrated Easter 
at the court of the Bulgarian Khan. 
2 Nicephorus plundered 
1. Surprisingly Browning (Byzantium... 2R-cit- p. 49) dates 
this expedition in the autumn of 809, probably by mistake. 
2, Theophanes 1,485. For this event see F. Dvornik, Les 
Slaves Byzance et Rome au. IXe siecle (Paris 1926), p. 36, 
ere the author interprets Theophanes' account in a way 
that, I am sure, would have delighted Theophanes himself. 
F. Dvornik, following Theophanes, argues that Nicephorus 
was lying, when he sent a message to Constantinople, letting 
the senate know about his success at Pliska. Moreover 
Dvornik speaks about a certain defeat of Nicephorus by 
Krum, somewhere near Pliska, an account, however, which is 
definitely not reported by any source. If such a defeat 
had taken place, Theophanes would not have hesitated to 
exploit it for further decrying of Nicephorus. J. B. Bury 
(E. R. E., p. 341, note) is of exactly the opposite opinion 
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the city and was about to proceed to Sardica, determined 
to rebuild the fortress. At that time a few survivors 
from Sardicals garrison came to join the main imperial 
forces. The Emperor., however, did not welcome them; 
on the contrary, he threatened to punish them and refused 
to accept the survivors' apologies. As a result, scared 
by the Emperor's threat ancLstubborness, they went over to 
the Bulgars. 
1 Theophanes, who criticizes the Emperor 
this time for his lack of consideration and foresight, C> 
mentions especially a certain Spatharius Eumathius, 
2 
whose 
knowledge on mechanics and warfare was to be properly 
exploited by the Bulgars in the years to come. In any case 
to that of Dvornik, and S. Runciman (The First..., p-54, 
note) has given a good explanation why Bury is right. 
Both Bury and Runciman see a certain malevolence in 
Theophanes' casting doubt on Nicephorus' arrival at Pliska. 
However, regardless of Theophanes' bias against Nicephorus, 
one might be entitled to argue that in this very case the 
chronicler's report can be justified. He says (1, p-485) 
that the Emperor left the capital on Tuesday of Holy Week 
and perhaps in his calculation the distance between 
Constantinople and Pliska was too long to be covered in 
five days by a campaigning army. We do not know where 
exactly the then Bulgarian capital was located, but 
S. Runciman (The First...., p. 56-, note) estimates the 
distance between Marcellae and Pliska to some seventy miles. 
To these, of course, the distance between Constantinople 
and Marcellae, which does not seem to have been shorter, 
must be added. 
1. Nicephorus' indignation was partly justified by the grief 
he felt as a consequence of the disaster at Sardica, 
but what made him even more angry was the way in which the 
fortress fell into the hands of Krum. The Emperor must 
have felt that, under normal circumstances, a garrison of 
6,000 men could have defended a well constructed fortress 
for a few days, until the main forces would have arrived 
from Constantinople. Whether, however, these men who 
survived the attack were to be blamed for the fall of 
Sardica, remains, of course, very doubtful. 
2. Theophanes de Boor 1, p. 485. See, however, Bonn ed. 1, 
p-7S3, where the Spatharius is given the name 
Euthymius. 
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this whole event was not considered by Nicephorus 
significant enough the alter his original plan and thus 
he marched directly towards Sardica. Surprisingly, the 
two armies failed to meet each other somewhere between 
Pliska and Sardica. A possible explanation for this is 
that Krum's army was probably very much outnumbered by 
the Byzantine forces and thus the Khan carefully avoided 
meeting Nicephorus at this stage. This does not mean 
that Nicephorus' task of rebuilding the place became easier. 
The soldiers' negative reaction to his plans has already 
been discussed at length. They refused to co-operate., so 
that the Emperor did not finally have Sardica rebuilt. He 
returned to Constantinople to punish the ringleaders of 
the protest. 
The two-year period from May 809 to May 811 was a quiet 
one, at least as far as the Byzantine-Bulgar relations are 
concerned. No conflicts between Byzantium and its northern 
neighbours are mentioned during this time. Whether the 
lack of events was the result of a mere coincidence or of 
some agreement between the two sides, we are not told., 
Nevertheless, a hint that a peace treaty or a truce was 
1 made is provided by. a Greek-Bulgarian inscription. it 
records that by resuming the war against the Bulgars in 811, 
Nicephorus failed to keep the oaths he had taken 
C. PI ("_TOVS ()fPKOV-S However., no matter how 
reliable the inscription itself is, the lack of support from 
1. The inscription was found in Hambarly (Kazyl or Kyzyl- 
Agatch) and was firstly published by the brothers Skorpil 
in the: Archdol. ogisch-epigraphische Mitteilungen aus 
Osterreich - Ungarn, 1892, pp. 98-99. On the importance 
and the period to which the inscription refers, see: 
H. Gr6goire, 'Llempereur Nicephore le Chauve et Kroum 
11premier" de Bulgariel, in Bulletin de la Classe des 
Lettres de l'Academie de Be , 20 (1935), pp. 261-72. .L 
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another source, hardly allows us to put forward such a 
theory. If a peace treaty or a truce had been agreed 
between the two rivals, then Theophanes would have been 
the first one to know about it and he certainly would not 
have missed an opportunity to criticize Nicephorus for his 
untrustworthiness. 
Unfortunately we have little information concerning 
Krum's activities during these two years. He was probably 
given the time to rebuild Pliska, to organize his country 
better and to provide it with legislation-' For his 
part Nicephorus, d-iring the two years 809-811, dedicated 
himself almost com)letely to the Balkan affairs. It was 
during this time (vvinter 809-810) that the Emperor ordered 
the transfer of population from the rest of the themes into 
the Sclaveniae. The many-sided considerations behind that 
2 transfer have been stressed elsewhere. Here only one 
general comment need be made: that transfer was designed 
to serve the imperial interests equally against Slavic 
and against Bulgarian aspirations. 
Meanwhile Nicephorus prepared the expedition of his life. 
Determined to crush the Bulgarian power once and for all, 
he created a huge army. The eastern borders of the Empire 
1. For Krum's legislation see Suidas (ed. Ada Adler) 1, 
pp-483-84; the author records that after having 
destroyed the nation of the Avars, Krum asked a few 
prisoners who had survived the destruction, what had been, 
according to their opinion, the cause of their complete 
defeat. Their reply numbered several reasons: First 
of all the hatred between each other, secondly the 
collusion between the thieves and the judges, thirdly 
drunkenness, then bribery and lastly venality in the 
commerce, which turned them against each other. The 
author reports that after that, Krum aimed at legislation 
which would protect his people from all these malignities, 
which had killed the Avars. (See also G. Kazarow: 'Die 
Gesetzgebung des bulgarisc4en Fürsten Krum', in B. Z., 
XVI (1907), pp. 254-57). 
2. On this measure see the chapter on domestic polcies, 
section under the title: Reconquest of Greece, pp. 129-37. 
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had been quiet since 807. In addition to this, the 
death of Harun al-Rashid (809) and the battle for the 
succession among his sons, gave the Byzantine Emperor an 
excellent chance of bringing Asiatic forces into Europe. 
The army of the Anatolikon theme with Romanus as their 
strategos certainly participated in the expedition, 
2 
and 
it is possible that the Armeniac theme forces were also 
available. 
3 Theophanes gives us the impression that 
Nicephorus even forced poor people to provide themselves 
with some very basic army equipment, such as sticks and 
slings 
4 
and to join the army, but there must be a lot of 
exaggeration in the chronicler's words. This is, perhaps, 
another 'edition' of the so-called second 'vexation', 
recorded by Theophanes elsewhere. 
5 
From a second source, which covers only the expedition 
of Nicephorus in the year 811, we hear that teenage sons of 
the archons,, those who had reached the age of fifteen, 
participated in the campaign, in the ranks of the Hikanatoi., 
a bodyguard for the Emperor's son Stauracius. 
6 The 
Emperor's third grandson Nicetas, the future patriarch 
Ignatius, though only ten years old at that time, had been 
enrolled in the same body and had been appointed by his 
grandfather as their domestic, 
7 but it does not become clear 
1. M. Canard, 'Byzantium and the Muslim World to the Middle 
of the Eleventh Century' in C-M H., 4, pt. 1, p-708. 
See, however, Theophanes (1,489), where an episode 
between Leo, the strategos of the Armeniac theme and 
future Emperor Leo V and the Arabs, is recorded. On 
that incident, see above, the section on the Arabs, p. 281. 
2. Theophanes 1,491 
3. Bury, E. R. E., (op: cit. ), p-343- 
4. Theophanes 1,490: ýI-rotbevcIoNcLis Kot'i p&OWS wn 6f A 6"Vo V I"@' 
S. ibid., p. 486. 
6. T--Dujýev, 'La chronique ... (loc. cit. ), p-210. T. His life, by Nicetas - David Paphlagon, in Migne, 
P. G..? 105, col. 489. 
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from the texts whether or not he took part in the 
expedition. Nicetas' father, however, the Emperor's 
son-in-law and future Emperor Michael I, was certainly 
present. 
1 
Unfortunately, as far as Nicephorus' forces are 
concerned, we are not given any numbers. The only thing 
that we can be sure of, is that they certainly outnumbered 
Krum's army. 
Some time in May 811, Nicephorus left the capital, full 
of self-confidence. We do not know the exact route the 
Emperor followed, but he surely marched through Thrace. 
While the Byzantine army was at Marcellae,, on the 
frontiers, 2 two events happened. The first was the appeal 
of Krum for peace., But it was revenge and victory that 
Nicephorus was seeking. Thus he totally rejected any 
proposal for peace. He had, of course, his reasons for 
believing that no reliance could be placed on Krum's words. 
The second event, which according to Theophanes was 
considered as a bad omen for Nicephorus, was the desertion 
of the Emperor's faithful servant Byzantius, who went over 
to Krum, taking with him 100 pounds of gold and an imperial 
3 
costume. At first sightP this might be seen as a plot 
against Nicephorus from within his own household. However, 
as the desertion of Byzantius seems to have been an isolated 
occurrence, not matched by other events, such a conclusion 
would be going beyond the evidence. 
Theophanes gives us July 20th as the date when 
Nicephorus crossed the borders and entered Bulgaria. 
4 
1.1. Duj8ev: 'La chronique... I(loc. Sit. ), p. 210. 
2. An approximate location of Marcellae is provided by the 
Patriarch Nicephorus in his Opuscula Historica, ed. 
de Boor (Lipsiae 1880), p-66, where it reads"cj: oF*IU'q, Oq '0, "TO; J, TC) INXVN6%C-'(WTC)LTCL 
See also Theophanes 1, p. 470. 
3. Theophanes 1,490. 
4. ibid. 
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However, keeping in mind that the crucial battle, 
according to the same chronicler, took place on the 26th 
of the same month, we believe that Theophanes must be 
somewhat inaccurate: the Emperor left the capital in May 
and by the time he reached Marcellae had covered roughly 
two thirds of the distance between Constantinople and Pliska. 
If Nicephorus, though marching through his own territory, 
spend about two months to cover that distance, it seems 
unlikely that everything after that happened in so few 
(six! ) days. 2 Furthermore the fact that, after the capture 
of his capital, 
3 
Krum found time to employ", 44MFOVS Kcx-% 74ýks Tl(-- 
? if 7v(A(Av%v%"cx!: confirms that Theophanes has given us the 
wrong date for the Emperor's entry into Bulgaria. As 
I. Dujýev has pointed out, it is most probable that 
Nicephorus left Marcellae sometime in June 
4 
or in early 
July, so that he had enough time to choose his route through 
a hostile country. 
5 What was the route? Theophanes 
records that the 'bragging coward' of an emperor (that is 
to say Nicephorus) followed a risky way through virtually 
impassable places. This may be taken to mean that at 
least at this, still early stage of his expedition, 
1. See also I. Dujýev, 'La chronique... 'p-212, where the 
23rd of July is given as the date of the disaster. 
2. S. Runciman (The First..., p. 56, note) assumes that the 
20th of July is in fact the date when Nicephorus entered 
the Bulgarian capital and not the date when he passed the 
frontiers, as Theophanes records. Bury (E. R. E., p-343) 
is almost of the same opinion, by suggesting that 'on the 
20th of July the Romans approached the capital of Krum'. 
3.1. Dujýev, 'La chronique... ' p-212. 
4. It is very likely that we are faced here with a mistake 
made in the copying of Theophanes; in other words, one 
of the copyists might have copied an A instead of an V 
and thus we are given "I co \. ) \, "c)u instead of 
conjectural, though possible. 
S. I. Dujýev, 'La chronique ... 1, p-221. 
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Nicephorus was forced to make detours, in order to avoid 
traps. If he had not, Krum would probably have attacked 
the imperial army much earlier than he actually did. 
Our sources do not make it clear, where the Bulgars 
provided their first opposition to the invaders. We are 
not told how close to the Bulgarian capital 'the first 
conflicts'. 
1 
mentioned by Theophanes, took place. In any 
case, since his appeal for peace at Marcellae had been 
rejected, Krum probably made his plans. We would expect 
him to have compared the numbers of his troops with those 
of the imperial army and to have found himself in a very 
weak position. More importantly, defensive war did not 
fit the Bulgars of Krum at all. From what we have seen so 
far, (e. g. at Strymon and Sardica) Krum had organized and 
trained his soldiers mainly for offensive war. Therefore, 
it is very likely that the Khan himself with the main part 
of his army did not oppose Nicephorus' invasion. Whether 
frightened or acting deliberately, 
2 he fleJ to the mountains. 
Before doing so, Krum left some of his forces behind with 
the aim of hindering Nicephorus' progress towards the 
interior of Bulgaria and of defending Pliska. 
3 The two 
sources which mention the troops do not differ much in the 
numbers they give us: the anonymous chronicler estimates 
the soldiers to have been not more than twelve thousand 
1, / vj J7 %"' Jt 
4 
cx )c k OIL e-cw C, % while the anonymous 
hagiographer of St. Nicolas raises the number up to 
1. Theophanes 1,490: " (Aerm TCX. S IQI? %LTOL S6 %J ýA 0 
This can be taken as an indication that other conflicts 
followed. 
2. The anonymous chronicler (I. Dujývec, 'La chronique... ' 
loc-cit. p. 210) says 'deliberately' , 
"J-j-s (7%T9tv 
VGVO% dLV'T%6-1ýj'%J(XI" I as if they could not provide any opposition') 
3. Theophanes (1,490) does not speak directly about such a 
garrison, but we can infer it from his words, concerning 
a victory of Nicephorus*OZj Tý, J 14Cff(-VO70; VVI GI-Z' Ta TAS v' ý/ extbev% C 'J'I 
See also Krum's appeal to Nicephorus, 
ýhile the latter was 
at Pliska: 'Look, you have conquered. Take everything 
that pleases you, and go in peace'. 
4.1. Dujýev, ILa chronique.,. '(loc. cit. ), p-210. 
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, fifteen thousand, perhaps more, perhaps fewer'. 
1 Though 
not stated categorically, it would appear that these 
'selected' 2 soldiers were left by Krum in order to garrison 
Pliska. Judging from what finally happened, one might be 
allowed to say that this garrison was deliberately 
sacrificed by Krum. As they did not have any chance 
against the obviously much 
4 
larger forces of Nicephorus, 
they were killed to a man. Were these twelve or fifteen 
thousand Bulgarian soldiers the only ones whom Nicephorus 
came up against? The anonymous chronicler speaks of 
another fifty thousand, whom the Byzantine forces also beat 
and killed. 
5 1. Dujýev takes it for granted that the 
anonymous chronicler is right and assumes that Krum had 
organized two zones of defence: the first one (12,000- 
15,000 men) was put somewhere in the narrow passes 
and the second (50,000 men of slightly fewer) had undertaken 
the task of saving the capital itself. 
6 However., 
Dujýevls reconstructions seem to be a bit hypothetical. 
The number of fifty thousand men is too impressive to be 
adopted as precise. It may only be a way of suggesting 
that,, once installed at Pliska, the Byzantines carried out 
some mopping up operations in the neighbourhood, the scope 
of which was grossly exaggerated. At any rate, either at 
Pliska itself or iq its surrounds, Krum appears to have 
lost a considerable number of soldiers. This explains 
L. Clugnet, 'Histoire de S. Nicolas, soldat et moine' 
(three versions), in Revue d'Orient Chretien', 7 (1902)p 
p. 325. The main aim of the Vita is not., oF course, to 
give us details about Bulgar- yzantine conflicts, but to 
stress the point that the Saint, he alone, was saved 
from the disaster of 811, because three times he resisted 
some womants advances. 
2.1. Dujýev, ILa chronique ... I (loc. cit. ), p-210. 3. ibid. " )o I 4*VACr-%kAI-j -ruý T6,10vl 
4.1 i-d- 
S. ibid. 
6. ibid., P? -225-26- 
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perhaps the desperate situation, the Khan was faced with. 
In his effort to gather some forces for his final assault - 
still to follow - Krum is reported to have asked for help 
even from women, whom he equipped as soldi. ers. 
1 
In regard to the plundering which followed the capture 
of Pliska, a difference in the accounts provided by our 
two main sources, should not be allowed to go unnoticed. 
Theophanes records that the Emperor locked up Krum's 
treasure aiming at keeping everything for himself. 
2 The 
anonymous chronicler, however, says almost exactly the 
opposite. According to this more reliable source, the 
Emperor found much booty, and started sharing it out 
among his soldiers. A list was even kept of the articles 
and the money given to each of them. 
3 Although this 
detail is out of keeping with Nicephorus' famed stinginess, 
reported by the same source too later on, 
4 it would seem 
that, whether he liked it or not, Nicephorus had this time 
to give the booty to his soldiers. What had happened two 
years previously at Sardica, 
5 taught the Emperor a lesson: 
that he had to be more generous to his soldiers than he used 
to be,, at least in regard to their rights to booty, 
We are not told how many days Nicephorus stayed at Pliska. 
The anonymous chronicler implies that it was his intention 
to build a city there, to which he wanted to give his name. 
Theophanes records that Krum made another appeal to 
Nicephorus, this time for a peaceful withdrawal. 
6 The 
1.1. Dujýev, 'La chronique... ' (loc. cit. ), p. 212. 
2. Theophanes 1,490. 
3.1. Dujýev, ILa chronique... ' (loc. cit. ), p-212. Another 
difference, this time between the account given by the 
anonymous author of -Ehe chronicle and what we. read in the 
Suidas dictionary about Krum's legislation, might also be 
spotted. According to the first source, Nicephorus found 
Krum's storehouses full of wine,. although according to the 
latter, the consumgion of wine is supposed to have been 
prohibited by the han (even the plantation ofvines was 
forbidden) after he destroyed the Avars. (On this cf. 
above, in this section P: 303 note 1). 4.1. Dujýev 
1, 
ILa chronique .. (loc - cit. p- 216: "ýA i (? oA*Avs 
T(r VcX-t do%X4ftjeaS KcLoW %5ne-ef6oXAv. % 
5. On that event cf. above, pp. 108-10. 
6. For Krum's words, see above, p. 306, note 3. 
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appeal was, of course, rejected. Both sources state 
that Nicephorus was overtaken by his pride. In the 
meantime discipline among the army was very loose. 
Nicephorus probably reached the false conclusion that he 
had destroyed the whole Bulgarian army and consequently 
1 that there would be no more resistance against his lordship. 
Nevertheless, whatever Nicaphorus' estimations were, a 
certain lack of basic precautions on the part of the imperial 
army has to be stressed. Therefore Krum started being 
hopeful of having another chance to attack the Byzantine 
army. The vital thing was that a part of the Bulgarian 
forces was still safe and ready to act under more auspicious 
circumstances. Moreover, while Nicephorus was plundering 
Krum's palace (x the Khan was enlarging his army 
by recruiting Avars and Slavs. 
Finally, sometime between the 23rd and 26th July, the 
Emperor decided to leave Pliska. Before leaving, however, 
he burned the whole city which was probably made of wood. 
3 
We cannot be sure whether Nicephorus left Pliska with the 
intention of marching towards Sardica or simply to return 
to Constantinople. One of the sources at our disposal 
speaks of the first possibi . lity. 
4 Perhaps he wanted to 
go there, in order to rebuild the city-fortress, a task 
which had remained unfinished since his visit there two 
years earlier in 809.5 But then, it is well known that the 
imperial forces, shortly after their departure from Pliska, 
were trapped in a narrow pass and no defile can be spotted 
1. 1. Dujýev, ' , La chronique... Lt. )., p. 212'. 
av 0 1, & ( ' (loc.. Si 6af 19-TI EV n ix-famV -r"' V 2. ibid. 
3. ibid.; J. B. Bury, E. R. E., p. 343. 
4. 1. Dujýev, ' La chronique... ' (loc. cit. ), p. 212- 
5. On this, see above, in this section p. 301. 
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on the road from Pliska to Sardica, which at least at that 
time went along the northerlside of the Haemus-Balkan 
Mountains and through Nicopolisj, on the south bank of the 
Danube. 1 Furthermore, one needs to remember that 
Nicephorus left Constantinople some time in May 
2 
and this, 
of course, means that by the end of July he had already 
been away from the capital for more than two months. it 
hardly needs to be emphasized that such a period of 
absence from Constantinople might be considered as too 
long from an emperor, who appears to have been always 
afraid of plots which might be hatched against him at any 
time. Finally a possibility that Nicephorus would have 
liked to celebrate his great victory over the Bulgars in the 
Byzantine capital itself, cannot be overlooked. Therefore, 
it seems more reasonable to suggest that the imperial 
forces made their way back to Constantinople. But it is 
well known that not long after he had left Pliska, 
Nicephorus fell victim to a well organised counter attack 
by the Bulgars. Whether the Byzantine soldiers set out 
in pursuit of the Bulgarian army or simply to return to 
Constantinople we are not told. It is more likely that 
Nicephorus did not follow the Bulgars who had escaped in 
the mountains, but was trapped by them on his return journey. 
3 
The exact place where the Byzantine army was encircled 
by the Bulgars cannot be precisely located. Among those 
who have tried to, 
4 S. Nedev seems to have given good 
1-S. Nedev, 'Razgromut a Nikofor i Genik_prez 811 g' -, in Voenno-Istoric6ski Sbornik.. 46 (1977), W"The article is in 
Bulgarian, but Mirs B. Strewe from the Slavic department 
of Hamburg Vniversity translated it for me into German. 
To her I am indebted. 
2. Theophanes 1, p. 489- 
3. R. Browning, Byzantium, (22. cit. ), p-49- 
4. The Pass of Verbitsa as the actual battlefield has been 
adopted by J. B. Bury (E. R. E., p-344) and S. Runciman (The 
First..., p. 57 note); C. Jirecek (Geschichte der 
Bulgaren,, Prague 1876, pp. 45-6 and Die Heerstraýe von 
Beograd nach Konstantinopel 
', 
Prague 1877, pp-149-50) 
assumed that the battle took place at the Pass of Veregave, 
while F. Dvornik (Les Slaves, Byzance et Rome au IX 
siýcle, Paris 1926, p-37) suggested the plain between 
Karnobat and Sumen. 
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reasons why the clash must have taken place in the 
Veselinovsky Pass, i. e. in the narrow place, through which 
the road from Kulnovo to VeselivIovo passes. 
1 St. Nedev 
has visited the area, produced two relatively convincing 
maps and his description of the place fits very well into 
what our two main sources have to say about the location 
of the disaster. The anonymous chronicer, for example, 
describes the pass as being so narrow at one of its ends 
that the Bulgars blocked it simply by wooden palisades. 
He also tells us that -a-river ran. along the 
bottom of the 
defile. The place that best corresponds to this 
description is to be found just to the east of Smiadovo, 
where the stream Brestova joins the river CamLja. (See 
map on page 313. ) 
By the time that the Byzantine army entered the defile, 
the Bulgars had already blocked its south exit, which 
is much narrower than the northern one. When Nicephorus 
realized the desperate situation in which he had put the 
imperial army, it was already too late to save the day. 
He is reported to have said: 'Had we had wings, we 
could not have escaped complete destruction'. 
2 But the 
Bulgars had prepared another surprise for the Byzantine 
army: a night attack launched on the 26th July. 
3 Theophanes 
records that it was Saturday 
4 
night and this means that it 
was the night from Friday to Saturday. S. Runciman assumes 
that the great battle took place on the 26th/27thS which 
1. St. Nedev, 'Razgromut... ' (loc. cit. ), p. 127. 
2. Theophanes 1,490. 
3. The anonymous chronicler (I. Dujýev, 'La chronique... ' 
loc-cit. p-212) dates it on the 23rd and F. Dvornic 
(Les Slaves... 
. 
2. p. cit. p-37) on the 25th July. Most of 
the modern historians, however, have adopted the date 
provided by Theophanes, i. e. the 26th. After all, the 
26th was a Saturday. Therefore the anonymous chronicler 
by suggesting that the great battle took place on the 
23rd 'which was Saturday', is mistaken. 
4. Theophanes 1,49l: `T4, vvv<-w', ro5J 
S. S. Runciman, The First..., p-S6, note. 
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is the Saturday-Sunday night. But if that was the case, 
then Theophanes would have said `T; vvwy'.. tK up% cL vc i; ss' 
VU KT "-T %";, "6 and not "70 -u simply because 
the Byzantine day started in the evening (at six o'clock 
in the evening). Furthermore, that it was Saturday 
morning is stated by our anonymous chronicler too: 
CX 4ý 0( V C, VT4: 0 S ro Ot 0 ttý 
The Byzantines did not expect an assault before dawn. 
2 
Unfortunately the details of the attack and of the massacre 
which followed, escape us. According to the anonymous 
narration, which is at this point more detailed than the one 
by Theophanes, not all the thematic armies were faced with 
the attack of the enemies. On the contrary, encamped at 
a certain distance from each other, they did not even 
notice that another part of the army was under attack. The 
Bulgars had reconnoitred the area the day before. Thus, 
not surprisingly, it was the forces around the Emperor, 
3 
which were attacked by the heathen. The men around 
Nicephorus managed to defend themselves for a while, but 
were soon overcome and finally massacred. Nicephorus 
himself was killed and Stauracius gravely wounded. 
According to the same source, news of this disaster prompted 
the rest of the army to flee. On their way to escape they 
soon encountered a muddy river. The river was at the 
beginning-not passable, but after a while it was filled up 
with drowned Byzantine soldiers and horses. These bodies Y%ow 
made mm the river easy to be crossed by the rest of the 
army! 
1.1. Dujýev, 'La chronique... ' (loc. cit. ), p. 212. 
2- Theophan es1, p-491: JE -T ý.; s %ý %A 0 3. Anonymou sc it p. 2 14: tA O%j T-o tc %0 V 
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However, for the majority of them, the safe crossing 
over the river did not mean anything. They reached the 
exits of the defile, but these exits had been blocked 
by strong wooden fortifications. 
1A 
number of soldiers 
who managed to climb the fence and throw themselves to 
the other side broke their limbs, some of them died 
instantly, while others, being unable to walk far away, 
died from thirst and starvation. At a certain time., the 
wooden palisades were set on fire and thus the escape 
became even more difficult.. From the detailed way, in 
which our anonymous source has recorded the event, it 
becomes clear that most deaths were caused by the confusion 
and the panic which followed the Bulgarian attack. 
Theophanes provides us with a list of names of those 
prominent people, who did not escape death. Among them 
there were the patri clans Aetius, Peter, Sisinius 
Triphy1hus, Theodosius Salibaras, Romanus, the strateg'os 
of Anatolikon theme 
2 
and the eparch of the capital, a 
patrician who is not named. 
3 
Unfortunately none of our sources which cover the fatal 
battle, provides us with numbers of survivors. There can 
not have been many. Among them there were the next two 
emperors, Stauracius and Michael Rangabe, the first one 
though severely wounded. 
1. It is not clear whether both the exists of the defile had 
been built, or only one, while the second was kept by 
Bulgarian soldiers. 
2. For the careers and the posts held by these patricians 
see R. Guilland, 'Contribution a la prosopographie.. 
les patrices', (loc. cit. ), pp. 317-360. 
3. It is surprising that even the eparch of Constantinople 
participated in this expedition; for according to the 
document fp'% Tt: Z; %4 .4 aL 6 -- A% v- ; j- %J -ro- ý%X %' w v'O 
(De Cerimoniis, 1, p. 503) the city eparch was one of the 
three dignitaries who acted on behalf of the emperor 
during his absence from the capital. The other two were 
the praepositus and the magister. The eparch's 
participation in the campaign of 811 can be considered as 
another indication that the Emperor Nicephorus was 
probably terrified of plots against him hatched in the 
capital while he was away. 
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Apart from the complete massacre of the Byzantine 
army, the imperial prestige was gravely shaken too. Since 
the year 378, no Roman emperor had fallen in battle. Krum 
exploited Nicephorus' death in a rather barbaric way: he 
decapitated the corpse and exposed the Emperor's head 
on a stake. After a few days the skull was covered with 
Ae, 
silver and Khan used in for toasts with his boyars. 
The relic of the Byzantine army reached Adrianople, 
where the heavily wounded Stauracius was proclaimed emperor 
by the Patrician and Domestic of the Schools Stephen. 
1 
Stauracius spoke to the army against his father, 
2 
probably 
(enouncing the late Emperor's strict economic and fiscal 
rolicies. But the health of the young Emperor was 
worsening day by day and by the time he was brought to the 
capital, his death had become much closer. As Stauracius 
himself was childless, his brother-in-law Michael Rangabe, 
the husband of Nicephorus' daughter Procopia, who had 
escaped the disaster unharmed, remained the closest, if not 
the only, heir to the Byzantine throne. The young Emperor 
knew that and was thinking about depriving Michael of his 
eyesight. 
3 As for the throne, it would either pass to the 
4 Empress Theophano, or a democracy would be established, 
with a collective leadership. But the idea of another Irene 
on the throne strengthened the candidature of Michael, 
dispelling the hesitations even of the Patrician and 
Domestic Stephen, Stauracius' last loyal supporter. Thus 
on the first of October 811, Michael Rangabe was proclaimed 
emperor by the senate. Before that, the Patriarch 
Nicephorus demanded from Michael a written promise that as 
emperor he would not restore Iconocla6-S 
1. Theophanes 1, p-492- 
2. ibid. 
3. ibid., p. 493. 
4. ibid., p. 492- 
S. 71"Fi-d ., p. 493- 
31S 
Luckily for the Byzantines Krum did not take advantage 
of his military superiority immediately after his great 
victory in July 811. Thus the succession to the throne 
could be solved without any external disturbances. In 
fact it was not before the spring of next year, i. e. 
812, that the Khan attacked the imperial fortress of 
Develtus, a Black Sea coastal city at the head of the 
gulf of Burgas. It seems that by the time the hesitating 
Emperor undertook a campaign against the Bulgars (7 June), 
1 
it was already too late to save Develtus. Its inhabitants, 
including its bishop, were transferred by the conquerors 
to somewhere in the interior of Bulgaria. However, no 
matter how bitter a setback, the fall of Develtus was not 
the only misfortune that befell the Emperor Michael I, for 
it produced a mutiny among the soldiers of the Opsikion and 
Thracesion themes. By spreading money and promises 
Michael managed to put the uprising down, but the Bulgars, 
who in the meantime had heard about it, exploited the 
situation by undertaking in their turit, campaigns against 
various parts of Macedonia and Thrace. Krum met scarcely 
any opposition. Theophanes mentions a series of cities 
and fortresses such as Anchialus, Berrhoea, the Thracian 
Nicaea, Probaton, Philippopolis, Philippi and Strymon, 
abandoned by their inhabitants and defenders, just because 
they were terrified of the Bulgarian threat. 
2 One needs 
only to remember that it was only recently that the 
Emperor Nicephorus had transferred, at least to some of 
these places, population from the Asiatic themes of the 
Empire. 3 
1. Theophanes 1,495. 
2. ibid., p. 496. 
3. On the transfer, cf. above, pp. 129-37. 
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But as in the previous year, Krum did not try to take 
advantage of all this. Surprisingly enough, in September 
812, the Khan sent Dragomer, an ambassador with a Slavic 
name, 
1 
to the Byzantine Emperor, asking for peace. 
As our sources do not shed any light on the matter, it 
is very difficult to say why Krum proposed peace at a time 
when he certainly had the upper hand. G. Cankova-Petkova 
suggests that the Bulgarian leader asked for peace, because 
he had estimated that the circumstances were suitable 
for achieving a recognition of the Bulgarian state by the 
Byzantines. 2 S. Runciman believes that Krum wanted 'to 
consolidate carefully his every step'. 
3 To this second 
interpretation which seems more likely than the first one, 
can be added that the peace proposals of Krum were dictated 
by the general impression that Byzantium was an empire, 
not easily disposed of. 
4 Furthermore, one needs to remember 
that even at this very difficult juncture (August 812) 
Leo, the strateRos of the Anatolikon theme and the future 
Emperor Leo V, had managed to defeat the Arabs somewhere 
in Asia Minor. 5 Krum probably heard about Leo's 
achievement and it could be that he was afraid that the 
Byzantines were about to transfer forces from the eastern 
provinces of the Empire into Europe, in order to fight against 
the Bulgars. To suggest that the Khan proposed peace, 




1. S. Runciman, The First..., p-S9- 
2. G. Cankova-Petkova, IDeux contributions a 11histoire des 
rapports bulgaro-byzantins au IXe siýcle', Byzantinoslavica, 
37 (1976) , p. 37. 3. S. Runciman, The First..., p-59- 
4. Th. Korres, 'Relations between Byzantium and Bulgaria 
during the reign of Michael I Rangabe' (in Greek), 
Byzantina-Metabyzantina, 11, (Thessalonica 1982), p. 148. 
5. Theophanes 1, p. 497. 
6. G. Cankova-Petkova, IDeux contributions... ' (loc. cit. ), 
p-36 sq. 
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But Krum's conditions for the proposed peace agreement 
are also of interest. He suggested that the peace treaty 
which had been signed almost one century ago (716) between 
Tervel and Theodosius III should be renewed. Meleona in 
Thrace would be given to the Bulgars as well as red hides 
and robes worth thirty pounds of gold. Trade relations 
were to be reopened, but merchants were to be officially 
authorized by the two governments. Finally Krum demanded 
the return of prisoners and refugeesý These proposals 
were accompanied by the threat that, unless they were met, 
he would attack Mesembria. 
2 
The imperial council gathered to discuss Krum's 
proposals. According to Theophanes among his terms, it 
was only one which was considered unacceptable, at least 
by some of the Emperor's advisers. They argued that 
Bulgar deserters ought not to be returned, and their 
argument appeared strong enough, so that the Emperor 
Michael I rejected the peace treaty. 
3 Although it was 
already the middle of October, the Khan, true to his word, 
appeared in front of the well fortified city of Mesembria. 
Again the Byzantines did not react immediately. Perhaps 
they did not believe that Mesembria would be easily 
conquered. After all the Bulgars, up to that time, lacked 
engineering skill and equipment suitable for such cases. 
Thus, instead of sending troops to help the besieged city, 
the Emperor Michael I Rangabe again asked his advisers to 
reconsider Krum's proposal for peace, this time under the 
pressure of the recent development at Mesembria. The 
imperial council met on the first of November. The 
metropolitan bishops of Nicaea and Cyzicus together with 




Theodore, the abbot of Stoudios, and the Patriarch Nicephorus, 
are known to have participated in it. 
1 As Theophanes 
asserts, it was Theodore with some other 'bad advisers' 
2 
who opposed a possible peace agreement, and their opinion 
again proved stronger. But on 4 November news reached 
the capital that Mesembria had fallen to the Bulgars. it 
appears that the deserter Eumathius 
3 had provided invaluable 
help to his new master in the capture of this coastal city. 
The bitterness produced by the fall of Mesembria was all the 
greater because, as a result, thirty-six syphons through 
which the most secret invention of the Byzantines, the 
'Greek fire', was delivered, together with quantities of 
'Greek fire' itself, fell into the hands of the Bulgars. 
In addition, various articles of luxury were looted by the 
soldiers of Krum. 
4 After this great achievement the Khan 
destroyed the fortifications and returned to Pliska. 
Michael was forced to undertake some action against the 
Bulgars. Early in spring of 813 he ordered the Asiatic 
themes to be transferred to Thrace. The Emperor himself 
at the head of the tagmata joined the thematic army in May. 
In a clash, which took place on 22 June somewhere between 
Adrianople and Versinicia, the imperial forces, though 
outnumbering the Bulgars by ten to one, 
5 
were again defeated. 
John Aplaces the strategos 
' 
of Macedonia, who opened the 
battle, suddenly realised that he was fighting alone, while 
the rest of the army led by the Anatolikon troops deserted 
the battlefield and fled back towards Adrianople in panic. 
Thus Krum did not have any difficulty in annihilating the 
1. Theophanes 1, p-498. 
2. ibid. 
3. On Eumathius cf. above in this section, p. 295, 
4. Theophanes 1, p-499- 
5. Scriptor Incertus, 'De Leone Armenio', C. S. H. B. (Bonn 
1842), p-337- 
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troops of Aplaces and in pursuing the fleeing army. The 
whole matter had been a well staged treachery, organized 
probably by the Anatolikon regiments. 
' It was their 
strategos Leo the Armenian, who benefited. On his return 
to the capital, the Emperor Michael, greatly disappointed, 
resigned in favour of Leo, who was crowned emperor on 
12 July 813. 
For his part, Krum did not withdraw to his capital this 
time. Having left his brother to besiege Adrianople, he 
himself appeared in front of the walls of Constantiniple 
on 18 July, i. e. only six days after Leo V's elevation to 
the throne. 
2 Impressed by the strong fort-fications, it 
seems, he did not risk an assault. He limited himself to 
a demonstration of power outside the Byzantine capital, 
plundering and destroying its rich suburbs on the European 
coast of the Bosphorus. When he asked-the new Byzantine 
Emperor to allow him to fix his lance to the Golden Gate of 
the capital, the Khan met, of course, with Leo's refusal. 
After that Krum renewed his peace proposals, which had been 
rejected by Michael Rangabe. The terms must have been 
roughly the same, as in the previous year. But in the course 
of the negotiations for a peace agreement on the shore of 
the Golden Horn, the Byzantines tried to kill the Bulgarian 
leader. Having escaped the trap with slight injuries, Krum 
took revenge by capturing Adrianople, 
3 
and Arcadiopolis fell 
to the Bulgars later that winter. 
4A 
victory of Leo V over 
a Bulgarian detachment somewhere near Mesembria was some 
small compensation for the Byzantines. Finally, while 
1. Treachery is suggested by the contemporary sources either 
directly (Ignatius the Deacon, Vita Nicephori (loc-cit. ) 
col-76CD) or indirectly (Scriptor Incertus, loc-cit., p-338; 
Theophanes Continuatus, C. S. H. B. p. 14). J. B. Bury 
(E. R. E., pp. 351-52) has discussed the strange battle of 
22 June in detail. His convincing conclusion, with which 
S. Runciman (The First..., p. 62, note) agrees, is that 
Leo the Armenian himself 'was in the plot, but played his 
cards so cleverly that nobody could prove anything against 
him, although there were the gravest suspicions'. 
J-B. Bury, E. R. E. p-352, note). 
2. 
Reophanes 
l-, --p. -'F0L 
3. ibid. 
4.7c--rlptor Incertusý 'De Leone... ' (loc. cit. ), p-346. 
.;? n 
preparing his greatest assault against the Byzantine 
capital, Krum died unexpectedly on 13 April 814.1 As 
soon as he had secured himself on the throne (815), 
Omourtag, Krum's son and successor, rushed into a peace 
treaty with the Byzantines. The agreement was concluded 
some time in the winter of 815-16 and the peace agreed was 
bound to last thirty years. With this peace treaty a 
period of great tension between Byzantine and Bulgaria 
came to an end. 
General Assessment 
The discussion on the relations between the Byzantine 
Empire and its northern neighbours during the Emperor 
Nicephorus' reign was taken a little further, i. e. until 
the death of Krum and the treaty of 815, because those years 
revealed a certain weakness of Bulgarian power in the same 
way in which the defeat of Nicephorus in 811 revealed its 
strengths: they were a people settled in a land, which 
they had made their own. This land was restricted to 
the area north of the Haemus-Balkan Mountains, which, it 
can be said, formed the frontier line between the two 
countries. Keeping these realities in mind, one might 
argue that it was odd that Nicephorus attacked the Bulgars 
in their strongholds. More than two years after 
Nicephorus' death, the Emperor Leo the Armenian also 
undertook an expedition against the Bulgars. But the route 
followed by the Byzantine army this time was entirely 
different from the one of Nicephorus. Leo V did not aim 
at Pliska. He and his soldiers marched northwards along 
the western coast of Black Sea in the direction of Mesembria. 
After beating a Bulgarian detachment there, they returned 
Scriptor Incertus, 'De Leone ... I (loc. cit. ). p. 348. 
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safely to Constantinople. Does this mean that 
Nicephorus had underestimated the risks involved in 
passing through the narrow defiles of the Haemus Mountains? 
Possibly so, but it is more an indication of how seriously 
he took the struggle with the Bulgars for control over the 
Slavs. It is probably this last point that urged 
Nicephorus to undertake and to carry out expeditions as 
far north as Pliska and Sardica. Moreover, Nicephorus 
seems to have never felt safe on the imperial throne. 
A spectacular victory over the Bulgars would secure his 
hold. on power, and perhaps popularity among the army, 
something he desperately needed. He was unlucky. His 
confrontation with Bulgaria took place at a time when the 
latter was exceptionally strong. However, in a general 
assessment of Nicephorus and the Bulgars, it should be 
emphasized that the period 802-811 was very important for 
the European provinces of the Empire. The Emperor 
Nicephorus lost to the Bulgars in a crucial battle, which 
cost him his life. But, before that he had ensured that 
continental Greece remained Greek. It could so easily 
have become Slav,, or even Bulgarian. 
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THE PORTRAITS OF NICEPHORUS 
THE PORTRAITS OF NICEPHORUS 
In May 811., as the last thing before departing for the 
fatal campaign against the Bulgars, the Emperor Nicephorus 
ordered the General Logothete Nicetas to increase public 
taxes on churches and monasteries and to demand eight year 
back taxes on the homes of the dignitaries. As we have 
seen, these measures met with Theodosius Salibaras' 
objections who remarked that everyon e was crying out 
against Nicephorus and his ministers, because of the 
recent measures. To these complaints Nicephorus replied: 
'Theodosius, do not expect anything else from Nicephorus 
except what you see'. 
1 Salibaras was high in the 
Emperor's favour and understood the necessity for these 
measures, but he was pointing out the unpopularity they 
produced. In other words, for other contemporaries of 
Nicephorus, the situation was quite different. They 
suffered as a result of Nicephorus' reforms-and did not 
appreciate their necessity'. 
We began with this incident, because Nicephorus' fiscal 
and economic reforms seem to have been one of the targets 
for a severe criticism of his rule. This comes out in the 
pages of Theophanes, who expressed contemporary feelings even 
if the way he presents Nicephorus' reign is deliberately 
unfair. Almost every measure, reform or act of this 
particular Emperor was distorted by the biased monastic 
historian. Nicephorus' effort to bring order to the fisc 
was seen as avarice; his tolerance on religious affairs was 
1. Theophanes 1, pp. 489-90. 
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criticized as heresy; his order for the transfer of some 
population into the Sclaveniae was described as oppression 
and his reform on the recruitment of poor people into the 
army as a mere vexation. Furthermore he is said to have 
confiscated properties of his opponents, to have deprived 
the soldiers of their pay on certain occasions, to have 
blinded and even killed people deliberately. The 
Emperor's private life could not escape his opponent's 
severe criticism either. Thus Nicephorus is presented as 
irreligious and immoral; he is said to have broken up 
Theophan6ls betrothal to someone else, in order to let her 
be the wife of his son Stauracius. In connection with 
Stauracius' wedding Theophanes implies that during the 
bride show, two candidates, prettier than Theophand, were 
simply put aside for Nicephorus' own delectation. Theophanes 
also says that the Emperor used to 'sleep' together with 
his servants. 
In order to evaluate these accusations, it is helpful 
to consider the words of Kolokotronis, that hero of the 
Greek war of independence. When he was asked why he was 
brought to trial and was twice imprisoned by the Greek 
government, he replied that children do not usually throw 
stones at an almond tree with no almonds on it. He meant, 
of course, that only those with achievements to their 
credit were worth accusing. Some of the accusations 
launched against Nicephorus might have contained elements 
of truth, but, even so, one can easily detect an abundance 
of exaggeration. Though there are some contemporary sources 
who occasionally admit his competence as a ruler, generally 
speaking, Nicephorus' reputation suffered because of 
Theophanes, who is the main source for his reign, but at 
the same time the main accuser of this Emperor, on every 
aspect of his rule. 
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But, it would seem that the bias with which the 
Confessor treated Nicephorus' reign, has also something 
to do with the standard according to which all these 
criticisms were made -a standard which seems to have 
been almost devoid of objectivity. In his treatment of 
Nicephorus, Theophanes is a polemicist, not a historian. 
In his effort to praise the reign of Nicephorus' successor 
Michael Rangabe, Theophanes concentrates his narration 
mostly around the donations which that Emperor lavished 
to the patriarch and to the priests of Hagia Sophia 
on certain occasions, as well as around the measures 
taken or attempted by Michael I towards acomplete destruction 
of the Paulicians and the Athinganoi of eastern Asia Minor! 
Just as Constantine Porphyrogenitus deliberately blackened 
the name of the Emperor Michael 111 (842-67), in order to 
glorify the achievements of his grandfather Basil I 
(867-86), 1 so Theophanes denigrates the memory of 
Nicephorus I as a means of exalting Michael I. His 
intention is to provide a damnat. io memoriae of Nicephorus. 
There were, of course, others, as we have seen,, who approved 
of what Nicephorus was doing and a more favourable view 
of the Emperor filters through in our sources; ironically 
enough in Methodius' Life of Theophanes, for example. But 
it has come down in so fragmented a form that it is hardly 
possible to use it to test or balance Theophanes' portrait 
of Nicephorus. We have therefore to establish our own 
criteria against which Nicephorus' views, reforms and 
policies can be measured with greater objectivity. 
We should start with what contemporaries considered 
to be the imperial ideal. A. Kazhdan has shown that the 
1. R. Jenkins., 'Constantine VII)S Portrait of Michael III', 
in Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences 
Mor'ales et-765-litiques, Academie Royale de Belgique 
Se se'r--T-e, XXXIV (1948), pp. 71-77. 
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imperial ideal around 900 included 'piety and various civil 
values, often in the shape of the quartet - spiritual 
fortitude, righteousness, chastity and intelligencele 12 
The cardinal imperial virtue was at all times philanthropy. 
Though the Emperor Nicephorus I fulfilled some of these 
qualities, such as piety, righteousness and intelligence, it 
appears that the way he ruled conforms better with a more 
pragmatic ideal, one better suited to a modern stateman. 
Is it, for instance, not considered as very essential for 
a prime minister of today to be well-informed about the 
situation of his country at home and abroad? If that was 
the first qualification needed, then it might be argued 
that Nicephorus did know the difficulties which the Empire 
faced at the time of his elevation to the throne in 802. 
According to the anonymous chronicler who covers the 
disaster of 811, Nicephorus was 'acute in grasping the 
essence of problems, especially of those connected with 
state affairs'. 
3 But, one could object, to realize a 
problem does not mean much; to provide a solution for it 
would demand much skill, capacity and courage. In regard 
to these abilities of the Emperor Nicephorus, the answer is 
provided by Michael the Syrian who asserts that this 
Emperor was 'homme vigoureux et 
, 
capable de gouverner 
, 
'* 4 
But, what exactly were these capacities of Nicephorus? 
First of all his experience as General Logothete provided 
him with a detailed understanding of the financial difficulties CP 
of the Empire and a general grasp of administrative problems 
1. A. Kazhdan,, 'The Aristocracy and the Imperial Ideal' 
(a still unpublished paper given at the Byzantine Spring 
Symposium of Edinburgh, April 1983, p-15). 
2. D. J. Constantelos, Byzantine Philanthropy and Social 
Welfare, N. Brunswick 1968, pp. 43-61. 
3.1. Dujýev, 'La chronique... ' (loc. cit. ), p-216: 
4. Michael the Syrian, Chronique ... (ed. J. A. Chabot, 9E. cit. ) III, P. 15. 
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including those of military organisation. His 
understanding of domestic policies was eminently practical 
and he sought to restore the effective authority of the 
imperial administration. He was not a soldier by training, 
though the fact that he came from Cappadocia, a border 
region., suggests that he must have had some acquaintance with 
military matters. He realised the-importance of 
participation in campaigns at the head of his armies; 
only thus was there some hope of restoring the morale of 
the Byzantine armies which had been much damaged by their 
treatment during the reigns of Irene and Constantine VI. 
Perhaps the clearest proof of his aptitude for government, 
at least in Byzantium, was the success he had in suppressing 
a succession of plots and rebellions; and, what is more, 
without resort to bloodshed. Turning to his foreign 
policy, in his dealings with Rakka, Aachen and Pliska, 
Nicephorus managed to preserve a balance between the needs 
of prestige and the realities of power, but all the time 
maintaining the vital interests of Byzantium. This was 
even the case with the Bulgars, because they were a threat 
to the security of the Greek provinces, which had only 
just been reincorporated into the Byzantine Empire. 
Nicephorus' involvement with the Bulgars would prove a 
disaster. Nor were there positive results gained in other 
areas of foreign policy. If Dalmatia and Venice remained 
within the Byzantine sphere of influence, the amount of 
control that Byzantium was able to exercise in these areas 
was increasingly restricted by the growth of local autonomy. 
The best that can be said is that after the Emperor's 
death in battle at the hands of the Bulgars, the Caliphate 
was in no position to exploit Byzantine weakness, but this 
can only be attributed in part to Nicephorus' policies. 
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More important was the death of Harun al-Rashid (809) 
and the succession problems that ensued. 
Nicephorus' death in 811 ushered in a period of 
political instability which lasted until the year 823, 
when Thomas the Slav's rebellion was finally suppressed. 
This was complicated by the revival of Iconoclasm in 815. 
This issue was only settled in 843 at the Feast of Orthodoxy, 
which proclaimed that icons were an essential part of 
christian worship. Abroad Byzantium was under considerable 
pressure from the Arabs from 824 until 863, from the loss 
of Crete to Spanish Muslims to Michael III's decisive 
victory over the Arabs at the battle of Bishop's Meadow. 
1 
For half a century after Nicephorus' death the Byzantine 
Empire experienced considerable difficulties at home and 
abroad. How far was Nicephorus to blame? He was to 
blame in the sense that his death left a political vacuum 
and opened up religious questions that a tolerant line of 
policy seemed set to solve. There is another side to this. 
Byzantium remained after his death, a basically sound 
economic, social and administrative concern. It is to his 
domestic policies., above all, that we must look, when 
trying to assess his achievement. 
Nicephorus believed that the strength of the Empire 
depended upon a sound fiscal administration to support a 
strong army. The Empire's revenue was increased 
considerably, so that the necessary expenses could be met 
easily. It is generally recognized that his experience in 
fiscal and economic affairs helped him to introduce a 
series of reforms which gave the imperial government 
greater control over the economy. From what we are in 
1. On this battle, see, G. Huxley, 'The Emperor 
I 
Michael III 
and the Battle of Bishop's Meadow (A. D. 863) in 
G. R. B. S., 16 (197S)ý pp-443-SO. 
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a position to know it can be said that rulers who dare to 
take such measures, probably know well in advance that 
people are very sensitive about reforms of this nature and 
as a rule these measure-s usually result in a loss of 
popularity for those who introduced them. Therefore. 
few statAnen have the bravery to sacrifice their own 
popularity for the welfare of future generations. 
Nicephorus was certainly one of these few. Because, even 
where rule is hereditary, tough fiscal measures and reforms 
will produce uprisings, rebellions and depositions. People 
are usually very reluctant in accepting economic and fiscal 
reforms, especially when these reforms do not produce 
immediate beneficial results. Nicephorus' measures, of 
course, brought immediate results, but few seem to benefit. 
Peasants were uprooted, monasteries lost some of their 
best estates and shippers were forced to borrow money at 
a high interest rate from the government. However, it 
would be fair to say that Nicephorus' fiscal and economic 
reforms strengthened the Byzantine economy in the long 
term and formed the basis for the prosperity witnessed 
later in the course of the ninth century. The most 
striking thing is the rapid increase of coinage, particularly 
bronze and copper issues, that were in circulation in the 
provinces. ' Considerable numbers from the reigns of 
Michael 11 (820-29) and Theophilus (829-42) have been 
discovered, for example at Corinth, 
2 
which was the main 
Byzantine base, a-long with Patras, for the reconquest of 
the Peloponnese. In other words, the growing amount of 
coinage in circulation should in this case be connected 
with the recovery of the Peloponnese, initiated under 
1. On this increase, cf. D. M. Metcalf., 'How Extensive Was 
the Issue of Folles During the Years 77S-820? ' in Byz-, 
37 (1967), pp. 270-310. 
2. D. M. Metcalf, 'Corinth in the Ninth Century: the 
Numismatic Evidence', Hesperia, 42 (1973), pp. 180-2Sl. 
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Nicephorus. There seems little doubt that economic 
revival in the Byzantine Empire was connected with the 
amount of money being pumped out by central government 
to the provinces. What Nicephorus' reforms achieved 
was to concentrate large revenues in the capital, which 
could then be distributed to the provinces, most clearly 
through the theme organization. We see this working under 
Nicephorus with the large amounts of money that went to 
the themes: 1100 pounds of gold went to Strymon, which 
at that point was still a Kleisoura and 1300 pounds of 
gold went to the Armeniac theme. Nicephorus' reforms 
worked together. His fiscal measures increased the 
imperial revenues, but he did not hoard this wealth in a 
miserly fashion. Instead he distributed it through the 
provinces. In the short term this would have had relatively 
little effect, but it provided a long term basis for the 
revival of the Byzantine economy. 
The army, always a cornerstone of Byzantine strength, 
naturally attracted the Emperor Nicephorus' attention. 
With the change in the system of recruitment of new 
soldiers he introduced, Nicephorus ensured that the Empire 
would have the necessary number of troops, properly 
equipped and available for action at any time. With 
the extension of the principle of village fiscal 
solidarity to the recruitment.. the numbers of soldiers 
serving in the Byzantine armies were decisively increased. 
This is in line with Treadgold's conclusions. 
1 We may 
not fully agree with his calculations about the size of 
the Byzantine armies, because almost all figures given in 
medieval sources are impressionistic and hoLVeto be treated 
1. W. Treadgold, Byzantine State Finances... 
pp. 107-08. 
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with caution. It is obvious, however, that the impression 
that Ibn Khurdadbeh, writing about 850, wished to leave, 
was of the vast size of the Byzantine armies of his day. 
Nicephorus' consistent efforts in gaining control 
over the Slavs of Greece need also to be praised. it 
has already been indicated elsewhere that the Slavs, 
either by themselves or in alliance with the Bulgars, 
had become a major threat to the Byzantine Empire. The 
transfer of population into the Sclaveniae together with 
the creation of new themes in or close to these areas., 
seem to have been the proper means towards a successful 
policy with regard to the problem of the Slavs. 
Finally, there is the question of whether Nicephorus 
stood closer to iconodules or to iconoclasts. It would, 
perhaps, be safe to say that he was a broad-minded believer, 
who did not wish 'to make windows into men's souls'. 
His tolerance towards all religious parties and movements 
should be seen as an effort to achieve unity among the various 
religious tendencies of the populace. He was withall a 
pious man, who fasted and prayed regularly. 
2 The monks, 
nevertheless, thought that they had good reasons to complain, 
because the Emperor imposed, reimposed or increased taxation 
on churches and monasteries and took steps towards the 
secularization of monastic properties. Pragmatist as he 
was, Nicephorus realised that he could not be at the same 
time very tolerant of monastic properties and a rigorous 
advocate of the Empire's fiscal strength. These two 
ideals do not tally at all. Without any hesitation he 
chose to pursue the second. Furthermore the Emperor 
1. Ibn Khurdadbeh, edit. and transl. by M. J. de Goeje in 
Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, VI (Leyden 1889), 
pp. 84-85. 
2. Bar Hebraeus, Chronograph2y (ed. E. A. W. Budge, 2p. cit. ) 
p-121. 
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appears to have come out against the custom of dedicating 
golden and silver offerings to churches and monasteries 
and also to have expressed the view that these items 
should be used only for the welfare of the populace. 
It would seem that such practical views on issues 
considered as purely religious, are almost unique in the 
Middle Ages. Consciously or not,, Nicephorus was trying to 
limit the amount of treasure tied up in the 'dead hand' 
of the monasteries. This was vital if he was to increase 
the amount of money in circulation. 
Nicephorus I was not born in the purple. Coming from 
a provincial town of Asia 4inor, he followed a career as 
a civil servant. Perhaps circumstances favoured his 
elevation to the imperial throne, but from the moment he 
established himself there, he exercised his own policies. 
Though his reign was turbulent because of internal disturbances, 
Nicephorus found the time., the courage and the strength to 
work for a solution of the Empire's immediate and long term 
problems. In his effort to build a strong and lasting 
imperial economy, the Emperor took some measures which 
might be seen as tough. But then, tough against whom? 
It is definitely of some interest to know that Theophanes 
denounces these fiscal reforms, not as a representative of 
the lower class population, but as a champion of the 
dignitaries! It is also significant that Theodore of 
Stoudios, a personality who under Nicephorus suffered 
imprisonment and exile, honestly admitted that with this 
Emperor in office, the affairs of state had been put into 
order. 2 Perhaps, not all his policies were altruistic, but 
they all aimed at one of the following targets: 
1. 
Theophanes 1, p. 489: "Wcw-t., ice. rw\) C- V tkkl ro Iw \j t&fp(; 'L Vol- 
VOGC*9cxt ýkj%oq 
2. Theodore of Stoudios, E-pist. 1,16, (loc. cit. )., 
col-960AB. 
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the strengthening of the fiscal 
administration and central control 
over the economy, 
2) the strengthening and effectiveness 
of the army and the navy, 
3) a lasting solution of the issue of 
the Slavs and 
4) harmony among ecclesiastical and 
paraecclesiastical forces. 
Nicephorus' weakness was that he was not as good a 
soldier as an administrator. His record as a general was 
poor. His troops never liked him and he had difficulty 
controlling them. He was easily misled by temporary 
success on the battlefield. His failure in 811 to take 
some basic precautions while campaigning brought disaster 
to the Byzantine army and a premature end to his own reign 
and life. 
There is not much point in speculating as to what would 
have happened if Nicephorus had survived in 811. One 
thing, nevertheless, remains certain. The less than nine 
year period of his reign was not long enough for his 
policies and reforms to take effect. Their success can 
only be measured in the long-term. But it can hardly be 
denied that in the short term he had, the Emperor Nicephorus 
was able to identify and tackle most of the basic problems 
facing the Empire. No department of state or sector of 
imperial interest was left neglected. Indeed he proceeded 
to take measures in fields which his predecessors, and his 
successors too, rarely thought about, let alone dared to 
tackle. It appears that a determination to rule effectively 
marked his reign. His understanding of what constituted 
effective rule was forged during his time as a civil servant. 
He placed the concerns of the Byzantine administration at 
the heart of government, in much the same way as that 
other civil servant who became emperor, Anastasius (491-518). 
334 
Apart from these two almost no civil servants were raised 
to the imperial dignity at Byzantium. It is interesting 
that both their reigns were stamped with the pragmatism 
of the bureaucrat. The sources at our disposal, no 
matter how biased or impartial some of them are, reveal 
a sound ruler. The more we read our texts the more we 
get the impression that Nicephorus was a dynamic and 
capable emperor. He concentrated in his hands every sort 
of power, but it seems that as a result the imperial 
machine worked properly. He had the ability to control all 
departments of the state in a more or less harmonious way. 
His prudence became a by-word. 
1 There were dangers, of 
course. After his death there was nobody with the ability 
to take his place at the centre of affairs. 
Nicephorus was perhaps unique among Byzantine emperors 
in that he attempted a concerted reform of most aspects of 
Byzantine government. Change in the imperial 
administration, as J. B. Bury long ago observed, was the 
result of a 'gradual series of modifications'. 
2 It was 
usual to improvise and adapt the machinery of government 
rather than to carry out any thorough-going reform. 
Nicephorus' reforms may have laid the foundations for 
Byzantium's period of greatness for the middle of the ninth 
century, but they also earned him great unpopularity. His 
obvious sense of humour can hardly have helped. We have 
only to remember the unfortunate candlemaker whom Nicephorus 
invited to the palace. He forced him to declare his wealth. 
It amounted to 100 pounds of gold. These Nicephorus 
immediately confiscated with the words: 'Why bother yourself 
with such a burden? Come dine with me and take 100 nomismata 
and go away satisfied' -3 
1. Dujýev,, 'La chronique... ' (loc. cit. ), p. 216: ", ýpoviA oS. 
4 
2. J. B. Bury, The Imperial Administrative System... 
(a. cit. ), p. 20. 
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